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KARL MARX FREDERICK ENGELS

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KARL MARX FREDERICK ENGELS

Volume **22**

MARX AND ENGELS: 1870-71



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Preface

Volume 22 of the *Collected Works* of Marx and Engels contains works written between the latter half of July 1870 and the end of October 1871.

In this relatively brief period there occurred the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 and what Lenin described as “the greatest working-class uprising of the 19th century” (*Collected Works*, Vol. 41, p. 113), the proletarian revolution of March 18, 1871 in Paris, during which a working-class state—the Paris Commune—was set up for the first time in history. These events arose from the socio-political and revolutionary crisis that had been building up in Europe for some years. The Paris Commune was a great victory for the working class in the struggle against capitalist exploitation and political domination by the bourgeoisie. The lessons of the Commune threw into sharp relief the further tasks and prospects of the working-class movement. On the basis of this experience Marx and Engels significantly enriched the theory of scientific communism.

Many works of Marx and Engels in this volume directly reflect their practical activities in the International Working Men's Association (the International).

In the conditions created by the Franco-Prussian war the General Council of the International had to arm the proletariat, especially the French and the German, with an understanding of their class objectives and prevent the wave of chauvinism that surged through both the belligerent countries from swamping the working-class movement. This was a test that the International passed with flying colours. It succeeded in raising the most advanced workers in its ranks from spontaneous actions and an

instinctive feeling of class brotherhood to awareness of the need for international solidarity and unity of action by the proletariat as a whole.

The volume begins with the First Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the Franco-Prussian War (July 1870) written by Marx. This document contains the fundamental propositions of Marxism on the attitude of the working class to militarism and war. Marx maintains that the aggressive wars were unleashed by the ruling classes to overcome internal crises and to crush the revolutionary movement, above all, that of the proletariat. He analyses the development of the international contradictions in Europe that led to the Franco-Prussian war and sets out the specific tasks for the workers of the various countries in the current situation.

Marx exposes the Bonapartist government in France, which began the war in the name of preserving and strengthening the empire, reinforcing its dominant role in Europe, and preventing the unification of Germany. On Germany's side the war was, in its initial stage, defensive (see this volume, p. 5). At the same time Marx shows the aggressive role played by the ruling circles of Prussia in its preparation. He makes a clear distinction between the German people's national interests and the dynastic, rapacious aims pursued by the Prussian Junkers and the German bourgeoisie. Marx warned the German workers that a war led by the Prussian militarists could turn into an aggressive war against the French people: "If the German working class allow the present war to lose its strictly defensive character and to degenerate into a war against the French people, victory or defeat will prove alike disastrous" (this volume, p. 6).

Arguing that the military defeat of the Bonapartist empire would usher in the regeneration of France and remove one of the main obstacles to the unification of Germany, Marx supports the French members of the International in their campaign against the regime of Napoleon III. The Address helped the German Social-Democrats to see how aggressive the policy of Bismarck's Prussia actually was and how incompatible with the German people's legitimate national aspirations.

Marx and Engels believed that objectively Germany's achievement of national unity would be in the interests of the German working class and would create favourable conditions for its organisation, which, in turn, would help to consolidate the whole international proletariat.

The Address set the task of strengthening the international

solidarity of the working class, especially in the belligerent countries. Marx gave a high appraisal of the anti-militarist activity of the members of the International in both Germany and France and saw this as a sign that "the alliance of the working classes of all countries will ultimately kill war" (this volume, p. 7). The development of the workers' international brotherhood despite the chauvinistic propaganda of the ruling classes, Marx emphasised, "proves that in contrast to old society, with its economical miseries and its political delirium, a new society is springing up, whose International rule will be *Peace*, because its national ruler will be everywhere the same—*Labour!*" (this volume, p. 7).

The shattering military defeats of the Second Empire heralded its collapse. Marx noted that in Prussian ruling circles claims were being made for the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. In these conditions it was especially important to help the German Social-Democrats adopt a genuine class position and strengthen their internationalist views. In a letter to the Committee of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party, Marx and Engels urged the German proletariat to come out wholeheartedly against the annexationist plans of the Prussian military and the bourgeoisie.

The Second Address of the General Council on the Franco-Prussian war, written after the collapse of the Second Empire and the establishment, on September 4, 1870, of the French Republic, when the war had lost its defensive character for Germany and become a blatantly expansionist war (see this volume, p. 263), defined the new tactical line of the International. The Address oriented the proletariat of the European countries towards a resolute struggle against the aggressive plans of the Prussian Junkers and the German bourgeoisie. It noted that there could be no justification for the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, and that the determination of state borders on the grounds of "military interests" only carried "the seed of fresh wars" (this volume, p. 266). With exceptional insight Marx foresaw the consequences of Bismarck's aggression and the subsequent line-up of rival forces in Europe for several decades.

Developing the principles of proletarian internationalism, the Address outlined the tactics for the various contingents of the international proletariat, thus guiding them towards an understanding of the unity of international and national goals. As in the letter to the Committee of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party, Marx oriented the German working class and its party towards a struggle against Prussian militarism, for an honourable

peace with France, and for recognition of the French Republic. He stressed the connection between this international task and the fight against internal reaction, against Bismarck's plans to use the victory over France for an attack on the democratic rights of his own people.

The International also urged the English workers to recognise the French Republic (see this volume, p. 269).

For the French workers it was vitally important, on the one hand, to use all republican freedoms "for the work of their own class organisation" (this volume, p. 269) and, on the other, to avoid being carried away by chauvinistic phrase-mongering. Marx warned the French workers of the untimeliness of any attempt to overthrow the government when the enemy was at the gates of Paris.

Both Addresses, which were official documents of the International, offered the working-class movement scientifically grounded guidelines and proposed an overall solution to both the national and international problems facing the proletariat. One of their crucial features was their resolute condemnation of militarism and wars of conquest.

The 59 articles by Engels on the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871, published in London's *Pall Mall Gazette*, occupy an important place in the volume. Written in the form of separate military reviews, these articles are, in fact, closely interconnected and constitute a complete and unified whole. Although, under the terms stipulated by the paper's editors, they should have been confined to purely military questions, Engels often reaches out beyond these limits and gives his reviews a trenchant class and political message. In his "Notes on the War", which in their political orientation are closely linked with the General Council's Addresses on the Franco-Prussian war, Engels was actually substantiating the tactics of the International at various stages of the war.

These articles by Engels reveal his detailed knowledge of the home and foreign-policy situations of the belligerent powers—their economic and political systems and, above all, the positions of the various classes and parties. All this, combined with Engels' truly encyclopaedic knowledge as a military historian and theoretician, enabled him in many cases to predict the exact course of events and their outcome. He uncovered the strategic plans of the headquarters of the Bonapartist and Prussian armies, established the areas and days of the first major battles and the forces that would take part in them (see this volume, pp. 15-16), anticipated the

situation that would lead to the retreat of the French army under MacMahon to Sedan (this volume, pp. 32-33) and predicted the place, the approximate date and the outcome of the decisive battle which was fought there (this volume, p. 69). The central idea of the articles was to show the dependence of military operations and the outcome of the war on a country's internal condition, and Engels' most important prediction was that the military defeat of Bonapartist France and the consequent fall of the Second Empire were inevitable.

The "Notes" contain much ruthless and far-reaching criticism of Bonapartism. Engels paints a vivid picture of the decay of the Bonapartist regime and its main bastion, the army. "The army organization fails everywhere; and a noble and gallant nation finds all its efforts for self-defence unavailing, because it has for twenty years suffered its destinies to be guided by a set of adventurers who turned administration, government, army, navy—in fact, all France—into a source of pecuniary profit to themselves" (this volume, p. 77). Engels stresses that the Bonapartist regime continued to have a pernicious effect on the army even during the war because its actions were guided by political rather than military considerations. He shows how, because of their fear of the Paris masses, the Bonapartist government refused to send to the front the forces vital for the army, preferring to keep them in the capital as a safeguard against revolution (see this volume, p. 55).

Engels exposes the militarist propaganda of the Prussian ruling circles, who were trying to present the Prussian army as a truly "popular" army, as the "armed people". "The phrase of the 'nation in arms' hides the creation of a large army for purposes of Cabinet policy abroad and reaction at home" (this volume, p. 125). He mercilessly brands the barbaric acts perpetrated by the German command—the bombardment and destruction of cities for which there was no military justification, the brutal treatment of civilians, and the harsh measures taken against the French guerrillas, the *francs-tireurs*.

The "Notes on the War" form a notable contribution to the development of Marxist military theory. They examine the character of wars—expansionist, defensive, and popular—on the basis of actual facts, and reveal the dialectics of their development. Engels demonstrated how "a war in which Germany, at the beginning, merely defended her own against French *chauvinisme* appears to be changing gradually, but surely, into a war in the interests of a new German *chauvinisme*..." (this volume, p. 104). Engels considered in great detail a number of general theoretical problems of the art

of war—the role of logistics, the influence of the political and economic state of the country on the course of operations, the correct deployment of troops on the eve of war, the factor of surprise in attack, and so on. He also showed what great changes had come about in the arming and equipping of troops before the war and how these changes influenced the course of military operations.

After the defeat of the regular French armies, Engels focused his attention on the possibility of creating new military formations and organising guerrilla warfare against the invaders. He showed particular interest in the problems of armed resistance to interventionist forces, in the problems of a people's war, including guerrilla movements, on both the political and the military plane. In complete accord with the line taken in the Second Address of the General Council, Engels resolutely championed the right of the French people to defend their country against enemy invasion by every means. He considered a real war of liberation to be "one in which the nation itself participates" (this volume, p. 193). Engels expected the operations of the guerrillas to inflict damaging material and moral losses on the enemy. "This constant erosion by the waves of popular warfare in the long run melts down or washes away the largest army in detail...", he wrote (this volume, p. 207). At the same time Engels realised that a decisive turn in military operations could not be achieved without the creation of a powerful regular army. He revealed the causes of the unwillingness of the generals and the new bourgeois republican government of France, who feared the revolutionary upsurge of the masses more than the external enemy, to mobilise the country's resources to the full.

The articles by Engels, like the Addresses of the General Council on the Franco-Prussian war, clearly demonstrate how fruitfully the method of historical materialism can be applied in the analysis of a complex military and political situation.

Marx and Engels kept a close watch on the events in France, which were systematically discussed at the meetings of the General Council. In the Second Address on the Franco-Prussian war Marx, foreseeing the further intensification of class contradictions in France, alerted the French workers to the need to strengthen their own class organisation. This would give them, he wrote, "Herculean powers for the regeneration of France, and our common task—the emancipation of labour" (this volume, p. 269).

On March 18, 1871 a proletarian revolution broke out in the French capital and led to the proclamation of the Paris Commune,

the first working-class government known to history. From the very beginning Marx and Engels saw the Commune as an event of world-wide historical significance. They regarded it as the brainchild of the International, as an attempt by the working class to put into practice the great principles of its movement. Marx saw it as the beginning of a new epoch in world history. "With the struggle in Paris the struggle of the working class against the capitalist class and its state has entered upon a new phase," Marx noted in a letter to Ludwig Kugelmann on 17 April 1871. "Whatever the immediate outcome may be, a new point of departure of world-wide importance has been gained" (present edition, Vol. 44).

Marx and Engels welcomed the Commune with all the enthusiasm of proletarian revolutionaries supporting its heroic fighters in every possible way. In their speeches at the meetings of the General Council they reported on the course of the Communards' struggle against the combined forces of the Versailles counter-revolution and the Prussian interventionists (see this volume, pp. 585-86, 588, 590, 593, 595-98). Marx used various channels for establishing contacts with the leaders of the Commune in order to help them avoid mistakes and work out a correct policy. He wrote many letters to the leading figures in the working-class movement of Europe and the United States (see present edition, Vol. 44) to explain the true character of events and expose the slander spread by the ruling classes. With the help of the General Council, led by Marx, a broad campaign in support of the Commune was launched in many countries. The advanced section of the working class and of the progressive intelligentsia in Britain also joined in the campaign.

As soon as the Paris Commune came into being, Marx set about studying and analysing its activities. Published in this volume, the First and Second Drafts of *The Civil War in France*, where he summed up massive factual material, testify to the exceptional scientific thoroughness with which he investigated the revolutionary creative work of the Communards.

The central position in this volume is occupied by Marx's outstanding work *The Civil War in France*, written in the form of an address of the General Council to all members of the International in Europe and the United States of America. Unanimously adopted at the meeting of the General Council on May 30, 1871, it was published as an official document of the International Working Men's Association a fortnight after the defeat of the Commune and became widely known in various countries.

In *The Civil War in France*, written in the form of keen political satire, Marx expounds the key propositions of revolutionary theory. The theory of the state, the revolution, and the dictatorship of the proletariat is developed on the basis of the experience of the Paris Commune. Lenin described this work as one of the fundamental documents of scientific communism. In it, he wrote, Marx had given a "profound, clear-cut, brilliant, *effective*" analysis of the Paris Commune (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 49).

The Civil War in France analyses the historical conditions of the origin of the Paris Commune. As Engels wrote in his 1891 Introduction, this work was an example of the author's remarkable gift "for grasping clearly the character, the import and the necessary consequences of great historical events, at a time when these events are still in progress before our eyes or have only just taken place" (present edition, Vol. 27). Relying on many years of study of the history of France in general and of the Bonapartist regime in particular, which he had begun in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (see present edition, Vol. 11), Marx revealed the factors responsible for the revolution in Paris.

With biting sarcasm he exposed the leaders of the Versailles counter-revolutionary government, the instigators and organisers of the savage reprisals against the Paris workers. To these "bloodhounds of 'order'" (this volume, p. 350), who in fear of revolution sank to national betrayal and collusion with the external enemy, Marx contrasted the courage, selflessness and heroism of the Communards.

Many years before this, when analysing the revolutionary events of 1848-49, Marx had concluded that the proletariat would play the decisive role in the future revolution. The experience of the Commune confirmed this conclusion. "This was the first revolution in which the working class was openly acknowledged as the only class capable of social initiative" (this volume, p. 336). For the first time in history the proletariat had attempted to assert its political supremacy and establish a new social order.

Study of the experience of the Paris Commune gave Marx new material for further investigation of such a social institution as the state. Drawing on his previous research in this sphere, Marx examines in *The Civil War in France* and its preliminary drafts the origin and stages of development of the state superstructure of capitalism, the dialectical interaction between this superstructure and the economic basis—capitalist relations of production, and the role of the bourgeois state as an instrument of the oppression of the working people. Its exploitato-

ry essence as a "public force organized for social enslavement" and "an engine of class despotism", he wrote, remains unchanged, no matter in what forms it appears (see this volume, p. 329).

Because of the class character of the bourgeois state and the political functions of its apparatus of oppression the destruction of the bourgeois state machine becomes a crucial condition for the social emancipation of the proletariat. This conclusion, which Marx had arrived at in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852), was confirmed by the experience of the Commune. "But the working class," Marx wrote, "cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for their own purpose. The political instrument of their enslavement cannot serve as the political instrument of their emancipation" (this volume, p. 533). Marx attached special importance to this key proposition of revolutionary theory, which was also clearly formulated in the Introduction that he and Engels wrote to the 1872 German edition of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (see present edition, Vol. 23). As we know, this proposition was further developed in the works of Lenin in its application to the specific features of the imperialist epoch.

In *The Civil War in France*, Marx demonstrated a dialectical and concrete historical approach, a differentiated attitude to the various elements of the state machine. He did not rule out the possibility of the victorious working class making use of the socially necessary bodies of the bourgeois state on condition that they were democratically reformed.

Up to the time of the Paris Commune the history of proletarian struggle had provided no practical example of what the working class could substitute for the state machine when it had been smashed. Marx saw in the Commune, short-lived though it was, the features of a state of the new type, a proletarian state, which was to replace the bourgeois state established for the oppression of the mass of the working people. The experience of the Commune allowed Marx to enrich revolutionary theory with a concrete conclusion regarding the form of proletarian state that was needed for its historic mission of building a new socialist society. The "true secret" of the Commune, he wrote in *The Civil War in France*, "was this. It was essentially a working-class government, the produce of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation of Labour" (this volume, p. 334).

Marx also considers the nature of the new type of state in his speech at the meeting devoted to the seventh anniversary of the International in September 1871. The Commune, he said, "and there could not be two opinions about it ... was the conquest of the political power of the working classes." The experience of the revolution of 1871, Marx stressed in this speech, clearly proved that to destroy the existing conditions of oppression "a proletarian dictatorship would become necessary" (this volume, p. 634). Summing up the conclusions Marx reached concerning the new type of state in *The Civil War in France*, Engels in his Introduction to the third German edition of this work (1891), marking the twentieth anniversary of the Commune, wrote, "Look at the Paris Commune. That was the dictatorship of the proletariat" (present edition, Vol. 27).

The Paris Commune gave Marx specific facts with which to demonstrate the truly democratic nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a form of state power. The Commune consisted mostly of "working men, of acknowledged representatives of the working class" (this volume, p. 331). The principles of electiveness, revocability, and responsibility to the people of all organs of power and of all functionaries, the democratic principles of the organisation of the administrative and judicial system, were put into effect. Marx stresses that the Commune was to be "a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time". (Ibid.)

Marx showed the creative character of the Commune's activity, the way it combined destruction of the organs of the bourgeois state, the instruments of the material and spiritual oppression of the people, with the setting up of new, revolutionary institutions. From this standpoint he analyses the main initiatives of the Commune—the replacement of the standing army by the armed people, the abolition of the police, the separation of church from state, the expropriation of the property of the churches, and the abolition of religious instruction and government supervision in public education. He attaches great importance to the Commune's social initiatives, to its first steps in expropriating big capital's property in the means of production and the handing over of idle factories abandoned by their owners to the workers' cooperative societies.

Marx pointed to the coincidence of the proletariat's class interests with those of the nation at large as one of the key features of the new type of state. The Commune, he observed, was "the true representative of all the healthy elements of French

society, and therefore the truly national Government", but at the same time it was "a working men's Government ... the bold champion of the emancipation of labour" (see this volume, p. 338). The Commune was the highest form of proletarian democracy, the form of government where "democracy, introduced as fully and consistently as is at all conceivable, is transformed from bourgeois into proletarian democracy" (V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 25, p. 424).

With the experience of the Commune in mind Marx went on to examine the problem of the allies of the proletariat in the revolution. He analysed the social initiatives that attracted to the Commune not only the indigent populace of Paris but also the middle strata of French society. He expressed his firm conviction that the policy of the Paris Commune as a proletarian state fully corresponded to the essential interests of the working peasantry and that, but for the isolation of Paris from the provinces due to the blockade by the Versailles, the French peasantry would have taken the side of the Communards (see this volume, pp. 492-94).

In *The Civil War in France* Marx poses the problem of the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. In his First Draft he notes the lengthiness and complexity of this process, the need to go through various stages of class struggle. The working class knows, he wrote, "that this work of regeneration will be again and again relented and impeded by the resistances of vested interests and class egotisms" (this volume, p. 491). The existence of a political organisation in the form of the Commune, i.e., the proletarian state, is necessary for these socio-economic reforms to be put into effect. "The working class did not expect miracles from the Commune...", Marx writes in *The Civil War in France*. "They know that in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it that higher form to which present society is irresistibly tending by its own economical agencies, they will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men" (this volume, p. 335). The classical formulation of the tasks of the transitional period and the dictatorship of the proletariat as the state of this period was later propounded by Marx in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (1875).

From the activities of the Commune Marx also drew material for elaborating the problem of the international character of the working-class struggle for emancipation. Arising out of the specific historical situation in France, the Commune, by taking the first

practical steps in the great cause of emancipating labour, embodied the aspirations of the working class of all countries and was "emphatically international" (this volume, p. 338). The advanced section of the working class of Europe and the United States embraced the Commune as its own cherished cause.

The Commune showed the full importance of properly combining the spontaneous and the conscious in the working-class movement. The Communards' class instinct told them what steps to take. But in the great work of transforming society revolutionary instinct and enthusiasm were not enough. Consisting for the most part of supporters of pre-Marxian forms of socialism, the Commune lacked ideological unity. It was not armed with a revolutionary theory that could ensure a consistent revolutionary policy. The experience of the Commune positively proved the proletariat's need for a militant vanguard, a political party armed with the theory of scientific communism. It was this task, which had become apparent from the experience of the Paris Commune, that Marx and Engels set before the International and the working class at the London Conference.

The content of *The Civil War in France* is supplemented in many ways by the preliminary drafts of this work. Although parts of them are no more than rough notes, the bulk are in finished form and are distinguished by the same power and vividness of expression that mark the final text. Both drafts are of independent theoretical value. In these drafts Marx expounded several important propositions more thoroughly than in the final version. Here we have his propositions on the historical origins of the Commune, his analysis of its socio-economic initiatives, his characterisation of its policy towards the middle strata, and also his theoretical generalisations concerning the historic mission and tasks of the proletarian state.

Of exceptional importance is the thought, formulated in the First Draft, on the class struggle in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. Marx pointed out: "The Commune does not [do] away with the class struggles, through which the working classes strive to the abolition of all classes and, therefore, of all class rule", but it "affords the rational medium in which that class struggle can run through its different phases in the most rational and human way" (this volume, p. 491).

In the drafts Marx goes deeply into the dialectics of the development of state power in the process of the transformation of society, showing the historically transient character of the proletarian state, of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which he

regards as a stage in the natural historical process of the withering away of the state. The Commune, he writes, "was a Revolution against the *State* itself, this supernaturalist abortion of society..." it was "the reabsorption of the State power by society, as its own living forces instead of as forces controlling and subduing it, by the popular masses themselves..." (this volume, pp. 486, 487).

Proceeding not only from the experience of the Commune but also from the results of his own economic research, Marx stressed in the First Draft of *The Civil War in France* that in the period of the building of a classless society the economic activity of the proletarian state would assume increasing importance. It was the mission of this state to reorganise the whole economy on a new basis, to achieve the "harmonious national and international coordination" of the social forms of production (this volume, p. 491).

Analysing the mistakes of the Communards, Marx declared that, notwithstanding the great breadth of its democratic organisation, the proletarian state must possess sufficiently effective revolutionary organs of power. It must be capable of rebuffing the attacks of the internal and external enemies of the revolution, of defending all that the people have won.

Marx did not gloss over the shortcomings in the Commune's activity. But he valued, above all, its attempts in the conditions of hardship and siege to set about building a new society. He showed the enormous transforming power of the revolution, which changed the face of the French capital. "Working, thinking, fighting, bleeding Paris ... radiant in the enthusiasm of its historic initiative!" (this volume, p. 341). Here was the true hero of Marx's work.

The conclusions Marx drew from the experience and lessons of the Paris Commune were developed by him and by Engels throughout their lives. They became the subject of a profound study and creative application by Lenin in the new historical epoch. Developing the ideas of Marxism, Lenin gave solid and convincing grounds for the necessity of the Soviet form of the proletarian state, while allowing that other forms were also quite possible, depending on the specific national historical conditions of the struggle for the socialist revolution.

The international counter-revolution tried to use the defeat of the Paris Commune to suppress the whole working-class move-

ment. The governments of the European states joined forces to intensify repressive measures against the working class and its organisations, particularly the sections of the International. In a number of countries the sections had to adopt an illegal or semi-legal position. The reactionary press did all it could to discredit the International and its leaders by publishing various kinds of forgeries and spreading slanderous allegations.

The numerous statements sent to various newspapers by Marx and Engels and, as a rule, published in the form of official documents of the General Council ("Statement by the General Council on Jules Favre's Circular", "Statement by the General Council to the Editor of *The Times*", Marx's letters to the editors of the newspapers *De Werker*, *Public Opinion*, *Le Gaulois*, *La Vérité*, et al.), reflect the energetic campaign Marx and Engels waged against the bourgeois press's persecution of the International, against the attempts to distort its principles and aims and undermine its authority.

An address composed by Marx in the name of the General Council and entitled "Mr. Washburne, the American Ambassador, in Paris", exposes the provocative role of bourgeois diplomacy in the period of the Paris Commune. This document exposes the disreputable, double-faced attitude to the Commune adopted by a diplomatic representative of American capitalist "democracy" (see this volume, pp. 379-82).

The Paris Commune was a turning-point in the development of the international working-class movement. Its lessons were learned by revolutionary proletarian circles. Their urgent task was to strengthen their organisations and achieve ideological unity. Marx and Engels concentrated on helping the new sections of the International in Italy, Spain and other countries, establishing close ties between the sections and the General Council and informing them of its tasks and goals (see this volume, pp. 272-73, 277-80, 294-96).

At the same time the Commune stimulated the polarisation of ideological trends in the working-class movement. The clear statement in *The Civil War in France* of the International's revolutionary platform caused the wavering reformist elements to break away from it. In the summer of 1871 the General Council had to condemn the leaders of the British trade unions Lucraft and Odger, who in defiance of the principles of proletarian internationalism struck their signatures off the General Council's Address *The Civil War in France* and sided with the bourgeoisie (see this volume, pp. 372-73, 610-11).

The General Council condemned and expelled from the International the right-wing Proudhonist Tolain, who had opted for a deputy's seat in the counter-revolutionary Versailles assembly rather than fighting for the Commune. The resolution underscored that "the place of every French member of the I.W.M.A. is undoubtedly on the side of the Commune of Paris" (this volume, p. 297).

The materials presented in this volume reflect Marxism's consistent struggle against anarchism in its Bakuninist form—the main ideological opponent of Marxism in those days. The influence of Bakuninism was growing in Spain, Italy, in Romance Switzerland and in the South of France, which was mainly due to the fact that new sections of the working class were drawn into the working-class movement, sections that were not as yet sufficiently differentiated from other indigent strata of bourgeois society.

The danger of Bakuninism reached a new peak after the defeat of the Paris Commune. Misinterpreting its experience, the Bakuninists presented the Commune not as a proletarian state, but as an example of the abolition of all statehood and the renunciation of all political activity on the part of the working class, as the embodiment of their "federalist ideas". They alleged that the Commune had vindicated their tactics, based on notions of the possibility of carrying out a revolution in any place at any time without regard to the historical preconditions for it. While claiming leadership of the international working-class movement, the Bakuninists steered a course towards splitting the movement. In a number of countries they set up sections on the basis of their programme, which they presented as the programme of the International. Objectively, the Bakuninists held back the awakening of class-consciousness among the proletariat and hindered the working out of its strategy and tactics in the new conditions. Disassociation from Bakuninism became an urgent necessity for the further development of the revolutionary working-class movement and its political organisation. A very important role in this process was played by the London Conference of the International that took place on September 17-23, 1871.

This volume contains various documents of the London Conference, a prominent place being given to the speeches by Marx and Engels and the conference decisions and resolutions which they drafted and which were afterwards approved by the General Council.

The conference was held to delineate the basic trends in the

activity of the International Working Men's Association under the new conditions.

As can be seen from the minutes the work of the conference focused on the problem of setting up a proletarian party, and the discussion of its programmatic and tactical principles. In his speech at the opening of the conference Marx said that it had been called to "set up a new organisation to meet the needs of the situation" (this volume, p. 613).

The London Conference was the first international forum of the International that took place under the direct leadership of Marx and Engels. Marx was the main rapporteur on all important issues. Engels took a very active part in preparing and conducting the conference.

During the conference, as Engels noted afterwards, at the 1893 meeting to commemorate the Commune, "the question of founding a political party different and distinct from all other political parties was raised" for the first time in the history of the International (see present edition, Vol. 27). This question became the focal point of the struggle against the Bakuninist and reformist ideology.

In the subsequent debate Marx and Engels emphasised that those who even after the Paris Commune still denied the need for "political action" by the working class thereby repudiated the opportunity of its winning political power, the only means by which the working-class movement could achieve its aims. "The experience of real life and the political oppression imposed on them by existing governments—whether for political or social ends—force the workers to concern themselves with politics," said Engels in his speech. The supreme political act is revolution, the establishment of the political supremacy of the proletariat, but the first condition for this is the creation of a working-class party which "must be constituted ... as an independent party with its own objective, its own politics" (this volume, p. 417). The crucial ninth resolution of the conference, drawn up by Marx and Engels, stated: "against this collective power of the propertied classes the working class cannot act, as a class, except by constituting itself into a political party, distinct from, and opposed to, all old parties formed by the propertied classes; ... this constitution of the working class into a political party is indispensable in order to insure the triumph of the social Revolution and its ultimate end—the abolition of classes..." (this volume, p. 427).

This resolution clearly indicated the basic direction of the further development of the struggle of the working class for

emancipation and defined the main objective facing the workers of every country after 1871—the founding of mass political parties of the proletariat. The immediate future showed that this was the course taken by the working-class movement.

As the documents published in this volume demonstrate, other issues that were debated—the significance of the struggle for the democratic rights of the working class, the drawing of peasants into the movement of the industrial proletariat, the development of the women's working-class movement, the interrelation of the political organisation of the working class and the trade unions, and so on—are all organically connected with the solution of the problem of the proletarian party, with the elaboration of its organisational and tactical principles. Marx and Engels showed that in its political activities the working class and its party should use various means in bourgeois society, combining legal and illegal forms of struggle depending on the conditions under which it had to be waged. They attached great importance to participation in parliamentary elections and getting working-class deputies into parliament. In his speech on political action by the working class Marx cited as an example of the successful use of the parliamentary platform in the interests of the working class the speeches of the socialist deputies Bebel and Liebknecht in the German Reichstag, whose words "the entire world can hear". Every worker elected to parliament, said Marx, is a victory over the ruling classes "but we must choose the right men" (this volume, p. 617).

The speeches of Marx and Engels and the resolutions passed by the conference against anarchistic sectarianism and adventurism are published in this volume. They sharply criticised the Bakuninist dogmas on abstention from political activity, and demonstrated that, in fact, such abstention would mean the workers' passive submission to bourgeois policies (see this volume, pp. 411-12, 415-16). One of the conference resolutions banned the setting up of sectarian, separatist organisations. The rules of any section joining the International should conform to the programmatic and organisation principles of the general Rules of the International Working Men's Association.

The conference opposed the attempts of the Bakuninists, and also the Blanquists to substitute secret conspiratorial societies for mass working-class organisations. In his speech on secret societies Marx noted that "this type of organisation is opposed to the development of the proletarian movement because instead of instructing the workers, these societies subject them to au-

thoritarian mystical laws which cramp their independence and distort their powers of reason" (this volume, p. 621).

At the London Conference Bakuninism suffered a damaging blow, and in the subsequent struggle against Bakunist sectarianism the decisions of the conference served as a reliable guide for the revolutionary wing of the International.

The conference authorised the General Council to bring out a new edition of the Rules, taking into account all the amendments proposed by the congresses of the International.

The London Conference became a landmark in the development of the international working-class movement, a new step in the process of uniting Marxism with the mass movement of the proletariat. Its decisions determined the programmatic and tactical objectives of the proletarian parties, the creation of which the workers of several countries had already begun. The discussion at the conference and its resolutions reflected the creative development of scientific communism, particularly such aspects of it as the theory of the socialist revolution, of the party of the working class, the tactics of class struggle by the proletariat. The speeches of Marx and Engels at the conference, the documents which they wrote affirmed the organic link between Marxism and the practical aims of the working-class movement.

The significance of the decisions of the London Conference and the historic lessons of the Paris Commune were revealed by Marx in his speech (published in this volume) at the celebration meeting dedicated to the seventh anniversary of the International. Marx noted the role played in the rallying of the militant forces of the proletariat in various countries by the International Working Men's Association. He ended his speech by saying: "The working classes would have to conquer the right to emancipate themselves on the battlefield. The task of the International was to organize and combine the forces of labor for the coming struggle" (this volume, p. 634). In this struggle for the fundamental restructuring of society the International relied on the historical experience of the first proletarian state—the Paris Commune.

* * *

Of the 82 works by Marx and Engels published in this volume 17—such as "On the Cigar-Workers' Strike in Antwerp", "Once Again 'Herr Vogt'", "The Address *The Civil War in France* and the English Press", several letters to the editors of newspapers

and records of speeches—are published in English for the first time.

The Appendices contain records of the speeches of Marx and Engels at the meetings of the General Council, the resumé of some of these speeches in newspaper reports, and the records of Marx's speeches at the London Conference of the International. These documents were too imperfect and fragmentary to be included in the main body of the volume. The speeches of Marx and Engels preserved in Engels' notes are published in the main body. The Appendices also include a newspaper report of Marx's interview with the correspondent of the New York paper *The World*, and a letter from Marx's daughter Jenny to the editors of *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly*. All these documents provide additional material illuminating the activities of Marx and Engels as leaders of the International.

In cases where more or less authentic versions of the documents of the International written by Marx and Engels or with their participation have reached us in several languages, the source—manuscript or printed—with an English text has been used as the basis for publication in this edition. Any substantial variant readings in other languages are given as footnotes.

During the preparation of the volume the dating of works was checked and in some cases corrected, and most of the sources used by the authors were traced. The results of this work are reflected in the endings and the reference apparatus. Any headings supplied by the editors of the volume are given in square brackets.

Obvious misprints in proper names, geographical designations, numerical data, dates, and so on, have been corrected by reference to the sources used by Marx and Engels, usually without comment. The spelling of proper names and geographical designations in English texts is reproduced from the originals, collated with reference works of the 19th century; in some cases the modern spelling is given as a footnote. The English paragraphs, sentences and words in the German or French originals are given in small caps or in asterisks. When the exact titles of documents referred to by Marx and Engels have not been established, they are given underfoot and in the index of quoted and mentioned literature as they are cited in newspaper articles, in square brackets.

The first part of the volume was compiled, prepared and annotated by Alexander Zubkov, the second part, beginning with *The Civil War in France*, by Yevgenia Dakhina (Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU); the preface and the index of quoted and mentioned literature were written by Alexander Zubkov

and Yevgenia Dakhina (Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU). The name index was compiled by Tatyana Nikolayeva and the index of periodicals, by Sergei Chuyanov (Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU). The editor of the volume was Tatyana Yeremeyeva and scientific editor Valeriya Kunina (Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU). The subject index was compiled by Alexander Zubkov. The translations were made by K.M. Cook, David Forgacs, Glenys Ann Kozlov, Rodney Livingstone and Barrie Selman and edited by Nicholas Jacobs, Glenys Ann Kozlov, K. M. Cook, Tatyana Grishina and Yelena Kalinina. The volume was prepared for the press by the editor Tatyana Grishina.

KARL MARX
and
FREDERICK ENGELS

WORKS

July 1870-October 1871

Karl Marx

[FIRST ADDRESS OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION ON THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR¹]

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

In the *Inaugural Address of the International Working Men's Association*, of November, 1864, we said:—"If the emancipation of the working classes requires their fraternal concurrence, how are they to fulfil that great mission with a foreign policy in pursuit of criminal designs, playing upon national prejudices and squandering in piratical wars the people's blood and treasure?"^a We defined the foreign policy aimed at by the International in these words: "Vindicate the simple laws of morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the laws paramount of the intercourse of nations."^b

No wonder that Louis Bonaparte, who usurped his power by exploiting the war of classes in France, and perpetuated^c it by periodical wars abroad, should from the first have treated the International as a dangerous foe. On the eve of the plebiscite he ordered a raid on the members of the Administrative Committees of the International Working Men's Association throughout France, at Paris, Lyons, Rouen, Marseilles, Brest, etc., on the pretext that the International was a secret society dabbling in a complot for his assassination, a pretext soon after exposed in its full absurdity by his own judges.² What was the real crime of the French branches of the International? They told the French people publicly and emphatically that voting the plebiscite was voting despotism at home and war abroad.^d It has been, in fact, their work that in all the great towns, in all the industrial centres

^a See present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 12-13.—*Ed.*

^b *Ibid.*, p. 13.—*Ed.*

^c The German edition of 1870 has "maintained" and that of 1891 "prolonged", instead of "perpetuated".—*Ed.*

^d *Manifeste antiplébiscitaire des Sections parisiennes fédérées del' Internationale et de la Chambre fédérale des Sociétés ouvrières*, Paris [1870].—*Ed.*

of France, the working class rose like one man to reject the plebiscite. Unfortunately the balance was turned by the heavy ignorance of the rural districts. The Stock Exchanges, the Cabinets, the ruling classes and the press of Europe celebrated the plebiscite as a signal victory of the French Emperor over the French working class; and it was the signal for the assassination, not of an individual, but of nations.

The war plot of July, 1870, is but an amended edition of the *coup d'état* of December, 1851.³ At first view the thing seemed so absurd that France would not believe in its real good earnest. It rather believed the deputy denouncing the ministerial war talk as a mere stock-jobbing trick.^a When, on July 15th, war was at last officially announced to the *Corps Législatif*,^b the whole opposition refused to vote the preliminary subsidies, even Thiers branded it as "detestable";^c all the independent journals of Paris condemned it, and, wonderful to relate, the provincial press joined in almost unanimously.

Meanwhile, the Paris members of the International had again set to work. In the *Réveil* of July 12th they published their manifesto "to the workmen of all nations", from which we extract the following few passages:

"Once more," they say, "on the pretext of the European equilibrium, of national honour, the peace of the world is menaced by political ambitions. French, German, Spanish workmen! Let our voices unite in one cry of reprobation against war!... War for a question of preponderance or a dynasty, can, in the eyes of workmen, be nothing but a criminal absurdity. In answer to the warlike proclamations of those who exempt themselves from the impost of blood, and find in public misfortunes a source of fresh speculations, we protest, we who want peace, labour and liberty!... Brothers of Germany! Our division would only result in the complete triumph of despotism on both sides of the Rhine.... Workmen of all countries! Whatever may for the present become of our common efforts, we, the members of the International Working Men's Association, who know of no frontiers, we send you as a pledge of indissoluble solidarity the good wishes and the salutations of the workmen of France."

This manifesto of our Paris section was followed by numerous similar French addresses, of which we can here only quote the declaration of Neuilly-sur-Seine, published in the *Marseillaise* of July 22nd:

^a The reference is to J. Favre's speech in the Corps Législatif of July 7, 1870 reported in the item "Paris, Thursday Evening", *The Times*, No. 26798, July 9, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b E. Ollivier's speech in the Corps Législatif on July 15, 1870, *Le Temps*, No. 3427, July 17, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c A. Thiers' speech in the Corps Législatif on July 15, 1870, *Le Temps*, No. 3426, July 16, 1870.—*Ed.*

"The war, is it just?—No! The war, is it national?—No! It is merely dynastic. In the name of humanity, of democracy, and the true interests of France, we adhere completely and energetically to the protestation of the International against the war."^a

These protestations expressed the true sentiments of the French working people, as was soon shown by a curious incident. *The Band of the 10th of December*, first organised under the presidency of Louis Bonaparte, having been masqueraded into *blouses* and let loose on the streets of Paris, there to perform the contortions of war fever,⁴ the real workmen of the Faubourgs came forward with public peace demonstrations so overwhelming that Piétri, the Prefect of Police, thought it prudent to at once stop all further street politics, on the plea that the real^b Paris people had given sufficient vent to their pent up patriotism and exuberant war enthusiasm.^c

Whatever may be the incidents of Louis Bonaparte's war with Prussia, the death knell of the Second Empire has already sounded at Paris. It will end as it began, by a parody. But let us not forget that it is the Governments and the ruling classes of Europe who enabled Louis Bonaparte to play during eighteen years the ferocious farce of the *Restored Empire*.

On the German side, the war is a war of defence, but who put Germany to the necessity of defending herself? Who enabled Louis Bonaparte to wage war upon her? *Prussia!* It was Bismarck who conspired with that very same Louis Bonaparte for the purpose of crushing popular opposition at home, and annexing Germany to the Hohenzollern dynasty. If the battle of Sadowa had been lost instead of being won, French battalions would have overrun Germany as the allies of Prussia.⁵ After her victory did Prussia dream one moment of opposing a free Germany to an enslaved France? Just the contrary. While carefully preserving all the native beauties of her old system, she superadded all the tricks of the Second Empire, its real despotism and its mock democratism, its political shams and its financial jobs, its high-flown talk and its low *légerdemains*. The Bonapartist regime, which till then only flourished on one side of the Rhine, had now got its

^a "Commune de Neuilly-sur-Seine", *La Marseillaise*, No. 153, July 22, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b The German edition of 1870 has "loyal" and that of 1891 "faithful", instead of "real".—*Ed.*

^c The reference is to the announcement of the Paris Prefect on the banning of demonstrations reported in the item "Paris, le 17 juillet", *Le Temps*, No. 3429, July 19, 1870.—*Ed.*

counterfeit on the other. From such a state of things, what else could result but *war*?

If the German working class allow the present war to lose its strictly defensive character and to degenerate into a war against the French people, victory or defeat will prove alike disastrous. All the miseries that befell Germany after her^a war of independence⁶ will revive with accumulated intensity.

The principles of the International are, however, too widely spread and too firmly rooted amongst the German working class to apprehend such a sad consummation. The voices of the French workmen have re-echoed from Germany. A mass meeting of workmen, held at Brunswick on July 16th, expressed its full concurrence with the Paris manifesto, spurned the idea of national antagonism to France, and wound up its resolutions with these words:

"We are enemies of all wars, but above all of dynastic wars.... With deep sorrow and grief we are forced to undergo a defensive war as an unavoidable evil; but we call, at the same time, upon the whole German working class to render the recurrence of such an immense social misfortune impossible by vindicating for the peoples themselves the power to decide on peace and war, and making them masters of their own destinies."^b

At Chemnitz, a meeting of delegates representing 50,000 Saxon workers adopted unanimously a resolution to this effect⁷:

"In the name of the German Democracy, and especially of the workmen forming the Democratic Socialist Party, we declare the present war to be exclusively dynastic.... We are happy to grasp the fraternal hand stretched out to us by the workmen of France.... Mindful of the watchword of the International Working Men's Association: *Proletarians of all countries, unite*, we shall never forget that the workmen of *all* countries are our *friends* and the despots of *all* countries our *enemies*."^c

The Berlin branch of the International has also replied to the Paris manifesto:

"We," they say, "join with heart and hand your protestation.... Solemnly we promise that neither the sound of the trumpet, nor the roar of the cannon, neither victory nor defeat shall divert us from our common work for the union of the children of toil^d of all countries."^e

^a The 1891 German edition has "after the so-called".—*Ed.*

^b "Politische Uebersicht", *Der Volksstaat*, No. 58, July 20, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c "Les travailleurs allemands à leurs frères de France", *L'Internationale*, No. 81, July 31, 1870.—*Ed.*

^d The German editions of 1870 and 1891 have "workers" instead of "children of toil".—*Ed.*

^e "Réponse des ouvriers allemands au manifeste de l'Internationale", *La Marseillaise*, No. 153, July 22, 1870.—*Ed.*

Be it so!

In the background of this suicidal strife looms the dark figure of Russia. It is an ominous sign that the signal for the present war should have been given at the moment when the Moscovite Government had just finished its strategical lines of railway and was already massing troops in the direction of the Pruth. Whatever sympathy the Germans may justly claim in a war of defence against Bonapartist aggression, they would forfeit at once by allowing the Prussian Government to call for, or accept, the help of the Cossacks. Let them remember that, after their war of independence against the first Napoleon, Germany lay for generations prostrate at the feet of the Czar.

The English working class stretch the hand of fellowship to the French and German working people. They feel deeply convinced that whatever turn the impending horrid war may take, the alliance of the working classes of all countries will ultimately kill war. The very fact that while official France and Germany are rushing into a fratricidal feud, the workmen of France and Germany send each other messages of peace and goodwill^a; this great fact, unparalleled in the history of the past, opens the vista of a brighter future. It proves that in contrast to old society, with its economical miseries and its political delirium, a new society is springing up, whose International rule will be *Peace*, because its national ruler will be everywhere the same—*Labour*! The Pioneer of that new society is the International Working Men's Association.^b

* * *

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Murray, Charles

^a The German editions of 1870 and 1891 have "friendship" instead of "goodwill".—*Ed.*

^b This sentence is omitted in the 1870 German edition.—*Ed.*

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Frederick Engels

NOTES ON THE WAR⁸

Written in late July 1870-February 1871
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NOTES ON THE WAR.—I^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1703, July 29, 1870]

Scarcely a shot has been fired so far, and yet a first stage of the war has passed away, ending in disappointment to the French Emperor.⁶ A few observations on the political and military situation will render this evident.

It is now admitted on all hands that Louis Napoleon expected to be able to isolate the North German Confederation⁹ from the Southern States, and to take advantage of the disaffection existing in the newly annexed Prussian provinces.¹⁰ A rapid dash upon the Rhine with as large a force as could be collected, a passage of that river somewhere between Germersheim and Mayence, an advance in the direction of Frankfort and Würzburg, might promise to effect this. The French would find themselves masters of the communications between North and South, and would compel Prussia to bring down to the Main, in hot haste, all available troops, whether ready or not, for a campaign. The whole process of mobilization in Prussia would be disturbed, and all the chances would be in favour of the invaders being able to defeat the Prussians in detail as they arrived from the various parts of the country. Not only political but also military reasons were in favour of such an attempt. The French cadre system admits of a far quicker concentration of say 120,000 to 150,000 men than the Prussian landwehr system.¹¹ The French peace footing differs from the war footing merely by the number of men on furlough, and by the non-existence of dépôts, which are formed on the eve of marching out. But the Prussian peace footing includes less than

^a Written not earlier than July 27, 1870. Signed Z.—Ed.

^b Napoleon III.—Ed.

one-third of the men who compose the war footing; and moreover, not only the men, but the officers also of these remaining two-thirds are in time of peace civilians. The mobilization of these immense numbers of men takes time; it is, moreover, a complicated process, which would be thrown into complete disorder by the sudden irruption of a hostile army. This is the reason why the war was so much *brusqué* by the Emperor. Unless he intended some such unexpected surprise, the hot language of Gramont,^a and the precipitate declaration of war^b would have been absurd.

But the sudden, violent outburst of German feeling put an end to any such plan. Louis Napoleon found himself face to face, not with King William "Annexander,"^c but with the German nation. And, in that case, a dash across the Rhine, even with 120,000 to 150,000 men, was not to be thought of. Instead of a surprise, a regular campaign with all available forces had to be undertaken. The Guards, the armies of Paris and Lyons, and the corps of the camp at Châlons, which might have sufficed for the first purpose, were now barely sufficient to form the mere nucleus of the great army of invasion. And thus began the second phase of the war—that of preparation for a great campaign; and from that day the chances of ultimate success for the Emperor began to decline.

Let us now compare the forces that are being got ready for mutual destruction; and to simplify matters, we will take the infantry only. The infantry is the arm which decides battles; any trifling balance of strength in cavalry and artillery, including mitrailleurs¹² and other miracle-working engines, will not count for much on either side.

France has 376 battalions of infantry (38 battalions of Guards, 20 *Chasseurs*,^d 300 line, 9 Zouaves, 9 Turcos,¹³ &c.) of eight companies each in time of peace. Each of the 300 line battalions, in time of war, leaves two companies behind to form a *depôt*, and marches out with six companies only. In the present instance, four of the six *depôt* companies of each line regiment (of three battalions) are intended to expand into a fourth battalion by being filled up with men on furlough and with reserves. The remaining two companies

^a The reference is to Duc de Gramont's speech in the Corps Législatif on July 6, 1871, reported in the item "Paris, July 6, Evening", *The Times*, No. 26796, July 7, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b On July 19, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c A coinage of two words, "annexation" and "Alexander", as an allusion to Alexander of Macedon.—*Ed.*

^d Riflemen.—*Ed.*

appear to be intended as a *depôt*, and may hereafter be formed into fifth battalions. But it will be certainly some time, at least six weeks, before these fourth battalions will be so far organized as to be fit for the field; for the present they and the *Garde Mobile*¹⁴ can be counted as garrison troops only. Thus, for the first decisive battles, France has nothing available but the above 376 battalions.

Of these, the army of the Rhine, according to all we hear, comprises, in the six army corps No. 1 to 6 and the Guards, 299 battalions. Including the Seventh Corps (General Montauban), which is supposed to be intended for the Baltic,¹⁵ the figure is given as high as 340 battalions, which would leave but 36 battalions to guard Algiers, the colonies, and the interior of France. From this it appears that France has sent every available battalion against Germany, and cannot increase her force by new formations fit for the field before the beginning of September at the very earliest.

Now for the other side. The North German army consists of thirteen army corps, composed of 368 battalions of infantry, or, in round numbers, twenty-eight battalions per corps. Each battalion counts, on the peace footing, about 540, and on the war footing 1,000 men. On the order for the mobilization of the army being received, a few officers are told off in each regiment of three battalions for the formation of the fourth battalion. The reserve men are at once called in. They are men who have served two to three years in the regiment, and remain liable to be called out until they are twenty-seven years of age. There are plenty of them to fill up the three field battalions and furnish a good stock towards the fourth battalion, which is completed by men from the *landwehr*. Thus the field battalions are ready to march in a few days, and the fourth battalions can follow in four or five weeks afterwards. At the same time, for every line regiment a *landwehr* regiment of two battalions is formed out of the men between twenty-eight and thirty-six years of age, and as soon as they are ready the formation of the third *landwehr* battalions is taken in hand. The time required for all this, including the mobilization of cavalry and artillery, is exactly thirteen days; and the first day of mobilization having been fixed for the 16th, everything is or should be ready to-day. At this moment, probably, North Germany has in the field 358 battalions of the line, and in garrison 198 battalions of the *landwehr*; to be reinforced, certainly not later than the second half of August, by 114 fourth battalions of the line and 93 third battalions of the *landwehr*. In all these troops there will scarcely be a man who has not passed through his

regular time of service in the army. To these we must add the troops of Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria, 104 battalions of the line in all; but as the landwehr system in these States has not yet had time to fully develop itself, there may be not more than seventy or eighty battalions available for the field.

The landwehr are principally intended for garrison duty, but in the war of 1866¹⁶ a large portion marched out as a reserve army for the field. This will no doubt be done again.

Of the thirteen North German army corps ten are now on the Rhine, forming a total of 280 battalions; then the South Germans, say 70 battalions; grand total, 350 battalions. There remain available on the coast or as a reserve three army corps or 84 battalions. One corps, together with the landwehr, will be ample for the defence of the coast. The two remaining corps may be, for aught we know, on the road to the Rhine too. These troops can be reinforced by the 20th of August by at least 100 fourth battalions and 40 to 50 landwehr battalions, men superior to the fourth battalions and Gardes Mobiles of the French, which mostly are composed of almost undrilled men. The fact is, France has not more than about 550,000 drilled men at her disposal, while North Germany alone has 950,000. And this is an advantage for Germany, which will tell more and more the longer decisive fighting is delayed, until it will reach its culminating point towards the end of September.

Under these circumstances, we need not be astonished at the news from Berlin that the German commanders hope to save German soil from the sufferings of war^a; in other words, that unless they are attacked soon they will attack themselves. How that attack, unless anticipated by Louis Napoleon, will be conducted is another question.

^a "Berlin, July 26, Evening", *The Times*, No. 26813, July 27, 1870.—Ed.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—II^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1705, August 1, 1870]

On the morning of Friday, the 29th of July, the forward movement of the French army will have commenced. In which direction? A glance at the map will show it.

The valley of the Rhine, on the left bank, is closed in to the west by the mountain chain of the Vosges from Belfort to Kaiserslautern. North of this latter town the hills become more undulating, until they gradually merge in the plain near Mayence.

The valley of the Moselle in Rhenish Prussia forms a deep and winding clough, which the river has worked out for itself through a plateau, which rises to the south of the valley into a considerable range called the Hochwald. As this range approaches the Rhine the plateau character becomes more predominant, until the last outlying hills meet the farthest spurs of the Vosges.

Neither the Vosges nor the Hochwald are absolutely impracticable for an army; both are crossed by several good high-roads, but neither are of that class of ground where armies of from 200,000 to 300,000 men could operate with advantage. The country between the two, however, forms a kind of broad gap, twenty-five to thirty miles in width, undulated ground, traversed by numerous roads in all directions, and offering every facility to the movements of large armies. Moreover, the road from Metz to Mayence goes through this gap, and Mayence is the first important point on which the French will probably move.

Here, then, we have the line of operations prescribed by nature. In case of a German invasion of France, both armies being

^a Written not later than July 29, 1870. The first part of the article is signed Z.—Ed.

prepared, the first great encounter must take place in the corner of Lorraine east of the Moselle and north of the railway from Nancy to Strasbourg¹⁷; so, with a French army advancing from the positions where it concentrated last week, the first important action will take place somewhere in this gap, or beyond it, under the walls of Mayence.

The French army was thus concentrated:—Three corps (the 3rd, 4th, and 5th) in a first line at Thionville, St. Avold, and Bitche; two corps (the 1st and 2nd) in second line at Strasbourg and Metz; and as a reserve, the Guards at Nancy and the 6th Corps at Châlons. During the last few days the second line was brought forward into the intervals of the first, the Guard was moved to Metz, Strasbourg was abandoned to the Mobile Guard. Thus the whole body of the French forces was concentrated between Thionville and Bitche, that is, facing the entrance of the gap between the mountains. The natural conclusion from these premisses is that they intend marching into it.

Thus, the invasion will have commenced by occupying the passages of the Saar and the Blies; the next day's proceedings will probably be to occupy the line from Tholey to Homburg; then the line from Birkenfeld to Landstuhl or Oberstein to Kaiserslautern, and so forth—that is to say, unless they are interrupted by an advance of the Germans. There will be, no doubt, flanking corps of both parties in the hills, and they, too, will come to blows; but for the real battle we must look to the ground just described.

Of the positions of the Germans we know nothing. We suppose, however, that their ground of concentration, if they intend to meet the enemy on the left bank of the Rhine, will be immediately in front of Mayence, that is, at the other end of the gap. If not, they will remain on the right bank, from Bingen to Mannheim, concentrating either above or below Mayence as circumstances may require. As to Mayence, which in its old shape was open to bombardment by rifled artillery, the erection of a new line of detached forts, 4,000 to 5,000 yards from the ramparts of the town, seems to have made it pretty secure.

Everything points to the supposition that the Germans will be ready and willing to advance not more than two or three days later than the French. In that case it will be a battle like Solferino¹⁸—two armies deployed on their full front, marching to meet each other.

Much learned and over-skilful manoeuvring is not to be expected. With armies of such magnitude there is trouble enough to make them move simply to the front according to the

preconcerted plan. Whichever side attempts dangerous manoeuvres may find itself crushed by the plain forward movement of the masses of the enemy long before these manoeuvres can be developed.

A military work on the Rhine fortresses, by Herr von Widdern, is much talked of just now at Berlin.^a The author says that the Rhine from Bâle to the Murg is not fortified at all, and that the only defence of South Germany and Austria against a French attack in that direction is the strong fortress of Ulm, occupied since 1866 by a mixed force of Bavarians and Württembergers, amounting to 10,000 men. This force could in case of war be augmented to 25,000 men, and 25,000 more could be stationed in an entrenched camp within the walls of the fortress. Rastatt, which, it is expected, will present a formidable obstacle to the French advance, lies in a valley through which runs the river Murg. The defences of the town consist of three large forts, which command the surrounding country, and are united by walls. The southern and western forts, called "Leopold" and "Frederick," are on the left bank of the Murg; the northern fort, called "Louis," on the right bank, where there is also an entrenched camp capable of holding 25,000 men. Rastatt is four miles from the Rhine, and the intervening country is covered with woods, so that the fortress could not prevent an army from crossing at that point. The next fortress is Landau, which formerly consisted of three forts—one to the south, one to the east, and one to the north-west, separated from the town by marshes on the banks of the little river Queich. The southern and eastern forts have been recently abandoned, and the only one kept in a state of defence is now the north-western. The most important and the best situated fortress in this district is Germersheim, on the banks of the Rhine. It commands a considerable stretch of the river on both sides, and practically closes it to an enemy as far as Mayence and Coblenz. It would greatly facilitate the advance of troops into the Rhine Palatinate, as two or three bridges might be thrown across the river, besides the floating bridge which already exists there, under cover of its guns. It would also form a basis of operations for the

^a G. Cardinal von Widdern, *Der Rhein und die Rheinfeldzüge. Militär-geographische und Operations-Studien im Bereich des Rheins und der benachbarten deutschen und französischen Landschaften*, Berlin, 1869.—Ed.

left wing of an army posted on the line of the River Queich. Mayence, one of the most important of the Rhine fortresses, is commanded by some of the adjoining hills; this has rendered it necessary to multiply the fortifications in the town, and there is, in consequence, hardly room enough for a large garrison. The whole of the country between Mayence and Bingen is now strongly fortified, and between it and the mouth of the Main (on the opposite bank of the Rhine) there are three large entrenched camps. As to Coblenz, Herr von Widdern says that it would require a force six times as large as the garrison to besiege it with any prospect of success. An enemy would probably begin the attack by opening fire on Fort Alexander from the hill known as the Kuhkopf, where his troops would be sheltered by the woods. The author also describes the fortifications of Cologne and Wesel, but adds nothing to what is already known on the subject.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—III^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1706, August 2, 1870]

At last the plan of campaign of the Prussians begins to emerge from the dark. It will be recollected that, although immense transports of troops have taken place on the right bank of the Rhine, from the east towards the west and south-west, very little was heard of concentrations in the immediate vicinity of the menaced frontier. The fortresses received strong reinforcements from the nearest troops. At Saarbrücken, 500 men of the 40th Infantry and three squadrons of the 7th Lancers (both 8th Corps) skirmished with the enemy; Bavarian Chasseurs and Baden dragoons continued the line of outposts to the Rhine. But no large masses of troops appear to have been placed immediately in rear of this curtain formed by a few light troops. Artillery had never been mentioned in any of the skirmishes. Trèves was quite empty of troops. On the other hand, we heard of large masses on the Belgian frontier; of 30,000 cavalry about Cologne (where the whole country on the left bank of the Rhine, to near Aix-la-Chapelle, abounds in forage); of 70,000 men before Mayence. All this seemed strange; it looked like an almost culpable distribution of troops, contrasted with the close concentration of the French within a couple of hours' march of the frontier. All at once, a few indications drop in from different quarters which seem to dispel the mystery.

The correspondent of the *Temps*, who had ventured as far as Trèves, witnessed on the 25th and 26th the passage of a large body of troops of all arms through that city towards the line of the Saar.^b The weak garrison of Saarbrücken was considerably

^a Written not later than July 31, 1870. Signed Z.—Ed.

^b "On nous écrit de Luxembourg...", *Le Temps*, No. 3439, July 29, 1870.—Ed.

reinforced about the same time, probably from Coblenz, the head-quarters of the 8th Corps. The troops passing through Trèves must have belonged to some other corps, coming from the north across the Eifel. Finally, from a private source ¹⁹ we learn that the 7th Army Corps on the 27th was on its march from Aix-la-Chapelle, by Trèves, to the frontier.

Here, then, we have at least three army corps, or about 100,000 men, thrown on the line of the Saar. Two of these are the 7th and 8th, both forming part of the Army of the North under General Steinmetz (7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th corps). We may pretty safely assume that the whole of this army is by this time concentrated between Sarrebourg and Saarbrücken. If the 30,000 cavalry (more or less) were really in the neighbourhood of Cologne, they too must have marched across the Eifel and the Moselle towards the Saar. The whole of these dispositions would indicate that the main attack of the Germans will be made with their right wing, through the space between Metz and Saarlouis, towards the upper Nied valley. If the reserve cavalry *has* gone that way, this becomes a certainty.

This plan presupposes the concentration of the whole German army between the Vosges and the Moselle. The Army of the Centre (Prince Frederick Charles, with the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 12th corps) would have to take up a position either adjoining the left flank of Steinmetz or behind him as a reserve. The Army of the South (the Crown Prince,^a with the 5th Corps, the Guards, and the South Germans) would form the left wing, somewhere about Zweibrücken. As to where all these troops are, and how they are to be transported to their positions, we know nothing. We only know that the 3rd Army Corps began passing through Cologne southwards by the railway on the *left* bank of the Rhine. But we may assume that the same hand which traced the dispositions by which from 100,000 to 150,000 men were rapidly concentrated on the Saar from distant and apparently divergent points, will also have traced similar converging lines of march for the rest of the army.^b

This is, indeed, a bold plan, and is likely to prove as effective as any that could be devised. It is intended for a battle in which the German left, from Zweibrücken to near Saarlouis, maintain a purely defensive fight; while their right, advancing from Saarlouis and west of it, supported by the full reserves, attack the enemy in

^a Frederick William.—*Ed.*

^b The reference is to H.C.B. Moltke.—*Ed.*

force and cut his communications with Metz by a flank movement of the whole of the reserve cavalry. If this plan succeeds, and the first great battle is won by the Germans, the French army risks not only being cut off from its nearest base—Metz and the Moselle—but also being driven to a position where the Germans will be between it and Paris.

The Germans, having their communication with Coblenz and Cologne perfectly safe, can afford to risk a defeat in this position; such a defeat would not be nearly so disastrous in its consequences to them. Still it is a daring plan. It would be extremely difficult to get a defeated army, especially the right wing, safe across the defiles of the Moselle and its tributaries. Many prisoners and a great portion of the artillery would undoubtedly be lost, and the reforming of the army under shelter of the Rhine fortresses would take a long time. It would be folly to adopt such a plan unless General Moltke were perfectly certain to have such overwhelming strength at his command that victory was almost undoubted, and, moreover, unless he knew that the French were not in a position to fall upon his troops while still converging from all sides to the position selected for the first battle. Whether this is really the case we shall probably know very soon—perhaps to-morrow, even.

In the meantime it is well to remember that these strategic plans can never be relied upon for the full effect of what is expected from them. There always occurs a hitch here and a hitch there; corps do not arrive at the exact moment when they are wanted; the enemy makes unexpected moves, or has taken unexpected precautions; and finally, hard, stubborn fighting, or the good sense of a general, often extricates the defeated army from the worst consequences a defeat can have—the loss of communications with its base.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—IV^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1710, August 6, 1870]

On the 28th of July the Emperor reached Metz, and from the following morning he assumed the command of the Army of the Rhine. According to Napoleonic traditions, that date ought to have marked the beginning of active operations; but a week has passed, and we have not yet heard that the Army of the Rhine, as a body, has moved. On the 30th the small Prussian force at Saarbrücken was enabled to repel a French reconnaissance. On the 2nd of August the second division (General Bataille) of the 2nd Army Corps (General Frossard) took the heights south of Saarbrücken and shelled the enemy out of the town, but without attempting to pass the river and to storm the heights which on its northern bank command the town. Thus the line of the Saar had not been forced by this attack. Since then no further news of a French advance has been received, and so far the advantage gained by the affair of the 2nd is almost *nil*.

Now it can scarcely be doubted that when the Emperor left Paris for Metz his intention was to advance across the frontier at once. Had he done so he would have been able to disturb the enemy's arrangements very materially. On the 29th and 30th of July the German armies were still very far from being concentrated. The South Germans were still converging by rail and march towards the bridges of the Rhine. The Prussian reserve cavalry was passing in endless files through Coblenz and Ehrenbreitstein, marching southwards. The 7th Corps was between Aix-la-Chapelle and Trèves, far away from all railways. The 10th Corps was leaving Hanover, and the Guards were leaving Berlin by rail. A resolute

^a Written not earlier than August 5, 1870.—*Ed.*

advance at that time could scarcely have failed to bring the French up to the outlying forts of Mayence, and to ensure them considerable advantages over the retiring columns of the Germans; perhaps even it might have enabled them to throw a bridge over the Rhine, and protect it by a bridgehead on the right bank. At all events, the war would have been carried into the enemy's country, and the moral effect upon the French troops must have been excellent.

Why, then, has no such forward movement taken place? For this good reason, that, if the French soldiers were ready, their commissariat was not. We need not go by any of the rumours coming from the German side; we have the evidence of Captain Jeannerod,^a an old French officer, now correspondent of the *Temps* with the army. He distinctly states that the distribution of provisions for a campaign began on the 1st of August only; that the troops were short of field flasks, cooking tins, and other camping utensils; that the meat was putrid and the bread often musty. It will be said, we fear, that so far the army of the Second Empire has been beaten by the Second Empire itself. Under a *régime* which has to yield bounties to its supporters by all the old regular established means of jobbery, it cannot be expected that the system will stop at the intendance of the army. This war, according to M. Rouher's confession, was prepared long ago; the laying in of stores, especially equipments, was evidently one of the least conspicuous parts of the preparation; and yet at this very point such irregularities occur as to cause nearly a week's delay at the most critical period of the campaign.

Now, this week's delay made all the difference to the Germans. It gave them time to bring their troops to the front and to mass them in the positions selected for them. Our readers are aware that we suppose the whole of the German forces to be by this time concentrated on the left bank of the Rhine, more or less facing the French army.^b All public and private reports received since Tuesday, when we supplied *The Times* with all the opinion it ever had on the subject, and which this morning it swears is its own,^c tend to confirm this view. The three armies of Steinmetz, Prince Frederick Charles, and the Crown Prince represent a grand

^a G. Jeannerod, "Correspondances particulières du Temps. Stiring-Wendel, lundi 1^{er} août", *Le Temps*, No. 3444, August 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 19-20.—*Ed.*

^c "The first blow in the war...", *The Times*, No. 26821, August 5, 1870. This leader contains some ideas from the article "Notes on the War.—III" without giving any references to the source.—*Ed.*

total of thirteen army corps, or at least 430,000 to 450,000 men. The total forces opposed to them cannot much exceed, at a very liberal estimate, 330,000 to 350,000 drilled soldiers. If they are stronger, the excess must consist of undrilled and recently formed battalions. But the German forces are far from representing the total strength of Germany. Of field troops alone there are three army corps (the 1st, 6th, and 11th) not included in the above estimate. Where they may be we do not know. We know that they have left their garrisons, and we have traced regiments of the 11th Corps to the left bank of the Rhine and the Bavarian Palatinate. We also know for certain that there are now in Hanover, Bremen, and neighbourhood no troops but landwehr. This would lead to the conclusion that the greater part at least of these three corps had also been forwarded to the front, and in that case the numerical superiority of the Germans would be increased by from some forty to sixty thousand men. We should not be surprised if even a couple of landwehr divisions had been sent to take the field on the Saar; there are 210,000 men of the landwehr now quite ready, and 180,000 men in the fourth battalions, &c., of the line nearly ready, and some of these might be spared for the first decisive blow. Let no one suppose that these men exist, to any extent, on paper only. The mobilization of 1866 is there to prove that the thing has been done, and the present mobilization has again proved that there are more drilled men ready to march out than are wanted. The numbers look incredible; but even they do not exhaust the military strength of Germany.

Thus, at the end of the present week, the Emperor^a finds himself face to face with a numerically superior force. And if he was willing but unable to move forward last week, he may be both unable and unwilling to advance now. That he is not unaware of the strength of his opponents is hinted at by the report from Paris that 250,000 Prussians are massed between Saarlouis and Neuenkirchen. What there is between Neuenkirchen and Kaiserslautern the Parisian telleth not. It is therefore possible that the inactivity of the French army up to Thursday has been partly caused by a change in the plan of campaign; that instead of attacking, the French intend to remain on the defensive, and to take advantage of the greatly increased strength which breech-loaders and rifled artillery give to an army awaiting an attack in an entrenched position. But if this be resolved upon, it will be a very disappointing commencement of the campaign for the French. To

^a Napoleon III.—*Ed.*

sacrifice half Lorraine and Alsace without a pitched battle—and we doubt that any good position for such a large army can be found nearer the frontier than about Metz—is a serious undertaking for the Emperor.

Against such a move of the French the Germans would develop the plan explained before. They would attempt to entangle their opponents into a great battle before Metz could be reached; they would push forward between Saarlouis and Metz. They would try in all cases to outflank the French entrenched position, and to interrupt its communications towards the rear.

An army of 300,000 men requires a great deal of feeding, and could not afford to have its lines of supply interrupted even for a few days. Thus it might be forced to come out and fight in the open, and then the advantage of position would be lost. Whatever may be done, we may be certain that something must be done soon. Three-quarters of a million of men cannot long remain concentrated on a space of fifty miles square. The impossibility of feeding such bodies of men will compel either one side or the other to move.

To conclude. We repeat that we start from the supposition that both French and Germans have brought up every available man to the front to take part in the first great battle. In that case, our opinion still is that the Germans will have a numerical superiority sufficient to ensure them the victory—barring great mistakes on their part. We are confirmed in this supposition by all reports, public and private. But it is manifest that all this does not amount to absolute certainty. We have to infer from indications which may be deceptive. We do not know what dispositions may be taken even while we are writing; and it is impossible to forecast what blunders or what strokes of genius may be displayed by the commanders on either side.

Our last observations to-day shall be upon the storming of the lines of Wissembourg in Alsace by the Germans.²⁰ The troops engaged on their side belonged to the Prussian 5th and 11th, and Bavarian 2nd corps. We have thus direct confirmation not only of the 11th Corps but of all the main forces of the Crown Prince being in the Palatinate. The regiment mentioned in the report^a as “the King’s Grenadier Guards” is the 7th or 2nd West Prussian regiment of grenadiers, which, as well as the 58th regiment, belongs to the 5th Corps. The Prussian system is always to engage

^a “Niederrothenbrach, Thursday, Aug. 4, 5.55 P.M.,” *The Times*, No. 26821, August 5, 1870.—*Ed.*

the whole of an army corps before troops from another corps are brought up. Now, here, troops from three corps, Prussians and Bavarians, are employed for a piece of work which one corps, at most, could have performed. This looks as if the presence of three corps menacing Alsace was to be impressed upon the French. Moreover, an attack up the valley of the Rhine would be stopped by Strasbourg, and a flank march through the Vosges would find the passes blocked by Bitche, Phalsbourg, Petite Pierre, little fortresses sufficient to stop the high roads. We expect that while three or four brigades of the three German corps attacked Wissembourg, the mass of these corps would be marching by Landau and Pirmasens to Zweibrücken, while, if the first were successful, a couple of MacMahon's divisions would be marching in the opposite direction towards the Rhine. There they would be perfectly harmless, as any invasion of the Palatinate, in the plain, would be arrested by Landau and Germersheim.

This affair at Wissembourg was evidently conducted with such a superiority of numbers as made success almost certain. Its moral effect, as the first serious engagement of the war, must necessarily be great, especially as the storming of an entrenched position is always considered a difficult matter. That the Germans should have driven the French out of entrenched lines, at the point of the bayonet, in spite of rifled artillery, mitrailleurs, and Chassepôts,²¹ will tell on both armies. It is undoubtedly the first instance where the bayonet has been successful against the breech-loader, and on this account the action will remain memorable.

For this very reason it will derange Napoleon's plans. This is a piece of news which cannot be given to the French army even in a highly diluted form, unless accompanied by reports of success in other quarters. And it cannot be kept secret for more than twelve hours at most. We may expect, therefore, the Emperor will set his columns in motion to look out for this success, and it will be wonderful if we do not soon have some account of French victories. But at the same time, probably, the Germans will move, and we shall have the heads of the opposite columns coming into contact at more places than one. To-day, or at latest to-morrow, ought to bring on the first general engagement.

THE PRUSSIAN VICTORIES^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1711, August 8, 1870]

The rapid action of the German Third Army throws more and more light upon Moltke's plans. The concentration of this army in the Palatinate must have taken place by the bridges of Mannheim and Germersheim, and perhaps by intermediate military pontoon bridges. Before entering upon the roads across the Hardt from Landau and Neustadt westwards, the troops massed in the Rhine valley were available for an attack on the French right wing. Such an attack, with the superior forces in hand, and with Landau close to the rear, was perfectly safe, and might lead to great results. If it succeeded in drawing a considerable body of French troops away from their main body into the Rhine valley, in defeating it and driving it up the valley towards Strasbourg, these forces would be out of the way for the general battle, while the German Third Army would still be in a position to take part in it, being so much nearer to the main body of the French. At any rate, an attack upon the French right would mislead them if the chief German attack, as we still believe, in spite of the contrary opinion of a host of military and unmilitary quidnuncs, were intended to be made on the French left.

The sudden and successful attack upon Wissembourg shows that the Germans possessed information as to the positions of the French which encouraged such a manoeuvre. The French, in their haste for a *revanche*, ran headlong into the trap. Marshal MacMahon immediately concentrated his corps towards Wissembourg, and to complete this manoeuvre he is reported to have required two days.^b But the Crown Prince^c was not likely to give him

^a Written on August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b French official report of August 6, 1870, datelined "Metz, Aug. 6, 1.20 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c Frederick William.—*Ed.*

that time. He followed up his advantage at once, and attacked him on Saturday near Woerth on the Sauer, about fifteen miles south-west of Wissembourg.²² MacMahon's position is described by himself as a strong one. Nevertheless, by five o'clock in the afternoon he was driven out of it, and was supposed by the Crown Prince to be in full retreat upon Bitche. By this means he would have saved himself from being driven excentrically upon Strasbourg, and maintained his communications with the mass of the army. By later French telegrams, however, it appears that he has really retreated towards Nancy, and that his head-quarters are now at Saverne.^a

The two French corps sent to resist this German advance consisted of seven divisions of infantry, of whom we suppose at least five to have been engaged. It is possible that the whole of them may have come up successively during the fight, but were no more able to restore the balance than the successive Austrian brigades as they appeared on the battle-field of Magenta.²³ At any rate, we may safely assume that from one-fifth to one-fourth of the total strength of the French was here defeated. The troops on the other side were probably the same whose advanced guard had won Wissembourg—the Second Bavarian, the Fifth and Eleventh North German corps. Of these, the fifth consists of two Posen, five Silesian and one Westphalian regiments, the Eleventh of one Pomeranian, four Hesse-Cassel and Nassau, and three Thuringian regiments, so that troops of the most varied parts of Germany were engaged.

What surprises us most in these passages of arms is the strategical and tactical part played by each army. It is the very reverse of what, from tradition, might have been expected. The Germans attack; the French defend themselves. The Germans act rapidly and in large masses, and they handle them with ease; the French own to having their troops, after a fortnight's concentration, in such a dispersed state that they require two days to bring together two army corps. Consequently they are beaten in detail. They might be Austrians, to judge from the way they move their troops. How is this to be accounted for? Simply by the necessities of the Second Empire. The sting of Wissembourg was enough to arouse all Paris, and, no doubt, to disturb the equanimity of the army too. A *revanche* must be had: MacMahon is sent off at once with two corps to effect it; the movement is palpably false, but, no matter, it must be made, and it is made—with what effect we have

^a "Metz, Aug. 7, 12.2 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—Ed.

seen. If Marshal MacMahon cannot be strengthened so as to face the Crown Prince again, the latter, by a march of some fifteen miles to the southward, may seize the rail from Strasbourg to Nancy and push on to Nancy, turning by this move any line the French could hope to hold in advance of Metz. It is the dread of this, no doubt, that leads the French to abandon the Sarre district. Or, leaving the pursuit of MacMahon to his advanced guard, he may file off to his right by the hills at once towards Pirmasens and Zweibrücken, to effect a formal junction with the left of Prince Frederick Charles, who has all the while been somewhere between Mayence and Saarbrücken, while the French persisted in sending him to Trèves. How the defeat of General Frossard's corps at Forbach,²⁴ followed, as it seems, by the advance of the Prussians to St. Avold yesterday, will affect his course we cannot determine.

If the Second Empire absolutely required a victory after Wissembourg, it now requires one, in a much higher degree, after Woerth and Forbach. If Wissembourg was enough to disarrange all previous plans with regard to the right wing, the battles of Saturday necessarily upset all arrangements made for the whole army. The French army has lost all initiative. Its movements are dictated less by military considerations than by political necessities. Here are 300,000 men almost within sight of the enemy. If their movements are to be ruled, not by what is done in the enemy's camp, but by what happens or may happen in Paris, they are half beaten already. Nobody, of course, can foretell with certainty the result of the general battle which is now impending if not going on; but this much we may say, that another week of such strategy as Napoleon III has shown since Thursday^a is alone sufficient to destroy the best and largest army in the world.

The impression gained from the Prussian accounts^b of these battles will only be deepened by the telegrams from the Emperor Napoleon. At midnight on Saturday he sent off the bare facts:—

"Marshal MacMahon has lost a battle. General Frossard has been compelled to fall back."^c

^a August 4.—*Ed.*

^b The reference is to the Prussian telegrams published under the common title "Great Prussian Victories", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c Napoleon III's telegram of August 7, 1870, datelined "Metz, Aug. 7, 12.30 A.M.", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

Three hours later came the news that his communications with Marshal MacMahon were interrupted.^a At six on Sunday morning the serious meaning of General Frossard's defeat was virtually acknowledged by the confession that it was sustained as far west of Saarbrücken as Forbach, and the impossibility of immediately arresting the Prussian advance was further conceded in the announcement "the troops, which had found themselves divided, are concentrated on Metz."^b The next telegram is hard to interpret.

"The retreat will be effected in good order"?^c

What retreat? Not Marshal MacMahon's, for the communications with him were still interrupted. Not General Frossard's, for the Emperor goes on to say, "There is no news from General Frossard." And if at 8.25 A.M. the Emperor could only speak in the future tense of a retreat to be effected by troops of whose position he knew nothing, what value must be assigned to the telegram of eight hours' earlier, in which he says, in the present tense, "the retreat is being effected in good order." All these later messages prolong the note struck in the "Tout peut se rétablir"^d of the first. The victories of the Prussians were too serious to allow of a resort to the tactics which the Emperor would naturally have adopted. He could not venture to conceal the truth in the prospect of being able to efface the effect of it by a contemporaneous account of a later battle with a different result. It was impossible to spare the pride of the French people by disguising from them that two of their armies had been worsted, and therefore the only resource left was to throw himself on the passionate desire to retrieve their losses which the news of similar disasters has before now generated in French hearts. Private telegrams no doubt sketched out for the Empress^e and the Ministers the line their public utterances were to take, or more probably the actual text of their respective proclamations was supplied to them from Metz. From both these we gather that whatever may be the temper of the French people, every one in authority, from the Emperor

^a Napoleon III's telegram of August 7, 1870, datelined "Metz, Sunday, 3.30 A.M.", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Napoleon III's telegram of August 7, 1870, datelined "Metz, Aug. 7, 6 A.M.", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c Napoleon III's telegram of August 7, 1870, datelined "Metz, Aug. 7, 8.25 A.M.", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

^d Not all is lost.—*Ed.*

^e E. Montijo.—*Ed.*

downward, is deeply dispirited, than which of itself nothing could be more significant. Paris has been declared in a state of siege^a—an indisputable indication of what may follow upon another Prussian victory, and the Ministerial proclamation ends,

“Let us fight with vigour, and the country will be saved.”^b

Saved, Frenchmen may perhaps ask themselves, from what? From an invasion undertaken by the Prussians in order to avert a French invasion of Germany. If the Prussians had been defeated and a similar exhortation had come from Berlin, its meaning would have been clear, since every fresh victory of French arms would have meant a fresh annexation of German territory to France. But if the Prussian Government are well advised a French defeat will only mean that the attempt to prevent Prussia from pursuing her German policy undisturbed has failed, and we can hardly believe that the levy *en masse*,^c upon which the French Ministers are said to be deliberating, will be available for the renewal of an offensive war.

^a On August 7, 1870.—*Ed*

^b [Proclamation of the Council of Ministers to the people of Paris, August 6,] *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed*.

^c “Paris, August 8”, *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed*.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—V^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1712, August 9, 1870]

Saturday, the 6th of August, was the critical day for the first phase of the campaign. The first despatches from the German side, by their extreme modesty, rather hid than exposed the importance of the results gained on that day.^b It is only through the later and fuller accounts, and by some rather awkward admissions in the French reports,^c that we are enabled to judge of the total change in the military situation accomplished on Saturday.

While MacMahon was defeated on the eastern slope of the Vosges, Frossard's three divisions, and at least one regiment of Bazaine's corps, the 69th, in all forty-two battalions, were driven from the heights south of Saarbrücken and on beyond Forbach, by Kameke's division of the 7th (Westphalian), and the two divisions of Barnekow and Stülpnagel, of the 8th (Rhenish) Corps, in all thirty-seven battalions. As the German battalions are stronger, the numbers engaged appear to have been pretty equal, but the French had the advantage of position. There were to the left of Frossard the seven infantry divisions of Bazaine and Ladmirault, and to his rear the two divisions of the Guards. With the exception of one regiment, as above stated, not a man of all these came up to support the unlucky Frossard. He had to fall back after a smart defeat, and is now in full retreat upon Metz; and so are Bazaine,

^a Written on August 9, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See the reports: "Mayence, Sunday, Aug. 7, 6 A.M.," and "Soultz, Aug. 7", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c See the reports entitled "Great Prussian Victories" and the French official report "Metz, Aug. 7, 12.2 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

Ladmirault, and the Guards. The Germans are in pursuit and were on Sunday^a in St. Avold, with all Lorraine open to them as far as Metz.

MacMahon, De Faily, and Canrobert, in the meantime, are retreating, not upon Bitche, as was at first stated, but upon Nancy; and MacMahon's headquarters were on Sunday at Saverne. These three corps, therefore, are not only defeated, but also driven back in a direction divergent from the line of retreat of the rest of the army. The strategical advantage aimed at in the attack of the Crown Prince,^b and explained by us yesterday,^c appears thus to have been attained, at least partially. While the Emperor retires due west, MacMahon goes much more towards the south, and will scarcely have reached Lunéville at the time the other four corps will be massed under the shelter of Metz. But from Sarreguemines to Lunéville is only a few miles farther than from Saverne to Lunéville. And it is not to be expected that, while Steinmetz follows up the Emperor and the Crown Prince tries to hold fast MacMahon in the defiles of the Vosges, Prince Frederick Charles, who was on Sunday at Blieskastel, with his advanced guard somewhere near Sarreguemines, should look on quietly. The whole of Northern Lorraine is a splendid cavalry country, and Lunéville in time of peace was always the head-quarters of a large portion of the French cavalry quartered in that neighbourhood. With the great superiority, both as to quantity and quality, in cavalry on the side of the Germans, it is difficult to suppose that they will not at once launch large masses of that arm towards Lunéville, intending to intercept the communications between MacMahon and the Emperor, destroy the railway bridges on the Strasbourg-Nancy line, and, if possible, the bridges of the Meurthe. It is even possible that they may succeed in interposing a body of infantry between the two separated bodies of the French army, compel MacMahon to retreat still farther south, and to take a still more circuitous route to restore his connection with the rest of the army. That something of that sort has already been done seems clear from the Emperor's admission that on Saturday his communications with MacMahon were interrupted^d; and the fear of more serious consequences is ominously expressed in the report

^a On August 7, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Frederick William.—*Ed.*

^c See this volume, pp. 27-28.—*Ed.*

^d Napoleon III's telegram of August 7, 1870, datelined "Metz, Sunday, 3.30 A.M.", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

of a removal of the French head-quarters to Châlons being contemplated.^a

Four of the eight corps of the French army have thus been more or less completely defeated, and always in detail, while of one of them, the Seventh (Félix Douay), the whereabouts is quite unknown. The strategy which rendered possible such blunders is worthy of the Austrians in their most helpless times. It is not Napoleon, it is Beaulieu, Mack, Gyulay, and the like of them, we are reminded of. Imagine Frossard having to fight at Forbach all day, while to his left, and not more than ten miles or so from the line of the Saar, seven divisions were looking on! This would be unaccountable, unless we suppose that there were facing them German forces sufficient to prevent them from either supporting Frossard or assisting him by an independent attack. And this, the only possible exculpation, is admissible only if, as we have always said, the decisive attack of the Germans was intended to be made by their extreme right. The hasty retreat upon Metz again confirms this view; it looks uncommonly like a timely attempt to withdraw from a position where the communications with Metz were already threatened. What German troops there may have been facing, and perhaps outflanking, Ladmirault and Bazaine, we do not know; but we must not forget that of Steinmetz's seven or more divisions only three have been engaged.

In the meantime another North German corps has turned up—the Sixth or Upper Silesian. It passed through Cologne last Thursday,^b and will now be either with Steinmetz or Frederick Charles, whom *The Times* persists in placing on the extreme right, at Trèves,^c in the same number which contains the telegram that he has moved from Homburg to Blieskastel.^d The superiority of the Germans, both as to numbers, morale, and strategical position, must now be such that, for a time, they may with impunity do almost anything they like. If the Emperor intends to keep his four army corps in the entrenched camp at Metz—and he has but the choice between that and an uninterrupted retreat upon Paris—that need not stop the advance of the Germans any more than the attempt of Benedek, in 1866, to reassemble his army under shelter of Olmütz arrested the Prussian advance upon Vienna.²⁵ Benedek!

^a "Metz, Aug. 7, 1.20 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26824, August 9, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b On August 4, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c "It requires something more than human foresight...", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

^d "Mayence, Sunday, Aug. 7, 6 A.M.", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

What a comparison for the conqueror of Magenta and Solferino! And yet it is more to the point than any other. Like Benedek, the Emperor had his troops massed in a position from which he could move in any direction, and that a full fortnight before the enemy was concentrated. Like Benedek, Louis Napoleon managed to have corps after corps beaten in detail by superior numbers or superior generalship. But here, we are afraid, the likeness ceases. Benedek had, after a week of daily defeats, strength enough left him for the supreme effort of Sadowa. To all appearances Napoleon has his troops separated, almost hopelessly, after two days' engagements, and cannot even afford to try a general action.

There will now, we suppose, be an end to the intended expedition of troops to the Baltic, if that was ever more than a feint. Every battalion will be wanted on the eastern frontier. Out of the 376 battalions of the French army, 300 were in the six corps of the line and one of Guards which we know stood between Metz and Strasbourg. The seventh corps of the line (Douay) might have been sent either to the Baltic or to join the main army, which accounts for forty more. The rest, thirty-six battalions, can hardly have been sufficient for Algeria and various other duties in the interior. What resources has the Emperor to draw upon for reinforcements? The 100 fourth battalions now in formation and the Garde Mobile. But both of these consist, the first mostly, the second altogether, of raw recruits. By what time the fourth battalions may be ready to march we do not know; they will have to march whether ready or not. What the Garde Mobile is at present we saw last week in the camp of Châlons.²⁶ Both are good material for soldiers, no doubt, but not soldiers yet; not yet troops to withstand the shock of men who are becoming used to the taking of mitrailleurs. On the other hand, in about ten days, the Germans will have 190,000 to 200,000 of the fourth battalions, &c., to draw upon—the flower of their army, besides at least an equal number of landwehr, all fit for duty in the field.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—VI^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1714, August 11, 1870]

There is no doubt now that scarcely ever was there a war undertaken with such an utter disregard of the ordinary rules of prudence as the Napoleonic "military promenade to Berlin."^b A war for the Rhine was Napoleon's last and most telling card; but at the same time its failure implied the downfall of the Second Empire. This was well understood in Germany. The constant expectation of a French war was one of the chief considerations which made very many Germans acquiesce in the changes effected in 1866. If Germany had been dismembered in one sense, it had been strengthened in another; the military organization of North Germany gave a far greater guarantee of safety than that of the larger but sleepy old Confederation.²⁷ This new military organization was calculated to place under arms, in organized battalions, squadrons, and batteries, in eleven days, 552,000 men of the line and 205,000 of the landwehr; and in a fortnight or three weeks more another 187,000 men of the reserve (*Ersatztruppen*) fully fit to take the field. There was no mystery about this. The whole plan, showing the distribution of this force in the various corps, the districts from which each battalion, &c., was to be raised, had often been published. Moreover, the mobilization of 1866 had shown that this was not an organization existing on paper only. Every man was duly registered; and it was well known that in the office of every district commander of the landwehr the orders for calling out each man were ready, and awaited but the filling up of the date. For the French Emperor,^c however, these enormous

^a Written between August 9 and 11, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See "Nemeßis", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 221, August 9, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c Napoleon III.—*Ed.*

forces existed on paper only. The whole force he brought together to open the campaign with were, at the outside, 360,000 men of the Army of the Rhine, and 30,000 to 40,000 more for the Baltic expedition, say 400,000 men in all. With such a disproportion of numbers, and with the long time it takes to get the French new formations (fourth battalions) ready for the field, his only hope of success was a sudden attack, while the Germans were still in the midst of their mobilization. We have seen how this opportunity slipped away; how even the second chance, that of a push forward to the Rhine, was neglected; and we shall now point out another blunder.

The disposition of the French about the time of the declaration of war was excellent. It was evidently part and parcel of a long-considered plan of campaign. Three corps at Thionville, St. Avold, and Bitche in the first line, immediately on the frontier; two corps at Metz and Strasbourg, in a second line; two corps in reserve about Nancy, and an eighth corps at Belfort. With the aid of the railways, all these troops could be massed in a few days for an attack either across the Saar from Lorraine, or across the Rhine from Alsace, striking either north or east as might be required. But this disposition was essentially one for attack. For defence it was absolutely faulty. The very first condition of a disposition of an army of defence is this: to have your advanced troops so far in front of your main body that you receive the news of the enemy's attack in time to concentrate your troops before he arrives upon you. Suppose it takes you one day's march to get your wings to close on your centre, then your advanced guard should be at least one day's march in front of your centre. Now, here, the three corps of Ladmirault, Frossard, and De Failly, and afterwards a portion of MacMahon's too, were close upon the frontier, and yet spread upon a line from Wissembourg to Sierck—at least ninety miles. To draw in the wings on the centre would have required fully two days' march; and yet, even when the Germans were known to be within a few miles in front, no steps were taken either to shorten the length of front, or to push forward advanced guards to such a distance as would secure timely advice of an impending attack. Is it to be wondered at that the several corps were defeated by piecemeal?

Then came the blunder of posting one division of MacMahon's east of the Vosges, at Wissembourg, in a position inviting an attack with superior forces. Douay's defeat brought on MacMahon's next blunder in trying to retrieve the fight east of the Vosges, thereby separating the right wing still more from the centre, and laying

open his line of communications with it. While the right wing (MacMahon's, and portions at least of Faily's and Canrobert's corps) was crushed at Woerth, the centre (Frossard, and two divisions of Bazaine, as it now appears) were severely beaten before Saarbrücken.²⁸ The rest of the troops were too far away to come up to assistance. Ladmirault was still near Bouzonville, the rest of Bazaine's men and the Guards were about Boulay, the mass of Canrobert's troops turned up at Nancy, part of De Faily's were lost sight of completely, and Félix Douay, we now find, on the 1st of August was at Altkirch, in the extreme south of Alsace, nearly 120 miles from the battle-field of Woerth, and probably with but imperfect means of railway conveyance. The whole arrangement indicates nothing but hesitation, indecision, vacillation, and that in the most decisive moment of the campaign.

And what idea were the soldiers allowed to have of their opponents? It was all very well for the Emperor at the last moment to tell his men that they would have to face "one of the best armies of Europe;"^a but that went for nothing after the lessons of contempt for the Prussians which had been driven into them for years. We cannot show this better than by the evidence of Captain Jeannerod, of the *Temps*, whom we have quoted before,^b and who left the army but three years ago. He was taken prisoner by the Prussians at the "baptism of fire" affair, and spent two days among them, during which time he saw the greater portion of their Eighth Army Corps. He was astounded to find such a difference between his idea of them and the reality. This is his first impression on being brought to their camp:—

Once in the forest, there was a complete change. There were outposts under the trees, battalions massed along the roads; and let nobody try to deceive the public in a manner unworthy of our country and of our present circumstances: from the first step I had recognized the characters which announce an excellent army (*une belle et bonne armée*) as well as a nation powerfully organized for war. In what consisted these characteristics? In everything. The demeanour of the men, the subordination of their smallest movements to chiefs protected by a discipline far stronger than ours, the gaiety of some, the serious and determined look of others, the patriotism to which most of them gave vent, the thorough and constant zeal of the officers, and, above all, the moral worth—of which we may envy them—of the non-commissioned officers; that is what struck me at once, and what has never been from under my eyes from the two days I passed in the midst of that army and in that country where signboards placed from distance to distance, with the

^a Napoleon III's appeal to the army "Au quartier impérial de Metz, le 28 juillet 1870", *Le Temps*, No. 3440, July 30, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, p. 23.—*Ed.*

numbers of the local battalions of the landwehr, recall the effort of which it is capable in a moment of danger and of ambition.^a

On the German side it was quite different. The military qualities of the French were certainly not underrated. The concentration of German troops took place rapidly but cautiously. Every available man was brought to the front; and now, the First North German Army Corps having turned up at Saarbrücken in Prince Frederick Charles's army, it is certain that every man, horse, and gun of the 550,000 troops of the line has been brought to the front, there to be joined by the South Germans. And the effect of such an enormous numerical superiority has been, so far, increased by superior generalship.

^a G. Jeannerod, "Correspondances particulières du Temps. Metz, vendredi 5 août", *Le Temps*, No. 3448, August 7, 1870. See also Engels' letter to Marx of August 10, 1870 (present edition, Vol. 44).—*Ed.*

NOTES ON THE WAR.—VII^a[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1716, August 13, 1870]

The public have been waiting all this week for that great battle before Metz which a French bulletin^b described as impending; and yet not one of our military critics has thought fit to explain that this impending battle was nothing but a tub thrown out to that unruly whale, the people of Paris, to play with. A battle before Metz! Why should the French desire it? They have collected under shelter of that fortress four corps; they are trying to draw towards it some of Canrobert's four divisions; they may hope soon to learn that the remaining three corps, of MacMahon, De Failly, and Douay, have reached the Moselle at Nancy and found shelter behind it. Why should they court a pitched battle before all their army is united again, when the forts of Metz protect them from an attack? And why should the Germans break their heads in an unprepared assault against these forts? If the whole French army was united under the ramparts of Metz, then the French might be expected to sally forth east of the Moselle and offer battle in front of their stronghold, but not till then. But that has yet to be accomplished, and it is still doubtful whether it ever will be.

On Sunday last^c MacMahon was compelled to leave Saverne, which was occupied the same night by the Germans. He had with him the remnants of his own corps, of one division (Conseil-Dumesnil's) of Douay's corps, and, besides, one division of De Failly's, which had covered his retreat. On the same evening the

^a Written between August 11 and 13, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b "Metz, 7 août, 4 h. 30 du matin. Le major général au ministre de l'intérieur", *Le Temps*, No. 3449, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c On August 7.—*Ed.*

German First and Second armies were in advance of Forbach and nearly in St. Avold. Both these places are nearer to Nancy than Saverne: they are considerably nearer than Saverne to Pont-à-Mousson and Dieulouard, places on the Moselle between Nancy and Metz. Now, when the Germans must, as soon as possible, secure or construct a passage across that river, and that *above* Metz (for various pretty evident reasons); when they are nearer to the river than MacMahon, and thus by hurrying on may prevent his reunion with Bazaine; when they have troops enough and to spare—is it not almost evident that they will attempt something of the sort? Their cavalry, as we predicted it would, is already scouring the whole of Northern Lorraine,^a and must have ere now come into contact with MacMahon's right; it had passed, on Wednesday, Gros-Tenquin, which is only about twenty-five miles from the direct road between Saverne and Nancy. They will, therefore, know perfectly where he is and operate accordingly, and we shall soon learn at what point between Nancy (or, rather, Frouard) and Metz they have struck the Moselle.

This is the reason why we have not heard of any fights since last Saturday's. The soldiers' legs are doing all the work just now; it is a race between MacMahon and Frederick Charles, which of them shall first get across the river. And if Frederick Charles should win this race, then we may expect the French to issue from Metz, not to offer battle in sight of its ramparts, but to defend the passage of the Moselle; which, indeed, may be done by an attack either on the right or the left bank. The two pontoon trains captured at Forbach may have to do duty very soon.

Of De Failly we hear nothing definite. It is, indeed, stated in a Metz bulletin that he has rejoined the army.^b But which? Bazaine's or MacMahon's? Evidently the latter, if there be any truth in the whole report; for between Bazaine and him were the heads of the German columns ever since he got lost. Douay's remaining two divisions—he was still on the Swiss frontier, near Basel, on the 4th of August—must, by the German advance upon Strasbourg, be cut off from the rest of the army for the present; they can only rejoin it by Vesoul. Of Canrobert's troops we find, all at once, at least one division (Martimprey's) in Paris, facing, not the Germans, but the Republicans. The 25th, 26th, and 28th regiments, which belong to it, are mentioned as having been employed on Tuesday among the troops protecting the Corps Législatif.²⁹ The rest

^a See this volume, p. 33.—*Ed.*

^b "Metz, 8 août, 10 h. soir", *Le Temps*, No. 3451, August 10, 1870.—*Ed.*

should now be in Metz, raising the army there to fifteen divisions (infantry), three of which, however, are completely shattered by their defeat at Spicheren.

As to Spicheren, it is wrong to say that the French were in that engagement crushed by superior numbers. We have now a tolerably full report of Generals Steinmetz^a and Alvensleben,^b which shows pretty clearly what troops were engaged on the German side. The attack was made by the 14th division, supported by our old friends, the 40th regiment—in all fifteen battalions. They alone, of infantry, fought for six hours against the three divisions, or thirty-nine battalions, which Frossard brought up successively. When they were nearly crushed, but still held the heights of Spicheren, which they had stormed in the beginning of the fight, the 5th division of the 3rd or Brandenburg Corps came up, and at least three out of its four regiments took part in the fight—all in all, either twenty-four or twenty-seven battalions of Germans. They drove the French from their position, and it was only after the retreat had commenced that the head of the 13th division, which had turned the French right by the valley of the Rossel, reached the field of battle, fell upon Forbach, and turned an orderly retreat into a rout by cutting off the direct road to Metz. The Germans at the close of the fight had another division (the 6th) ready to engage, and, indeed, slightly engaged; but at the same time two French divisions, Montaudon's and Castagny's (both of Bazaine's), had come up, and the 69th regiment, which forms part of the latter, had suffered severely. Thus, if at Wissembourg and Woerth the French were crushed by superior masses, they were beaten by inferior numbers at Spicheren. As to their common report that they were outnumbered,^c it is not to be forgotten that individual soldiers in a battle cannot possibly judge of numbers, and that it is the common assertion of all beaten armies. Besides, it should not be forgotten that the solid qualities of the German army are only now beginning to be recognized. We have it officially from the French head-quarters that the German fire is much superior in steadiness and precision to the French,^d and MacMahon insists that the

^a K. F. Steinmetz, "Mainz, 7 Aug. Vorm. 9 Uhr", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 222, August 10, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b K. Alvensleben, "Mainz, 7 Aug. Vorm. 9 Uhr", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 222, August 10, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c See the report "Paris, Aug. 7, 10 A.M.", *The Times*, No. 26823, August 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

^d Official report from the French head-quarters of August 10, 1870 "The Battle of Woerth", *The Times*, No. 26826, August 11, 1870.—*Ed.*

French have no chance against the Germans in woods, because these latter know so much better how to take advantage of shelter. As to the cavalry, here is what Jeannerod says in Thursday's *Temps*:—

“Their cavalry is much superior to ours, the privates are better mounted than many officers in our army, and they ride better. ... I have seen one of their Cuirassier regiments which was something splendid.... Their horses, moreover, are far less weighted than ours. The Cuirassiers I saw carried less weight on their big steeds than we do on our small Arabs and South of France horses.”^a

He also praises the great knowledge the officers have of the ground, not only in their own country, but also in France. But no wonder. Every lieutenant is provided with excellent copies of the French ordnance maps, while the French officers are supplied only with a ridiculous map (*une carte dérisoire*) of the seat of war. And so forth. It would have been good for the French army if only one such sincere reporter had been sent to Germany before the war.

^a G. Jeannerod, “Correspondances particulières du Temps. Metz, lundi, midi”, *Le Temps*, No. 3452, August 11, 1870.—*Ed*

NOTES ON THE WAR.—VIII^a[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1717, August 15, 1870]

Where is MacMahon? The German horse, in their raid up to the gates of Lunéville and Nancy, appear not to have met with him; otherwise we should have heard of encounters. On the other hand, if he had arrived in safety at Nancy, and thus restored his communications with the army at Metz, such a consoling fact would certainly have been announced at once from the French head-quarters. The only conclusion we can draw from this absolute silence regarding him is this, that he has thought it too dangerous to follow the direct road from Saverne to Lunéville and Nancy; and that, in order not to expose his right flank to the enemy, he has taken a more circuitous route, farther south, passing the Moselle at Bayon or even higher up. If this surmise be correct, there would be very little chance of his ever reaching Metz; and, in that case, it must have been a question for the Emperor or whoever commands at Metz, whether the army had not better at once retreat to Châlons-sur-Marne, the nearest point where a junction with MacMahon may be effected. We are therefore disposed to accept the report of a general retreat of the French line in that direction.

In the meantime, we hear of tremendous reinforcements for the French army. The new Minister of War^b assures the Chamber that in four days two army corps, 35,000 men each, are to be sent to the front.^c Where are they? We know that the eight corps of the Army of the Rhine, and the troops intended for the Baltic, with

^a Written on August 14 or 15, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Comte de Palikao.—*Ed.*

^c Palikao's speech in the Corps Législatif on August 12, 1870, *The Times*, No. 26829, August 15, 1870.—*Ed.*

the garrison of Algeria, fully accounted for every battalion of the French army, including the marines. We know that 40,000 men, from Canrobert's corps and from the Baltic expedition, are in Paris. We know from General Dejean's speech in the Chamber that the fourth battalions, so far from being ready, required filling up, and that this was to be done by drafting into them men from the Garde Mobile.^a Where, then, are these 70,000 men to come from? especially if, as is but likely, General Montauban de Palikao will not part with the 40,000 men in Paris as long as he can help it. Yet, if there is any meaning in what he said, these two corps must mean the troops at Paris and Canrobert's corps, which hitherto has always been counted as part of the Army of the Rhine; and in that case, the only real reinforcement being the garrison of Paris, the grand total in the field will be raised from twenty-five to twenty-eight divisions, seven at least of which have suffered severely.

Then we hear that General Trochu is named chief of the 12th Corps forming at Paris, and General Vendez (?) chief of the 13th Corps forming at Lyons. The army consisted hitherto of the Guards, and corps Nos. 1 to 7. Of Nos. 8, 9, 10, and 11 we have never heard; now we are suddenly treated to Nos. 12 and 13. We have seen that there are no troops existing out of which any of these corps could be formed; always excepting No. 12, if that means the garrison of Paris. It seems a poor trick to raise public confidence by creating on paper imaginary armies; yet there is no other interpretation than this to be put on the alleged establishment of five army corps, four of which have been hitherto non-existent.

No doubt attempts are being made to organize a fresh army; but what materials are there for it? There is, firstly, the gendarmerie, out of which a regiment of horse and one of foot can be formed; excellent troops, but they will not exceed 3,000 men, and will have to be brought together from all parts of France. So will the douaniers,^b who are expected to furnish the stuff for four-and-twenty battalions; we doubt whether they will complete half that number. Then come the old soldiers of the classes of 1858 to 1863, the unmarried men amongst whom have been called out again by special law.^c These may furnish a

^a P. Ch. Dejean's speech in the Corps Législatif on August 9, 1870, *Le Temps*, No. 3452, August 11, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Custom-house officers.—*Ed.*

^c The law is set forth in de Forcade La Roquette's speech in the Corps Législatif on August 10, 1870, *Le Temps*, No. 3453, August 12, 1870.—*Ed.*

contingent of 200,000 men, and will form the most valuable addition to the army. With less than one half of these the fourth battalions may be filled up, and the rest formed into new battalions. But here begins the difficulty—where are the officers to come from? They will have to be taken from the fighting army, and although this may be effected by a considerable promotion of sergeants to sub-lieutenants, it must weaken the corps from which they are taken. The whole of these three classes will give, at most, an increase of 220,000 to 230,000 men, and it will take under favourable circumstances at least fourteen to twenty days before even a portion of them can be ready to join the active army. But, unfortunately for them, circumstances are not favourable. It is now admitted that not merely the commissariat, but the whole of the French army administration was utterly ineffective, even to supply the army on the frontier. What, then, will be the state of forwardness of accoutrements and equipments for these reserves which nobody ever expected to be wanted in the field? It is very doubtful, indeed, whether, beyond the fourth battalions, any new formations will be ready before a couple of months. Then it is not to be forgotten that not one of these men ever handled a breech-loader, and that they are, all of them, totally ignorant of the new tactics inaugurated by that arm. And if the present French line, as is now admitted by themselves, fire hastily and at random, and squander their ammunition, what will these newly formed battalions do in the presence of an enemy whose steadiness and precision of fire appear to be very little affected by the din of battle?

There remain the Garde Mobile, the levy of all unmarried men up to thirty years, and the sedentary National Guard. As to the Garde Mobile, what little of it ever had any formal organization appears to have broken down as soon as it was sent to Châlons. Discipline there was none, and the officers, most of them totally unacquainted with their duties, seem to have lost in authority every day; there were not even arms for the men, and now the whole thing appears to be in complete dissolution. General Dejean indirectly acknowledged this^a by the proposal to fill up the ranks of the fourth battalions from the Garde Mobile. And if this, the apparently organized portion of the levy *en masse* be utterly useless, what is to become of the rest of it? Even if there were officers, accoutrements, and arms for them, how long would it

^a P. Ch. Dejean's speech in the Corps Législatif on August 9, 1870, *Le Temps*, No. 3452, August 11, 1870.—Ed.

take to make them into soldiers? But there is nothing provided for the emergency. Every officer fit for his post is already employed; the French have not that almost inexhaustible reserve of officers furnished by the "one year's volunteers," about 7,000 of whom enter the German armies every year, and almost every one of whom leaves the service quite fit to undertake an officer's duties. Accoutrements and arms appear to be equally absent; it is even said that the old flint-locks will have to be brought out of store. And under these circumstances, what are these 200,000 of men worth to France? It is all very well for the French to point to the Convention, to Carnot, with his frontier armies³⁰ created out of nothing, and so forth. But while we are far from saying that France is irretrievably beaten, let us not forget that in the successes of the Convention the allied armies³¹ bore a significant part. At that time the armies which attacked France numbered on an average 40,000 men each; there were three or four of them, each acting out of reach of the other, the one on the Schelde, the other on the Moselle, the third in Alsace, &c. To each of these small armies the Convention opposed immense numbers of more or less raw levies which, by acting upon the flanks and rear of the enemy, then entirely dependent upon his magazines, compelled him upon the whole to keep pretty close to the frontier; and, having been formed into real soldiers by five years' campaigning, finally succeeded in driving him across the Rhine. But is it for a moment to be supposed that similar tactics will avail against the present immense army of invasion, which, though formed in three distinct bodies, has always managed to keep together within supporting distance, or that this army will leave the French time to develop their now dormant resources? And to develop them to any extent is possible only in case the French are prepared to do what they never have done before, to abandon Paris and its garrison to their fate, and to continue the struggle with the line of the Loire for their base of operations. It may never come to that, but unless France is prepared to face it, she had better not talk about a levy *en masse*.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—IX^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1720, August 18, 1870]

"The French army commenced to cross over to the left bank of the Moselle. This (Sunday) morning reconnoitring parties announced the presence of the Prussian vanguards. When one-half of the army had crossed, the Prussians attacked in great force, and, after a fight which lasted four hours, were repulsed with considerable losses."^b

Such was the version of the Emperor's despatch which Mr. Reuter furnished on Monday^c night. It contained, however, an important error, the Emperor having expressly stated that the reconnoitring parties did not announce the presence of the enemy, though he was near at hand and in force.^d Apart from this, however, nothing apparently could be more straightforward and businesslike than this bulletin. You have the whole thing distinctly before your eyes; the French, busily engaged in that risky operation, the crossing of a river; the wily Prussians, who always know how to take their opponents at a disadvantage, falling upon them as soon as one-half of them has got to the other side; then the gallant defence of the French, crowning its superhuman efforts, finally, by a dashing advance, which repels the enemy with considerable losses. It is quite graphic, and there is only one thing wanting—the name of the place where all this occurred.

From the bulletin we cannot but suppose that this passage of the river, and this attempt to interrupt it which was so victoriously

^a Written on August 18, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Napoleon III's official report of August 14, 1870 "Paris, Aug. 15, 9.20 A.M.", *The Times*, No. 26830, August 16, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c On August 15.—*Ed.*

^d Napoleon III's official report of August 14, 1870 "Longeville, 10 h. du soir. L'empereur à l'impératrice", *Le Temps*, No. 3457, August 16, 1870.—*Ed.*

defeated, took place in the open country. But how could this be, when the French had all the bridges inside Metz to cross by—bridges perfectly safe from any hostile interference? when there was, besides, plenty of room for more pontoon bridges to be constructed, in equally safe places, on the five or six miles of river which are covered by the forts round Metz? Surely the French staff do not mean us to imply that they wantonly disregarded all these advantages, led the army outside of Metz, constructed their bridges in the open, and passed the river within sight and reach of the enemy, merely to bring on that “battle before Metz” which had been promised us for a whole week?

And if the passage of the Moselle took place by bridges inside the works of Metz, how could the Prussians attack the French troops still on the right bank so long as these kept, as they might have done, inside the line of detached forts? The artillery of these forts would soon have made the place too hot for any attacking troops.

The whole thing seems impossible. The least the French staff could have done would have been to give the name of the locality, that we might have traced the different phases of this glorious battle on the map. But that name they will not give. Fortunately for us, the Prussians are not so mysterious; they say the fight occurred near Pange, on the road to Metz.^a We look at the map, and the whole thing is clear.³² Pange is not on the Moselle, but eight miles away from it, on the Nied, about four miles outside the detached forts of Metz. If the French were crossing the Moselle, and had one-half of their troops over already, they had, in a military sense, no business whatever to keep strong forces at or near Pange. If they went there, it was for reasons not military.

Napoleon, once compelled to abandon Metz and the line of the Moselle, could not very well without a fight, and, if possible, a real or sham victory, enter upon a retreat which must be continued at least as far as Châlons. The opportunity was favourable. While one-half of his troops crossed, the other would debouch from between the forts east of Metz, push back the Prussian advanced troops, bring on as much of a general engagement as appeared convenient, draw on the enemy until within reach of the guns of the forts, and then, with a showy advance of the whole front, drive them back to a safe distance from the works. Such a plan could not entirely fail; it must lead to something which could be made to look like a victory; it would restore confidence in the army,

^a “Henry, Aug. 15”, *The Times*, No. 26830, August 16, 1870.—*Ed.*

perhaps even in Paris, and make the retreat to Châlons look less humiliating.

This view explains that apparently simple, but in reality absurd, bulletin from Metz. Every word of that bulletin is correct in a certain sense, while the whole context at the first glance is calculated to evoke a totally false impression. This view equally explains how both parties could claim the victory. The Prussians drove back the French till under the shelter of their forts, but having advanced too close to these forts had to retire in their turn. So much for the celebrated "battle before Metz," which might as well not have been fought at all, for its influence upon the course of the campaign will be zero. It will be observed that the Count of Palikao, speaking in the Chamber, was much more cautious.

"There has not been," he said, "what you would call a battle, but partial engagements, in which every man with military intelligence must see that the Prussians have received a check, and have been obliged to abandon the line of retreat of the French army."^a

The Marshal's last assurance seems to have been only momentarily true, for the retreating body of the French has certainly been severely harassed by the Prussians at Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte.

It was, indeed, high time that Napoleon and his army left Metz. While they were tarrying about the Moselle, the German cavalry passed the Meuse at Commercy and destroyed the railway thence to Bar-le-Duc; they also appeared at Vigneulles, threatening the flank of the columns retreating from Metz to Verdun. What these horsemen dare risk we see from the way in which a squadron of them entered Nancy, levied 50,000 francs, and compelled the townspeople to destroy the railway. Where are the French cavalry? where are the forty-three regiments attached to the eight army corps, and the twelve regiments of reserve cavalry which figure on the état of the Army of the Rhine?

The only obstacle in the way of the Germans now is the fortress of Toul, and this would not be of any importance whatever if it did not command the railway. The Germans are sure to want the railway, and therefore they no doubt will take the shortest means to reduce Toul, which, being an old-fashioned fortress without detached forts, is perfectly open to bombardment. We shall probably soon hear that it has surrendered after being bombarded by field guns for something like twelve hours, perhaps less.

^a Engels gives a rendering of Palikao's speech in the Corps Législatif on August 16, 1870 apparently according to *Le Temps*, No. 3459, August 18, 1870.—Ed.

If it be true, as French papers say, that MacMahon, having left his army, was in Nancy two days after the battle of Woerth,^a we may assume that his corps is totally disorganized, and that the infection has caught the troops of De Failly too. The Germans are now marching on to the Marne, almost on an equal front line with the two French armies, and having one of them on each flank. Bazaine's line of march is from Metz by Verdun and St. Ménehould to Châlons; that of the Germans from Nancy, by Commercy and Bar-le-Duc, to Vitry; that of MacMahon's troops (for even if the Marshal himself has joined the Emperor at Châlons, it must be without his army) somewhere to the south, but, no doubt, also directed towards Vitry. The reunion of the two French armies thus becomes more doubtful every day; and unless Douay's troops have been ordered from Belfort by Vesoul and Chaumont to Vitry in time, they may have to rejoin the army by way of Troyes and Paris, for Vitry will now soon be impassable by train for French soldiers.

^a Report of the French Command "Metz, 9 août, 1 h. 52, soir", *Le Temps*, No. 3452, August 11, 1870.—Ed.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—X^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1721, August 19, 1870]

Undoubtedly, if General Moltke be old, his plans have all the energy of youth. Not satisfied with having once already pushed his compact army between one wing of the French and the rest of their troops, he now repeats the same manoeuvre over again, and apparently with equal success. Had he continued his straight march on to the Marne, and merely harassed the right flank and rear of the French during their parallel march towards the same goal, he would, in the opinion of most military critics, have done quite enough. But it was hardly to be expected that he would have used the legs of his soldiers with such terrible vigour as he now appears to have done. What we took for mere attacks of detached corps upon the exposed flanks and rear of that long marching column which moved from Metz towards Verdun appears now to have been the reconnaissances preceding an attack in force upon it. Three or four German army corps had marched in a semicircle round on the southern side of Metz; their advanced troops reached the French line of march on Tuesday^b morning, and at once fell upon it. The French army began its retreat from Metz on Sunday; the engagements between Pange and Fort Bellecroix on the evening of that day may have retarded that movement, still it was continued on Monday and had not been completed on Tuesday. It took place at least by two different columns, following the two roads which separate, five miles west of Metz, at Gravelotte; the northernmost of these roads passes Doncourt and Etain, the southernmost Vionville, Mars-la-Tour, and Fresnes, and

^a Written on August 19, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b On August 16.—*Ed.*

both unite again at Verdun. It was near Mars-la-Tour that the German attack took place³³; the fight lasted all day, and ended, according to the German account, in the defeat of the French, who lost two eagles, seven cannon, and 2,000 prisoners, and were driven back to Metz.^a On the other hand, Bazaine too claims the victory. He says his troops repelled the Germans, and passed the night on the position won. But there are two very ominous statements in his telegram of Wednesday evening.^b There he says he fought all day on Tuesday between Doncourt and Vionville; that is to say, he fought with his front extending from Doncourt to Vionville, facing west, the Germans barring the way to Verdun on both roads. Whatever success he claims, he does not pretend to say that he cleared the roads to Verdun, or only one of them. Had he done so, his evident duty would have been to continue his retreat during the night as fast as he could, as the enemy would almost certainly be reinforced in the morning. But he stops and passes the night "on the position won," whatever that may mean. Not satisfied with that, he stays there till four o'clock on Wednesday afternoon, and even then announces, not his intention of moving, but of delaying his further movements for a few hours longer, in order to largely increase his ammunition. Thus we may be certain that the night to Thursday was also passed at the same spot; and as the only place whence he could increase his ammunition was Metz, we shall be fully entitled to conclude that the "positions conquered" were positions to the rear, that the retreat to Verdun was and remained cut off, and that by this time Marshal Bazaine will have either gone back to Metz, or attempted to escape by a route farther north.

If this view be correct—and we do not see how the evidence before us can be made to justify any other—a portion of the French army is again cut off from the rest. We do not know what troops may have passed towards Verdun on Monday, and on Tuesday morning before the Germans came up. But the portion driven back to Metz is evidently considerable, and whatever its importance may be, by so much will be reduced the great army which it was attempted to concentrate at Châlons. There is, indeed, a loophole left by which Bazaine might try to escape. A railway runs, close to the Belgian frontier, from Thionville to

^a "The Battle of Vionville. Pont-à-Mousson, Aug. 17", *The Times*, No. 26833, August 19, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Bazaine's telegram of August 17, 1870 "Aug. 17, 4 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26833, August 19, 1870.—*Ed.*

Longuyon, Montmédy, and Mézières, where it meets a cross line to Reims and Châlons; but any troops using this border line, or merely marching towards it, might be driven by a pursuing enemy up to the frontier, and compelled either to surrender or to cross it and be disarmed by the Belgians. Moreover, it is not likely that there will be rolling stock enough on this out-of-the-way line to take up a considerable body of troops; and, lastly, we have reports from Verdun that Prussians, who must have passed the Moselle between Metz and Thionville, were on Wednesday at Briey,^a on the direct road from Metz towards the available portion of that railway. Should Bazaine attempt to save his beaten troops in that direction he would, in the best of cases, have the whole of them reduced to utter dissolution. A long retreat, with the enemy on the direct line of communication of the beaten troops, is a most disastrous proceeding. Witness MacMahon's troops, some dribbles of which have continued to arrive by train at Châlons. On the 12th some 5,000 dropped in; in what state let the *Siècle* tell. They consisted of men of all arms and regiments mixed up, without arms, without cartridges, without knapsacks; the cavalry had no horses, the gunners no guns; a motley, disorganized, demoralized crew whom it would take weeks to form into battalions, squadrons, and batteries again. It is enough that correspondents decline to describe the state of the troops of the line at Châlons for fear to divulge matters which might be useful to the enemy.

That grand army which was destined to concentrate at Châlons may never meet there. After Canrobert's troops had been drawn, partly to Paris and partly to Metz, there remained but the eighteen battalions of Mobiles there; not worth mentioning in a war like this. Since then some marine infantry from Paris has been sent to Châlons; Douay's two remaining divisions, if there is any common sense left in Bazaine's dispositions, will have arrived by this time; perhaps a few fourth battalions, certainly not many. The newly formed regiments of gendarmes and douaniers^b may, some of them, arrive in the course of a few days. A few small bodies of francs-tireurs³⁴ may also come in; but, leaving all raw levies out of account, the chief portion of that grand army which can be concentrated there before the Germans arrive would, under all circumstances, consist of the troops retiring from Metz. And what these now may be, after Tuesday's fights, we shall have to learn.

^a French report of August 17, 1870 "Verdun, Aug. 17, 4.50 P.M.," *The Times*, No. 26832, August 18, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Custom-house officers.—*Ed.*

The nomination of General Trochu to the command of the army destined to defend Paris, so closely following upon his appointment to the command of the 12th Corps "forming at Paris," proves that it is not intended to send the mass of the troops now in Paris to the front. Paris must be kept down. And yet, who will be able to keep it down when the truth about last Tuesday's battle becomes known there?

THE CRISIS OF THE WAR^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1722, August 20, 1870]

The Emperor has left the army, but his evil genius has remained with it—that evil genius which hurried on, in hot impatience, the declaration of war and—that accomplished—was henceforth unable to make up its mind to anything. The army was to be ready to march by the 20th of July at latest. The 20th of July came and nothing had been done. On the 29th Napoleon III took the supreme command at Metz, there was still time for an almost unresisted advance up to the Rhine: yet the army did not stir. Hesitation even appears to have gone so far that the Emperor could not determine whether to attack at all, or to take up a position for defence. The heads of the German columns were already converging from all directions towards the Palatinate, and every day they might be expected to attack. Yet the French remained in their positions on the frontier—positions designed for an attack which was never made, and altogether unfit for the defence which was so soon to be their only choice. The hesitation which lasted from the 29th of July to the 5th of August has been characteristic of the whole campaign. The French army, being placed close to the frontier, was without advanced guards at the proper distances in front of the main body, and there were but two ways in which this defect could have been remedied. The advanced guards might have been pushed forward into the enemy's territory; or they might have been left in their actual positions on the border, and the main bodies drawn nearer together a day's march to the rear. But the first plan would have brought on collisions with the enemy under circumstances beyond

^a Written on August 20, 1870.—*Ed.*

the control of the Emperor; while the second would have involved the political impossibility of a retreat before the first battle. Thus, hesitation continued, and nothing at all was done; as if the enemy would be caught by the infection, and equally refrain from moving. But the enemy did move. The very day before the whole of his troops had arrived at the front, on the 4th of August, it was resolved to take advantage of the faulty disposition of the French. The battle of Wissembourg drew the whole of MacMahon's and Faily's corps still more away from the centre of the French position; and on the 6th, the Germans being now fully ready, their Third Army defeated MacMahon's six divisions at Woerth, and drove him, along with De Faily's remaining two divisions, by Saverne towards Lunéville, while the advanced bodies of their First and Second armies beat Frossard's and part of Bazaine's troops at Spicheren, and drove the whole centre and left of the French back upon Metz. Thus, all Lorraine lay between the two retreating French armies, and into this wide gap poured the German cavalry and, behind it, the infantry, in order to make the most of the advantage gained. The Crown Prince^a has been blamed for not having followed up MacMahon's beaten army to and beyond Saverne. But after Woerth the pursuit was carried out in the most correct manner. As soon as the beaten troops were driven so far south that they could regain the rest of the French army only by a circuitous route, the pursuers, marching straight on towards Nancy, kept continually between the two; and that this mode of pursuit (the same as Napoleon's after Jena⁸⁵) is at least as telling as a direct march in the rear of the fugitives is now shown by the results. Whatever there is still in existence of these eight divisions is either cut off from the main body or has joined it in a state of total disorganization.

Thus much for the consequences of the hesitation which marked the beginning of the campaign. It might surely have been expected that the same mistake would not again have been committed. The Emperor had resigned his command into the hands of Marshal Bazaine, and Marshal Bazaine might certainly have known that, whether he did or did not, the enemy would not allow the grass to grow under his feet.

The distance from Forbach to Metz is not quite fifty miles. Most of the corps had less than thirty miles to march. Three days would have brought all of them safely under shelter at Metz; and on the fourth the retreat towards Verdun and Châlons might have been

^a Frederick William.—*Ed.*

begun. For there could no longer be any doubt as to the necessity of that retreat. Marshal MacMahon's eight divisions and General Douay's remaining two divisions—more than one-third of the army—could not possibly rejoin Bazaine at any nearer point than Châlons. Bazaine had twelve divisions, including the Imperial Guard; so that even after he had been joined by three of Canrobert's divisions, he cannot have had, with cavalry and artillery, above 180,000 men—a force quite insufficient to meet his opponents in the field. Unless, therefore, he intended to abandon the whole of France to the invaders, and to allow himself to be shut up in a place where famine would soon compel him to surrender or to fight on terms dictated by the enemy, it seems as though he could not have had a moment's doubt about retreating from Metz at once. Yet he does not stir. On the 11th, the German cavalry is at Lunéville; still he gives no sign of moving. On the 12th they are across the Moselle, they make requisitions in Nancy, they tear up the railway between Metz and Frouard, they show themselves in Pont-à-Mousson. On the 13th their infantry occupy Pont-à-Mousson, and are thenceforth masters of both banks of the Moselle. At last, on Sunday, the 14th, Bazaine begins moving his men to the left bank of the river; the engagement at Pange is drawn on, by which the retreat is confessedly again retarded; and we may suppose that on Monday the actual retreat towards Châlons was commenced by sending off the heavy trains and artillery. But on that Monday the German cavalry were across the Meuse at Commercy, and within ten miles of the French line of retreat at Vigneulles. How many troops got away on Monday and early on Tuesday morning we cannot tell, but it appears certain that the main body was still behind when the German Third Corps and the reserve cavalry attacked the marching columns near Mars-la-Tour about nine in the morning on Tuesday, the 16th of August. The result is known: Bazaine's retreat was effectually stopped; on the 17th, his own telegrams show that he had at the most only maintained the position it was his one desire to leave behind him.

On Wednesday, the 17th, the two armies seem to have taken breath, but on Thursday any hopes that Bazaine might still have entertained of making good his retreat were fatally stricken down. The Prussians attacked him on that morning, and after nine hours' fighting

"the French [...] army was completely defeated, cut off from its communications with Paris, and driven back towards Metz."³⁶

On that evening or on the following day the Army of the Rhine must have re-entered the fortress it had left at the beginning of the week. Once cooped up there it will be easy for the Germans to cut off all supplies; the more so, as the country is already thoroughly drained of everything by the prolonged presence of the troops, and as the investing army is sure to require for its own use everything that can be got together. Thus, famine must soon compel Bazaine to move; but in what direction it is difficult to tell. A move to the west is sure to be resisted by overwhelming forces; one to the north is extremely dangerous; one to the south-east might perhaps partially succeed, but it would be wholly barren of immediate results. Even if he reached Belfort or Besançon with a disorganized army, he could not exercise any appreciable influence upon the fate of the campaign. This is the situation to which hesitation in the second phase of the campaign has brought the French army. No doubt it is accurately known to the Government in Paris. The recall of the Mobile Guard from Châlons to Paris proves it. From the moment Bazaine's main forces are cut off, the position of Châlons, which was a mere place of rendezvous, and nothing else, has lost all importance. The nearest place of rendezvous now for all forces is Paris, and thither everything must now move. There is no force whatever which could oppose in the field the Third German Army, now probably moving upon the capital. Before long the French will find out, by a practical trial, whether or not the fortifications of Paris are worth their cost.

Though this crowning catastrophe has been impending for days, it is hardly possible as yet to realize that it has actually come to pass. No expectations went the length of this reality. A fortnight ago Englishmen were speculating on the possible consequences of the French army winning the first great battle. The danger to which their fears most pointed was that Napoleon III might make such an initial success the occasion of a hasty peace at the expense of Belgium. Upon this point they were speedily reassured. The battles of Woerth and Forbach showed that no theatrical triumph was in store for the French arms. The demonstration that Germany had nothing to fear from France seemed to promise well for the speedy ending of the war. The time must soon come, it was thought, when the French would acknowledge that the attempt to control the consolidation of Germany under Prussia had failed, and that, consequently, they had nothing left to fight for, while the Germans would hardly care to go on waging a chequered and doubtful war, when the admission it was designed to extort had been already conceded. The first five days of this

week have again changed the whole face of affairs. The military power of France has to all appearance been utterly overthrown, and for the time being there seems to be no limit to German ambition except the doubtful barrier of German moderation. We cannot attempt as yet to estimate the political results of this tremendous reverse. We can only look on in wonder at its magnitude and its suddenness, and in admiration at the manner in which it has been sustained by the French troops. That after four days of almost constant fighting under the most discouraging conditions possible they should on the fifth have resisted the attack of greatly superior numbers for nine hours reflects infinite credit upon their courage and resolution. Never in its most triumphant campaigns has the French army won more real glory than in its disastrous retreat from Metz.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XI^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1725, August 24, 1870]

Although still without full details of the three terrible battles fought last week around Metz,³⁷ we have learned enough about them to be able now to give an intelligible account of what actually occurred.

The battle of Sunday, the 14th of August, was commenced by the Germans, with the intention of delaying the retreat of the French towards Verdun. The remnant of Frossard's corps was observed to cross the Moselle towards Longeville on Sunday afternoon; signs of moving were visible among the troops encamped east of Metz. The First (East Prussian) and Seventh (Westphalian and Hanoverian) army corps were ordered to attack. They drove the French in until they themselves got within range of the forts; but the French, foreseeing such a movement, had massed large bodies in sheltered positions in the valley of the Moselle, and in a narrow clough, through which a brook runs east and west, joining the main river to the north of Metz. These masses suddenly fell upon the right flank of the Germans, already suffering from the fire of the forts, and are said to have driven them back in confusion; after which the French must have retired again, for it is certain that the Germans remained in possession of that part of the battle-field which is out of range of the forts, and that they retired to their former bivouacs after daybreak only. We know this both from private letters written by men engaged in the battle,³⁸ and from a correspondent's letter from Metz in Monday's^b *Manchester Guardian*, who visited the battle-field on Monday morning, and found it in the occupation of the Prussians, by

^a Written on August 23 or 24, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b August 15.—*Ed.*

whom the French wounded, then still remaining there, were being attended to. Both parties, in a certain sense, may claim to have attained the object for which the contest was engaged: the French enticed the Germans into a trap and made them suffer severely; the Germans delayed the French retreat until Prince Frederick Charles could gain the line by which this retreat was to be effected. On the German side there were two corps, or four divisions, engaged; on the French side, Decaen's and Ladmirault's corps, and part of the Guards, or above seven divisions. The French in this battle were thus in a great numerical superiority. Their position is also said to have been greatly strengthened by rifle pits and trenches, from which they fired with more coolness than usual.

The retreat of the Army of the Rhine towards Verdun was not commenced in force before Tuesday, the 16th. At that time the heads of Prince Frederick Charles's columns—the 3rd Army Corps (Brandenburgers)—were just reaching the neighbourhood of Mars-la-Tour. They attacked at once, and for six hours held the French army at bay. Reinforced later on by the 10th Army Corps (Hanoverians and Westphalians), and portions of the 8th (Rhinelanders) and 9th (Schleswig-Holsteiners and Mecklenburgers), they not only maintained their position, but drove back the enemy, took two eagles, seven cannon, and above 2,000 prisoners. The forces against them consisted of Decaen's, Ladmirault's, Frossard's, and part at least of Canrobert's corps (they had reached Metz from Châlons during the last days the railway via Frouard was still open), and the Guards, or, in all, from fourteen to fifteen divisions. The eight German divisions were thus again faced by superior numbers, even if, as is likely, not all Bazaine's troops were engaged. It is well to keep this in mind, while the French accounts continue to explain all reverses by their being constantly outnumbered.^a That the French were effectively stopped in their retrograde movement is clear from the fact that they themselves speak of rearguard engagements having taken place on the 17th near Gravelotte, more than five miles to the rear of their own position of the 16th.^b At the same time, the fact that only four German corps could be brought up on Tuesday shows that the success they obtained was incomplete. Captain Jeannerod, who came on the 17th from Briey to Conflans, found there two cavalry regiments of the French Guard much cut up and taking flight at


^a See the report "Paris, Aug. 22", *The Times*, No. 26835, August 22, 1870.—Ed.

^b "Paris, Aug. 17", *The Times*, No. 26834, August 20, 1870.—Ed.

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE-ST. PRIVAT ON AUGUST 18, 1870 AND SIEGE OF METZ

1.5 0 1.5 3 km

BATTLE OF MARS-LA-TOUR ON AUGUST 16, 1870



the bare cry, "The Prussians are coming!"^a This proves that though the road by Etain, on the evening of the 16th, might not be actually in the possession of the Germans, they were so near as to render impossible any retreat by it without another battle. Bazaine, however, seems to have given up all thought of that, for he entrenched himself in a very strong position near Gravelotte, and there awaited the attack of the Germans, which took place on the 18th.

The plateau, over which runs the road from Mars-la-Tour by Gravelotte to Metz, is intersected by a series of deep ravines, formed by brooks running from north to south towards the Moselle. There is one of these ravines immediately in front (west) of Gravelotte; two others run, in parallel lines, to the rear of the first. Each of these forms a strong defensive position, which had been reinforced by earthworks, and by the barricading and loopholing of such farmyards and villages as occupied places of tactical importance. To receive in this strong entrenched position the enemy, to let them break their heads against it, to hurl them back finally by a mighty "retour offensif,"^b and thus clear the road to Verdun—this was evidently the only hope left to Bazaine. But the attack was made with such forces and with such energy that position after position was taken, and the Army of the Rhine driven back close under the guns of Metz. Against fourteen or fifteen French divisions twelve German divisions were actually engaged, and four more in reserve. The numbers engaged on both sides would be not far from equal; on the whole somewhat in favour of the Germans, four of their six corps having been nearly intact; but this slight numerical superiority would by no means make up for the strength of the French position.

French opinion still hesitates to accept the full reality of the position created for Bazaine and his army, a position the counterpart of that into which General Bonaparte drove Wurmser at Mantua, 1796, and Mack at Ulm, 1805.³⁹ That the brilliant Army of the Rhine, the hope and strength of France, should after fourteen days' campaigning be reduced to the choice either to attempt to force its passage through the enemy under disastrous circumstances, or to capitulate, is more than the French can bring themselves to believe. They look for all possible explanations. One theory is that Bazaine is, so to say, sacrificing himself in order to gain time for MacMahon and Paris. While Bazaine retains two of

^a G. Jeannerod, "Correspondances particulières du Temps, Briey, mercredi 17 août", *Le Temps*, No. 3461, Aug. 20, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Counter-attack.—*Ed.*

the three German armies before Metz, Paris can organize her defences, and MacMahon will have time to create a fresh army. Bazaine thus remains at Metz, not because he cannot help it, but because it is in the interest of France he should be there. But where, it may be asked, are the elements of MacMahon's new army? His own corps, now numbering at most 15,000 men; De Failly's remaining troops, disorganized and scattered by a long circuitous retreat—he is said to have arrived at Vitry-le-François with but 7,000 or 8,000 men; perhaps one division of Canrobert's; the two divisions of Félix Douay's, the whereabouts of which nobody seems to know: about 40,000 men, including the marines of the intended Baltic expedition. These include every battalion and squadron which is left to France of its old army outside of Metz. To these would come the fourth battalions. They appear now to be arriving in Paris in pretty good numbers, but filled up to a great extent with recruits. The whole of these troops may reach something like 130,000 to 150,000 men; but this new army is not to be compared in quality to the old Army of the Rhine. The old regiments in it cannot but have suffered greatly from demoralization. The new battalions have been formed in a hurry, contain many recruits, and cannot be as well officered as the old army. The proportion of cavalry and artillery must be very small indeed; the mass of the cavalry is in Metz, and the stores necessary for the equipment of new batteries, harness, &c., appear in some instances to exist on paper only. Jeannerod quotes an example in Sunday's *Temps*.^a As to the Mobile Guard, after having been brought back from Châlons to Saint Maur, near Paris, it appears to have dispersed altogether, for want of provisions. And it is to gain time for forces like these that the whole of the best army which France possesses should be sacrificed. And sacrificed it is, if it is true that it is shut up in Metz. If Bazaine had got his army into its present position advisedly, he would have committed a blunder compared to which all previous blunders of the war would sink into nothing. In regard to Bazaine's rumoured retreat from Metz and junction with MacMahon at Montmédy, the refutation of the story to which *The Standard* yesterday gave circulation has been sufficiently accomplished by the writer of the military review in the same journal this morning. Even if any detachments of Bazaine's force have escaped to the north after or in the course of the recent engagements round Mars-la-Tour, the bulk of his army is still locked up in Metz.

^a G. Jeannerod, "Correspondances particulières du Temps. Reims, samedi 20 août, 3 heures", *Le Temps*, No. 3463, August 22, 1870.—Ed.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XII^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1727, August 26, 1870]

The two latest facts of the war are these—that the Crown Prince^b is pushing on beyond Châlons, and that MacMahon has moved his whole army from Reims, whither is not exactly known. MacMahon, according to French reports, finds the war getting on too slowly; in order to hasten its decision he is now said to be marching from Reims to the relief of Bazaine.^c This would indeed be hurrying on matters to an almost final crisis.

In our Wednesday's publication we estimated MacMahon's force at from 130,000 to 150,000 men on the assumption that all the troops from Paris had joined him.^d We were right in supposing that he had at Châlons the remnants of his own and of De Failly's troops; also that Douay's two divisions were at Châlons, whither we know now they went by a circuitous railway journey viâ Paris; also that the marines and other portions of the Baltic corps were there. But we now learn that there are still troops of the line in the forts round Paris; that a portion of MacMahon's and Frossard's men, especially cavalry, have gone back to Paris to be reorganized, and that MacMahon has only about 80,000 regular troops in camp. We may, therefore, reduce our estimate by fully 25,000 men, and set down 110,000 to 120,000 men as the maximum of MacMahon's forces, one-third of which would consist of raw levies. And with this army he is said to have set out to relieve Bazaine at Metz.

Now, MacMahon's next and more immediate opponent is the army of the Crown Prince. It occupied on the 24th with its

^a Written on August 25, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Frederick William.—*Ed.*

^c "Paris, Aug. 24, Evening", *The Times*, No. 26838, August 25, 1870.—*Ed.*

^d See this volume, p. 66.—*Ed.*

outposts the former camp of Châlons, which fact is telegraphed to us from Bar-le-Duc.^a From this we may conclude that at that town were then the head-quarters. MacMahon's nearest road to Metz is by Verdun. From Reims to Verdun by an almost straight country road there is fully seventy miles; by the high road, *viâ* St. Ménehould, it is above eighty miles. This latter road, moreover, leads through the camp of Châlons—that is to say, through the German lines. From Bar-le-Duc to Verdun the distance is less than forty miles.

Thus not only can the army of the Crown Prince fall upon the flank of MacMahon's march if he use either of the above roads to Verdun, but it can get behind the Meuse and join the remaining two German armies between Verdun and Metz, long before MacMahon can debouch from Verdun on the right bank of the Meuse. And all this would remain unaltered, even if the Crown Prince had advanced as far as Vitry-le-François, or required an extra day to concentrate his troops from their extended front of march; so great is the difference of distance in his favour.

Under these circumstances it may be doubted whether MacMahon will use either of the roads indicated; whether he will not at once withdraw from the immediate sphere of action of the Crown Prince, and choose the road from Reims by Vouziers, Grandpré, and Varennes, to Verdun, or by Vouziers to Stenay, where he would pass the Meuse, and then march south-east upon Metz. But that would only be to secure a momentary advantage in order to make final defeat doubly certain. Both these routes are still more circuitous, and would allow still more time to the Crown Prince to unite his forces with those before Metz, and thus to oppose to both MacMahon and Bazaine a crushing superiority of numbers.

Thus, whichever way MacMahon chooses to get near Metz, he cannot shake off the Crown Prince, who, moreover, cannot be denied the choice of fighting him either singly or in conjunction with the other German armies. From this it is evident that MacMahon's move to the relief of Bazaine would be a gross mistake, so long as he has not completely disposed of the Crown Prince. To get to Metz, his shortest, quickest, and safest road is right across the Third German Army. If he were to march straight upon it, attack it wherever he finds it, defeat it, and drive it for a few days in a south-easterly direction, so as to interpose his

^a German official report "Bar-le-Duc, Aug. 24, 9 P.M", *The Times*, No. 26838, August 25, 1870.—Ed.

victorious army like a wedge between it and the other two German armies—in the same way as the Crown Prince has shown him how to do it—then, and not till then, would he have a chance to get to Metz and set Bazaine free. But if he felt himself strong enough to do this, we may be sure he would have done it at once. Thus, the withdrawal from Reims assumes a different aspect. It is not so much a move towards the relief of Bazaine from Steinmetz and Frederick Charles as a move for the relief of MacMahon from the Crown Prince. And from this point of view it is the worst that could be made. It abandons all direct communications with Paris to the mercy of the enemy. It draws off the last available forces of France away from the centre towards the periphery, and places them intentionally farther away from the centre than the enemy is already. Such a move might be excusable if undertaken with largely superior numbers; but here it is undertaken with hopelessly inferior numbers and in the face of the almost certainty of defeat. And what will that defeat bring? Wherever it occurs it will push the remnants of the beaten army away from Paris towards the northern frontier, where they may be driven upon neutral ground or forced to capitulate. MacMahon, if he really has undertaken the move in question, is deliberately placing his army in exactly the same position in which Napoleon's flank march round the southern end of the Thuringian forest in 1806 placed the Prussian army at Jena. A numerically and morally weaker army is deliberately placed in a position where, after a defeat, its only line of retreat is through a narrow strip of territory leading towards neutral territory or the sea. Napoleon forced the Prussians to capitulate by reaching Stettin before them.⁴⁰ MacMahon's troops may have to surrender in that little strip of French territory jutting out into Belgium between Mézières and Charlemont-Givet.⁴¹ In the very best of cases they may escape to the northern fortresses—Valenciennes, Lille, &c., where, at all events, they will be harmless. And then France will be at the mercy of the invader.

The whole plan seems so wild that it can only be explained as having arisen from political necessities. It looks more like a *coup de désespoir*^a than anything else. It looks as if anything must be done, anything risked, before Paris be allowed fully to understand the actual situation. It is the plan not of a strategist, but of an "Algérien,"⁴² used to fight irregulars; the plan not of a soldier, but of a political and military adventurer, such as have had it all

^a An act of despair.—*Ed.*

their own way in France these last nineteen years. The language ascribed to MacMahon in justifying this resolve is quite in keeping with this. "What would they say" if he did not march to the aid of Bazaine? Yes, but "what would they say" if he got himself into a worse position than Bazaine has got himself into? It is the Second Empire all over. To keep up appearances, to hide defeat, is the thing most required. Napoleon staked all upon one card, and lost it; and now MacMahon is again going to play *va banque*, when the odds are ten to one against him. The sooner France is freed from these men the better for her. It is her only hope.

^a "Paris, Aug. 24, Evening", *The Times*, No. 26838, August 25, 1870.—*Ed.*

NOTES ON THE WAR—XIII^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1728, August 27, 1870]

Yesterday a piece of news was telegraphed which caused great sensation among our contemporaries. It came from Berlin, and was to this effect, that the King's head-quarters had been moved to Bar-le-Duc, that corps of the First and Second Armies remained facing Bazaine's army, and that the remainder of the German forces "had resolutely entered upon their march to Paris."^b

Hitherto the movements of the German armies have been kept secret during their execution. It was only when the move had been completed, when the blow had been struck, that we learned whither the troops had been going. It seems strange that this system should be reversed all at once; that taciturn Moltke should, without any visible occasion for it, all of a sudden proclaim to the world that he is marching upon Paris, and "resolutely" too.

At the same time we hear that the advanced troops of the Crown Prince^c are pushed nearer and nearer to Paris, and that his cavalry spread more and more towards the south. Even in Château-Thierry, almost half way between Châlons and Paris, the dreaded Uhlans are said to have been seen.

Might there not be a special reason, not quite evident at the first glance, why this announcement of the intentions of the King of Prussia should be made just now, and why, at the same time, the German cavalry should redouble their activity?

^a Written on August 26, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Prussian telegram, datelined "Berlin, Aug. 25", *The Times*, No. 26839, August 26, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c Frederick William.—*Ed.*

Let us compare dates. On the evening of Monday, the 22nd, MacMahon commenced his movements through Reims on the road to Rethel, and for more than fourteen hours the columns passed continually through the town. By the evening of Wednesday, if not before, the news of this march might have reached the German head-quarters. There could be but one meaning in it: the intention to set free Bazaine from the trap in which he is shut up. The more MacMahon advanced in the direction he had taken the more would he endanger his communications with Paris and his line of retreat, the more would he place himself between the German army and the Belgian frontier. Let him once get beyond the Meuse, which he is said to intend passing at Laneuville, opposite Stenay, and his retreat may easily be cut off. Now, what could more encourage MacMahon to persist in his dangerous manoeuvre than the news that, while he was hurrying to the relief of Bazaine, the Germans had left only a comparatively small portion of their forces before Metz, and were marching "resolutely" upon Paris with the great body of their troops? Thus on Wednesday night this same piece of news is telegraphed from Pont-à-Mousson to Berlin, from Berlin to London, from London to Paris and Reims, whence no doubt MacMahon has at once been favoured with the information; and while he marches on towards Stenay, Longuyon, and Briey, the army of the Crown Prince, leaving a corps or two in Champagne, where now nothing opposes them, would draw off the rest towards St. Mihiel, pass the Meuse there, and try to gain by Fresnes a position threatening the communications of MacMahon's army with the Meuse, and yet within supporting distance of the German troops before Metz. If this were to succeed, and if MacMahon were to be defeated under these circumstances, his army would have either to pass into neutral territory or to surrender to the Germans.

There can be no doubt that MacMahon's movements are perfectly well known at the German head-quarters. From the moment the battle of Rezonville (or Gravelotte, as it is to be officially called) had settled the fact that Bazaine was shut up in Metz, from that moment MacMahon's army was the next object, not only of the army of the Crown Prince, but also of all other troops which could be spared from before Metz. In 1814, indeed, the Allies, after the junction of Blücher and Schwarzenberg between Arcis-sur-Aube and Châlons, marched upon Paris, entirely disregarding Napoleon's march towards the Rhine,⁴³ and this march decided the campaign. But at that time Napoleon had been defeated at Arcis and was unable to stand against the allied

army; there was no French army shut up by allied troops in a border fortress which he might relieve; and, above all things, Paris was not fortified. Now, on the contrary, whatever may be the military value, numerically and morally, represented by MacMahon's army, there is no doubt that it is quite sufficient to raise the investment of Metz, if that investment be carried out by no more troops than are necessary to hold Bazaine in check. And, on the other hand, whatever may be thought of the fortifications of Paris, nobody will be foolhardy enough to expect that they will fall like the walls of Jericho, before the first trumpet blast of the invaders.^a They will at least compel either a lengthy investment to starve out the defence, or a beginning, if not more, of a regular siege. Thus, while the Germans were "resolutely" arriving before Paris, and brought to a dead stop by the forts, MacMahon would defeat the German troops before Metz, unite with Bazaine, and then France would have an army upon the communications and lines of supply of the Germans strong enough to compel them to retreat more "resolutely" than they had advanced.

If MacMahon's army, then, be too strong to be neglected by the Germans under the circumstances, we must come to the conclusion that the intelligence of the resolute march of King William to Paris, which most of our contemporaries consider of the highest importance, either is a piece of false news thrown out intentionally to mislead the enemy, or, if it be really an indiscreet publication of correct news, represents a resolution come to before MacMahon's latest move was known, in which case it will be speedily reversed. In either case, a corps or two may continue to advance towards Paris, but the mass of all available troops will be marched north-east⁴⁴ to reap to the full those advantages which MacMahon almost throws at their feet.⁴⁵

^a Joshua 6:20.—*Ed.*

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XIV^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1731, August 31, 1870]

The Germans have again been too quick for MacMahon. The Fourth Army, under the Crown Prince Albert of Saxony, comprising at least two corps (the Prussian Guards and the 12th or Royal Saxon Corps), if not more, have pushed at once up to the Meuse, secured passages somewhere between Stenay and Verdun, and sent their cavalry across. The defiles of the Argonnes are in their power. At St. Ménehould last Thursday^b they took 800 Gardes Mobiles prisoners, and at Buzancy on Saturday they defeated a French cavalry brigade. On their road they pushed a strong reconnaissance against Verdun last Thursday,^c but, finding the place in condition to receive them, they did not persist in an attack by main force.

MacMahon, who in the meantime had left Reims on the 22nd and 23rd with an army, according to French reports, of 150,000 men, well equipped, well provided with artillery, ammunition, and provisions,^c had not, on the evening of the 25th, got farther than Rethel, about twenty-three miles beyond Reims. How long he continued there, and when he left it, we do not know for certain. But the cavalry engagement at Buzancy, which is on the road to Stenay, some twenty miles farther on, proves that even on Saturday his infantry had not yet arrived there. This slowness of movement contrasts vividly with the activity of the Germans. No doubt, to a great extent it is caused by the composition of his

^a Written on August 30 or 31, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b August 25.—*Ed.*

^c "Paris, Aug. 23", *The Times*, No. 26837, August 24, 1870; "Paris, Aug. 24, Evening", *The Times*, No. 26838, August 25, 1870.—*Ed.*

army, which contains either more or less demoralized troops, or new formations in which young recruits are predominating; some of them are even mere volunteer corps with numbers of non-professional officers. It is evident that this army can neither have the discipline nor the cohesion of the old "Army of the Rhine," and that it will be almost impossible to move from 120,000 to 150,000 men of this sort both rapidly and with order. Then there are the trains. The great mass of the heavy trains of the Army of the Rhine did certainly escape from Metz on the 14th and 15th, but it may be imagined that they were not in the very best of conditions; it may be assumed that their supply of ammunition and the state of their horses are not all that is to be desired. And finally, we may take it for granted that the French Intendance has not mended since the beginning of the war, and that consequently the provisioning of a large army in an extremely poor country will be no easy matter. But even if we allow very liberally for all these obstacles, we shall still be compelled to see besides in MacMahon's dilatoriness a distinct symptom of indecision. His nearest way to the relief of Bazaine, the direct road by Verdun once given up, was that by Stenay, and in that direction he struck. But before he got farther than Reims he must have known that the Germans had seized upon the passages of the Meuse, and that the right flank of his columns on the road to Stenay was not safe. This rapidity of the German advance appears to have disconcerted his plans. We are told that on Friday he was still at Reims, where he received fresh reinforcements from Paris, and that he intended to move to Mézières next day. As we have had no authentic news of important engagements, this appears very probable. It would imply an almost complete abandonment of his plan to relieve Bazaine; for a movement through the narrow strip of French territory on the right bank of the Meuse, between Mézières and Stenay, would have its great difficulties and dangers, cause fresh delay, and give his opponents ample time to envelop him from all sides. For there can be no doubt now that quite sufficient forces have been sent northwards for this purpose from the army of the Crown Prince. Whatever we hear of the whereabouts of the Third Army points to a northward movement by the three great routes most handy for the purpose—Epernay, Reims, Reims; Reims; Châlons, Vouziers; and Bar-le-Duc, Varennes, Grandpré. The fact of the engagement at Saint Ménehould being telegraphed from Bar-le-Duc^a renders it even possible that it was

^a German official report "Bar-le-Duc, Aug. 26", *The Times*, No. 26842, August 30, 1870.—*Ed.*

part of the Third Army which there defeated the Mobs and occupied the town.

But what can be MacMahon's intention if he really moves upon Mézières? We doubt whether he has any very clear idea himself of what he intends doing. We now know that his march northwards was, to a certain extent at least, forced upon him by the insubordination of his men, who grumbled at the "retreat" from the camp of Châlons to Reims, and rather strongly demanded to be led against the enemy. The march to relieve Bazaine was then entered upon. By the end of the week MacMahon may have been pretty well convinced that his army had not the mobility necessary for a direct march upon Stenay, and that he had better take the, for the moment, safer road by Mézières. This would certainly postpone and might render impracticable the intended relief of Bazaine; but had MacMahon ever any very decided faith in his ability to effect that? We doubt it. And then the move on Mézières would, at all events, delay the enemy's march upon Paris, give the Parisians more time to complete their defence, gain time for the organization of the armies of reserve behind the Loire and at Lyons; and in case of need might he not retire along the northern frontier upon the threefold belt of fortresses, and try whether there was not some "quadrilateral" among them? Some such more or less indefinite ideas may have induced MacMahon, who certainly does not seem to be anything of a strategist, to make a second false move after once having entangled himself in a first one; and thus we see the last army which France has, and probably will have, in the field during this war march deliberately to its ruin, from which only the grossest blunders of the enemy can save it; and that enemy has not made one mistake yet.

We say the last army which France probably will have in the field during this war. Bazaine has to be given up, unless MacMahon can relieve him, and that is more than doubtful. MacMahon's army, in the best of cases, will get scattered among the fortresses on the northern frontier, where it will be harmless. The reserve armies that are now spoken about will be raw levies, mingled with a certain number of old soldiers, and unavoidably commanded by chiefly unprofessional officers; they will be armed with all sorts of arms; they will be totally unused to the breech-loaders, which is tantamount to saying that their ammunition will be spent before it is really wanted—in one word, they will be unfit for the field, fit for nothing but the defence of fortifications. While the Germans have not only brought their battalions and squadrons to their full complement again, but keep

sending division after division of landwehr to France, the French fourth battalions are not complete yet. Only sixty-six of them have been formed into "régiments de marche,"^a and sent either to Paris or to MacMahon; the remaining thirty-four were not ready to march out a few days ago. The army organization fails everywhere; and a noble and gallant nation finds all its efforts for self-defence unavailing, because it has for twenty years suffered its destinies to be guided by a set of adventurers who turned administration, government, army, navy—in fact, all France—into a source of pecuniary profit to themselves.

^a Regiments ready for battle.—*Ed.*

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XV^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1733, September 2, 1870]

On the 26th of August, when the whole of our contemporaries, with scarcely one exception, were far too busy descanting upon the immense importance of the Crown Prince's^b "resolute" march upon Paris to have any time left for MacMahon, we ventured to point out that the really important movement of the day was that which the latter general was reported to be making for the relief of Metz. We said that in case of defeat "MacMahon's troops may have to surrender in that little strip of French territory jutting out into Belgium between Mézières and Charlemont-Givet."^c

What we presumed then is now almost accomplished. MacMahon has with him the 1st (his own), 5th (formerly De Failly's, now Wimpffen's), 7th (Douay's), and 12th (Lebrun's) corps, with such troops as could be spared from Paris up to the 29th, including even those rebellious Mobiles of Saint Maur; and, besides, the cavalry of Canrobert's corps, which was left at Châlons. The whole force will represent, perhaps, 150,000 men, barely one half of which are troops of the old army; the rest, fourth battalions and Mobiles, in about equal proportions. It is said to be well provided with artillery, but of this a great portion must consist of newly-formed batteries, and it is notoriously very weak in cavalry. Even if this army should be numerically stronger than we estimate it, this excess must consist of new levies, and will not add to its strength, which we can scarcely deem to be equivalent to a force of 100,000 good soldiers.

MacMahon left Reims for Bethel and the Meuse on the evening of the 22nd, but the 13th Corps was despatched from Paris on the

^a Written on September 1, 1870.—*Ed*

^b Frederick William.—*Ed*

^c See this volume, p. 69.—*Ed*

28th and 29th only; and as by that time the direct railway to Rethel, viâ Reims, was menaced by the enemy, these troops had to be sent round by the Northern of France Railway, by St. Quentin, Avesnes, and Hirson. They could not complete their journey before the 30th or 31st, and then fighting had already begun in earnest; so that the troops for which MacMahon had waited were not there after all when wanted. For, while he kept losing time between Rethel, Mézières, and Stenay, the Germans came marching on from all sides. On the 27th a brigade of his advanced cavalry was defeated at Buzancy. On the 28th, Vouziers, an important crossing of roads in the Argonne, was in German hands, and two of their squadrons charged and took Vrizy, a village occupied by infantry, who had to surrender—a feat, by-the-by, of which there is but one previous example—the taking of Dembe Wielkie by Polish cavalry, from Russian infantry and cavalry, in 1831.^a On the 29th no engagements are reported from any trustworthy source. But on the 30th (Tuesday) the Germans, having concentrated sufficient forces, fell upon MacMahon and defeated him. The German accounts speak of a battle near Beaumont,^a and of an engagement near Nouart^b (on the road from Stenay to Buzancy),⁴⁷ but Belgian reports refer to fighting on the right bank of the Meuse, between Mouzon and Carignan.^c The two can be easily reconciled, and supposing the Belgian telegrams to be substantially correct, the German Fourth Army (4th, 12th, and Guards corps) appear to have had the 4th and 12th corps on the left bank of the Moselle, where they were joined by the First Bavarian Corps, the first instalment of the Third Army arriving from the South. They met MacMahon's main forces at Beaumont, marching evidently in the direction of Mézières to Stenay; they attacked them, a portion, probably the Bavarians, falling upon and overlapping their right flank, and pushing them away from their direct line of retreat towards the Meuse at Mouzon, where the difficulty and delay of the passage over the bridge would account for their great losses of prisoners, artillery, and stores. While this was going on, the advanced guard of the 12th German Corps, which appears to have been sent off in a different direction, met the 5th French Corps (Wimpffen's) marching, to all appearances, by way of Le Chêne Populeux, the valley of the Bar, and Buzancy,

^a "Buzancy, Aug. 30", *The Times*, No. 26844, September 1, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b "Varennes, Aug. 30, Afternoon", *The Times*, No. 26844, September 1, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c "Florenville (Belgium), Aug. 31", *The Times*, No. 26844, September 1, 1870.—*Ed.*

towards the flank of the Germans. The encounter took place at Nouart, about seven miles south of Beaumont, and was successful for the Germans; that is to say, they succeeded in stopping Wimpffen's flank movement while the fighting was going on at Beaumont. A third portion of MacMahon's forces, according to the Belgian reports, must have advanced on the right bank of the Meuse, where it is said to have encamped the previous night at Vaux, between Carignan and Mouzon; but this corps, too, was attacked by the Germans (probably the Guards) and completely defeated, with the loss, as is alleged, of four mitrailleurs.^a

The *ensemble* of these three engagements (always supposing the Belgian accounts to be substantially correct) would constitute that complete defeat of MacMahon which we have repeatedly predicted.^b The four corps opposed to him would now number about 100,000 men, but it is questionable whether they were all engaged. MacMahon's troops, as we have said, would be equivalent to about that number of good soldiers.^c That their resistance was nothing like that of the old Army of the Rhine is implied in the remark of a German official telegram, that "out losses are moderate,"^d and the number of prisoners taken. It is too early yet to attempt to criticise MacMahon's tactical arrangements for and during this battle, as we know scarcely anything about them. But his strategy cannot be too strongly condemned. He has thrown away every fair chance of escape. His position between Rethel and Mézières rendered it possible for him to fight so as to have his retreat open to Laon and Soissons, and thereby the means of again reaching Paris or western France. Instead of this, he fought as if his only line of retreat was to Mézières, and as if Belgium belonged to him. He is said to be at Sedan, the victorious Germans will by this time have lined the left bank of the Meuse, not only before that fortress, but also before Mézières, whence their left will, in another day or so, extend to the Belgian frontier near Rocroi, and then MacMahon will be shut up in that little strip of territory upon which we placed our finger six days ago.

Once there, he has but little choice left to him. He has four fortresses around him—Sedan, Mézières, Rocroi, and Charlemont; but upon twelve square miles of territory, with an overpowering

^a "Florenville (Belgium), Aug. 31", *The Times*, No. 26844, September 1, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 69, 72 and 76.—*Ed.*

^c See this volume, p. 78.—*Ed.*

^d William I's telegram to the Queen "Varennnes, Aug. 30, Afternoon", *The Times*, No. 26844, September 1, 1870.—*Ed.*

army in front, and a neutral country in the rear, he cannot play at quadrilaterals. He will be starved out or fought out; he will be compelled to surrender either to the Prussians or to the Belgians. But there is one other course open to him. We said just now he had acted as if Belgium belonged to him. What if he really thought so? What if the whole mystery at the bottom of this inexplicable strategy was a settled determination to use Belgian territory as if it belonged to France? From Charlemont there is a straight road through Belgium, by Philippeville, to French territory, near Maubeuge. This road is but one half of the distance from Mézières to Maubeuge through French territory. What if MacMahon intended to use that road for escape, in case he was reduced to the last extremity? The Belgians, he may think, will not be in a condition to effectually resist an army as strong as his; and if the Germans, as is very likely, follow MacMahon into Belgian territory, in case the Belgians cannot stop him, why, then there arise new political complications which may better, but cannot render much worse, the present situation of France. Moreover, if MacMahon should succeed in driving but one German patrol upon Belgian ground, the breach of neutrality would be established, and form an excuse for his subsequent violation of Belgium. Such ideas may have passed through the head of this old Algerian; they are in keeping with African warfare, and, indeed, they are almost the only ones by which such strategy as he has shown can be excused. But even that chance may be cut off from him; if the Crown Prince acts with his usual quickness, he may possibly reach Monthermé and the junction of the rivers Semois and Meuse before MacMahon, and then MacMahon would be pent up between Semois and Sedan on about as much ground as his men require for a camp, and without any hope of a short cut through neutral ground.

THE FRENCH DEFEATS^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1734, September 3, 1870]

A large army, when driven into a corner, dies hard. It took first of all three battles to teach Bazaine's troops that they were really shut up in Metz, and then thirty-six hours' desperate fighting through day and night on Wednesday and Thursday last⁴⁸ to convince them—if even then convinced—that there was no opening for escape through the toils in which the Prussians had caught them. Nor was the battle of Tuesday enough to compel MacMahon to give in. A fresh battle—apparently the greatest and most bloody of all the series—had to be fought on Thursday,⁴⁹ and he himself wounded, before he was brought to a sense of his real position. The first account of the fighting near Beaumont^b and Carignan^c appears to have been substantially correct, with this exception, that the line of retreat of the French corps engaged at Beaumont, which ran on the left bank of the Meuse to Sedan, was not cut off entirely. Some portion of these troops seem to have escaped on the left bank to Sedan—at least there was fighting again on that same bank on Thursday. Then there appears to be some doubt as to the date of the engagement of Nouart, which the staff in Berlin are disposed to think took place on Monday.^d This would certainly make the German telegrams agree better, and, if so, the turning movement which was ascribed to the French Fifth Corps would equally fall to the ground.

^a Written on September 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Prussian telegram, datelined "Buzancy, Aug. 30", *The Times*, No. 26844, September 1, 1870.—*Ed.*


^c Engels refers to the telegram reproduced from the Belgian *L'Etoile* in *The Times*, No. 26844, September 1, 1870, under the heading "Carignan, Aug. 30, 4 P.M."—*Ed.*

^d Prussian telegram, datelined "Berlin, Sept. 1", *The Times*, No. 26845, September 2, 1870.—*Ed.*

BATTLE OF GRAVELOTTE-ST. PRIVAT ON AUGUST 18, 1870 AND SIEGE OF METZ

1,5 0 1,5 3 km

BATTLE OF MARS-LA-TOUR ON AUGUST 16, 1870



PRUSSIAN ARMY

Positions and operations

X, XII Corps
G Guard

FRENCH ARMY

Positions and operations

IV, VI Corps
G Guard

SIEGE OF METZ

French troops
Prussian troops

The result of the fighting on Tuesday was disastrous to the French corps engaged. Above twenty cannon, eleven mitrailleurs, and 7,000 prisoners are results almost equivalent to those of Woerth, but conquered much more easily, and with much smaller sacrifices. The French were driven back on both banks of the Meuse to the immediate neighbourhood of Sedan. On the left bank their position after the battle appears to have been defined to the west by the River Bar and the Canal des Ardennes, both of which run along the same valley, and enter the Meuse at Villers, between Sedan and Mézières; on the east, by the ravine and brook running from Raucourt to the Meuse at Remilly. Having thus both flanks secured, their main body would occupy the intervening plateau, ready to meet an attack from any side. On the right bank, the river Chiers, which joins the Meuse about four miles above Sedan, opposite Remilly, must have been crossed by the French after Tuesday's battle. There are three parallel ravines, running north and south from the Belgian frontier, the first and second towards the Chiers, the third and largest immediately in front of Sedan, towards the Meuse. On the second of these, near its highest point, is the village of Cernay; on the third, above, where it is crossed by the road to Bouillon in Belgium, Givonne; and lower down, where the road to Stenay and Montmédy crosses the ravine, is Bazeilles. These three ravines in Thursday's battle must have formed as many successive defensive positions for the French, who naturally would hold the last and strongest with the greatest tenacity. This part of the battle-field is something like that of Gravelotte; but, while there the ravines could be and actually were turned by the plateau whence they sprang, here the proximity of the Belgian frontier rendered an attempt at turning them very risky, and almost compelled a direct front attack.

While the French established themselves in this position, and drew towards them such troops as had not taken part in Tuesday's battle (among others, probably, the 12th Corps, including the Mobiles from Paris), the Germans had a day's time to concentrate their army; and when they attacked on Thursday they had on the spot the whole of the Fourth Army (Guards, 4th and 12th corps) and three corps (5th, 11th, and one Bavarian) of the Third; a force morally if not numerically superior to that of MacMahon. The fighting began at half-past seven in the morning, and at a quarter past four, when the King of Prussia telegraphed,^a it was

^a William I's telegram "On the Battle-Field of Sedan, Sept. 1, 4.15 P.M.," *The Times*, No. 26846, September 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

still going on, the Germans gaining ground on all sides. According to the Belgian reports, the villages of Bazeilles, Remilly, Villers, and Cernay were in flames, and the chapel of Givonne was in the hands of the Germans.^a This would indicate that on the left bank of the Meuse the two villages which supported, in case of a retreat, the French wings had been either taken or rendered untenable; while on the right bank the first and second lines of defence had been conquered, and the third, between Bazeilles and Givonne, was at least on the point of being abandoned by the French. Under these circumstances there can be no doubt that nightfall would see the Germans victorious and the French driven back to Sedan. This, indeed, is confirmed by telegrams from Belgium announcing the fact that MacMahon was completely hemmed in, and that thousands of French troops were crossing the frontier and being disarmed.^b

Under these circumstances there were only two alternatives open to MacMahon—capitulation or a dash across Belgian territory. The defeated army, shut up in and about Sedan—that is, in a district not larger, at best, than it would require for its encampment—could not possibly maintain itself; and even if it had been able to keep open its communication with Mézières, which is about ten miles to the west, it would still be hemmed in in a very confined strip of territory, and unable to hold out. Thus MacMahon, unable to fray a road through his enemies, must either pass on Belgian territory or surrender. As it happened, MacMahon, disabled by his wounds, was spared the pain of a decision. It fell to General De Wimpffen to announce the surrender of the French army. This conclusion can hardly fail to have been hastened by the news, supposing news could reach them, of Bazaine's decisive repulse in his efforts to get away from Metz. The Germans had foreseen his intention, and were prepared to meet him at all points. Not only Steinmetz but Prince Frederick Charles (as appears from the corps mentioned, 1st and 9th^c), were on the watch, and careful entrenchments further strengthened the barrier encircling Metz.

^a "Brussels, Sept. 2, 7.34 A.M.", *The Times*, No. 26846, September 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Telegram from a special correspondent of *The Times*, datelined "Arlon, Sept. 2, 7.46 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26846, September 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c Prussian official report "Malancourt, Sept. 2", *The Times*, No. 26846, September 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XVI^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1737, September 7, 1870]

The capitulation of Sedan settles the fate of the last French army in the field. It settles at the same time the fate of Metz and Bazaine's army; relief being now out of the question, they will have to capitulate too, perhaps this week, almost certainly not later than next week.

There remains the colossal entrenched camp of Paris, the last hope of France. The fortifications of Paris form the hugest complex of military engineering works ever constructed; they have never yet been put to the test, and consequently opinions as to their value are not only divided, but absolutely contradictory. By examining the actual facts of the case, we shall gain a safe basis upon which to found our conclusions.

Montalembert, a French cavalry officer, but a military engineer of uncommon and, perhaps, unparalleled genius, was the first to propose and work out during the latter half of the eighteenth century the plan of surrounding fortresses by detached forts at such a distance as to shelter the place itself from bombardment. Before him the outworks—citadels, lunettes, &c.—were more or less attached to the enceinte or rampart of the place, scarcely ever farther distant from it than the foot of the glacis.⁵⁰ He proposed forts large and strong enough to hold out a separate siege, and distant from the ramparts of the town from six hundred to twelve hundred yards, and even more. The new theory was for years treated with contempt in France, while it found willing pupils in Germany when, after 1815, the line of the Rhine had to be fortified. Cologne, Coblenz, Mayence, and later

^a Written between September 3 and 7, 1870.—*Ed.*

on Ulm, Rastatt, and Germersheim, were surrounded with detached forts; the proposals of Montalembert were modified by Aster and others, and a new system of fortifications thus arose, known under the name of the German school. By-and-by the French began to see the utility of detached forts, and, when Paris was fortified, it was at once evident that the immense line of ramparts round that city would not be worth constructing unless covered by detached forts, otherwise a breach effected in one place of the rampart would bring on the fall of the whole.

Modern warfare has shown in more than one instance the value of such entrenched camps, formed by a circle of detached forts, with the main fortress for its nucleus. Mantua, by its position, was an entrenched camp, so was Dantzic, more or less, in 1807, and these two were the only fortresses which ever arrested Napoleon I. Again, in 1813, Dantzic was enabled by its detached forts—field works for the most part—to offer a prolonged resistance.⁵¹ The whole of Radetzky's campaign in 1849 in Lombardy hinged on the entrenched camp of Verona, itself the nucleus of the celebrated Quadrilateral,⁵² so did the whole of the Crimean war depend on the fate of the entrenched camp of Sebastopol, which held out so long merely because the Allies were unable to invest it on all sides, and cut off supplies and reinforcements from the besieged.⁵³

The case of Sebastopol is, for our purpose, most in point, because the extent of the fortified place was larger than in any previous instance. But Paris is much larger even than Sebastopol. The circuit of the forts measures about twenty-four miles. Will the strength of the place be increased in proportion?

The works of themselves are models of their kind. They are of the utmost simplicity; a plain enceinte of bastions, without even a single demi-lune before the curtains,⁵⁴ the forts, mostly bastioned quadrangles or pentagons, without any demi-lunes or other outworks; here and there a horn-work or crown-work⁵⁵ to cover an outlying space of high ground. They are constructed not so much for passive as for active defence. The garrison of Paris is expected to come out into the open, to use the forts as supporting points for its flanks, and by constant sallies on a large scale to render impossible a regular siege of any two or three forts. Thus, whilst the forts protect the garrison of the town from a too near approach of the enemy, the garrison will have to protect the forts from siege batteries; it will have constantly to destroy the besiegers' works. Let us add that the distance of the forts from the ramparts precludes the possibility of an effective bombardment of the town until two or three at least of the forts shall have been

taken. Let us further add that the position, at the junction of the Seine and Marne, both with extremely winding courses, and with a strong range of hills on the most exposed, the north-eastern front, offers great natural advantages, which have been made the best of in the planning of the works.

If these conditions can be fulfilled, and the two million people inside can be regularly fed, Paris is undoubtedly an extremely strong place. To procure provisions for the inhabitants is not a very difficult matter, if taken in hand in time, and carried out systematically. Whether that has been done in the present instance is very doubtful. What has been done by the late Government looks like spasmodic and even thoughtless work. The accumulation of live cattle without provender for them was a perfect piece of absurdity. We may presume that, if the Germans act with their usual decision, they will find Paris but poorly provisioned for a long siege.

But how about that chief condition, the active defence, the garrison which goes out to attack the enemy, instead of striking behind the ramparts? To show the full strength of its works, and to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of its weakness, the absence of protecting outworks in the main ditches, Paris requires to count among its defenders a regular army. And that was the fundamental idea with the men who planned the works; that a defeated French army, its inability to hold the field being once established, should fall back upon Paris, and participate in the defence of the capital; either directly, as a garrison strong enough to prevent, by constant attacks, a regular siege and even a complete investment, or indirectly, by taking up a position behind the Loire, there recruiting its strength, and then falling, as opportunities might offer, upon such weak points as the besiegers, in their immense investing line, could not avoid presenting.

Now, the whole conduct of the French commanders in this war has contributed to deprive Paris of this one essential condition of its defence. There are of all the French army but the troops which remained in Paris and the corps of General Vinoy (the 13th, originally Trochu's); together, perhaps, 50,000 men, almost all, if not indeed all of them, fourth battalions and Mobile Guards. To these may be added perhaps 20,000 or 30,000 men more of fourth battalions, and an indefinite number of Mobile Guards of the provinces, raw levies totally unfit for the field. We have seen at Sedan what little use such troops are in a battle. They, no doubt, will be more trustworthy when they have forts to fall back upon, and a few weeks' drill, discipline, and fighting will certainly

improve them. But the active defence of a large place like Paris implies movements of large masses in the open, regular battles at a distance in front of the sheltering forts, attempts to break through the line of investment or to prevent its completion. And for that, for attacks on a superior enemy, where surprise and dash are required, and where the troops must be kept perfectly in hand for that purpose, the present garrison of Paris will be scarcely available.

We suppose the united Third and Fourth German armies, fully 180,000 strong, will appear before Paris in the course of next week, surround it with flying columns of cavalry, destroy the railway communications, and thereby all chance of extensive supplies, and prepare the regular investment, which will be completed on the arrival of the First and Second armies after the fall of Metz, leaving plenty of men to be sent beyond the Loire to scour the country, and prevent any attempt at the formation of a new French army. Should Paris not surrender, then the regular siege will have to begin, and, in the absence of an active defence, must proceed comparatively rapidly. This would be the regular course of things if there were none but military considerations; but affairs have now come to a point when these may be set aside by political events, to prognosticate which does not belong to our province here.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XVII^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1739, September 9, 1870]

The time it will take the German armies to march to Paris and there open a new phase of the war gives us leisure to look back upon what has been going on behind the front of the troops in the field, before the fortresses.

Leaving out of the question Sedan, which was included as a corollary in the capitulation of MacMahon's army, the Germans have taken four fortresses—La Petite Pierre and Viiry, without a blow; Lichtenberg and Marsal, after a short bombardment. They have merely blockaded Bitche; they are besieging Strasbourg; they have bombarded, so far without result, Phalsbourg, Toul, Montmédy; and they intend to begin in a few days the regular sieges of Toul and Metz.

With the exception of Metz, which is protected by detached forts far in advance of the town, all other fortresses which resisted have been subjected to bombardment. This proceeding has, at all times, formed a part of the operations of a regular siege; at first, it was principally intended to destroy the stores of provisions and ammunition of the besieged, but since it has become the custom to secure these in bomb-proof vaults, constructed for the purpose, the bombardment has more and more been used to set fire to and destroy as many buildings as possible inside the fortress. The destruction of the property and provisions of the inhabitants of the place became a means of pressure upon them, and, through them, upon the garrison and commander. In cases where the garrison was weak, ill-disciplined, and demoralized, and where the commander was without energy, a bombardment alone often

^a Written between September 7 and 9, 1870.—*Ed.*

effected the surrender of a fortress. This was the case especially in 1815 after Waterloo,⁵⁶ when a whole series of fortresses, garrisoned chiefly by National Guards,⁵⁷ surrendered to a short bombardment without awaiting a regular siege. Avesnes, Guise, Maubeuge, Landrecies, Marienbourg, Philippeville, &c., all fell after a few hours', at best a few days', shelling. It was no doubt the recollection of these successes, and the knowledge that most of the frontier places were garrisoned chiefly by Mobile and sedentary National Guards, which induced the Germans to try the same plan again. Moreover, the introduction of rifled artillery having made shells the almost exclusive projectiles even of field artillery, it is now comparatively easy to bombard a place and set fire to its buildings with the ordinary field guns of an army corps, without awaiting, as formerly, the arrival of mortars and heavy siege howitzers.

Although recognized in modern warfare, it is not to be forgotten that the bombardment of the private houses in a fortress is always a very harsh and cruel measure, which ought not to be had recourse to without at least a reasonable hope of compelling surrender, and without a certain degree of necessity. If places like Phalsbourg, Lichtenberg, and Toul are bombarded, this may be justified on the ground that they stop mountain passes and railways, the immediate possession of which is of the greatest importance to the invader, and might reasonably be expected to follow as the result of a few days' shelling. If two of these places have so far held out, this redounds so much more to the credit of the garrison and the inhabitants. But as to the bombardment of Strasbourg, which preceded the regular siege, the case is quite different.

Strasbourg, a city of above 80,000 inhabitants, surrounded by fortifications in the antiquated manner of the sixteenth century, was strengthened by Vauban, who built a citadel outside the town, nearer the Rhine, and connected it with the ramparts of the town by the continuous lines of what was then called an entrenched camp. The citadel commanding the town, and being capable of independent defence after the town has capitulated, the simplest way to take both would be to attack the citadel at once, so as not to have to go through two successive sieges; but then, the works of the citadel are so much stronger, and its situation in the swampy lowlands near the Rhine renders the throwing up of trenches so much more difficult, that circumstances may, and generally will, advise a previous attack on the town, with the fall of which a further defence of the citadel alone would, in the eyes of a weak

commander, lose much of its purpose; except in so far as it might secure better conditions of surrender. But, at all events, if the town alone be taken, the citadel remains to be reduced, and an obstinate commander may continue to hold out, and keep the town and the besieger's establishments in it under fire.

Under these circumstances what could be the use of a bombardment of the town? If all went well, the inhabitants might demoralize the greater part of the garrison, and compel the commander to abandon the town and throw himself, with the élite of his soldiers, 3,000 to 5,000 men, into the citadel, and there continue the defence and hold the town under his fire. And the character of General Uhrich (for that, and not Ulrich, is the name of the gallant old soldier) was known well enough to prevent anybody from supposing that he would allow himself to be intimidated into a surrender, both of town and citadel, by any amount of shells thrown into them. To bombard a place which has an independent citadel commanding it is in itself an absurdity and a useless cruelty. Certainly, stray shells or the slow shelling of a siege will always do damage in a besieged town; but that is nothing compared to the destruction and sacrifice of civilian life during a regular, systematic six days' bombardment such as has been inflicted upon the unfortunate city.

The Germans say they must have the town soon, for political reasons. They intend to keep it at the peace. If that be so, the bombardment, the severity of which is unparalleled, was not only a crime, it was also a blunder. An excellent way, indeed, to obtain the sympathies of a town which is doomed to annexation, by setting it on fire and killing numbers of the inhabitants by exploding shells! And has the bombardment advanced the surrender by one single day? Not that we can see. If the Germans want to annex the town and break the French sympathies of the inhabitants, their plan would have been to take the town by as short a regular siege as possible, then besiege the citadel, and place the commander on the horns of the dilemma, either to neglect some of the means of defence at his disposal or to fire on the town.

As it is, the immense quantities of shell thrown into Strasbourg have not superseded the necessity for a regular siege. On the 29th of August the first parallel had to be opened on the north-western side of the fortress, near Schiltigheim, running at a distance of from 500 to 650 yards from the works. On the 3rd of September the second parallel (some correspondents call it by mistake the third) was opened at 330 yards; the useless bombardment has

been stopped by order of the King of Prussia, and it may take till about the 17th or 20th before a practicable breach can be made in the ramparts. But all estimates in this case are hazardous. It is the first instance of a siege in which the percussion shells of modern rifled artillery are used against masonry. In their trials during the dismantling of Jülich the Prussians obtained extraordinary results; masonry was breached and blockhouses were demolished at great distances, and by indirect fire (that is, from batteries where the object fired at could not be seen); but this was merely a peace experiment and will have to be confirmed in actual war. Strasbourg will serve to give us a pretty good idea of the effect of the modern heavy rifled artillery in siege operations, and on this account its siege deserves to be watched with peculiar interest.

THE RISE AND FALL OF ARMIES^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1740, September 10, 1870]

When Louis Napoleon founded the Empire "which was peace,"^b on the votes of the peasants and on the bayonets of their sons, the soldiers of the army, that army did not occupy a particularly prominent rank in Europe, except, perhaps, by tradition. There had been peace since 1815—peace interrupted, for some armies, by the events of 1848 and 1849. The Austrians had gone through a successful campaign in Italy and a disastrous one in Hungary; neither Russia in Hungary nor Prussia in South Germany had gathered any laurels worth speaking of⁵⁸; Russia had her permanent war in the Caucasus and France in Algeria.⁵⁹ But none of the great armies had met another on the field of battle since 1815. Louis Philippe had left the French army in a condition of anything but efficiency; the Algerian troops, and especially the pet corps founded more or less for African warfare—Chasseurs-à-Pied,^c Zouaves, Turcos, Chasseurs d'Afrique^d—were indeed the objects of much attention; but the mass of the infantry, the cavalry, and the matériel in France were much neglected. The Republic did not improve the state of the army. But the Empire came which was peace, and—"si vis pacem, para bellum"^e—to it the army at once became the chief object of attention. At that time France possessed a great many comparatively young officers who

^a Written on September 9 or 10, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Napoleon III's speech at Bordeaux, October 9, 1852, *Oeuvres*, t. 3, Paris, 1856.—*Ed.*

^c Light infantry.—*Ed.*

^d African infantry.—*Ed.*

^e "If you desire to maintain peace, be prepared for war" (Vegetius, *Epitome institutorum rei militaris*, 3, prol.).—*Ed.*

had served, in high positions, in Africa at the time when there was still some serious fighting there. She possessed, in the Algerian special corps, troops who undoubtedly were superior to any others in Europe. She had, in the numerous substitutes,⁶⁰ a greater number of professional soldiers who had seen service, real veterans, than any other continental Power. The one thing necessary was to elevate as much as possible the mass of the troops to the level of the special corps. This was done to a great extent. The "pas gymnastique" (the "double" of the English), hitherto practised by the special corps only, was extended to the whole infantry, and thus a rapidity of manoeuvring was obtained previously unknown to armies. The cavalry was mounted, as far as possible, with better horses; the matériel of the whole army was looked to and completed; and, finally, the Crimean war was commenced. The organization of the French army showed to great advantage beside that of the English; the numerical proportions of the Allied armies naturally gave the principal part of the glory—whatever there was of it—to the French; the character of the war, circling entirely round one grand siege, brought out to the best advantage the peculiarly mathematical genius of the French as applied by their engineers; and altogether the Crimean war again elevated the French army to the rank of the first army in Europe.

Then came the period of the rifle and the rifled gun. The incomparable superiority of the fire of the rifled over the smooth-bore musket led to the abolition, or in some cases to the general rifling, of the latter.^a Prussia had her old muskets converted into rifles in less than one year; England gradually gave the Enfield, Austria an excellent small-bore rifle (Lorentz), to the whole infantry. France alone retained the old smooth-bore musket, the rifle being confined, as before, to the special corps alone. But while the mass of her artillery retained the short twelve-pounder, a pet invention of the Emperor, but of inferior efficiency to the old artillery on account of the reduced charge—a number of rifled four-pounder batteries—were equipped and held in readiness for a war. Their construction was faulty, being the first rifled guns made since the fifteenth century; but their efficiency was much superior to that of any smooth-bore field gun in existence.

Under these circumstances the Italian war broke out.⁶¹ The Austrian army had rather easy-going ways; extraordinary efforts had seldom been its forte; in fact, it was respectable, and nothing

^a Engels has "former", clearly a slip of the pen.—Ed.

more. Its commanders counted some of the best and a great many of the worst generals of the age. Court influence brought the mass of the latter into high command. The blunders of the Austrian generals, the greater ambition of the French soldiers, gave the French army a rather hard-fought victory. Magenta brought no trophies at all; Solferino only a few; and politics dropped the curtain before the real difficulty of the war, the contest for the Quadrilateral, could come off.

After this campaign the French was the model army of Europe. If after the Crimean war the French Chasseur-à-Pied had already become the *beau idéal* of a foot soldier, this admiration was now extended to the whole of the French army. Its institutions were studied; its camps became instructing schools for officers of all nations. The invincibility of the French became almost a European article of faith. In the meantime France rifled all her old muskets, and armed all her artillery with rifled cannon.

But the same campaign which elevated the French army to the first rank in Europe gave rise to efforts which ended in procuring for it, first a rival, then a conqueror. The Prussian army from 1815 to 1850 had undergone the same process of rusting as all other European hosts. But for Prussia this rust of peace became a greater clog in her fighting machinery than anywhere else. The Prussian system at that time united a line and a landwehr regiment in every brigade, so that one half of the field troops had to be formed anew on mobilization. The material for the line and landwehr had become utterly deficient; there was a great deal of petty pilfering among the responsible men. Altogether, when the conflict of 1850 with Austria compelled a mobilization, the whole thing broke down miserably, and Prussia had to pass through the Caudine Forks.⁶² The matériel was immediately replaced at great cost, and the whole organization revised, but in its details only. When the Italian war of 1859 compelled another mobilization, the matériel was in better order, but not even then complete; and the spirit of the landwehr, excellent for a national war, showed itself completely unmanageable during a military demonstration which might lead to a war with either one or the other of the belligerents. The reorganization of the army was resolved upon.

This reorganization, carried out behind the back of the Parliament, kept the whole of the thirty-two landwehr regiments of infantry under arms, gradually filling up the ranks by an increased levy of recruits, and finally forming them into line regiments, increasing their number from forty to seventy-two. The artillery was increased in the same proportion, the cavalry in a

much smaller one. This increase of the army was about proportional to that of the population of Prussia from 1815 to 1860, from 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ to 18 $\frac{1}{2}$ millions. In spite of the opposition of the Second Chamber,⁶³ it remained practically in force. The army was, besides, made more efficient in every respect. It had been the first to supply the whole of the infantry with rifles. Now the needle-gun breech-loader, which had hitherto been supplied to a fraction of the infantry only, was given to all, and a reserve stock prepared. The experiments with rifled artillery, carried on for some years, were brought to a close, and the adopted models gradually replaced the smooth-bores. The excessive parade drill, inherited from stiff old Frederick William III, made room more and more for a better system of training, in which outpost duty and skirmishing were chiefly practised, and the models in both branches were to a great extent the Algerian French. For the detached battalions the company column was adopted as the chief fighting formation. Target-shooting was paid great attention to, and capital results were obtained. The cavalry was likewise much improved. The breed of horses, especially in East Prussia, the great horse-breeding country, had been attended to for years, much Arab blood having been introduced, and the fruits now began to become available. The East Prussian horse, inferior in size and speed to the English trooper, is a far superior war horse, and will stand five times as much campaigning. The professional education of the officers, which had been much neglected for a long time, was again screwed up to the prescribed very high level, and altogether the Prussian army was undergoing a complete change. The Danish war⁶⁴ was sufficient to show to any one who would see that this was the case; but people would not see. Then came the thunderclap of 1866, and people could not help seeing. Next, there was an extension of the Prussian system to the North German army, and in its fundamental essentials to the South German armies too; and how easily it can be introduced the result has shown. And then came 1870.

But in 1870 the French army was no longer that of 1859. The speculation, jobbery, and general misuse of public duty for private interest which formed the essential base of the system of the Second Empire, had seized the army. If Haussmann and his crew made millions out of the immense Paris job,⁶⁵ if the whole Department of Public Works, if every Government contract, every civil office, was shamelessly and openly turned into a means of robbing the public, was the army alone to remain virtuous—the army to which Louis Napoleon owed everything—the army,

commanded by men who were quite as fond of wealth as the more fortunate civilian hangers-on of the Court? And when it came to be known that the Government was in the habit of receiving the money for substitutes without providing these substitutes—a thing necessarily known to every regimental officer; when those other peculations in stores &c., commenced which were to supply the funds secretly paid over to the Emperor by the Ministry of War; when the highest places had to be held by men who were in the secret and could not be dismissed whatever they did or neglected—then the demoralization spread to the regimental officers. We are far from saying that peculation at the public expense became common among them; but contempt for their superiors, neglect of duty, and decay of discipline were the necessary consequences. If the chiefs had commanded respect, would the officers have dared, as was the rule, to drive in coaches on the march? The whole thing had become rotten; the atmosphere of corruption in which the Second Empire lived had at last taken effect upon the main prop of that Empire, the army; in the hour of trial, there was nothing but the glorious traditions of the service and the innate bravery of the soldiers to oppose the enemy, and these are not alone sufficient to keep an army in the foremost rank.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XVIII^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1744, September 15, 1870]

There still appears to exist great misapprehension with regard to the siege operations now going on in France. Some of our contemporaries, *The Times* for instance, incline towards the opinion that the Germans, excellent though they be in the field, do not understand how to carry on a siege^b; others suppose that the siege of Strasbourg is carried on for the purpose not so much of getting hold of the town as of making experiments and exercising the German engineers and artillerymen. And all this because neither Strasbourg, nor Toul, nor Metz, nor Phalsbourg has as yet surrendered. It appears to be completely forgotten that the last siege carried on previous to this war, that of Sebastopol, required eleven months of open trenches before the place was reduced.

To rectify such crude notions, which could not be put forth but by people unacquainted with military matters, it will be necessary to recall to them what sort of a proceeding a siege really is. The rampart of most fortresses is bastioned—that is to say, it has at its angles pentagonal projections called bastions, which protect by their fire both the space in front of the works and the ditch lying immediately at their foot. In this ditch, between every two bastions, there is a detached triangular work called the demi-lune, which covers part of the bastions, and the curtain—that is, the portion of rampart between them; the ditch extends round this demi-lune. Outside this main ditch there is the covered way, a

^a Written between September 10 and 15, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b "We are officially informed that...", *The Times*, No. 26854, September 13, 1870.—*Ed.*

broad road protected by the edge of the glacis, an elevation of ground about seven feet high, and gently sloping down externally. In many cases there are other works added to complicate the difficulties of the attack. The ramparts of all these works are lined at the bottom with masonry or protected by water in the ditches, so as to render an assault on the intact works impossible; and the works are so arranged that the outer ones are always commanded—that is, looked down upon—by the inner ones, while they themselves command the field by the height of their ramparts.

To attack such a fortress the method perfected by Vauban is still the one made use of, although the rifled artillery of the besieged may compel variations if the ground before the fortress be perfectly level to a great distance. But as almost all these fortresses were constructed under the reign of smooth-bore artillery, the ground beyond 800 yards from the works is generally left out of the calculation, and in almost every case will give the besiegers a sheltered approach up to that distance without regular trenches. The first thing, then, is to invest the place, drive in its outposts and other detachments, reconnoitre the works, get the siege guns, ammunition, and other stores to the front, and organize the dépôts. In the present war a first bombardment by field guns also belonged to this preliminary period, which may last a considerable time. Strasbourg was loosely invested on the 10th of August, closely about the 20th, bombarded from the 23rd to the 28th, and yet the regular siege began on the 29th only. This regular siege dates from the opening of the first parallel, a trench with the earth thrown up on the side towards the fortress, so as to hide and shelter the men passing through it. This first parallel generally encircles the works at a distance of from 600 to 700 yards. In it are established the enfilading batteries; they are placed in the prolongation of all the faces—that is, those lines of rampart whose fire commands the field; and this is done upon all that part of the fortress which is subjected to attack. Their object is to fire along these faces, and thus to destroy the guns and kill the gunners placed upon them. There must be at least twenty such batteries, with from two to three guns each; say fifty heavy guns in all. There were also usually placed in the first parallel a number of mortars to bombard the town or the bombproof magazines of the garrison; they will, with our present artillery, be required only for the latter purpose, rifled guns being now sufficient for the former.

From the first parallel, trenches are pushed in advance in lines, the prolongation of which does not touch the works of the

fortress, so that none of the works can enfilade them; they advance in zigzag until they arrive within about 350 yards from the works, where the second parallel is then traced—a trench similar to the first, but shorter in length. This is generally done the fourth or fifth night after the opening of the trenches. In the second parallel are established the counter-batteries, one against each of the attacked faces, and nearly parallel to them; they are to demolish the guns and ramparts face to face, and cross their fire with the enfilading batteries. They will contain in all about sixty guns of heavy calibre. Then, again, the besiegers advance by new zigzags, which become shorter and closer together the nearer they come to the fortress. At about 150 yards from the works the half-parallel is dug out for mortar batteries, and at the foot of the glacis, about sixty yards from the works, the third parallel is placed, which again contains mortar batteries. This may be completed on the ninth or tenth night of open trenches.

In this proximity to the works the real difficulty begins. The artillery fire of the besieged, as far as it commands the open, will by this time have been pretty nearly silenced, but the musketry from the ramparts is now more effective than ever, and will retard the work in the trenches very much. The approaches now have to be made with much greater caution and upon a different plan, which we cannot explain here in detail. The eleventh night may bring the besieger to the salient angles of the covered way, in front of the salient points of the bastions and demi-lunes; and by the sixteenth night he may have completed the crowning of the glacis—that is to say, carried along his trenches behind the crest of the glacis parallel to the covered way. Then only will he be in a position to establish batteries in order to break the masonry of the ramparts so as to effect a passage across the ditch into the fortress, and to silence the guns on the bastion flanks, which fire along the ditch and forbid its passage. These flanks and their guns may be destroyed and the breach effected on the seventeenth day. On the following night the descent into the ditch and a covered way across it to protect the storming party against flanking fire may be completed and the assault given.

We have in this sketch attempted to give an account of the course of siege operations against one of the weakest and simplest classes of fortress (a Vauban's hexagon), and to fix the time necessary for the various stages of the siege—if undisturbed by successful sallies—on the supposition that the defence does not display extraordinary activity, courage, or resources. Yet, even under these favourable circumstances, we see it will take at least

seventeen days before the main ramparts can be breached, and thereby the place opened to an assault. If the garrison be sufficient in number and well supplied, there is no military reason whatever why they should surrender before; from a merely military point of view it is nothing but their duty that they should hold out at least so long. And then people complain that Strasbourg, which has been subjected to but fourteen days of open trenches, and which possesses outworks on the front of attack, enabling it to hold out at least five days longer than the average—that Strasbourg has not yet been taken. They complain that Metz, Toul, Phalsbourg have not yet surrendered. But we do not yet know whether a single trench has been opened against Toul, and of the other fortresses we know that they are not yet regularly besieged at all. As to Metz, there seems at present no intention to besiege it regularly; the starving out of Bazaine's army appears the most effective way of taking it. These impatient writers ought to know that there are but very few commanders of fortresses who will surrender to a patrol of four Lancers, or even to a bombardment, if they have anything like sufficient garrisons and stores at their command. If Stettin surrendered in 1807 to a regiment of cavalry, if the French border fortresses in 1815 capitulated under the effect, or even the fear, of a short bombardment, we must not forget that Woerth²² and Spicheren²⁴ together amounted neither to a Jena³⁵ nor to a Waterloo⁵⁶; and, moreover, it would be preposterous to doubt that there are plenty of officers in the French army who can hold out a regular siege even with a garrison of Gardes Mobiles.

HOW TO FIGHT THE PRUSSIANS^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1746, September 17, 1870]

After the Italian war of 1859, when the French military power was at its height, Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, the same who is now investing Bazaine's army in Metz, wrote a pamphlet, "How to Fight the French."^b At the present day, when the immense military strength of Germany, organized upon the Prussian system, is carrying everything before it, people begin to ask themselves who is in future, and how, to fight the Prussians. And when a war in which Germany, at the beginning, merely defended her own against French *chauvinisme* appears to be changing gradually, but surely, into a war in the interests of a new German *chauvinisme*, it is worth while to consider that question.

"Providence always is on the side of the big battalions" was a favourite way of the Napoleon's to explain how battles were won and lost.⁶⁶ It is upon this principle that Prussia has acted. She took care to have the "big battalions." When, in 1807, Napoleon forbade her to have an army of more than 40,000 men, she dismissed her recruits after six months' drill, and put fresh men in their places; and in 1813 she was able to bring into the field 250,000 soldiers out of a population of four-and-a-half millions. Afterwards, this same principle of short service with the regiment and long liability for service in the reserve was more fully developed, and, besides, brought into harmony with the necessities of an absolute monarchy. The men were kept from two to three years with the regiments, so as not only to drill them well, but also to break them in completely to habits of unconditional obedience.

^a Written about September 16, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b [Friedrich Karl von Preussen,] *Ueber die Kampfweise der Franzosen* [1860].—*Ed.*

Now, here is the weak point in the Prussian system. It has to reconcile two different and finally incompatible objects. On the one hand, it pretends to make every able-bodied man a soldier; to have a standing army for no other object than to be a school in which the citizens learn the use of arms, and a nucleus round which they rally in time of attack from abroad. So far the system is purely defensive. But, on the other hand, this same army is to be the armed support, the mainstay, of a quasi-absolute Government; and for this purpose the school of arms for the citizens has to be changed into a school of absolute obedience to superiors, and of royalist sentiments. This can be done by length of service only. Here the incompatibility comes out. Foreign defensive policy requires the drilling of many men for a short period, so as to have in the reserve large numbers in case of foreign attack; and home policy requires the breaking in of a limited number of men for a longer period, so as to have a trustworthy army in case of internal revolt. The quasi-absolute monarchy chose an intermediate way. It kept the men full three years under arms, and limited the number of recruits according to its financial means. The boasted universal liability to military service does not in reality exist. It is changed into a conscription distinguished from that of other countries merely by being more oppressive. It costs more money, it takes more men, and it extends their liability to be called out to a far longer period than is the case anywhere else. And, at the same time, what originally was a people armed for their own defence now becomes changed into a ready and handy army of attack, into an instrument of Cabinet policy.

In 1861 Prussia had a population of rather more than eighteen millions, and every year 227,000 young men became liable to military service by attaining the age of twenty.^a Out of these, fully one-half were bodily fit for service—if not there and then, at least a couple of years afterwards. Well, instead of 114,000 recruits, not more than 63,000 were annually placed in the ranks; so that very near one-half of the able-bodied male population were excluded from instruction in the use of arms. Whoever has been in Prussia during a war must have been struck by the enormous number of strong hearty fellows between twenty and thirty-two who remained quietly at home. The state of “suspended animation” which special

^a “Resultate der Ersatz-Aushebungsgeschäfts im preussischen Staate in den Jahren von 1855 bis mit 1862”, *Zeitschrift des königlich preussischen statistischen Bureaus*, No. 3, March 1864.—Ed.

correspondents have noticed in Prussia during the war exists in their own imagination only.^a

Since 1866 the number of annual recruits in the North-German Confederation has not exceeded 93,000, on a population of 30,000,000. If the full complement of able-bodied young men—even after the strictest medical scrutiny—were taken, it would amount to at least 170,000. Dynastic necessities on the one side, financial necessities on the other, determined this limitation of the number of recruits. The army remained a handy instrument for absolutist purposes at home, for Cabinet wars abroad; but as to the full strength of the nation for defence, that was not nearly made available.

Still this system maintained an immense superiority over the old-fashioned cadre system of the other great continental armies. As compared to them, Prussia drew twice the number of soldiers from the same number of population. And she has managed to make them good soldiers too, thanks to a system which exhausted her resources, and which would never have been endured by the people had it not been for Louis Napoleon's constant feelers for the Rhine frontier, and for the aspirations towards German unity of which this army was instinctively felt to be the necessary instrument. The Rhine and the unity of Germany once secure, that army system must become intolerable.

Here we have the answer to the question, How to fight the Prussians. If a nation equally populous, equally intelligent, equally brave, equally civilized were to carry out in reality that which in Prussia is done on paper only, to make a soldier of every able-bodied citizen; if that nation limited the actual time of service in peace and for drill to what is really required for the purpose and no more; if it kept up the organization for the war establishment in the same effective way as Prussia has lately done—then, we say, that nation would possess the same immense advantage over Prussianized Germany that Prussianized Germany has proved herself to possess over France in this present war. According to first-rate Prussian authorities (including General von Roon, the Minister of War) two years' service is quite sufficient to turn a lout into a good soldier. With the permission of her Majesty's^b martinets, we should even be inclined to say that for the mass of the recruits eighteen months—two summers and one winter—would suffice. But the exact length of service is a

^a "Berlin, July 17", *The Times*, No. 26807, July 20, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Victoria.—*Ed.*

secondary question. The Prussians, as we have seen, obtained excellent results after six months' service, and with men who had but just ceased to be serfs. The main point is, that the principle of universal liability to service be really carried out.

And if the war be continued to that bitter end for which the German Philistines are now shouting, the dismemberment of France, we may depend upon it that the French *will* adopt that principle. They have been so far a warlike but not a military nation. They have hated service in that army of theirs which was established on the cadre system, with long service and few drilled reserves. They will be quite willing to serve in an army with short service and long liability on the reserve, and they will do even more, if that will enable them to wipe out the insult and restore the integrity of France. And then, the "big battalions" will be on the side of France, and the effect they produce will be the same as in this war, unless Germany adopt the same system. But there will be this difference. As the Prussian landwehr system was progress compared with the French cadre system, because it reduced the time of service and increased the number of men capable to defend their country, so will this new system of really universal liability to serve be an advance upon the Prussian system. Armaments for war will become more colossal, but peace-armies will become smaller; the citizens of a country will, every one of them, have to fight out the quarrels of their rulers in person and no longer by substitute; defence will become stronger, and attack will become more difficult; and the very extension of armies will finally turn out to be a reduction of expense and a guarantee of peace.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XIX^{a67}

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1754, September 27, 1870]

The fortifications of Paris have shown their value already. To them alone it is owing that the Germans have not been in possession of the town for more than a week. In 1814 half a day's fighting about the heights of Montmartre compelled the city to capitulate. In 1815, a range of earthworks, constructed from the beginning of the campaign, created some delay; but their resistance would have been very short had it not been for the absolute certainty on the part of the Allies that the city would be handed over to them without fighting.⁶⁸ In this present war, whatever the Germans may have expected from diplomacy has not been allowed to interfere with their military action. And this same military action, short, sharp, and decisive up to the middle of September, became slow, hesitating, *tâtonnante*^b from the day the German columns got within the sphere of operation of that immense fortified camp, Paris. And naturally so. The mere investment of such a vast place requires time and caution, even if you approach it with 200,000 or 250,000 men. A force so large as that will be hardly sufficient to invest it properly on all sides, though, as in this present case, the town contains no army fit to take the field and to fight pitched battles. That there is no such army in Paris the pitiable results of General Ducrot's sally near Meudon have most decisively proved.⁶⁹ Here the troops of the line behaved positively worse than the Garde Mobile; they actually "bolted,"^c the renowned Zouaves leading the way. The thing is

^a Written between September 23 and 27, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Uncertain.—*Ed.*

^c See official German report "Ferrieres, Sept. 22", *The Times*, No. 26863, September 23, 1870, and French report "Tours, Sept. 25, Evening", *The Times*, No. 26865, September 26, 1870.—*Ed.*

easily explained. The old soldiers—mostly men of MacMahon's, De Failly's, and Félix Douay's corps, who had fought at Woerth—were completely demoralized by two disastrous retreats and six weeks of constant ill-success; and it is but natural that such causes will tell most severely upon mercenaries, for the Zouaves, consisting mostly of substitutes, deserve no other name. And these were the men who were expected to steady the raw recruits with which the thinned battalions of the line had been filled up. After this affair there may be small raids, successful here and there, but there will scarcely be any more battles in the open.

Another point: The Germans say that Paris is commanded by their guns from the heights near Sceaux^a; but this assertion is to be taken with a considerable grain of salt. The nearest heights on which they can have placed any batteries above Fontenay-aux-Roses, about 1,500 metres from the fort of Vanves, are fully 8,000 metres, or 8,700 yards, from the centre of the town. The Germans have no heavier field artillery than the so-called rifled 6-pounder (weight of projectile about 15 lb.), but even if they had rifled 12-pounders, with projectiles of 32 lb., ready to hand, the extreme range of these guns, at the angles of elevation for which their limbers are constructed, would not exceed 4,500 or 5,000 metres. Thus this boast need not frighten the Parisians. Unless two or more forts are taken, Paris need not fear a bombardment; and even then the shells would spread themselves so much over the enormous surface that the damage must be comparatively small and the moral effect almost nothing. Look at the enormous mass of artillery brought to bear upon Strasbourg: how much more will be required for reducing Paris, even if we keep in mind that the regular attack by parallels will naturally be confined to a small portion of the works! And until the Germans can bring together under the walls of Paris all this artillery, with ammunition and all other appliances, Paris is safe. From the moment the siege matériel is ready, from that moment alone does the real danger begin.

We see now clearly what great intrinsic strength there is in the fortifications of Paris. If to this passive strength, this mere power of resistance, were added the active strength, the power of attack of a real army, the value of the former would be immediately increased. While the investing force is unavoidably divided, by the rivers Seine and Marne, into at least three separate portions, which cannot communicate with each other except by bridges

^a "Berlin, Sept. 23, 10 A.M.", *The Times*, No. 26863, September 23, 1870.—*Ed.*

constructed to the rear of their fighting positions—that is to say, by roundabout roads and with loss of time only—the great mass of the army in Paris could attack with superior forces any one of these three portions at its choice, inflict losses upon it, destroy any works commenced, and retire under shelter of the forts before the besiegers' supports had time to come up. In case this army in Paris were not too weak compared with the besiegers' forces, it might render the complete investment of the place impossible, or break through it at any time. And how necessary it is to completely invest a besieged place so long as reinforcements from without are not completely out of the question has been shown in the case of Sebastopol, where the siege was protracted entirely by the constant arrival of Russian reinforcements in the northern half of the fortress, access to which could be cut off at the very last moment only. The more events will develop themselves before Paris, the more evident will become the perfect absurdity of the Imperialist generalship during this war, by which two armies were sacrificed and Paris left without its chief arm of defence, the power of retaliating attack for attack.

As to the provisioning such a large town, the difficulties appear to us even less than in the case of a smaller place. A capital like Paris is not only provided with a perfect commercial organization for provisioning itself at all times; it is at the same time the chief market and storehouse where the agricultural produce of an extensive district is collected and exchanged. An active Government could easily take measures to provide, by using these facilities, ample stores for the duration of an average siege. Whether this has been done we have no means of judging; but why it might not have been done, and rapidly too, we cannot see.

Anyhow, if the fighting goes on "to the bitter end," as we now hear it will,^a resistance will probably not be very long from the day the trenches are opened. The masonry of the scarps is rather exposed, and the absence of demi-lunes before the curtains favours the advance of the besieger and the breaching of the walls. The confined space of the forts admits of a limited number of defenders only; their resistance to an assault, unless seconded by an advance of troops through the intervals of the forts, cannot be serious. But if the trenches can be carried up the glacis of the forts without being destroyed by such sallies of the army in Paris, this very fact proves that that army is too weak—in numbers,

^a "Paris, Sept. 14", *The Times*, No. 26858, September 17, 1870.—Ed.

organization, or morale—to sally forth with a chance of success on the night of the assault.

A couple of forts once taken, it is to be hoped the town will desist from a hopeless struggle. If not, the operation of a siege will have to be repeated, a couple of breaches effected, and the town again summoned to surrender. And if that be again rejected, then may come the equally chanceless struggle on the barricades. Let us hope that such useless sacrifices will be spared.

THE STORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS^{a 70}

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1758, October 1, 1870]

The story we laid before our readers yesterday according to the version of M. Jules Favre we have no difficulty in accepting as correct; always excepting little errors, such as when Bismarck is said to intend the annexation of Metz, Château-Salins, and "Soissons."^b M. Favre evidently is ignorant of the geographical whereabouts of Soissons. The Count said Sarrebourg, which town has long been singled out as falling within the new strategical border line, while Soissons is as much outside of it as Paris or Troyes. In his rendering of the terms of the conversation M. Favre may not be quite exact; but where he asserts facts contested by the officious Prussian press, neutral Europe will be generally disposed to go by his statement. Thus, if at Berlin what M. Favre says about the surrender of Mont Valérien being proposed at one time is disputed, there will be few to believe that M. Favre either invented this or totally misunderstood Count Bismarck's meaning.

His own report shows but too clearly how little M. Favre understood the actual situation, or how confused and indistinct was his view of it. He came to treat about an armistice which was to lead to peace. His supposition that France still has the power of compelling her opponents to abandon all claim to territorial cession we readily excuse; but on what terms he expected to obtain a cessation of hostilities it is hard to say. The points finally insisted upon were the surrender of Strasbourg, Toul, and Verdun—their

^a Written on October 1, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Here and below the reference is to "The Story of the Negotiations", *The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1757, September 30, 1870.—*Ed.*

garrisons to become prisoners of war. Toul and Verdun appear to have been more or less conceded. But Strasbourg? The demand was taken by M. Favre simply as an insult and as nothing else.

"You forget that you are speaking to a Frenchman, M. le Comte. To thus sacrifice an heroic garrison whose behaviour has been admired universally, and more particularly by us, would be cowardice, and I promise not to say that you have offered us such a condition."

In this reply we find little consideration of the facts of the case—nothing but an outburst of patriotic sentiment. Since this sentiment operated very powerfully in Paris, it was not, of course, to be set aside at such a moment; but it might have been as well to have pondered the facts of the case too. Strasbourg had been regularly besieged long enough to make its early fall a matter of positive certainty. A fortress regularly besieged can resist a given time; it may even prolong its defence for a few days by extraordinary efforts; but, unless there arrive an army to relieve it, it is mathematically certain that fall it must. Trochu and the engineering staff in Paris are perfectly aware of this; they know that there is no army anywhere to come to the relief of Strasbourg; and yet Trochu's colleague in the Government, Jules Favre, appears to have put all this out of his reckoning. The only thing he saw in the demand to surrender Strasbourg was an insult to himself, to the garrison of Strasbourg, to the French nation. But the chief parties interested, General Uhrich and his garrison, had certainly done enough for their own honour. To spare them the last few days of a perfectly hopeless struggle, if thereby the feeble chances of salvation for France could be improved, would not have been an insult to them, but a well-merited reward. General Uhrich must necessarily have preferred to surrender to an order from the Government, and for an equivalent, rather than to the threat of an assault and for no return whatsoever.

In the meantime, Toul and Strasbourg have fallen, and Verdun, so long as Metz holds out, is of no earthly military use to the Germans, who thus have got, without conceding the armistice, almost everything Bismarck was bargaining for with Jules Favre. It would, then, appear that never was there an armistice offered on cheaper and more generous terms by the conqueror; never one more foolishly refused by the vanquished. Jules Favre's intelligence certainly does not shine in the transaction, though his instincts were probably right enough; whereas Bismarck appears in the new character of the generous conqueror. The offer, as M. Favre understood it, was uncommonly cheap; and, had it been

only what he thought, it was one to be accepted at once. But then the proposal was something more than he perceived it to be.

Between two armies in the field an armistice is a matter easily settled. A line of demarcation—perhaps a belt of neutral country between the two belligerents—is established, and the thing is arranged. But here there is only one army in the field; the other, as far as it still exists, is shut up in fortresses more or less invested. What is to become of all these places? What is to be their status during the armistice? Bismarck takes care not to say a word about all this. If the fortnight's armistice be concluded, and nothing said therein relating to these towns, the *status quo* is maintained as a matter of course, except as regards actual hostilities against the garrisons and works. Thus Bitche, Metz, Phalsbourg, Paris, and we know not how many other fortified places, would remain invested and cut off from all supplies and communications; the people inside them would eat up their provisions just as if there was no armistice; and thus the armistice would do for the besiegers almost as much as continued fighting would have done. Nay, it might even occur that in the midst of the armistice one or more of these places would completely exhaust their stores, and might have to surrender to the blockaders there and then, in order to avoid absolute starvation. From this it appears that Count Bismarck, astute as ever, saw his way to making the armistice reduce the enemy's fortresses. Of course, if the negotiations had continued far enough to lead to a draft agreement, the French staff would have found this out, and would necessarily have made such demands, relatively to the invested towns, that the whole thing probably would have fallen through. But it was M. Jules Favre's business to probe Bismarck's proposals to the bottom, and to draw out what the latter had an interest to hide. If he had inquired what was to be the status of the blockaded towns during the armistice, he would not have given Count Bismarck the opportunity of displaying before the world an apparent magnanimity, which was too deep for M. Favre though it was but skin deep. Instead of that, he fires up at the demand for Strasbourg, with its garrison as prisoners of war, in a way which makes it clear to all the world that even after the severe lessons of the last two months, the spokesman of the French Government was incapable of appreciating the actual facts of the situation because he was still *sous la domination de la phrase*.^a

^a Under the sway of the phrase.—Ed.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XX^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1759, October 3, 1870]

It is a surprising fact, even after the inconceivable blunders which have led to the practical annihilation of the French armies, that France should be virtually at the mercy of a conqueror who holds possession of barely one-eighth of her territory. The country actually occupied by the Germans is bounded by a line drawn from Strasbourg to Versailles, and another from Versailles to Sedan. Within this narrow strip the French still hold the fortresses of Paris, Metz, Montmédy, Verdun, Thionville, Bitche, and Phalsbourg. The observation, blockade, or siege of these fortresses employ nearly all the forces that have so far been sent into France. There may be plenty of cavalry left to scour the country round Paris as far as Orléans, Rouen, and Amiens, and even farther; but a serious occupation of any extensive district is not to be thought of at present. There is certainly a force of some 40,000 or 50,000 landwehr now in Alsace south of Strasbourg, and this army may be raised to double its strength by the greater portion of the besieging corps from Strasbourg. These troops are intended, it appears, for an excursion towards the southern portions of France: it is stated that they are to march upon Belfort, Besançon, and Lyons. Now, every one of these three fortresses is a large entrenched camp, with detached forts at a fair distance from the main rampart; and a siege, or even a serious blockade, of all these three places at once would take more than the forces of this army. We take it therefore for granted that this assertion is a mere blind, and that the new German army will take no more notice of these

^a Written between October 1 and 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

fortresses than it can help; that it will march into and eat up the valley of the Saône, the richest part of Burgundy, and then advance towards the Loire, to open communications with the army round Paris, and to be employed according to circumstances. But even this strong body of troops, while it has no direct communications with the army before Paris, so as to enable it to dispense with direct and independent communications with the Rhine, even this strong body of troops is employed on a mere raid, and unable to hold in subjection an extensive territory. Thus its operations for a couple of weeks to come will not increase the actual hold the Germans have upon French soil, which remains limited to barely one-eighth of the whole extent of France; and yet France, though she will not own to it, is virtually conquered. How is this possible?

The main cause is the excessive centralization of all administration in France, and especially of military administration. Up to a very recent time France was divided, for military purposes, into twenty-three districts, each containing, as much as possible, the garrisons composing one division of infantry, along with cavalry and artillery. Between the commanders of these divisions and the Ministry of War there was no intermediate link. These divisions, moreover, were merely administrative, not military organizations. The regiments composing them were not expected to be brigaded in war; they were merely in time of peace under the disciplinary control of the same general. As soon as a war was imminent they might be sent to quite different army corps, divisions, or brigades. As to a divisional staff other than administrative, or personally attached to the general in command, such a thing did not exist. Under Louis Napoleon, these twenty-three divisions were united in six army corps, each under a marshal of France. But these army corps were no more permanent organizations for war than the divisions. They were organized for political, not for military ends.⁷¹ They had no regular staff. They were the very reverse of the Prussian army corps, each of which is permanently organized for war, with its quota of infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineers, with its military, medical, judicial, and administrative staff ready for a campaign. In France the administrative portion of the army (Intendance and so forth) received their orders, not from the marshal or general in command, but from Paris direct. If under these circumstances Paris becomes paralyzed, if communication with it be cut off, there is no nucleus of organization left in the provinces; they are equally paralyzed, and even more so, inasmuch as the time-honoured dependency of the provinces on Paris and its initiative has by long habit become part and parcel of the

national creed, to rebel against which is not merely a crime but a sacrilege.

Next to this chief cause, however, there is another, a secondary one but scarcely less important in this case; which is that, in consequence of the internal historical development of France, her centre is placed in dangerous proximity to her north-eastern frontier. This was the case to a far greater extent three hundred years ago. Paris then lay at one extremity of the country. To cover Paris by a greater extent of conquered territory towards the east and north-east was the aim of the almost uninterrupted series of wars against Germany and Spain while the latter possessed Belgium. From the time Henry II seized upon the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun (1552) to the Revolution, Artois, parts of Flanders and Hainaut, Lorraine, Alsace, and Montbéliard were thus conquered and annexed to France to serve as buffers to receive the first shock of invasion against Paris. We must admit that nearly all these provinces were predestined by race, language, and habits to become part and parcel of France, and that France has understood—principally by the revolution of 1789-98—how to thoroughly assimilate the rest. But even now Paris is dangerously exposed. From Bayonne to Perpignan, from Antibes to Geneva, the land frontiers of the country are at a great distance from Paris. From Geneva by Bâle to Lauterbourg in Alsace the distance remains the same; it forms an arc described from the centre, Paris, with one and the same radius of 250 miles. But at Lauterbourg the frontier leaves the arc, and forms a chord inside it, which at one point is but 120 miles from Paris. “Là où le Rhin nous quitte, le danger commence,”^a said Lavallée in his chauvinistic work on the frontiers of France.^b But if we continue the arc from Lauterbourg in a northerly direction, we shall find that it follows almost exactly the course of the Rhine to the sea. Here, then, we have the real cause of the French clamour for the whole of the left bank of that Rhine. It is after the acquisition of that boundary alone that Paris is covered, on its most exposed side, by equidistant frontiers, and with a river for the boundary line into the bargain. And if the military safety of Paris were the leading principle of European politics France would certainly be entitled to have it. Fortunately, that is not the case; and if France chooses to have Paris for a capital she must put up with the drawbacks attached to Paris as well as with the advantages, one of which drawbacks is

^a “Danger begins where the Rhine quits us.”—*Ed.*

^b Th. Lavallée, *Les frontières de la France*, Paris, 1864.—*Ed.*

that an occupation of a small portion of France, including Paris, will paralyze her national action. But if this be the case; if France acquire no right to the Rhine by the accident of having her capital in an exposed situation, Germany ought to remember that military considerations of a similar sort give her no better claim upon French territory.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXI^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1762, October 6, 1870]

If we are to believe the reports sent by balloon from Paris, that city is defended by forces innumerable. There are between one and two hundred thousand Gardes Mobiles from the provinces; there are 250 battalions of Parisian National Guards, numbering 1,500, some say 1,800 or 1,900 men each—that is, at the most moderate computation, 375,000 men; there are at least 50,000 troops of the line, besides marine infantry, sailors, francs-tireurs, and so forth. And—so runs the latest information—if these be all disabled, there are still 500,000 citizens behind them fit to bear arms, ready in case of need to take their places.^b

Outside Paris there is a German army composed of six North German Army Corps (4th, 5th, 6th, 11th, 12th, and Guards), two Bavarian corps, and the Württemberg division; in all, eight corps and a half, numbering somewhere between 200,000 and 230,000 men—certainly not more. Yet this German army, although extended on a line of investment of at least eighty miles, notoriously keeps in check that innumerable force inside the town, cuts off its supplies, guards all roads and pathways leading outwards from Paris, and so far has victoriously repulsed all sallies made by the garrison. How is this possible?

First, there can be little doubt that the accounts given of the immense number of armed men in Paris are fanciful. If the 600,000 men under arms of whom we hear so much be reduced to 350,000 or 400,000, we shall be nearer the truth. Still it cannot be

^a Written on October 5 or 6, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b "Une lettre de Paris...", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 274, October 4, 1870.—*Ed.*

denied that there are far more armed men in Paris to defend it than outside to attack it.

Secondly, the quality of the defenders of Paris is of the most motley kind. Among the whole of them, we should consider none as really trustworthy troops but the marines and sailors who now man the outer forts. The line—the dregs of MacMahon's army reinforced by reserve men, most of them raw recruits—have shown in the affair of the 19th of September, near Meudon, that they are demoralized. The Mobiles, good material in themselves, are but just now passing through recruit-drill; they are badly officered, and armed with three different kinds of rifle—the Chassepôt,²¹ the converted Minié, and the unconverted Minié.⁷² No efforts, no amount of skirmishing with the enemy, can give them, in the short time allowed, that steadiness which alone will enable them to do that which is most required—to meet and defeat the enemy in the open field. It is the original fault of their organization, the want of trained teachers, officers and sergeants, which prevents them from becoming good soldiers. Still, they appear the best element in the defence of Paris; they are at least likely to submit to discipline. The sedentary National Guard is a very mixed body. The battalions from the faubourgs, consisting of working men, are willing and determined enough to fight; they will be obedient, and show a kind of instinctive discipline if led by men possessing personally and politically their confidence; towards all other leaders they will be rebellious. Moreover, they are undrilled and without trained officers; and unless there be actually a final struggle behind barricades, their best fighting qualities will not be put to the test. But the mass of the National Guards, those armed by Palikao, consist of the bourgeoisie, especially the small shopkeeping class, and these men object to fighting on principle. Their business under arms is to guard their shops and their houses; and if these are attacked by the shells of an enemy firing from a distance their martial enthusiasm will probably dwindle away. They are, moreover, a force organized less against a foreign than against a domestic enemy. All their traditions point that way, and nine out of every ten of them are convinced that such a domestic enemy is, at this very moment, lurking in the very heart of Paris, and only waiting his opportunity to fall upon them. They are mostly married men, unused to hardship and exposure, and indeed, they are grumbling already at the severity of the duty which makes them spend one night out of three in the open air on the ramparts of the city. Among such a body you may find companies and even battalions which, under peculiar cir-

cumstances, will behave gallantly; but, as a body, and especially for a regular and tiresome course of duty, they cannot be relied on.

With such a force inside Paris it is no wonder that the far less numerous and widely dispersed Germans outside feel tranquil as to any attacks from that quarter. Indeed, all engagements that have so far taken place show the Army of Paris (if we may call it so) to be incompetent to act in the field. The first great attack on the blockading troops, on the 19th, was characteristic enough. General Ducrot's corps of some 30,000 or 40,000 men was arrested for an hour and a half by two Prussian regiments (the 7th and 47th), until two Bavarian regiments came to their assistance, and another Bavarian brigade fell upon the flank of the French; when the latter retreated in confusion, leaving in the hands of the enemy a redoubt armed with eight guns, and numerous prisoners. The number of the Germans engaged on this occasion could not exceed 15,000. Since then, the sorties of the French have been conducted quite differently. They have given up all intention of delivering pitched battles; they send out smaller parties to surprise outposts and other small detachments; and if a brigade, a division, or more advance beyond the line of the forts, they are satisfied with a mere demonstration. These fights aim less at the infliction of damage upon the enemy than at the breaking-in of the French levies to the practice of warfare. They will, no doubt, improve them gradually, but only a small proportion of the unwieldy mass of men in Paris can benefit by practice on such a small scale.

That General Trochu, after the fight of the 19th, was perfectly aware of the character of the force under his command his proclamation of the 30th of September clearly shows.^a He certainly lays the blame almost exclusively on the line, and rather pats the Mobiles on the back; but this merely proves that he considers these (and rightly so) as the best portion of the men under him. Both the proclamation and the change of tactics adopted since prove distinctly that he is under no delusion as to the unfitness of his men for operations in the open field. And he must, moreover, know that whatever other forces may remain to France under the name of Army of Lyons,⁷³ Army of the Loire, and so forth, are of exactly the same composition as his own men; and that therefore he need not expect to have the blockade or siege of Paris raised by

^a L. J. Trochu's order to the Paris garrison, the National Guard and the Garde Mobile of September 20, 1870 "Dans le combat d'hier...", *Le Temps*, No. 3393, September 21, 1870. It is reported in the item "The Battle of the Nineteenth", *The Times*, No. 26865, September 26, 1870. *The Pall Mall Gazette* gives the wrong date: "30th of September".—*Ed.*

a relieving army. It is therefore remarkable that we should receive a report according to which Trochu had opposed, in a council of Ministers, the proposal to treat for peace. The report certainly comes from Berlin, not a good quarter for impartial information as to what is going on inside Paris. Be that as it may, we cannot believe that Trochu is hopeful of success. His views of army organization in 1867^a were strongly in favour of fully four years' service with the regiment and three years' liability in the reserve, such as had been the rule under Louis Philippe; he even considered the time of service of the Prussians—two or three years—totally inadequate to form good soldiers. The irony of history now places him in a position where he carries on a war with completely raw—almost undrilled and undisciplined—men against these very same Prussians, whom he but yesterday qualified as but half-formed soldiers; and that after these Prussians have disposed in a month of the whole regular army of France.

^a [L. J. Trochu,] *L'Armée française en 1867*, Paris, 1867.—Ed.

THE RATIONALE OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY SYSTEM^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1764, October 8, 1870]

A few weeks ago we pointed out that the Prussian system of recruiting the army was anything but perfect.^b It professes to make every citizen a soldier. The army is, in the official Prussian words, nothing but "the school in which the whole nation is educated for war," and yet a very small percentage only of the population passes through that school. We now return to this subject, in order to illustrate it by a few exact figures.

According to the tables of the Prussian Statistical Bureau,^c there were actually levied for the army on the average of the years 1831 to 1854, 9.84 per cent. per annum of the young men liable to service; there remained available every year 8.28 per cent.; there were totally unfit for service from bodily infirmities 6.40 per cent.; there were temporarily unfit, to be re-examined in a future year, 53.28 per cent.; the rest were absent, or comprised under headings too insignificant to be here noticed. Thus, during these four-and-twenty years, not one-tenth of the young citizens were admitted into the national war-school; and that is called "a nation in arms"⁷⁴!

In 1861 the figures were as follows:—Young men of twenty, class 1861, 217,438; young men of previous classes, still to be disposed of, 348,364; total, 565,802. Of these there were absent 148,946, or 26.32 per cent.; totally unfit, 17,727, or 3.05 per cent.; placed in the Ersatz Reserve⁷⁵—that is to say, liberated from

^a Written between October 6 and 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 105, 106.—*Ed.*

^c "Resultate der Ersatz-Aushebungsgeschäfts im preussischen Staate in den Jahren von 1855 bis mit 1862", *Zeitschrift des königlich preussischen statistischen Bureaus*, No. 3, March 1864.—*Ed.*

service in time of peace, with liability to be called on in time of war—76,590, or 13.50 per cent.; sent home for future re-examination on account of temporary unfitness, 230,236 or 40.79 per cent.; disposed of on other grounds, 22,369, or 3.98 per cent.; remained available for the army, 69,934 men, or 12.36 per cent.; and of these, 59,459 only, or 10.50 per cent., were actually placed in the ranks.

No doubt since 1866 the percentage of recruits draughted annually has been larger, but it cannot have been so to any considerable extent; and if at present 12 or 13 per cent. of the North German male population pass through the army, it will be much. This certainly does strongly contrast with the fervid descriptions of "special correspondents" during the mobilization in Germany. Every able-bodied man, according to them, then donned his uniform and shouldered his rifle, or bestrode his horse; all kind of business was at a standstill: factories were closed, shops shut up, crops left on the fields uncut; all production was stopped, all commerce abandoned—in fact, it was a case of "suspended animation,"^a a tremendous national effort, but which, if prolonged only a few months, must end in complete national exhaustion. The transformation of civilians into soldiers did certainly go on at a rate of which people out of Germany had no idea; but if the same writers will look at Germany now, after the withdrawal of above a million men from civil life, they will find the factories working, the crops housed, the shops and counting-houses open. Production, if stopped at all, is stopped for want of orders, not for want of hands; and there are plenty of stout fellows to be seen about the streets quite as fit to shoulder a rifle as those who have gone off to France.

The above figures explain all this. The men who have passed through the army do certainly not exceed 12 per cent. of the whole adult male population. More than 12 per cent. of them cannot, therefore, be called out on a mobilization, and there remains fully 88 per cent. of them at home; a portion of whom, of course, is called out as the war progresses to fill up the gaps caused by battles and disease. These may amount to two or three per cent. more in the course of half a year; but still the immense majority of the men is never called upon. The "nation in arms" is altogether a sham.

The cause of this we have before pointed out.^b It is the necessity

^a See "Berlin, July 17", *The Times*, No. 26807, July 20, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 104-07.—*Ed.*

under which the Prussian dynasty and Government are, as long as their hereditary policy is insisted upon, to have an army which is an obedient instrument of that policy. According to Prussian experience, three years' service in the ranks is indispensable to break in the average civilian for that class of work. It has never been seriously maintained, even by the most obstinate martinets in Prussia, that an infantry soldier—and they constitute the vast mass of the army—cannot learn all his military duties in two years; but, as was said in the debates in the Chamber from 1861 to 1866, the true military spirit, the habit of unconditional obedience, is learned in the third year only. Now, with a given amount of money for the war budget, the longer the men serve, the fewer recruits can be turned into soldiers. At present, with three years' service, 90,000 recruits annually enter the army; with two years, 135,000; with eighteen months, 180,000 men might be draughted into it and drilled every year. That there are plenty of able-bodied men to be had for the purpose is evident from the figures we have given, and shall be made more evident by-and-by. Thus we see that the phrase of the "nation in arms" hides the creation of a large army for purposes of Cabinet policy abroad and reaction at home. A "nation in arms" would not be the best instrument for Bismarck to work with.

The population of the North German Confederation is a trifle below 30,000,000. The war establishment of its army is in round numbers 950,000 men, or barely 3.17 per cent. of the population. The number of young men attaining the age of twenty is about 1.23 per cent. of the population in every year, say 360,000. Out of these, according to the experience of the secondary German States, fully one-half are—either there and then, or within two years afterwards—fit for service in the field; this would give 180,000 men. Of the rest, a goodly proportion is fit for garrison duty; but these we may leave out of the account for the present. The Prussian statistics seem to differ from this, but in Prussia these statistics must, for obvious reasons, be grouped in such a way as to make the result appear compatible with the delusion of the "nation in arms." Still the truth leaks out there too. In 1861 we had, besides the 69,934 men available for the army, 76,590 men placed in the Ersatz Reserve, raising the total of men fit for service to 146,524, out of which but 59,459, or 40 per cent., were draughted into the ranks. At all events, we shall be perfectly safe in reckoning one-half of the young men as fit for the army. In that case, 180,000 recruits might enter the line every year, with twelve years' liability to be called out, as at present. This would

give a force of 2,160,000 drilled men—more than double the present establishment, even after ample allowance is made for all reductions by deaths and other casualties; and if the other half of the young men were again looked to when twenty-five years of age, there would be found the material for another 500,000 or 600,000 good garrison troops, or more. Six to eight per cent. of the population ready drilled and disciplined, to be called out in case of attack, the cadres for the whole of them being kept up in time of peace, as is now done—that would really be a “nation in arms;” but that would not be an army to be used for Cabinet wars, for conquest, or for a policy of reaction at home.

Still this would be merely the Prussian phrase turned into a reality. If the semblance of a nation in arms has had such a power, what would the reality be? And we may depend upon it if Prussia, by insisting on conquest, compels France to it, France will turn that semblance into reality—either in one form or another. She will organize herself into a nation of soldiers, and a few years hence may astonish Prussia as much by the crushing numbers of her soldiers as Prussia has astonished the world this summer. But cannot Prussia do the same? Certainly, but then she will cease to be the Prussia of to-day. She gains in power of defence, while she loses in power of attack; she will have more men, but not quite so handy for invasion in the beginning of a war; she will have to give up all idea of conquest, and as to her present home policy, that would be seriously jeopardized.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXII^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1766, October 11, 1870]

In one of our preceding Notes we called attention to the fact that even now, after the fall of Strasbourg, nearly the whole of the immense German army in France is fully employed, although not one-sixth of the territory of the country is held by the invaders.^b The subject is so very significant that we feel justified in returning to it.

Metz, with Bazaine's army enclosed within its line of forts, finds occupation for eight army corps (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, the division of Hessians, and General Kummer's division of landwehr), in all sixteen divisions of infantry. Paris engages seventeen divisions of infantry (the Guards, 4th, 5th, 6th, 11th, 12th North German, 1st and 2nd Bavarian corps, and the Württemberg division). The newly-formed 13th and 14th corps, mostly landwehr, and some detachments from the corps already named, occupy the conquered country, and observe, blockade, or besiege the places which, within it, still belong to the French. The 15th Corps (the Baden division and at least one division of landwehr), set free by the capitulation of Strasbourg, is alone disposable for active operations. Fresh landwehr troops are to be joined to it, and then it is to undertake some operations, the character of which is still very indefinitely known, in a more southerly direction.

Now these forces comprise almost all the organized troops of which Germany disposes, with the very important exception of the fourth battalions of the line. Contrary to what was done in the Austrian war, when they were sent out against the enemy, these 114 battalions have this time been kept at home; in accordance with their original purpose, they serve as cadres for the drill and organization of the men intended to fill up the gaps which battles

^a Written on October 11, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 115-16.—*Ed.*

and disease may have caused in the ranks of their respective regiments. As soon as the thousand men forming the battalion are sufficiently broken in to do duty before the enemy, they are sent off to join the three field battalions of the regiment; this was done on a large scale after the severe fighting before Metz in the middle of September. But the officers and non-commissioned officers of the battalion remain at home, ready to receive and prepare for the field a fresh batch of 1,000 men, taken from the Ersatz Reserve or from the recruits called out in due course. This measure was absolutely necessary in a war as bloody as the present one, and the end of which is not to be foreseen with certainty; but it deprives the Germans of the active services for the time being of 114 battalions, and a corresponding force of cavalry and artillery, representing in all fully 200,000 men. With the exception of these, the occupation of scarcely one-sixth of France and the reduction of the two large fortresses in this territory—Metz and Paris—keeps the whole of the German forces so fully employed that they have barely 60,000 men to spare for further operations beyond the territory already conquered. And this, while there is not anywhere a French army in the field to oppose serious resistance.

If ever there was needed a proof of the immense importance, in modern warfare, of large entrenched camps with a fortress for their nucleus, here that proof is furnished. The two entrenched camps in question have not at all been made use of to the best advantage, as we may show on some other occasion.^a Metz has for a garrison too many troops for its size and importance, and Paris has of real troops fit for the field scarcely any at all. Still, the first of these places at present holds at least 240,000, the second 250,000 enemies in check; and if France had only 200,000 real soldiers behind the Loire, the siege of Paris would be an impossibility. Unfortunately for France, these 200,000 men she does not possess; nor is there any probability of their ever being brought together, organized and disciplined in useful time. So that the reduction of the two great centres of defence is a mere question of weeks. The army in Metz has so far kept up its discipline and fighting qualities wonderfully well, but the constant repulses it has sustained must at length break down every hope of escape. French soldiers are capital defenders of fortresses, and can stand defeat during a siege far better than in the field; but if demoralization once begins among them, it spreads rapidly and irresistibly. As to Paris, we will not take M. Gambetta's 400,000

^a See this volume, pp. 134-37, 138-41.—*Ed.*

National Guards, 100,000 Mobiles, and 60,000 troops of the line too literally, any more than the countless cannons and mitrailleurs that are being manufactured in Paris, or the great strength of the barricades.^a But there is no doubt that there are elements enough in Paris for a very respectable defence; though that defence, by being, from the character of the garrison, necessarily passive, will lack its strongest element—powerful attacks on the besiegers.

Anyhow, it must be evident that if there was a real national enthusiasm alive among the French, everything might still be gained. While the whole forces of the invader, all but 60,000 men and the cavalry which can raid but not subdue, are laid fast in the conquered territory, the remaining five-sixths of France might raise armed bands enough to harass the Germans on every point, to intercept their communications, destroy bridges and railways, provisions and ammunition in their rear, and compel them to detach from their two great armies such numbers of troops that Bazaine might find means to break out of Metz, and that the investment of Paris would become illusory. Already at present the movement of the armed bands is a source of great trouble, though not as yet of danger, to the Germans, and this will increase as the country round Paris becomes exhausted in food and other supplies, and as more distant districts have to be placed under requisition. The new German army now forming in Alsace will probably soon be called away from any expedition towards the South by the necessity of securing the German communications and of subjecting a greater tract of country round Paris. But what would be the fate of the Germans if the French people had been stirred up by the same national fanaticism as were the Spaniards in 1808⁷⁶—if every town and almost every village had been turned into a fortress, every peasant and citizen into a combatant? Even the 200,000 men of the fourth battalion would not suffice to hold down such a people. But such national fanaticism is not nowadays within the habits of civilized nations. It may be found among Mexicans and Turks; its sources have dried up in the money-making West of Europe, and the twenty years during which the incubus of the Second Empire has weighed upon France have anything but steeled the national character. Thus we see a great deal of talking and a minimum of work; a deal of show and an almost total neglect of organization; very little non-official resistance and a good deal of submission to the enemy; very few real soldiers and an immense number of francs-tireurs.

^a L. Gambetta's proclamation, dated October 9, addressed to the citizens of the Departments, *The Times*, No. 26878, October 11, 1870.—*Ed.*

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXIII^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1768, October 13, 1870]

The Prussian staff officers in Berlin seem to be getting impatient. Through the *Times* and *Daily News* correspondents in Berlin^b they inform us that the siege material has now been for some days ready before Paris, and that the siege will begin presently. We have our doubts about this readiness. Firstly, we know that several tunnels on the only available line of railway have been blown up by the retreating French near La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, and that they are not yet in working order; secondly, we also know that the matériel for a regular and effective siege of such a vast place as Paris is so colossal that it will take a long time to get it together, even had the railway been always open; and thirdly, five or six days after this announcement from Berlin had been made, we have not yet heard of the opening of a first parallel. We must therefore conclude that by readiness to open the siege, or regular attack, we are to understand the readiness to open the irregular attack, the bombardment.

Still, a bombardment of Paris, with any chance of compelling a surrender, would require far more guns than a regular siege. In the latter you may confine your attack to one or two points of the line of defence; in the former, you must constantly scatter such a number of shells over the entire vast area of the town that more fires are made to break out everywhere than the population can extinguish, and that the very operation of extinguishing them

^a Written on October 12 or 13, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b "Berlin, Oct. 8, 10.12 A.M.," *The Times*, No. 26877, October 10, 1870, and "Berlin, Oct. 12", *The Times*, No. 26879, October 12, 1870.—*Ed.*

becomes too dangerous to be attempted. Now we have seen that even Strasbourg, with 85,000 inhabitants, was perfectly able to hold out under a bombardment of almost unparalleled severity; that, with the exception of a few solitary and pretty well-defined districts, which had to be sacrificed, the fires could be well kept down. The cause of this is the comparatively great extent of the town. It is easy to shell a small place of five or ten thousand inhabitants into submission, unless there be plenty of bombproof shelter inside it; but a city of from 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants can stand a great deal of shelling, especially if built, as most French towns are, of freestone, or with thick brick walls. Paris, within the fortifications, measures twelve kilometres by ten; within the old *barrières*,⁷⁷ which comprise the closely-built part of the town, nine kilometres by seven; that is to say, this part of the town comprises an area of about fifty millions of square metres or nearly sixty millions of square yards. To throw on an average one shell per hour into every one thousand square yards of that surface would require 60,000 shells per hour, or a million and a half of shells for every twenty-four hours, which would presuppose the employment of at least 2,000 heavy guns for the purpose. Yet one shell per hour for a space nearly one hundred feet long by one hundred feet broad would be a weak bombardment. Of course the fire might be concentrated temporarily upon one or more quarters until these were thoroughly destroyed, and then transferred to the neighbouring quarters; but this proceeding, to be effective, would last almost as long as or longer than a regular siege, while it would be necessarily less certain to compel the surrender of the place.

Moreover, Paris, while the forts are not reduced, is in fact out of reach of effective bombardment. The nearest heights outside the town now in the hands of the besiegers, those near Châtillon, are fully 8,000 metres=8,700 yards, or five miles from the Palais de Justice,⁷⁸ which pretty nearly represents the centre of the town. On the whole of the southern side, this distance will be about the same. On the north-east, the line of forts is as far as 10,000 metres, or about 11,000 yards, from the centre of the town, so that any bombarding batteries in that quarter would have to be placed 2,000 yards farther off, or from seven to eight miles from the Palace of Justice. On the north-west, the bends of the Seine and Fort Mont Valérien protect the town so well that bombarding batteries could be erected in closed redoubts or regular parallels only; that is to say, not before the regular siege had begun, to which we here suppose the bombardment to be a preliminary.

Now there is no doubt that the Prussian heavy rifled guns, of calibres of five, six, seven, eight, and nine inches, throwing shells from twenty-five to above three hundred pounds' weight, might be made to cover a distance of five miles. In 1864 the rifled twenty-four pounders on Gammelmark bombarded Sonderburg⁷⁹ at a distance of 5,700 paces=4,750 yards, or nearly three miles, although these guns were old bronze ones, and could not stand more than a 4 lb. or 5 lb. charge of powder to a shell weighing 68 lb. The elevation was necessarily considerable, and had to be obtained by a peculiar adaptation of the gun-carriages, which would have broken down if stronger charges had been used. The present Prussian cast-steel guns can stand charges far heavier in proportion to the weights of their shells; but, to obtain a range of five miles, the elevation must still be very considerable, and the gun-carriages would have to be altered accordingly; and, being put to uses they were not constructed for, would soon be smashed. Nothing knocks up a gun-carriage sooner than firing at elevations even as low as five and six degrees with full charges; but in this case, the elevation would average at least fifteen degrees, and the gun-carriages would be knocked to pieces as fast as the houses in Paris. Leaving, however, this difficulty out of consideration, the bombardment of Paris by batteries five miles distant from the centre of the town, could be at best but a partial affair. There would be enough of destruction to exasperate, but not enough to terrify. The shells, at such ranges, could not be directed with sufficient certainty to any particular part of the town. Hospitals, museums, libraries, though ever so conspicuous from the heights where the batteries might be, could hardly be spared even if directions were given to avoid particular districts. Military buildings, arsenals, magazines, storehouses, even if visible to the besieger, could not be singled out for destruction with any surety; so that the common excuse for a bombardment—that it aimed at the destruction of the means of defence of the besieged—would fail. All this is said on the supposition that the besiegers have the means at hand for a really serious bombardment—that is to say, some two thousand rifled guns and mortars of heavy calibre. But if, as we suppose is the case, the German siege-park is composed of some four or five hundred guns, this will not suffice to produce any such impression on the city as to make its surrender probable.

The bombardment of a fortress, though still considered as a step permitted by the laws of war, yet is a measure implying such an amount of suffering to non-combatants that history will blame any one nowadays attempting it without reasonable chance of

thereby extorting the surrender of the place. We smile at the chauvinisme of a Victor Hugo, who considers Paris a holy city—very holy!—and every attempt to attack it a sacrilege.^a We look upon Paris as upon any other fortified town, which, if it chooses to defend itself, must run all the risks of fair attack, of open trenches, siege batteries, and stray shots hitting non-military buildings. But if the mere bombardment of Paris cannot force the city into surrender, and if, nevertheless, such a bombardment should take place, it will be a military blunder such as few people would lay to the charge of Moltke's staff. It will be said that Paris was bombarded not for military but for political reasons.

^a V. Hugo, "Aux Parisiens, Paris, 2 octobre 1870", *Le Temps*, No. 3406, October 4, 1870.—*Ed.*

THE FATE OF METZ^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1771, October 17, 1870]

If we are to believe the news from Berlin, the Prussian staff seem to anticipate that Paris will be conquered before Metz. But this opinion is evidently founded quite as much on political as on military reasoning. The troubles within Paris for which Count Bismarck has been waiting have not yet begun; but discord and civil war are expected to break out without fail as soon as the big guns of the besiegers shall commence booming over the city. So far, the Parisians have belied the opinion held of them in the German headquarters, and they may do so to the end. If so, the notion that Paris will be taken by the end of this month will almost certainly prove illusory, and Metz may have to surrender before Paris.

Metz, as a mere fortress, is infinitely stronger than Paris. The latter city is fortified on the supposition that the whole or at least the greater portion of the beaten French army will retire upon it and conduct the defence by constant attacks on the enemy, whose attempts to invest the place necessarily weaken him on every point of the long line he has to take up. The defensive strength of the works therefore is not very great, and very properly so. To provide for a case such as has now occurred by the blunders of Bonapartist strategy would have raised the cost of the fortifications to an immense sum; and the time by which the defence could thereby be prolonged would scarcely amount to a fortnight. Moreover, earthworks erected during or before the siege can be made to strengthen the works considerably. With Metz the case is

^a Written between October 13 and 17, 1870.—*Ed.*

very different. Metz was handed down to the present generation by Cormontaigne and other great engineers of the last century as a very strong fortress—strong in its defensive works. The Second Empire has added to these a circle of seven very large detached forts at distances of from two-and-a-half to three miles from the centre of the town, so as to secure it from bombardment even with rifled guns, and to transform the whole into a large entrenched camp second to Paris only. A siege of Metz, therefore, would be a very lengthy operation even if the town held but its normal war garrison. But a siege in the face of the 100,000 men who are now sheltered under its forts would be almost impossible. The sphere in which the French are still masters extends to fully two miles beyond the line of forts; to drive them back to the line of forts, so as to conquer the ground where the trenches would have to be dug, would necessitate a series of hand-to-hand fighting such as was only seen before Sebastopol; and supposing the garrison not to be demoralized by their constant fights or the besiegers not to be tired of such a sacrifice of life, the struggle might last many a month. The Germans have therefore never attempted a regular siege, but are trying to starve the place out. An army of 100,000 men, added to a population of nearly 60,000 and to the numbers of country people who have sought shelter behind the forts, must sooner or later exhaust the stock of provisions if the blockade be strictly enforced; and, even before this shall have taken place, the chances are that demoralization among the garrison will compel surrender. When once an army finds itself completely shut up, all attempts to break through the investing circle fruitless, all hope of relief from without cut off, even the best army will gradually lose its discipline and cohesion under sufferings, privations, labours, and dangers which do not appear to serve any other purpose but to uphold the honour of the flag.

For symptoms of this demoralization we have been watching for some time in vain. The stock of provisions inside the town has been much more considerable than was supposed, and thus the army of Metz has had a pretty good time of it. But the stores, if plentiful, must have been ill assorted; which is quite natural, as they were stray supplies for the army, accidentally left in the town and never intended for the purpose they have now to serve. The consequence is that the diet of the soldiers in the long run becomes not only different from what they are accustomed to, but positively abnormal, and produces sickness of various kinds and of daily increasing severity, the causes of this sickness operating stronger and stronger every day. This phase of the blockade

appears to have now been reached. Among the articles of which Metz is short are bread, the chief ordinary food of the French peasantry, and salt. The latter is absolutely indispensable to maintain health; and, as bread is almost the only form in which the French partake of starch for fat-producing food, the same may in this case be said of the former. The necessity of feeding the men and inhabitants on meat principally has, it is said, produced dysentery and scurvy. Without trusting too much to reports from deserters, who generally say what they think will please their captors, we may still believe such to be the case, as it is just what must occur under the circumstances. That the chances of demoralization must thereby increase rapidly is a matter of course.

The very capable correspondent of *The Daily News* before Metz states, in his description of Bazaine's sortie of the 7th of October, that after the French had established themselves in the villages to the north of Fort Saint-Eloy (north of Metz, in the valley of the Moselle) a mass of at least 30,000 of them was formed more to their right, close to the river, and advanced against the Germans. This column, or group of columns, was evidently intended to break through the circle of investment. This task required the utmost determination. They would have to march straight into a semicircle of troops and batteries concentrating their fire upon them; the severity of this fire would increase up to the point of actual contact with the enemy's masses, when, if they succeeded in routing them, it would at once considerably diminish, while, if they had to retreat, they would have to undergo the same cross-fire a second time. This the men must have known; and, moreover, Bazaine would use for this supreme effort his very best troops. Yet we are told that they never even got within the rifle-fire of the German masses. Before they reached the critical point, the fire of the artillery and of the line of skirmishers had dissolved their cohesion: "the dense columns first staggered and then broke."

This is the first time in this war that we hear such things of the men who could face cold steel and hot fire well enough at Vionville, Gravelotte, and the latter sorties. This inability even to attempt thoroughly the task which they were put to seems to show that the army of Metz is no longer what it was. It seems to indicate, not as yet demoralization, but discouragement and hopelessness—the feeling that it is no use trying. From that to positive demoralization there are not many steps, especially with French soldiers. And though it would be premature to predict from these indications the speedy fall of Metz, yet it will be surprising

if we do not soon discover more symptoms announcing that the defence is on the wane.

The surrender of Metz would have a far less moral, but a far greater material influence upon the course of the war than the fall of Paris. If Paris be taken, France may give in, but she need not any more than now. For by far the greater portion of the troops now investing Paris would be required to hold the town and its environs, and it is more than doubtful whether men enough could be spared to advance as far as Bordeaux. But, if Metz capitulated, more than 200,000 Germans would be set at liberty, and such an army, in the present state of the French forces in the field, would be amply sufficient to go where it liked in the open country, and to do there what it liked. The progress of occupation, arrested by the two great entrenched camps, would at once commence again, and any attempts at guerrilla warfare, which now might be very effective, would then soon be crushed.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXIV^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1775, October 21, 1870]

The investment of Paris has now lasted exactly one month. During this time two points relating to it have been practically settled in accordance with our predictions.^b The first is that Paris cannot hope to be relieved, in useful time, by any French army from without. The Army of the Loire is utterly deficient in cavalry and field artillery, while its infantry, with very trifling exceptions, consists of either young or demoralized old troops, badly officered and entirely wanting that cohesion which alone could render them fit to meet in the open old soldiers flushed with constant success such as von der Tann leads against them. Even were the Army of the Loire raised to 100,000 or 120,000 men, which it may be before Paris falls, it would not be able to raise the investment. By their great superiority in cavalry and field artillery, both of which can be spared to a great extent before Paris as soon as the siege train with its gunners has arrived, and by the superiority of their infantry, soldier for soldier, the Germans are enabled to meet such a force with one of inferior numbers without fear of the results. Besides, the troops now scouring the country east and north of Paris to distances of fifty and sixty miles could, in such a case, be sent temporarily to reinforce von der Tann, as well as a division or two from the investing army. As to the Army of Lyons, whatever of that possesses any tangible existence will find plenty of work with General Werder's Fourteenth North German Corps, now in Epinal and Vesoul, and the Fifteenth Corps following in his rear or on his right flank. The Army of the North, with Bourbaki for

^a Written on October 19, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 121-22.—*Ed.*

commander, has as yet to be formed. From all we hear, the Mobiles about Normandy and Picardy are extremely deficient in officers and drill; and the sedentary National Guards, if not most of the Mobiles too, will be required to garrison the twenty-five or more fortresses encumbering the country between Mézières and Havre. Thus efficient relief from this quarter is not very likely, and Paris will have to rely upon itself.

The second point settled is that the garrison of Paris is unfit to act on the offensive on a large scale. It consists of the same elements as the troops outside Paris, and it is equally deficient in cavalry and field artillery. The three sorties of the 19th and 30th of September and of the 13th of October have fully proved their inability to make any serious impression upon the investing forces. As these latter said, "They never were able to break through even our first line." Although General Trochu states in public that his disinclination to attack the enemy in the field is caused by the deficiency in field artillery, and that he will not go out again until that is supplied,^a he cannot help knowing that no field artillery in the world could prevent his first sortie *en masse* from ending in an utter rout. And by the time his field artillery can be ready, if that be more than a mere pretext, the fire of the German batteries against the forts and the closing in of their lines of investment, will have rendered its use in the open impossible.

Trochu and his staff appear to be perfectly aware of this. All their measures point to a mere passive defence, without any more great sorties than may be necessary to satisfy the clamour of an undisciplined garrison. The ramparts of the forts cannot long withstand the projectiles of the heavy German guns, of which more anon. It may be, as the staff in Berlin hopes, that two or three days will suffice to demolish the guns on the ramparts of the southern forts, to breach, from a distance and by indirect fire, the masonry revetment of their escarpments in one or two places, and then to storm them while the fire of the batteries from the commanding heights prevents any efficient succour from the works to the rear. There is nothing in the construction of the forts nor in the configuration of the ground to prevent this. In all the forts round Paris, the escarp—that is, the inner side of the ditch, or the outer face of the rampart—is covered with masonry to the height of the horizon merely, which is generally considered insufficient to secure the work from escalade. This deviation from the general

^a L. J. Trochu's despatch to the Mayor of Paris, c. October 16, 1870, *Le Temps*, No. 3418, October 16, 1870.—*Ed.*

rule was justified on the supposition that Paris would always be actively defended by an army. In the present case it will even be an advantage inasmuch as this low masonry will be difficult to hit by indirect fire from batteries from which it cannot be seen. The breaching from a distance will thus be rendered more tiresome, unless the heights on which these batteries are constructed will admit of a really plunging fire; and this cannot be judged of except on the ground.

Under any circumstances, the resistance of these southern forts, commanded as they are by heights within the most effective range of heavy rifled artillery, need not be expected to be a long one. But immediately behind them, between the forts and the enceinte, the activity of the garrison has been chiefly displayed. Numerous earthworks have been everywhere constructed; and though, as a matter of course, we are kept in ignorance of all details, we may be sure that they will have been planned and executed with all that care, foresight, and science which have placed for more than two centuries the French engineering staff in the foremost rank. Here, then, evidently is the fighting ground chosen by the defence; a ground where ravines and hill-slopes, factories and villages, mostly built of stone, facilitate the work of the engineer and favour the resistance of young and but half-disciplined troops. Here, we expect, the Germans will find the toughest work cut out for them. We are, indeed, informed by *The Daily News*, from Berlin, that they will be satisfied with the conquest of some of the forts, and leave hunger to do the rest. But we presume that this choice will not be left to them, unless, indeed, they blow up the forts and retire again to their present mere investing positions; and if they do that the French can gradually by counter approaches recover the lost ground. We presume therefore that the Germans intend to keep whatever forts they may take, as efficient bombarding positions to frighten the inhabitants by occasional shells, or to use them for as complete a bombardment as they can carry out with the means at their command. And in that case they cannot decline the combat offered to them by the defence on the ground chosen and prepared for the purpose, for the forts will be under the close and effective fire of the new works. Here we shall perhaps witness the last struggle in this war offering any scientific interest; may be, the most interesting of all to military science. Here the defence will be enabled to act on the offensive again, though upon a smaller scale, and, thus restoring to a certain extent the balance of the contending forces, may prolong resistance until famine compels surrender. For we must

keep in mind that of the stores of food provided for Paris one month's stock has already been consumed, and nobody outside the town knows whether it is provisioned for more than another month.

There appears to be great confusion of ideas among "special correspondents" as to the German siege guns; and there may well be, considering that the nomenclature of the various calibres among German artillerymen is founded upon principles at least as absurd and contradictory as those adopted in England. It may be worthwhile to clear this matter up a little now that these big guns may begin to speak any day. Of old-fashioned siege guns there were in use before Strasbourg, and have now been forwarded to Paris, twenty-five-pounder and fifty-pounder mortars—called so from the weight of a marble ball fitting their bore. Their calibres are about $8\frac{1}{2}$ to $8\frac{3}{4}$ inches respectively, and the real weight of the spherical shells they throw is, for the first 64 lb., and for the second 125 lb. Then there was a rifled mortar, calibre 21 centimetres, or $8\frac{1}{4}$ inches, throwing an elongated shell of 20 inches in length and rather above 200 lb. weight. These mortars have a tremendous effect, not only because the rifling gives their shells greater accuracy, but chiefly because the elongated percussion shell, always falling upon its heavy point, where the percussion fuze protrudes, secures the explosion of the charge at the very moment of penetration, thus combining in one and the same moment the effects of impact with that of explosion. Of rifled shell guns there were 12 lb. and 24 lb. guns, so called from the weight of the spherical solid iron ball they used to fire before being rifled. Their respective calibres are about four-and-a-half and five-and-a-half inches, and the weights of their shells 33 lb. and 64 lb. Besides these, there have been sent to Paris some of the heavy rifled guns intended for ironclad ships and for coast defence against such ships. The exact details of their construction have never been published, but their calibres are of about 7, 8 and 9 inches, and the corresponding shells of the weights of about 120, 200, and 300 lb. respectively. The heaviest guns used either in or before Sebastopol were the English naval 68-pounder, the 8- and 10-inch shell guns, and the French $8\frac{3}{4}$ and 12-inch shell guns, the heaviest projectile of which, the 12-inch spherical shell, weighed about 180 lb. Thus the siege of Paris will as much surpass Sebastopol as Sebastopol surpassed all former sieges by the weight and mass of the projectiles used. The German siege park, we may add, will contain the number of guns we guessed it would—namely, about four hundred.

SARAGOSSA—PARIS^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1776, October 22, 1870]

To form an appropriate idea of such a colossal operation as the siege and defence of Paris, we shall do well to look out, in military history, for some previous siege on a large scale to serve, at least in some degree, as an example of what we may expect to witness. Sebastopol would be a case in point if the defence of Paris took place under normal conditions; that is to say, if there were an army in the field to come to the relief of Paris or to reinforce its garrison, such as was the case with Sebastopol. But Paris defends itself under quite abnormal conditions: it has neither a garrison fit for an active defence, for fighting in the open, nor any reasonable hope of relief from without. Thus the greatest siege on record, that of Sebastopol, inferior only to the one we are about to see opened, offers no correct image of what will be done before Paris; and it will be at later stages of the siege only, and principally by contrast, that the events of the Crimean war will come in for comparison.

Nor will the sieges of the American war⁸⁰ offer better examples. They occurred during a period of the struggle when not only the Southern army, but also, following in its wake, the troops of the North, had lost the character of raw levies and had come under the description of regular troops. In all these sieges the defence was extremely active. At Vicksburg as well as at Richmond there were long preliminary struggles for the mastery of the ground on which alone the siege batteries could be erected; and, with the exception of Grant's last siege of Richmond, there were always attempts at relief too.⁸¹ But here, in Paris, we have a garrison of

^a Written between October 19 and 22, 1870.—*Ed.*

new levies feebly supported by scattered new levies outside the town, and attacked by a regular army with all the appliances of modern warfare. To find a case in point, we shall have to go back to the last war in which an armed people had to fight against a regular army, and actually did fight on a large scale—the Peninsular war. And here we find a celebrated example, which we shall see is in point in more than one respect: Saragossa.

Saragossa had but one-third of the diameter and one-ninth of the surface of Paris; but its fortifications, though erected in a hurry and without detached forts, would resemble those of Paris in their general defensive strength. The town was occupied by 25,000 Spanish soldiers, refugees from the defeat of Tudela,⁸² among them not more than 10,000 real soldiers of the line, the rest young levies; there were besides armed peasants and inhabitants, raising the garrison to 40,000 men. There were 160 guns in the town. Outside, a force of some 30,000 men had been raised in the neighbouring provinces to come to its succour. On the other hand, the French Marshal Suchet had no more than 26,000 men wherewith to invest the fortress on both sides of the river Ebro, and, besides, 9,000 men covering the siege at Calatayud. Thus, the numerical proportion of the forces was about the same as that of the armies now respectively in and before Paris: the besieged nearly twice as numerous as the besiegers. Yet the Saragossans could no more afford to go out and meet the besiegers in the open than the Parisians can now. Nor could the Spaniards outside at any time seriously interfere with the siege.

The investment of the town was completed on the 19th of December 1808; the first parallel could be opened as early as the 29th, only 350 yards from the main rampart. On the 2nd of January, 1809, the second parallel is opened 100 yards from the works; on the 11th the breaches are practicable and the whole of the attacked front is taken by assault. But here, where the resistance of an ordinary fortress garrisoned by regular troops would have ceased, the strength of a popular defence only commenced. The portion of the rampart which the French had stormed had been cut off from the rest of the town by new defences. Earthworks, defended by artillery, had been thrown up across all the streets leading to it, and were repeated at appropriate distances to the rear. The houses, built in the massive style of hot Southern Europe, with immensely thick walls, were loopholed and held in force by infantry. The bombardment by the French was incessant; but, as they were badly provided with heavy mortars, its effects were not decisive against the town. Still it was

continued for forty-one days without intermission. To reduce the town, to take house after house, the French had to use the slowest process of all, that of mining. At last, after one-third of the buildings of the town had been destroyed, and the rest rendered uninhabitable, Saragossa surrendered on the 20th of February. Out of 100,000 human beings present in the town at the beginning of the siege 54,000 had perished.

This defence is classical of its kind, and well merits the celebrity it has gained. But, after all, the town resisted only sixty-three days, all told. The investment took ten days; the siege of the fortress fourteen; the siege of the inner defences and the struggle for the houses thirty-nine. The sacrifices were out of all proportion to the length of the defence and the positive result obtained. Had Saragossa been defended by 20,000 good enterprising soldiers, Suchet, with his force, could not have carried on the siege in the face of their sallies, and the place might have remained in the hands of the Spaniards until after the Austrian war of 1809.⁸³

Now we certainly do not expect Paris to prove a second Saragossa. The houses in Paris, strong though they be, cannot bear any comparison as to massiveness with those of the Spanish city; nor have we any authority for supposing that the population will display the fanaticism of the Spaniards of 1809, or that one half of the inhabitants will patiently submit to be killed by fighting and disease. Still that phase of the struggle which came off in Saragossa after the storming of the rampart, in the streets, houses, and convents of the town, might to a certain extent repeat itself in the fortified villages and earthworks between the forts of Paris and the enceinte. There, as we said yesterday—in our twenty-fourth batch of Notes on the War^a—appears to us to lie the centre of gravity of the defence. There the young Mobiles may meet their opponents, even in offensive movements, upon something like equal terms, and compel them to proceed in a more systematical way than the staff in Berlin seemed to imagine when, a short time ago, it expected to reduce the town in twelve or fourteen days from the opening of the siege batteries. There, too, the defence may cut out so much work for the mortars and shell-guns of the attack that even a partial bombardment of the town, at least upon a large scale, may be for the time being out of the question. The villages outside the enceinte will under all circumstances have to be sacrificed wherever they may happen to lie between the German front of attack and the French front of defence; and if therefore

^a See this volume, p. 140.—*Ed.*

by sacrificing them the town can be spared so much the better for the defence.

How long this defence of the ground outside the enceinte can be made to last we cannot even guess at. It will depend upon the strength of the works themselves, upon the spirit with which the defence is conducted, upon the mode of attack. If the resistance become serious, the Germans will rely upon the fire of their artillery chiefly, in order to spare their troops. Anyhow, with the enormous artillery fire they will be able to concentrate upon any given point, it is not likely that it will take them more than a fortnight or three weeks before they arrive at the enceinte. To break and carry that will be the work of a few days. Even then there will be no absolute necessity to give up resistance; but it will be better to defer considering these eventualities until there shall be a greater probability of their actually occurring. Until then, too, we may be allowed to say nothing about the merits and demerits of M. Rochefort's barricades.⁸⁴ Upon the whole, we are of opinion that if the new works between the forts and the enceinte offer a really serious resistance, the attack will confine itself as much as possible—how far depends in a great measure upon the energy of the defence—to artillery fire, vertical and horizontal, and to the starving out of Paris.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXV^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1780, October 27, 1870]

While the negotiations for an armistice are pending,⁸⁵ it will be as well to make out the positions of the different corps of the German armies, which do not appear to be generally understood. We say the German armies, for of the French there is very little to be said. What is not shut up in Metz consists almost exclusively of new levies, the organization of which has never been made public, and cannot but vary from day to day. Moreover, the character of these troops, who prove themselves in all engagements more or less unfit for the field, takes away almost all interest in either their organization or their numbers.

As to the Germans, we know that they marched out with thirteen army corps of North Germany (including the Guards), one division of Hessians, one of Badeniers, one of Württembergers, and two army corps of Bavarians. The 17th division of the 9th North German Corps (one brigade of which consists of Mecklenburgers) remained on the coast while the French fleet was in the Baltic. In its stead the 25th, or Hessian division, was attached to the 9th Corps, and remains so up to the present day. There remained at home, with the 17th division, nine divisions of landwehr (one of the Guards, and one for each of the eight old provinces of Prussia⁸⁶; the time elapsed since 1866, when the Prussian system was introduced all over North Germany, having been barely sufficient to form the necessary number of reserve men, but not as yet any landwehr). When the recall of the French fleet and the completion of the fourth battalions of the line rendered these forces disposable, fresh army corps were formed

^a Written between October 22 and 27, 1870.—*Ed.*

out of them and sent to France. We shall scarcely know, before the end of the war, the details of formation of all these corps, but what has leaked out in the meantime gives us a pretty clear insight into the general character of the plan. Before Metz we have, under Prince Frederick Charles, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th corps, of which the 9th consists, for the time being, of the 18th and 25th divisions, besides two divisions of landwehr, one, the first (East Prussian), under General Kummer; the number of the other is not known—in all sixteen divisions of infantry.

Before Paris there are, under the Crown Prince,^a the 5th, 6th, and 11th North German, the two Bavarian corps, and the division of landwehr of the Guards; under the Crown Prince of Saxony,^b the 4th and 12th North German corps, and the Prussian Guards; under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg,^c the 13th Corps and the Württemberg division. The 13th Corps is formed of the 17th division mentioned above, and of one division of landwehr. Of these troops, forming in all twenty divisions, there are four divisions sent on detached duty. Firstly, von der Tann with two Bavarian divisions and the 22nd North German division (of the 11th Corps) to the south and west, holding with the Bavarians Orléans and the line of the Loire; while the 22nd division (General Wittich's) successively occupied Châteaudun and Chartres. Secondly, the 17th division is detached towards the north-east of Paris; it has occupied Laon, Soissons, Beauvais, St. Quentin, &c., while other troops—probably flying columns, chiefly composed of cavalry—have advanced almost to the gates of Rouen. If we set down these as equal to another division, we have in all five divisions detached from the army before Paris to scour the country, to collect cattle and provisions, to prevent the formation of armed bands, and to keep at a distance any new bodies of troops which the Government of Tours⁸⁷ may be able to send up. This would leave for the actual investment fifteen divisions of infantry, or seven army corps and a half.

Besides the 13th Corps, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg commands the whole of the detached troops in Champagne and the other occupied districts west of Lorraine, the garrisons of Sedan, Reims, Épernay, Châlons, Vitry, and the troops besieging Verdun. These consist of landwehr, principally of the 8th landwehr division. The garrisons in Alsace and Lorraine, almost all landwehr, are under the command of the respective military

^a Frederick William.—*Ed.*

^b Albert.—*Ed.*

^c Frederick Francis II.—*Ed.*

governors of these provinces. Moreover, there are the troops echeloned along the line of railway and the main roads whose exclusive duty it is to keep these in working order and open for army transport; these, formed by detachments of the various corps of the line, and amounting at least to the strength of a division, are under the "Etappen-Commandant."^a

The Baden division and another landwehr division have been combined into the 14th Corps, which is now, under General von Werder, advancing upon Besançon, while General Schmeling, with the fourth reserve division, has just successfully besieged Schelestadt, and is now taking in hand Neu Breisach. Here for the first time we find the mention of a "reserve division," which, in Prussian military language, is something essentially different from a landwehr division. In fact, we have so far accounted for six out of the nine landwehr divisions, and it may well be supposed that the garrisoning of Alsace and Lorraine, and in part of the Rhine fortresses, will account for the other three. The application of the term reserve division proves that the fourth battalions of the line regiments are now gradually arriving on French soil. There will be nine of them, or, in some cases, ten, to every army corps; these have been formed in as many reserve divisions, and probably bear the same number as the army corps to which they belong. Thus the fourth reserve division would be the one formed out of the fourth battalions of the Fourth Army Corps recruited in Prussian Saxony. This division forms part of the new 15th Army Corps. What the other division is we do not know—probably one of the three with which General Löwenfeld has just started from Silesia for Strasbourg; the other two would then form the 16th Corps. This would account for four out of thirteen reserve divisions, leaving nine still disposable in the interior of North Germany.

As to the numerical strength of these bodies of troops, the North German battalions before Paris have certainly been brought up again to a full average of 750 men; the Bavarians are reported to be weaker. The cavalry will scarcely average more than 100 sabres to the squadron instead of 150; and, upon the whole, an army corps before Paris will average 25,000 men, so that the whole army actually there will be nearly 190,000 men. The battalions before Metz must be weaker, on account of the greater amount of sickness, and will hardly average 700 men. Those of the landwehr will scarcely number 500.

The Polish press has lately begun to claim a rather large share

^a L. of C. Commandant.—Ed.

in the glory of the Prussian arms. The truth of the matter is this: the whole number of the Polish-speaking population in Prussia is about two millions, or one-fifteenth of the whole North German population; in these we include both the Water-Polacks of Upper Silesia and the Masures of East Prussia,⁸⁸ who would both be very much surprised to hear themselves called Poles. The 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th corps have an admixture of Polish soldiers, but the Polish element actually predominates in one division only of the 5th, and perhaps in one brigade of the 6th Corps. It has been the policy of the Prussian Government as much as possible to scatter the Polish element in the army over a great number of corps. Thus, the Poles of West Prussia are divided between the 1st and 2nd corps, and those of Posen between the 2nd and 5th, while in every case care has been taken that the majority of the men in each corps should be Germans.

The reduction of Verdun is now being energetically pushed on. The town and citadel are not very strongly fortified, but have deep wet ditches. On the 11th and 12th of October the garrison was driven from the villages surrounding the place, and the investment made close; on the 13th a bombardment was opened with forty-eight guns and mortars (French ones taken in Sedan), placed between 700 and 1,300 yards from the works. On the 14th some old French 24-pounders arrived from Sedan. and on the following day some of the new Prussian rifled 24-pounders which had reduced Toul. They were in full activity on the 18th. The town appeared to suffer severely, being very closely built.

THE FALL OF METZ^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1782, October 29, 1870]

The present war is a war of capitulations, each one of which seems to be destined to surpass its predecessors in magnitude. First came the 84,000 men laying down their arms at Sedan, an event the like of which, or even anything approaching to which, had not been witnessed in any previous war, not even in those of Austria. Now comes the surrender of 170,000 men, together with the fortress of Metz, surpassing Sedan as much as Sedan surpassed all previous capitulations. Is Metz, in its turn, to be surpassed by Paris? If the war be continued there can be little doubt it will.

The three radical blunders which brought Napoleon from the 2nd of August to the 2nd of September, from Saarbrücken to Sedan, and which virtually deprived France of the whole of her armies, were—first, the receiving of the enemy's attack in a position which allowed the victorious Germans to push in between the scattered corps of the French army, and thus to divide it into two distinct bodies, neither of which could rejoin or even act in concert with the other; second, the delay of Bazaine's army at Metz, by which it got hopelessly shut up there; and third, the march to the relief of Bazaine with forces and by a route which positively invited the enemy to take the whole of the relieving army prisoners. The effects of the first blunder were conspicuous throughout the campaign. Those of the third were brought to a close at Sedan; those of the second we have just witnessed at Metz. The whole of that "Army of the Rhine," to which Napoleon promised an arduous campaign^b in a country full of fortresses, is

^a Written between October 27 and 29, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Napoleon III's appeal to the army "Au quartier impérial de Metz, le 28 juillet 1870", *Le Temps*, No. 3440, July 30, 1870.—*Ed.*

now in, or on the road to, these very same fortresses as prisoners of war, and France is not only virtually, but positively, deprived of nearly all of her regular troops.

The loss of the men themselves, and of the matériel surrendered along with Metz, which must be enormous, is a blow hard enough. But it is not the hardest. The worst for France is that, with these men and this matériel, she is deprived of that military organization of which she is more in need than of anything else. Of men there are plenty; even of drilled men between twenty-five and thirty-five there must be at least 300,000. Matériel can be replaced from stores and factories at home and by commerce from abroad. Under circumstances like these all good breech-loaders are useful, no matter on what model they are constructed, or whether the ammunition of the one will suit the other models. Anything serviceable being welcome, with a proper use of telegraphs and steamers, there might be more arms and cartridges now at the disposal of the Government than could be used. Even field artillery might have been supplied by this time. But what is most wanted is that solid organization which can make an army out of all these armed men. This organization is personified in the officers and non-commissioned officers of the regular army, and finally ceases to be available with their surrender. The number of officers withdrawn from the active service of France, by losses on the battle-field and by capitulations, cannot now be less than from ten to twelve thousand, that of non-commissioned officers being nearly three times as great. With such organizing forces all at once withdrawn from the national defence, it becomes extremely difficult to turn crowds of men into companies and battalions of soldiers. Whoever has seen popular levies on the drill-ground or under fire—be they Baden Freischaaren, Bull-Run Yankees, French Mobiles, or British Volunteers⁸⁹—will have perceived at once that the chief cause of the helplessness and unsteadiness of these troops lies in the fact of the officers not knowing their duty; and in this present case in France who is there to teach them their duty? The few old half-pay or invalided officers are not sufficiently numerous to do it; they cannot be everywhere; the teaching has to be not theoretical only, but practical too; not by word of mouth only, but by act and example. A few young officers or newly-promoted sergeants in a battalion will very soon settle down to their work by the constant observation of what the old officers do; but what is to be done when the officers are almost all new, and not even many old sergeants to be had to be commissioned? The same men who now prove themselves in

almost every encounter unfit to act in masses in the open would have soon learned how to fight if it had been possible to embody them in Bazaine's old battalions; nay, if they had merely had the chance of being commanded by Bazaine's officers and sergeants. And in this final loss for this campaign of almost the last vestige of her military organization, France suffers most by the capitulation of Metz.

It will be time to form a decided opinion upon the conduct of the defence when we shall have heard what the defenders have to say for themselves. But if it be a fact that 170,000 men capable of bearing arms have surrendered, then the presumption is that the defence has not been up to the mark. At no time since the end of August has the investing army been double the strength of the invested. It must have varied between 200,000 and 230,000 men, spread out on a circle of at least twenty-seven miles' periphery, in the first line only; which means to say that the circle occupied by the masses must at least have been thirty-six to forty miles in periphery. This circle was moreover cut in two by the river Moselle, impassable except by bridges at some distance to the rear of the first line. If an army of 170,000 men could not manage to be in superior strength at any one point of this circle, and break through it before sufficient reinforcements could be brought up, we must conclude either that the arrangements of the investing troops were beyond all praise, or that the attempts to get through them were never made as they ought to have been done. We shall probably learn that here, as throughout this war, political considerations have lamed military action.

Unless peace be now concluded, the consequences of this fresh disaster will soon be brought home to France. We suppose that the two landwehr divisions will be left to garrison Metz. The 2nd Corps is already on the road to Paris, which does not absolutely imply that it is intended to take part in the investment of the capital. But supposing that to be the case, there would remain six corps, or at least 130,000 to 140,000 men, whom Moltke can send where he likes. The communications of the army with Germany were kept up without much participation of Prince Frederick Charles's troops; for this purpose he will have to detach few men, if any at all. The rest is disposable for the invasion of the west and south of France. There will be no necessity to keep the whole of them together. They will probably be divided into two or three bodies, forming, with von der Tann's corps, together at least 150,000, and will be ordered to advance into the parts of France hitherto unoccupied by the Germans. One corps will almost

certainly occupy the rich provinces of Normandy and Le Maine as far as the Loire, with Le Mans, where five railways meet, for a centre. Another will push forward in the direction of Bordeaux, after having cleared the line of the Loire from Tours to Nevers, and occupied or destroyed the arsenals and military factories of Bourges. This corps might march from Metz by Chaumont and Auxerre, where the country has not yet been eaten up by requisitions. A third corps might go straight to the south, to open communications with General Werder. The interior of France being almost entirely divested of fortresses deserving of the name, there will be no resistance except the evanescent one of the new levies, and the more passive but also more stubborn one of the populations. Whether, with such armies set free all at once, Moltke will attempt the siege of any more fortresses, or even the reduction of a fortified naval port such as Cherbourg, remains to be seen; he need reduce no more fortresses now, except Phalsbourg and Belfort, which block main lines of railway, and, of course, Paris.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXVI^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1787, November 4, 1870]

There can be no longer any reasonable doubt that the army which surrendered at Metz actually numbered 173,000 men, 140,000 of which were fit to bear arms, while rather more than 30,000 were sick and wounded. *The Daily News* gives us, in a telegram from Berlin, what professes to be full particulars of these troops:—67 infantry regiments, 13 battalions of Chasseurs-à-Pied,^b 18 fourth and dépôt battalions; 36 cavalry regiments—viz. 10 Cuirassiers, 1 Guides,⁹⁰ 11 Dragoons, 2 Lancers, 3 Hussars, 6 Chasseurs-à-Cheval,^c and 3 Chasseurs d'Afrique,^d besides 6 dépôt squadrons. We must suppose that this statement comes from the Prussian Staff in Berlin, and contains an abstract either of what they had made out from previous and indirect sources to be the composition of the French forces in Metz, or else of the French returns handed over to the captors on surrender. The latter appears most likely. We know there were within Metz, of infantry, the Guards (8 regiments=30 battalions, and 1 battalion Chasseurs), the Second Corps (Frossard, 3 divisions), the Third (Dacaen, late Bazaine, 4 divisions), the Fourth (Ladmirault, 3 divisions), the Sixth (Canrobert, 3 divisions), and 1 division of the Fifth Corps (De Failly's), in all 14 divisions of the line, each containing 1 battalion of Chasseurs and 4 regiments or 12 battalions of the line, excepting 2 divisions of Canrobert's which had no Chasseurs. This would give 12 battalions of Chasseurs and 168 battalions of the line, or, with the Guards, a grand total of 13 battalions Chasseurs

^a Written between October 29 and November 4, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Light infantry.—*Ed.*

^c Light cavalry.—*Ed.*

^d African infantry.—*Ed.*

and 198 of infantry, and, with the 18 dépôt battalions, in all 229 battalions, which is rather more than the 221 given as the total number in *The Daily News*. On the other hand, this list would give but 64 regiments of infantry, while our contemporary has 67. We must therefore conclude that the three missing regiments formed the garrison of Metz, and for that reason do not figure in the status of the "Army of the Rhine." As to the discrepancy in the number of battalions, that is easily accounted for. The losses of many regiments during the battles in August, and the sorties of September and October, as well as by sickness, must have been such that the three battalions had to be formed into two, perhaps even one.

That such a force, as large as Napoleon's army at Leipzig,⁹¹ should be compelled to surrender at all, is a fact unheard of in the history of warfare, and almost incredible even now after it has happened. But it becomes more inconceivable still if we compare the strength of this army with that of the captors. On the 18th of August Bazaine was thrown back, from the heights of Gravelotte, under the guns of the forts of Metz; in a few days after, the investment of the place was completed. But of the army which had fought at Gravelotte, 3 corps, or 75 battalions, were detached under the Crown Prince of Saxony^a on the 24th of August, at latest; for three days afterwards their cavalry defeated MacMahon's Chasseurs-à-Cheval at Buzancy. There remained before Metz 7 corps, or 175 battalions, and 12 landwehr battalions, in all 187 battalions, to invest an army of at least 221 battalions! At that time Bazaine must have had at his disposal 160,000 combatants, if not more. The Prussians certainly had taken every step to send up fresh men from their reserve troops to make up for the losses of the late battles; but it will be impossible to suppose that their battalions were brought up again to the full complement of 1,000 men. Even supposing this to have been the case, with the exception of the landwehr, which forms battalions of five or six hundred only, this will give the Prussians a force of not more than 182,000, or with cavalry and artillery about 240,000 men; that is to say, merely one-half more than the army shut up in Metz. And these 240,000 men were spread out on a front of twenty-seven miles in length, and there was an unfordable river to divide them into two distinct bodies. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to doubt that Bazaine, had he really attempted to break through the investing circle with the mass of his troops, could have done

^a Albert.—*Ed.*

so—unless indeed we suppose that the French, after Gravelotte, were no longer the men they had been before; and for that there is no reason.

That Bazaine, after the proclamation of the Republic, should have refrained from breaking out of Metz through political motives appears to the writer of these Notes quite certain. It is equally certain that every day of delay decreased his chances of success for doing so; still the Prussians themselves appear to think now that, had they been in the same position, they could have performed the feat. But what remains inexplicable is the inaction, or at least the indecision, of Bazaine during the last days of August and the first days of September. On the 31st of August he attempts an attack towards the north-east, and continues it throughout the night and the following morning; yet three Prussian divisions are sufficient to drive him back under the guns of the forts. The attempt must have been extremely feeble, considering the enormous strength with which he might have made it. A general who has sixteen divisions of splendid infantry under him, to be repelled by three divisions of the enemy! It is too bad.

As to the political motives which are said to have caused Bazaine's inactivity after the revolution of the 4th of September, and the political intrigues in which he engaged, with the connivance of the enemy, during the latter part of the investment,⁹² they are thoroughly in keeping with the Second Empire, which, in one form or another, they were intended to restore. It shows to what an extent that Second Empire had lost every comprehension of French character if the general in command of the only regular army France then possessed could think of restoring the fallen dynasty with the help of the invader of his country.

Bazaine's previous military career was none of the brightest. His Mexican campaign⁹³ merely proved that he cared more for reward than for glory or the credit of his country. His nomination to the command-in-chief of the Army of the Rhine was due to accidental circumstances; he got it, not because he was the most eligible but the least ineligible of the possible candidates; and the deciding considerations were anything but strictly military. He will be immortalized as the man who committed the most disgraceful act in French military history—who prevented 160,000 Frenchmen from breaking through the investing army of, under the circumstances, positively inferior strength, and surrendered them as prisoners of war when there was nothing more to eat.

THE EMPEROR'S APOLOGIA^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1788, November 5, 1870]

Like other great men in bad luck, Louis Napoleon appears aware that he owes the public an explanation of the causes which led him, much against his will, from Saarbrücken to Sedan; and consequently we have now been put in possession of what professes to be this explanation of his.^b As there is no evidence, either external or internal, to fix any suspicion of spuriousness upon the document, but rather to the contrary, we take it, for the present, to be genuine. Indeed, we are almost bound to do so, out of mere compliment; for if ever there was a document confirming, both generally and in detail, the view taken of the war by *The Pall Mall Gazette*, it is this Imperial self-justification.

Louis Napoleon informs us that he was perfectly aware of the great numerical superiority of the Germans; that he hoped to counteract it by a rapid invasion of Southern Germany in order to compel that country to remain neutral, and to secure, by a first success, the alliance of Austria and Italy. For this purpose 150,000 men were to be concentrated at Metz, 100,000 at Strasbourg, and 50,000 at Châlons. With the first two rapidly concentrated, the Rhine was to be passed near Karlsruhe, while the 50,000 men from Châlons advanced on Metz to oppose any hostile movement on the flank and rear of the advancing forces. But this plan evaporated as soon as the Emperor came to Metz. He found there only 100,000 men, at Strasbourg there were only 40,000, while

^a Written between November 1 and 5, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b [Napoleon III.] *Campagne de 1870. Des causes qui ont amené la capitulation de Sedan*. Par un officier attaché à l'Etat-Major Général, avec les plans de la place et de bataille, Brussels, 1870.—*Ed.*

Canrobert's reserves were anywhere and everywhere except at Châlons, where they ought to have been. Then the troops were unprovided with the first necessities for a campaign, knapsacks, tents, camp-kettles, and cooking-tins. Moreover, nothing was known of the enemy's whereabouts. In fact, the bold, dashing offensive was from the very beginning turned into a very modest defensive.

There will be scarcely anything new in all this to the readers of *The Pall Mall Gazette*. Our "Notes on the War" sketched out the above plan of attack as the most rational the French could pursue, and traced the causes why it had to be abandoned.^a But there is one fact, which was the proximate cause of his first defeats, for which the Emperor does not account: why he left his several corps in the faulty position of attack close to the frontier, when the intention of attack had been long given up. As to his figures, we shall criticize them by-and-by.

The causes of the breakdown of the French military administration the Emperor finds in

"the defects of our military organization such as it has existed for the last fifty years."

But surely this was not the first time that this organization was put upon its trial. It had answered well enough during the Crimean war. It produced brilliant results at the outset of the Italian war, when it was held up in England, not less than in Germany, as the very model of army organization. No doubt it was shown to have many shortcomings even then. But there is this difference between then and now: then it did work, and now it does not. And the Emperor does not profess to account for this difference, which was the very thing to be accounted for—but, at the same time, the most tender point of the Second Empire, which had clogged the wheels of this organization by all manner of corruption and jobbery.

When Metz was reached by the retreating army,

"its effective force was brought up to 140,000 by the arrival of Marshal Canrobert with two divisions and the reserve."

This statement, compared with the numbers who have just laid down their arms at Metz, compels us to look a little more closely into the Imperial figures. The army of Strasbourg was to be composed of MacMahon's, De Faily's, and Douay's corps, in all ten divisions, and should number 100,000 men; but it is now said

^a See this volume, pp. 15-16 and 22-23.—*Ed.*

not to have exceeded 40,000. Leaving Douay's three divisions entirely out of the question, although one of them came to MacMahon's assistance at or after Woerth, this would give less than 6,000 men per division (13 battalions), or barely 430 men per battalion, even if we do not count one single man for cavalry or artillery. Now, with all the credit we are inclined to give the Second Empire in the matter of jobbery and dilapidation, we cannot bring ourselves to believe that there should have been ninety battalions in the army the effective strength of which, twenty days after the calling out of the reserves and men on furlough, averaged 430 men instead of 900. As to the army of Metz it comprised, in the Guards and ten divisions of the line, 161 battalions; and if we take the 100,000 men given in the pamphlet as consisting of infantry only, without allowing anything for cavalry or artillery, that would still give not more than 620 men per battalion, which is undoubtedly below the reality. More wonderful still, after the retreat to Metz, this army was raised to 140,000 men by the arrival of two divisions of Canrobert and the reserves. The new additions thus consisted of 40,000 men. Now, as the "reserves" arriving at Metz after Spicheren could consist of cavalry and artillery only, the Guards having arrived there long before, they cannot be set down at more than 20,000 men, leaving another 20,000 for Canrobert's two divisions, which, for twenty-five battalions, would give 800 men per battalion; that is to say, Canrobert's battalions, which were the most unready of all, are made by this account to be far stronger than those which had been concentrated and got ready long before. But, if the army of Metz, before the battles of the 14th, 16th, and 18th of August, counted but 140,000 men, how comes it that after the losses of these three days—certainly not less than 50,000 men—after the losses of the later sorties, and the deaths from sickness, Bazaine could still hand over 173,000 prisoners to the Prussians? We have entered into these figures merely to show that they contradict each other and all the known facts of the campaign. They can be dismissed at once as totally incorrect.

Besides the army organization, there were other circumstances hampering the Imperial eagle's flight towards victory. There was, firstly, "the bad weather;" then "the encumbrance of baggage;" and finally,

"the absolute ignorance in which we always remained concerning the position and the strength of the hostile armies."

Three very untoward circumstances indeed. But the bad weather was there for both parties, for in all his devout references

to Providence King William has not once mentioned the fact that the sun shone on the German positions while rain fell on those of the French. Nor were the Germans unencumbered with baggage. As to the ignorance of the whereabouts of the enemy, there exists a letter of Napoleon's to his brother Joseph,^a who complained in Spain^b of the same hardship, and which is anything but complimentary to generals making such complaints. It says that if generals are ignorant of the whereabouts of the enemy it is their own fault, and proves that they do not understand their business. One sometimes doubts, in reading these excuses for bad generalship, whether this pamphlet is really written for grown-up people.

The account given of the part played by Louis Napoleon himself will not please his friends very much. After the battles of Woerth and Spicheren he "resolved immediately to lead back the army to the camp of Châlons." But this plan, though first approved by the Council of Ministers, two days afterwards was considered likely "to produce a deplorable effect on the public mind;" and, on the reception of a letter from M. E. Ollivier (!) to that effect, the Emperor abandoned it. He leads the army to the left bank of the Moselle, and then—"not foreseeing a general battle, and only looking for partial engagements"—leaves it for Châlons. Scarcely is he gone when the battles of the 16th and 18th of August take place, and shut up in Metz Bazaine and his army. In the meantime, the Empress and the Ministry, exceeding their powers, and behind the Emperor's back, convoke the Chamber; and, with the meeting of that eminently powerful body, the Corps Législatif of Arcadians,⁹⁴ the fate of the Empire was sealed. The Opposition—there were twenty-five of them, you know—became all-powerful, and "paralyzed the patriotism of the majority and the progress of the Government"—which Government, we all recollect, was not that of mealy-mouthed Ollivier but of rough Palikao.

"From this period Ministers appeared to be afraid to pronounce the name of the Emperor; and he, who had quitted the army, and had only relinquished the command in order to resume the reins of government, soon discovered that it would be impossible for him to play out the part which belonged to him."

In fact, he was made to see that he was virtually deposed, that he had become impossible. Most people with some self-respect, under the circumstances, would have abdicated. But no; his irresolution, to use the mildest possible expression, continues, and

^a Napoleon I's letter to Joseph Bonaparte of August 16, 1808, in: J. Bonaparte, *Mémoires et correspondance politique et militaire du roi Joseph*, t. IV, Paris, 1854.—Ed.

^b J. Bonaparte's letter to Napoleon I of August 14, 1808, *ibid.*—Ed.

he follows MacMahon's army, a mere clog, powerless to do good, but not to prevent its being done. The Government in Paris insist upon MacMahon making a move to relieve Bazaine. MacMahon refuses, as this would be tantamount to running his army into the jaws of perdition; Palikao insists.

"As to the Emperor, he made no opposition. It could not enter into his views to oppose the advice of the Government and of the Empress Regent, who had shown so much intelligence and energy under the greatest difficulties."

We admire the meekness of the man who for twenty years had maintained that submission to his own individual will was the only road to salvation for France, and who now, when "a plan of campaign is imposed from Paris, contrary to the most elementary principles of the art of war," makes no opposition, because it could never enter into his views to oppose the advice of the Empress Regent, who had, &c. &c.!

The description of the state of the army with which this fatal march was undertaken is an exact confirmation in every particular of our estimate of it at the time.^a There is only one redeeming feature in it. De Failly's corps, during its retreat by forced marches, had at least managed to lose, without a fight, "almost all its baggage;" but the corps does not appear to have appreciated this advantage.

The army had gone to Reims on the 21st of August. On the 23rd it advanced as far as the river Suippe, at Bétheniville, on the direct road to Verdun and Metz. But commissariat difficulties compelled MacMahon to return without delay to a line of railway; consequently, on the 24th, a movement to the left is made and Rethel is reached. Here the whole of the 25th is spent in distributing provisions to the troops. On the 26th, head-quarters go to Tourteron, twelve miles further eastward; on the 27th, to Le Chêne Populeux, another six miles. Here MacMahon, finding out that eight German army corps were closing in around him, gave orders to retreat again towards the west; but during the night positive orders from Paris arrived that he was to march to Metz.

"Unquestionably, the Emperor could have countermanded this order, but he was resolved not to oppose the decision of the Regency."

This virtuous resignation compelled MacMahon to obey; and so he reached Stonne, six miles further east, on the 28th. But "these orders and counter-orders occasioned delays in the movements."

^a See this volume, pp. 66 and 78.—*Ed.*

In the meantime

"the Prussian army had made forced marches, while we, encumbered with baggage [again!], had occupied six days with fatigued troops in marching twenty-five leagues."

Then came the battles of the 30th, 31st [of August], and 1st of September, and the catastrophe, which is narrated very fully, but without giving any new particulars. And then comes the moral to be drawn from it:—

"Certainly the struggle was disproportionate; but it would have been longer sustained, and less disastrous for our arms, if military operations had not been unceasingly subordinated to political considerations."

It is the fate of the Second Empire and everything connected with it to fall without being pitied. The commiseration which is the least that falls to the lot of great misfortunes does not, somehow or other, appear to be extended to it. Even the "*honneur au courage malheureux*"^a which you cannot nowadays use in French without a certain irony, seems to be denied to it. We doubt whether, under the circumstances, Napoleon will derive much benefit from a document according to which his eminent strategical insight is in every case set at nought by absurd orders, dictated by political motives, from the Government at Paris, while his power to cancel these absurd orders is again set at nought by his unlimited respect for the Regency of the Empress. The best that can be said of this uncommonly lame pamphlet is, that it does acknowledge how necessarily things must go wrong in war "if military operations be unceasingly subordinated to political considerations."

^a Honour to the courage in distress.—*Ed.*

THE FIGHTING IN FRANCE^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1793, November 11, 1870]

During the first six weeks of the war, while German victories followed each other rapidly, while the expanding force of the invaders was as yet but incompletely spent, and while there were still French armies in the field to oppose them, the contest, generally speaking, remained one of armies. The population of the invaded districts took but little part in the fighting. True, there were a dozen or so of Alsatian peasants court-martialed and shot for participating in battles or for maiming the wounded; but a tragedy like that of Bazeilles was quite the exception. This is proved by nothing better than by the immense impression it made, and by the eager controversy carried on in the press as to the degree in which the treatment of that village was justifiable or otherwise. If it were advisable to reopen that controversy, we could prove, from the testimony of unimpeachable eye-witnesses, that inhabitants of Bazeilles did fall upon the Bavarian wounded, ill-treated them, and threw them into the flames of houses fired by shells; and that in consequence of this, General von der Tann gave the stupid and barbarous order to destroy the whole place—stupid and barbarous chiefly because it meant setting fire to houses in which his own wounded were lying by the hundred. But anyhow, Bazeilles was destroyed in the heat of battle, and in a contest the most exasperating—that of house and street fighting, where reports must be acted upon and decisions taken at once, and where people have no time to sift evidence and to hear counsel on both sides.

During the last six weeks the character of the war has undergone a remarkable change. The regular armies of France

^a Written between November 5 and 11, 1870.—*Ed.*

have disappeared; the contest is carried on by levies whose very rawness renders them more or less irregular. Wherever they attempt to come out in masses in the open, they are easily defeated; wherever they fight under shelter of barricaded and loopholed villages and towns, they find they can offer a serious resistance. They are encouraged in this kind of fighting, in night surprises, and other coups of petty warfare, by proclamations and orders of the Government, who also command the people of the district in which they operate to support them in every way. This resistance would be easily put down if the enemy disposed of forces sufficient for the occupation of the whole country. But this he did not up to the surrender of Metz. The force of the invaders was spent before Amiens, Rouen, Le Mans, Blois, Tours, and Bourges could be reached on the one hand, and Besançon and Lyons on the other. And that this force became spent so soon is in no small degree owing to this greater condensation of the resisting medium. The eternal "four Uhlans"^a cannot now ride into a village or a town far outside their own lines and command absolute submission to their orders without risk of being caught or killed. Requisition columns have to be accompanied by an imposing force, and single companies or squadrons have to guard themselves well from night surprises when quartered in a village, and from ambushes when on the march. There is a belt of disputed ground all around the German positions, and it is just there that popular resistance is most severely felt. And to put down this popular resistance the Germans are having recourse to a code of warfare as antiquated as it is barbarous. They are acting upon the rule that every town or village where one or more of the inhabitants take part in the defence, fire upon their troops, or generally assist the French, is to be burned down; that every man taken in arms who is not, according to their notion, a regular soldier, is to be shot at once; and that where there is reason to believe that any considerable portion of the population of a town have been guilty of some such offence, all able-bodied men are to be massacred at once. This system has now been ruthlessly carried out for nearly six weeks, and is still in full force. You cannot open a German newspaper without stumbling over half a dozen reports of such military executions, which there pass quite as a matter of course, as simple proceedings of military justice carried out with wholesome severity by "honest soldiers" against "cowardly assass-

^a See the item "Berlin, Nov. 1", *The Times*, No. 26899, November 4, 1870.—*Ed.*

sins and brigands." There is no disorder of any kind, no promiscuous plunder, no violation of women, no irregularity. Nothing of the kind. It is all done systematically and by order; the doomed village is surrounded, the inhabitants turned out, the provisions secured, and the houses set fire to, while the real or suspected culprits are brought before a court-martial, when a short shrift and half a dozen bullets await them with unerring certainty. In Ablis, a village of 900 inhabitants, on the road to Chartres, a squadron of the 16th (Sleswig-Holstein) Hussars were surprised at night by French irregulars, and lost one half of their men; to punish this piece of insolence, the whole brigade of cavalry marched to Ablis and burned down the whole place; and two different reports, both from actors in the drama, assert that all able-bodied men were taken out from the inhabitants and shot down, or hacked to pieces without exception.^a This is but one out of very many cases. A Bavarian officer in the neighbourhood of Orléans writes that his detachment had burned down five villages in twelve days^b; and it is no exaggeration to say that wherever the German flying columns are passing in the centre of France, their road but too often remains traced by fire and by blood.

Now it will scarcely suffice in 1870 to say that this is legitimate warfare, and that the interference of civilians or of anybody not properly recognized as a soldier is tantamount to brigandage, and may be put down by fire and sword. All this might apply in the time of Louis XIV and Frederick II, when there were no other contests but those of armies. But from the American war of independence down to the American war of secession, in Europe as well as in America, the participation of the populations in war has become not the exception but the rule. Wherever a people allowed itself to be subdued merely because its armies had become incapable of resistance it has been held up to universal contempt as a nation of cowards; and wherever a people did energetically carry out this irregular resistance, the invaders very soon found it impossible to carry out the old-fashioned code of blood and fire. The English in America,⁹⁵ the French under Napoleon in Spain, the Austrians, 1848, in Italy and Hungary, were very soon compelled to treat popular resistance as perfectly legitimate, from fear of reprisals on their own prisoners. Not even the Prussians in

^a Report from the *Kreisblatt für das Westhavilland* "Rambouillet, Oct. 9". Engels cites it according to *The Times*, No. 26897, November 2, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b H. Voget's report from the *Frankfurter Zeitung* entitled "Aus Orleans, 23. Okt.". Engels cites it according to the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 308, November 4, 1870.—*Ed.*

Baden, 1849, or the Pope^a after Mentana,⁹⁶ had the courage to shoot down indiscriminately their prisoners of war, irregulars and "rebels" though they were. There exist only two modern examples of the ruthless application of this antiquated code of "stamping out:" the suppression of the Sepoy mutiny⁹⁷ by the English in India, and the proceedings of Bazaine and his French in Mexico.

Of all armies in the world, the very last that ought to renew such practices is the Prussian. In 1806 Prussia collapsed merely because there was not anywhere in the country a trace of that spirit of national resistance. After 1807, the reorganizers of the administration and of the army did everything in their power to revive it. At that time Spain showed the glorious example how a nation can resist an invading army. The whole of the military leaders of Prussia pointed out this example to their countrymen as the one to be followed. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Clausewitz were all of one mind in this respect; Gneisenau even went to Spain himself to fight against Napoleon. The whole of the new military system then inaugurated in Prussia was an attempt to organize popular resistance to the enemy, at least as far as this was possible in an absolute monarchy. Not only was every able-bodied man to pass through the army and to serve in the landwehr up to his fortieth year; the lads between seventeen and twenty and the men between forty and sixty were to form part of the landsturm or *levée en masse*,^b which was to rise in the rear and on the flanks of the enemy, harass his movements, intercept his supplies and couriers, use whatever arms it could find, employ indiscriminately whatever means were at hand to annoy the invader—"the more effective these means the better"—and, above all,

"to wear no uniform of any kind, so that the landsturm might at any time resume their character of civilians and remain unknown to the enemy."^c

The whole of this "Landsturm Ordnung," as the law of 1813 regarding it is called, is drawn up—and its author is no other than Scharnhorst, the organizer of the Prussian army—in this spirit of uncompromising national resistance, to which all means are justifiable and the most effective are the best. But then all this was to be done by the Prussians against the French, and if the French act in the same way towards the Prussians that is quite a different

^a Pius IX.—*Ed.*

^b General levy.—*Ed.*

^c Frederick William III, "Verordnung über den Landsturm. Vom 21sten April 1813", in: *Gesetz-Sammlung für die königlichen preussischen Staaten*, Berlin [1813]. See this volume, p. 195.—*Ed.*

thing. What was patriotism in the one case becomes brigandage and cowardly assassination in the other.

The fact is, the present Prussian Government are ashamed of that old, half-revolutionary Landsturm Ordnung, and try to make it forgotten by their proceedings in France. But every act of wanton cruelty they get committed in France will more and more call it to memory; and the justifications made for such an ignoble mode of warfare will but tend to prove that if the Prussian army has immensely improved since Jena,³⁵ the Prussian Government are rapidly ripening that same state of things which rendered Jena possible.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXVII^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1797, November 16, 1870]

Those who believed, with M. Gambetta, that the skilful and well-combined movements by which the Army of the Loire manoeuvred von der Tann's Bavarians out of Orléans would be followed up at once by an advance on Paris have been doomed to disappointment. The engagement of Coulmiers,⁹⁸ or whatever else it may hereafter be called, took place on the 9th, and up to the evening of the 13th the Bavarian outposts appear to have remained unmolested in front of Toury, only twenty-five miles from Orléans.

It redounds greatly to the credit of General d'Aurelle de Paladines that after his first success he not only had the sense, but also the moral strength, to stop in time. With M. Gambetta behind him, proclaiming to his men that they are on the road to Paris, that Paris awaits them and must be freed from the barbarians,^b it cannot have been an easy matter to keep back these young and half-disciplined troops, who are but too ready to cry "trahison" unless they are at once led against the enemy, and to run away when they are made seriously to feel that enemy's presence. That d'Aurelle has made them stop on the road to Paris shows that his efforts to discipline them have not been unsuccessful, and that his first success has gained him their confidence. His dispositions for this first French victory were everything they should have been. Von der Tann cannot have had more than 25,000 men in the neighbourhood of Orléans, which exposed position he was allowed

^a Written on November 16, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b L. Gambetta's proclamation to the troops, c. November 13, 1870, *The Times*, No. 26907, November 14, 1870.—*Ed.*

to continue to hold, in the consciousness that his seasoned troops would, under any circumstances, be able to fray themselves a road through no matter what number of the new levies opposed to them. D'Aurelle could operate against the Bavarians with at least fourfold their numbers, and he did what is usual in such a case: he turned their flanks and displayed, especially on their right rear, such a strength that von der Tann was at once compelled to fall back towards his supports. These joined him at Toury on the 11th, or at latest the 12th; and they consisted of Wittich's 21st division of North German infantry, Prince Albrecht's division of cavalry, and the 13th Corps (17th North German division and Württemberg division). Thus a force of from 65,000 to 70,000 men at least is concentrated under the command of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg at Toury, and General d'Aurelle may well look at them twice before he ventures upon an attack on them, though they are commanded by a very common-place chief indeed.

But there are other motives besides this which must compel General d'Aurelle to pause before making any fresh movement. If his intention really be to come to the relief of Paris, he must know perfectly well that his own forces are not sufficient to effect this object unless at the same time a vigorous effort is made, from within, to second him. We know that General Trochu has picked out the most disciplined and best organized portion of his troops and formed of them what may be called the active army of Paris. Under the command of General Ducrot, they appear to be intended for those grand sorties without which the defence of a place like Paris is like a soldier fighting with his right arm tied up.

It is not perhaps a matter of accident that this reorganization of the Army of Paris coincides, in point of time, with the advance of the Army of the Loire. General Trochu and General d'Aurelle doubtless have attempted, by means of balloons and carrier pigeons, to arrange a combined movement, to be made at a time agreed upon beforehand; and, unless the Germans previously attack the Army of the Loire, we may expect a sortie on a large scale from Paris on or about the same time that d'Aurelle makes his next forward movement. That sortie would probably be made with at least the whole of Ducrot's three corps, on the south side of the town, where communication with the Army of the Loire might, in case of success, be established, while on the north-east and north-west sides Trochu's "Third Army" would make simulated attacks and diversions, supported by the fire of the forts, to prevent the investing army from sending reinforcements

to the south. We may be sure, on the other hand, that all this is taken into account by General Moltke, and that he will not be caught napping. In spite of the great numerical superiority which the French will be able to bring into the field, we are decidedly of opinion that the difference in the quality of the troops and in the generalship will more than make up for this.

This attempt to free Paris from the grasp of the "barbarians" will have to be made very soon if it is to have any chance at all. Besides the five divisions of infantry which are opposed to the Army of the Loire, there are now before Paris sixteen divisions of infantry (the 2nd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th corps, the Guards, the 1st Bavarian Corps, the 21st division, and the division of landwehr of the Guards). This force must be, in Moltke's eyes, quite sufficient to keep Paris effectively blockaded; otherwise he would have drawn towards Paris more troops than the 2nd Corps, out of those that became free by the surrender of Metz. And considering that its positions, facing Paris, are everywhere strongly entrenched, and will shortly be under the protection of tremendous siege batteries, such will no doubt be the case. But we are now beginning to receive news from Prince Frederick Charles, who after the capitulation of Metz had become invisible with three army corps (the 3rd, 9th, and 10th). The first glimpse we since then have had of his troops was the short piece of news that the "9th regiment" had had a brush with the Mobs just outside Chaumont, in the Haute-Marne, on the 7th of November.^a The 9th belongs to the seventh brigade (of the Second) Corps which had already arrived before Paris, and the whole story became thereby unintelligible. Since then, it has been established that the telegram, by mistake, gave the ninth regiment instead of the ninth brigade, and this clears up the matter. The ninth brigade is the first of the Third Army Corps, and belongs therefore to the army of Prince Frederick Charles. The locality of the engagement, combined with the report generally accredited in military circles in Berlin that the Prince had been marching upon Troyes, which city he was said to have reached on the 7th or 8th, left but little doubt that he had taken the route we supposed the main body of his troops would take, viz. "to march from Metz by Chaumont and Auxerre, and to push forward in the direction of Bordeaux after having cleared the line of the Loire from Tours to Nevers."^b We now learn that

^a Report of a special correspondent of *The Times* "Berlin, Nov. 9, 1.36 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26904, November 10, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, p. 153.—*Ed.*

this army has occupied the line of the Yonne at Sens,^a about fifty miles from Gien on the Loire, and but thirty from Montargis, whence any French position to the north of Orléans could be taken in flank by one good day's march. The detachments reported at Malesherbes and Nemours may have been sent by Prince Frederick Charles to feel for von der Tann's left, or they may be flanking parties on the extreme left of the line of march of the 13th Corps. At any rate, we may now expect that the Prince will very soon establish his communications by flying columns with von der Tann at Toury, on the one hand, and Werder at Dijon on the other. If the Army of the Loire delays its attack until Prince Frederick Charles arrives within reach, it will have, besides the 70,000 men in its front, another 75,000 men on its right flank and rear, and all idea of relieving Paris will have to be abandoned. It will have enough to do to look after its own safety, and will have to recede, hopelessly, before that broad flood-wave of invasion which will then cover central France on a front extending from Chartres to Dijon.

^a "Gien, Nov. 14", *The Times*, No. 26909, November 16, 1870.—*Ed.*

FORTIFIED CAPITALS^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1801, November 21, 1870]

If there is any military question which the experience of the present war may be said to have finally settled, it is that of the expediency of fortifying the capital of a great State. Ever since the day when the fortification of Paris was resolved upon, the controversy as to the usefulness or otherwise, and even as to the possibility of defending such a vast fortress, has been going on in the military literature of all countries. Nothing could settle it but practical experience—the actual siege of Paris, the only fortified capital in existence; and though the real siege of Paris has not yet begun, the fortifications of Paris have rendered such immense services to France already that the question is as good as decided in their favour.

The dangerous proximity of Paris to the north-eastern frontier of France—a frontier, moreover, entirely deprived of any defensible line either of river or mountains—led, first, to the conquest of the nearest border-lands; secondly, to the construction of a triple belt of fortresses running from the Rhine to the North Sea; and, thirdly, to that continuous hankering after the whole of the left bank of the Rhine, which has at last brought France to her present position. The conquests were cut down and defined by the Treaties of 1814 and 1815,⁹⁹ the fortresses were proved to be all but useless, and completely incapable of arresting large armies, by the two invasions of the same years; finally, the shouts for the Rhine were, in 1840, checked for a time by a European coalition against France.¹⁰⁰ Then it was that France, as became a great

^a Written on November 21, 1870.—*Ed.*

nation, attempted to counterbalance the dangerous position of Paris by the only means in her power—by fortifying it.

In this present war France was covered, on her most vulnerable side, by the neutrality of Belgium. Still, one short month sufficed to drive all her organized forces from the field. One half had surrendered themselves prisoners; the other was hopelessly shut up in Metz, their surrender but a question of weeks. Under ordinary circumstances, the war would have been at an end. The Germans would have occupied Paris and as much of the rest of France as they desired, and after the capitulation of Metz, if not before, peace would have been concluded. France has nearly all her fortresses close to the frontier: this belt of fortified towns once broken through on a front sufficiently wide for liberty of movement, the remaining fortresses on the border or the coast might be neglected, and the whole of the central country occupied; after which, the border fortresses would be easily brought to surrender one after another. Even for guerilla warfare fortresses in the interior, as safe centres of retreat, are necessary in cultivated countries. In the Peninsular War, the popular resistance of the Spaniards was rendered possible mainly by the fortresses. The French, in 1809, drove Sir John Moore's English troops out of Spain¹⁰¹; they were victorious everywhere in the field, and yet never conquered the country. The comparatively small Anglo-Portuguese army, on its reappearance, could not have faced them had it not been for the innumerable Spanish armed bands which, easily beaten in open battle, infested the flanks and rear of every French column, and held fast by far the greater portion of the invading army. And these bands could not have held out for any length of time had it not been for the great number of fortresses in the country; fortresses, mostly small and antiquated, but still requiring a regular siege to reduce them, and therefore safe retreats for these bands when attacked in the open field. Such fortresses being absent in France, even a guerrilla war could never be very formidable there, unless there were some other circumstances to make up for their absence. And one such circumstance is the fortification of Paris.

On the 2nd of September the last French army in the field capitulated.^a And to-day, on the 21st of November, nearly eleven weeks afterwards, almost one-half of all the German troops in France is still held fast around Paris, while the greater portion of

^a The reference is to the French army near Sedan. See this volume, p. 87.—*Ed.*

the remainder are hurried forward from Metz to protect the investment of Paris against a newly-formed Army of the Loire, an army which, whatever its value may be, could not have even come into existence had it not been for the fortifications of Paris. These fortifications have been invested for just two months, and the preparations for the opening of the regular siege are not yet complete; that is to say, the siege of a fortress of the size of Paris, even if defended by none but new levies and a determined population, can begin only when that of a common fortress would have been long brought to a successful close. The event has proved that a town holding two millions of inhabitants can be provisioned almost easier than a smaller fortress exercising less central attraction upon the produce of the surrounding country; for although the provisioning of Paris was taken seriously in hand after the 4th of September, or a fortnight only before the investment was complete, Paris is not yet starved into submission after nine weeks' blockading. In fact, the armies of France resisted but for one month; Paris has, already now, resisted for two months and still holds fast the main body of the invaders. Surely this is more than ever a fortress did before, and repays in full the outlay upon the works. And we must not forget, what we have more than once pointed out already, that the defence of Paris this time is carried on under quite abnormal conditions, because it has to do without an active field army. What would that resistance be, how would it have delayed, if not altogether prevented, the investment, how many more men of the invading armies would it have fettered around Paris, if MacMahon's army had gone to the capital instead of to Sedan?

But this is not all. Not only has the defence of Paris given to France two months of breathing time, which, under less disastrous circumstances, would have been invaluable and may even now turn out so, but it has also given her the benefit of whatever chances political changes may bring on during the siege. We may say as long as we like that Paris is a fortress like any other, yet the fact remains that the actual siege of a place like Paris will produce far more excitement all over the world than a hundred sieges of minor places. The laws of warfare may be what they may, our modern consciousness refuses to acquiesce in having Paris treated as Strasbourg was. The neutrals, under such circumstances, may pretty safely be counted on for trying mediation; political jealousies against the conqueror are almost certain to crop up before the place is completely reduced; in fact, an operation of the magnitude and duration of the siege of Paris is as likely to be

decided in the Cabinet of some non-combatant Power, by alliances and counter-alliances, as in the trenches by dismounting¹⁰² and breaching batteries. Of this we are about to witness an example perhaps. It is just possible that the sudden irruption upon Europe of the Eastern question¹⁰³ may do for Paris what the Army of the Loire cannot do—save it from surrender and free it from blockade. If, as is but too probable, Prussia should be unable to clear herself from complicity—of whatever degree—with Russia, and if Europe be determined not to tolerate the Russian breach of faith, then it is of the utmost importance that France should not be completely prostrated and Paris not be held by the Prussians. It is therefore absolutely necessary that Prussia should be compelled at once to declare herself categorically, and that if she attempt to prevaricate, steps should be taken at once to strengthen the hopes and the resistance of Paris. Thirty thousand British soldiers landed at Cherbourg or Brest would form an ingredient which, added to the Army of the Loire, would give it a degree of steadiness unknown to it heretofore. The British infantry, by its uncommon solidity, even by its corresponding fault, its clumsiness in light infantry movements, is peculiarly adapted thus to steady newly-formed levies; it performed that duty admirably in Spain, under Wellington; it did a similar duty in all Indian wars as regards the less trustworthy native troops. Under such circumstances the influence of such a British army corps would far exceed that due to its mere numbers, as, indeed, has always been the case when a British army corps was thus employed. A couple of Italian divisions thrown towards Lyons and the Saône Valley, as the advanced guard of an Italian army, would soon attract Prince Frederick Charles; there is Austria; there are the Scandinavian kingdoms to menace Prussia on other fronts and attract her troops; Paris itself, on receiving such news, would certainly undergo almost any degree of starvation rather than surrender—and bread there seems to be plenty—and thus the fortifications of the town might actually, even in its present distress, save the country by having enabled it to hold out until help arrived.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXVIII^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1803, November 23, 1870]

If ever there was a chance of relief for Paris that chance existed during the last eight days. A resolute advance of the Army of the Loire, reinforced by all troops that could be brought up from the East of France, against Mecklenburg's^b army of observation, combined with a sortie *en masse* made by the whole of Trochu's disciplined forces, both attacks carried out at the same time and before Prince Frederick Charles could come up with the Second Army—this was the only plan which promised success. And if we look at the counter-dispositions of the Germans we can hardly help concluding that it had more chances of success than could be expected at first sight.

Before Paris there were last week seventeen German infantry divisions, including the Württembergers, who had not left their post between the Seine and the Marne, as had been erroneously reported at first. The army of observation, under Mecklenburg, counted two North German and two Bavarian divisions, besides cavalry. After the battle of Coulmiers, D'Aurelle, instead of following up the Bavarian rear, marched north and west in the direction of Chartres, where, for the present, he became lost to our eyes. The Germans followed this movement by a change of front towards the west, von der Tann's Bavarians holding the country from Etampes to Ablis, while the 17th and 22nd divisions marched towards Chartres and Dreux. The latter town had, in the meantime, been reoccupied by French troops; it was supposed that D'Aurelle, reinforced by Kératry and other forces, was trying to

^a Written between November 21 and 23, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Frederick Francis II.—*Ed.*

turn the army of observation and to arrive suddenly upon the army blockading Paris. So serious did this attempt appear to Count Moltke that he despatched at once the nearest troops, portions of the 5th and 12th Corps, to the support of Mecklenburg, and ordered the 2nd Bavarian and 6th North German Corps, the 21st, and the Württemberg divisions to hold themselves in readiness to march south if required. The reinforcements already sent enabled Mecklenburg to retake Dreux on the 17th, and to follow the enemy up, on the 18th, beyond Châteauneuf. What French troops they were who were here defeated it is impossible to tell. They may have been portions of the Army of the Loire, but they certainly were not the Army of the Loire itself. Since then there is no news whatever of further French movements; while time runs on and Prince Frederick Charles draws nearer and nearer, and ought, by now, to be within supporting distance of Mecklenburg's left wing.

There seems to be little doubt that a great opportunity has been missed by the French. The advance of the Army of the Loire made such a powerful impression upon Moltke that he did not hesitate a moment to give orders which implied, if it became necessary to execute them, nothing less than the raising of the investment of Paris. The portions of the 5th and 12th Corps, which advanced towards Dreux, we will set down at not more than a brigade each, or a division in all; but besides them, two Bavarian, three North German and the Württemberg divisions were told off to hold themselves ready to march against D'Aurelle at the first notice. Thus, out of the seventeen divisions before Paris, seven at least were to march against the relieving army in case of need, and these seven just those which occupied the ground to the south of Paris. The Crown Prince would have retained but the 2nd and greater part of the 5th Corps, wherewith to guard the long extent of ground from the Seine at Choisy, by Versailles, to St. Germain; while the Guards, the 4th, and greater part of the 12th Corps would have had to hold the whole of the northern line from St. Germain round by Gonesse and St. Brice, across the Marne, again to the Seine above Paris. Thus ten divisions of infantry would have held a line of investment of forty miles, or four miles of front for each division. Such a scattering of forces would have reduced the investment to a mere line of observation; and Trochu, with eight divisions under Ducrot and seven more, in his Third Army, under his own immediate command, could have outnumbered his opponents at least three to one on any point he might have chosen for an attack. With such

odds victory ought to have been certain to him. He could have pierced the lines of the Germans, seized upon and destroyed their siege parks, ammunitions, and stores, and caused them such losses in men that a close investment, much less a siege, of Paris would have been rendered impossible for some time to come.

So far, we have merely considered Trochu's chances, independent of those of the Army of the Loire. It is as good as certain that the latter would have been no match for the eleven German divisions told off against it, in case these eleven divisions were all concentrated. But the chances were much against that eventuality. It is likely enough that a bold and quick attack by D'Aurelle, combined with a large sortie made by Trochu at the same time, would have carried disorder into Moltke's arrangements. None of the corps which Trochu happened to attack could have been spared to march off against D'Aurelle. Thus it might remain a matter of accident which of the two French chiefs might have to fight the bulk of the Germans; but the fact remained that their forces together were far superior in numbers to anything the Germans could bring against them. From Paris to Dreux the distance is less than fifty miles. A simultaneous attack upon the Germans from both ends, and with all available forces, would, in all probability, find some of their divisions on the march between the two end-points, and therefore not immediately available. If the attack were really simultaneous, an almost crushing numerical superiority on the French side, either at the Dreux end or at the Paris end, was a positive certainty; and therefore it was almost impossible to miss at least one victory. We know very well what great drawbacks and difficulties attach to combined movements, and how often they miscarry. But in this case it is to be observed that no other condition of success was necessary than that both attacks should be made at exactly the same time. And, further, it is clear that with a distance of forty miles from one army to the other, the Prussians had to combine their movements too.

It is impossible to explain why neither D'Aurelle nor Trochu has done anything to take advantage of the chance thus offered to them. The slight engagements near Dreux and Châteauneuf were certainly not of a nature to drive back the Army of the Loire; there were not more than three German divisions engaged in them, while the Army of the Loire counts at least eight. Whether D'Aurelle is awaiting further reinforcements; whether his pigeon-messages have miscarried; whether there are differences between him and Trochu, we cannot tell. Anyhow, this delay is fatal to

their cause. Prince Frederick Charles keeps marching on, and may be by this time so near to the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's army that he can co-operate, and the six divisions from before Paris can be spared. And from the day when that takes place, the two French generals will have lost another chance of victory—may be, their last one.

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN FRANCE^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1806, November 26, 1870]

Yesterday we called attention to the fact that since the surrender at Sedan the prospects of France had much improved,^b and that even the fall of Metz, and the setting free thereby of some 150,000 German soldiers, does not now look the crushing disaster it appeared to be at first. If we recur to the same subject to-day, it is in order to prove still more, by a few military details, the correctness of this view.

The positions of the German armies on the 24th of November, as far as they can be made out, were as follows:—

Investing Paris: The Third Army (2nd, 5th, 6th, and 2nd Bavarian corps, the 21st, the Württemberg, and Landwehr Guard divisions) and the Fourth Army (4th, 12th, and Guards corps); in all seventeen divisions.

Army of Observation, protecting this investment: To the north, the First Army (1st and 8th corps); to the west and south-west, Duke of Mecklenburg's army (17th and 22nd divisions, and 1st Bavarian Corps); to the south, the Second Army (3rd, 9th, and 10th corps, and a division of landwehr, a detachment of which was so severely handled at Châtillon by Ricciotti Garibaldi)¹⁰⁴; in all fifteen divisions.

On special duty, in the south-east of France, the 14th Corps (Werder's, consisting of two divisions and a half), and 15th Corps; in Metz and about Thionville, the 7th Corps; on the line of communication, at least a division and a half of landwehr; in all eight divisions at least.

^a Written on November 26, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b "The Prospect for France to-day", *The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1805, November 25, 1870.—*Ed.*

Of these forty divisions of infantry, the first seventeen are at present fully engaged before Paris; the last eight show by their immobility that they have as much work cut out for them as they can manage. There remain disposable for the field the fifteen divisions composing the three armies of observation, and representing with cavalry and artillery a total force of some 200,000 combatants at most.

Now, before the 9th of November, there appeared to be no serious obstacle to prevent this mass of men from overrunning the greater part of central and even southern France. But since then things have changed considerably. And it is not so much the fact of von der Tann having been beaten and compelled to retreat, or that of D'Aurelle having shown his ability to handle his troops well, which has inspired us with a greater respect for the Army of the Loire than we confess we had up to that day; it is chiefly the energetic measures which Moltke took to meet its expected march on Paris which have made that army appear in quite a different light. Not only did he find it necessary to hold in readiness against it, even at the risk of raising *de facto* the investment of Paris, the greater portion of the blockading forces on the south side of the town, but he also changed at once the direction of march of the two armies arriving from Metz, so as to draw them closer to Paris, and to have the whole of the German forces concentrated around that city; and we now hear that, moreover, steps were taken to surround the siege park with defensive works. Whatever other people may think, Moltke evidently does not consider the Army of the Loire an armed rabble, but a real, serious, redoubtable army.

The previous uncertainty as to the character of that army resulted to a great extent from the reports of the English correspondents at Tours.^a There appears to be not one military man among them capable of distinguishing the characteristics by which an army differs from a mob of armed men. The reports varied from day to day regarding discipline, proficiency in drill, numbers, armament, equipment, artillery, transport—in short, regarding everything essential to form an opinion. We all know the immense difficulties under which the new army had to be formed: the want of officers, of arms, of horses, of all kinds of matériel, and especially the want of time. The reports which came to hand, principally dwelt upon these difficulties; and thus, the

^a See "Tours, Sept. 30", *The Times*, No. 26873, October 5, 1870; "Tours, Oct. 5", *The Times*, No. 26877, October 10, 1870; "Tours, Oct. 8", *The Times*, No. 26878, October 11, 1870; "Tours, Oct. 9", *The Times*, No. 26880, October 13, 1870.—*Ed.*

Army of the Loire was generally underrated by people whose sympathies do not run away with their judgment.

Now the same correspondents are unanimous in its praise.^a It is said to be better officered and better disciplined than the armies which succumbed at Sedan and in Metz. This is no doubt the case to a certain extent. There is evidently a far better spirit pervading it than ever was to be found in the Bonapartist armies; a determination to do the best for the country, to co-operate, to obey orders on that account. Then this army has learned again one very important thing which Louis Napoleon's army had quite forgotten—light infantry duty, the art of protecting flanks and rear from surprise, of feeling for the enemy, surprising his detachments, procuring information and prisoners. The *Times'* correspondent with the Duke of Mecklenburg gives proofs of that.^b It is now the Prussians who cannot learn the whereabouts of their enemy, and have to grope in the dark; formerly it was quite the reverse. An army which has learned that has learned a great deal. Still, we must not forget that the Army of the Loire as well as its sister Armies of the West and North has still to prove its mettle in a general engagement and against something like equal numbers. But, upon the whole, it promises well, and there are circumstances which make it probable that even a great defeat will not affect it as seriously as such an event does most young armies.

The fact is that the brutalities and cruelties of the Prussians, instead of stamping out popular resistance, have redoubled its energies; so much so that the Prussians seem to have found out their mistake, and these burnings of villages and massacres of peasants are now scarcely ever heard of. But this treatment has had its effect, and every day the guerilla warfare takes larger dimensions. When we read in *The Times* the reports about Mecklenburg's advance towards Le Mans, with no enemy in sight,^c no regular force offering resistance in the field, but cavalry and francs-tireurs hovering about the flanks, no news as to the whereabouts of the French troops, and the Prussian troops kept close together in pretty large bodies, we cannot help being reminded of the marches of Napoleon's marshals in Spain, or of Bazaine's troops in Mexico. And, that spirit of popular resistance once roused, even armies of 200,000 men do not go very far

^a "Tours, Nov. 19", *The Times*, No. 26917, November 25, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b "Head-Quarters Duke of Mecklenburg's Army, Châteauneuf-en-Thimerais, Nov. 18", *The Times*, No. 26917, November 25, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c "Tours, Nov. 24", *The Times*, No. 26917, November 25, 1870.—*Ed.*

towards the occupation of a hostile country. They soon arrive at the point beyond which their detachments become weaker than what the defence can oppose to them; and it depends entirely upon the energy of popular resistance how soon that line shall be reached. Thus even a defeated army soon finds a safe place from the pursuit of an enemy if only the people of the country arise; and this may turn out to be the case now in France. And if the population in the districts occupied by the enemy should rise, or merely his lines of communication be repeatedly broken, the limit beyond which the invasion becomes powerless will be still more contracted. We should not wonder, for instance, if Mecklenburg's advance, unless powerfully supported by Prince Frederick Charles, turned out to have been pushed too far even now.

For the present everything of course hinges upon Paris. If Paris hold out another month—and the reports on the state of provisions inside do not at all exclude that chance—France may possibly have an army in the field large enough, with the aid of popular resistance, to raise the investment by a successful attack upon the Prussian communications. The machinery for organizing armies appears to be working pretty well in France by this time. There are more men than are wanted; thanks to the resources of modern industry and the rapidity of modern communications, arms are forthcoming in unexpectedly large quantities; 400,000 rifles have arrived from America alone¹⁰⁵; artillery is manufactured in France with a rapidity hitherto quite unknown. Even officers are found, or trained, somehow. Altogether, the efforts which France has made since Sedan to reorganize her national defence are unexampled in history, and require but one element for almost certain success—time. If Paris holds out but one month more, that will go much towards it. And if Paris should not be provisioned for that length of time, Trochu may attempt to break through the investing lines with such of his troops as may be fit for the work; and it would be bold to say, now, that he cannot possibly succeed in it. If he should succeed, Paris would still absorb a garrison of at least three Prussian army corps to keep it quiet, so that Trochu might have set free more Frenchmen than the surrender of Paris would set free Germans. And, whatever the fortress of Paris can do if defended by Frenchmen, it is evident that it could never be successfully held by a German force against French besiegers. There would be as many men required to keep the people down within as to man the ramparts to keep off the attack from without. Thus the fall of Paris may, but does not of necessity, imply the fall of France.

It is a bad time just now for speculating on the probability of this or that event in the war. We have an approximative knowledge of one fact only—the strength of the Prussian armies. Of another, the strength, numerical and intrinsic, of the French forces, we know but little. And, moreover, there are now moral factors at work which are beyond all calculation, and of which we can only say that they are all of them favourable to France and unfavourable to Germany. But this much appears certain, that the contending forces are more equally balanced just now than they ever have been since Sedan, and that a comparatively weak reinforcement of trained troops to the French might restore the balance altogether.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXIX^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1811, December 2, 1870]

The long-expected storm has broken out at last. After a prolonged period of marching and manoeuvring on both sides, varied by skirmishes and guerilla fighting only, the war has entered upon another of those critical periods in which blow follows blow. On the 27th of November the French Army of the North was defeated before Amiens; on the 28th a considerable portion of the Army of the Loire was beaten by Prince Frederick Charles at Beaune-la-Rolande; on the 29th Trochu made an unsuccessful sortie on the south side of Paris, and on the 30th he appears to have attacked with all his available forces the Saxons and Württembergers investing Paris on the north-east side.

These different actions are the result of combined operations, such as we repeatedly pointed out^b as offering the only chance of success to the French. If the Army of the North, with inferior numbers, could hold Manteuffel's two corps in check so as to prevent him from reinforcing the Crown Prince of Saxony^c in his lines round the north side of Paris, then that army would have been well employed. But this was not the case. Its advance in the open country was soon stopped by inferior numbers of Prussians; for it appears all but certain, on a comparison of the various reports, that Manteuffel had only one of his corps engaged in the battle.^d The Army of the North would have been better employed

^a Written on December 2, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 169, 178.—*Ed.*

^c Albert.—*Ed.*

^d German official report "Moreuil, Nov. 28", *The Times*, No. 26920, November 29, 1870; "Berlin, 29. Nov.", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 334, November 30, 1870. Supplement.—*Ed.*

either by sending its field troops down south to Le Mans by rail, or by constantly harassing Manteuffel's outposts and detachments, but refusing battle except under the walls of one of the numerous fortresses in the North which form its base of operations. But in the present state of France, and with the young soldiers that form her armies, a General cannot always enter upon a retreat even if that be strategically necessary: such a course might demoralize his troops even more than a thorough defeat. In the present case, the Army of the North finds a safe retreat in its fortresses, where it can re-form, and where it would scarcely suit Moltke to send Manteuffel after it just now. But, at the same time, Manteuffel is now free to move in any other direction, and if, as is reported from Lille^a (though the report is denied^b), he has again evacuated Amiens and turned in haste towards Paris, we cannot but confess that the Army of the North has failed in its mission.

On the west, the 21st French Corps at Le Mans, and the 22nd (late Kératry's) in the camp of Conlie, have so far succeeded in drawing the troops of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg^c a long way from Paris without exposing themselves to any serious defeat. Our supposition that the advance of these German troops had been pushed almost too far^d seems confirmed by the unanimous French reports that they have again evacuated the positions lately taken up east and south-east of Le Mans, which have been reoccupied by the French.^e The latter, however, do not appear to have used their regular forces in a very energetic pursuit of the enemy, as we do not hear of any engagements of importance; and thus the Army of the West has not succeeded any more than that of the North in holding fast the troops opposed to it. Where it is, and what it is doing, we are not told; it may be that the sudden quarrel between Kératry and Gambetta had lamed its movements just at the most decisive moment. At all events, if it could neither beat Mecklenburg's troops nor keep them engaged, it would have acted more wisely in sending such of its troops as are equipped and organized for a campaign by rail towards the Army of the Loire, so as to make the chief attack with concentrated forces.

This chief attack could only be made by the Army of the Loire, being the main body of all the French troops now in the field, and could only be directed against Prince Frederick Charles, his army

^a French report "Lille, Dec. 1", *The Times*, No. 26922, December 1, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b "Lille, Dec. 1, 7 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26923, December 2, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c Frederick Francis II.—*Ed.*

^d See this volume, p. 183.—*Ed.*

^e "Tours, Nov. 30, 9.50 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26922, December 1, 1870.—*Ed.*

being the most numerous of the three which cover the investment of Paris. The Army of the Loire is reported to consist of the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 19th French corps which had been in front of Orléans for some time, and the 18th (now Bourbaki's) and 20th in reserve behind the Loire. As the 18th and 20th were both engaged—wholly or in part—on the 28th, they must have passed the Loire before that day, and thus the whole of these six corps must have been available for an attack upon the Second German Army. A French corps, in this war, has always been composed of from three to four divisions of infantry. According to an *ordre de bataille*^a published by a Vienna military paper, the *Kamerad*, about a fortnight ago, the 15th Corps numbered five brigades in two divisions; the 16th, four brigades in two divisions; the 18th, ten brigades in three divisions. Even if we do not go by the report of the *Journal de Bruxelles*, which gives to the Army of the Loire the full complement of eighteen divisions of infantry (or three per corps), as a good many of these must still be in course of formation, there is no doubt that the attack on the 28th might have been made with twelve or fifteen divisions instead of five or six at most. It is characteristic of the troops composing the Army of the Loire that they were defeated by greatly inferior numbers, only three divisions (the two of the 10th Corps and the 5th) of infantry, or less than one-half of the Second Army, having been engaged against them. Anyhow their defeat must have been very severe; not only the German reports tend to show it, but also the fact that the Army of the Loire has not since attempted a fresh attack with more concentrated forces.

From these various transactions it results that the attempt to relieve Paris from without has for the present failed. It failed, firstly, because the inestimable chances of the week preceding the arrival of the First and Second German Armies were allowed to pass away; and, secondly, because the attacks, when they were made, were made without the necessary energy and concentration of forces. The young troops forming the new armies of France cannot, at first, expect success against the seasoned soldiers who oppose them, unless they are matched two against one; and it is therefore doubly faulty to lead them to battle without having taken care that every man, horse, and gun that can be had is actually sent on to the battle-field.

On the other hand, we do not expect that the defeats of Amiens and Beaune-la-Rolande will have any other great effect than that

^a Battle array.—Ed

of frustrating the relief of Paris. The lines of retreat of the Armies of the West and of the Loire are perfectly safe, unless the grossest blunders are committed. By far the greater portion of these two armies has not taken part in the defeat. The extent to which the German troops opposing them can follow them up depends upon the energy of popular resistance and guerilla warfare—an element which the Prussians have a peculiar knack of arousing wherever they go. There is no fear now of Prince Frederick Charles marching as unopposed from Orléans to Bordeaux as the Crown Prince^a marched from Metz to Reims. With the broad extent of ground which must now be securely occupied before any further advance southward (other than by large flying columns) can be made, the seven divisions of Prince Frederick Charles will soon be spread out far and wide, and their invading force completely spent. What France requires is time, and, with the spirit of popular resistance once roused, she may yet get that time. The armaments carried on during the last three months must be everywhere approaching completion, and the additional number of fighting men which every fresh week renders disposable must be constantly increasing for some time.

As to the two sorties from Paris, the news^b received up to the moment of writing are too contradictory and too vague for any definite opinion to be formed. It appears, however, upon Trochu's own showing,^c that the results obtained up to the evening of the 30th were not at all of a kind to justify the shouts of victory raised at Tours. The points, then, still held by the French south of the Marne are all protected by the fire of the Paris forts; and the only place which they at one time held outside the range of these forts—Mont Mesly—they had to abandon again. It is more than probable that fighting will have been renewed yesterday before Paris, and to-day, perhaps, near Orléans and Le Mans; at all events, a very few days must now decide this second crisis of the war which, in all probability, will settle the fate of Paris.

^a Frederick William.—*Ed.*

^b The reference is to the French and German telegrams printed under the common title "The Battle before Paris", *The Times*, No. 26923, December 2, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c L. J. Trochu's proclamation to the population of Paris and the army, November 28, 1870, *Journal officiel de la République Française* (Paris), No. 330, November 30, 1870. Evening edition.—*Ed.*

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXX^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1812, December 3, 1870]

The Second Army of Paris began its offensive movements on the 29th of November by a sortie from the southern front of the town, in the direction of L'Hay and Choisy-le-Roi. According to the Prussian accounts, it was the First Corps of Ducrot's army, under Vinoy, which here attacked the Sixth Prussian Corps under Tümping.^b This attack appears to have been a mere feint to alarm the Prussians, and to induce them to strengthen this side by which the besieged could, if successful, join the Army of the Loire on the shortest road. Otherwise, Vinoy would, no doubt, have been supported by other corps, and would have lost more than a couple of hundred in killed and wounded, and a hundred men in prisoners. The real attack was opened on the following morning. Ducrot this time advanced on the right bank of the Seine, near its junction with the Marne, while a second sortie on the left bank was directed against Tümping, and false attacks west of Saint Denis against the 4th and Guard Corps. What troops were used for these false attacks we do not know; but an official French account says that the sortie against Tümping was made by Admiral De La Roncière Le Noury. This officer commands one of the seven divisions of the Third Army of Paris which remains under Trochu's direct command; it is therefore likely that all the secondary attacks were entrusted to this army, so as to leave the whole of Ducrot's right divisions available for the real attack on the Marne.

^a Written on December 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b William I's telegram to Queen Augusta of November 28, 1870, datelined "Versailles, Nov. 29", *The Times*, No. 26922, December 1, 1870.—*Ed.*

This attack again had to be made in two divergent directions. One portion of the troops necessarily was directed eastwards towards Chelles, along the right bank of the Marne, in order to keep off the 12th or Saxon Corps which invests the east side of Paris. This was another subordinate attack; we hear very little of its history except that the Saxons profess to have maintained their position,^a which they probably did. The main body of Ducrot's troops, however, Renault's Second Corps in front, passed the Marne on eight bridges, and attacked the three Württemberg brigades which held the space between the Marne and Seine. As has been already pointed out, the Marne, before joining the Seine, forms by its course an immense S, the upper or northern bend approaching Paris and the lower receding from it. Both these bends are commanded by the fire of the forts; but, while the upper or advancing one favours a sortie by its configuration, the lower or receding one is completely commanded by the ground on the left bank as well as by the forts, and the river moreover, both from the line it takes and from its many branches, is unfavourable to the construction of bridges under fire. The greater part of this bend appears to have remained, on that account, a kind of neutral ground, on each side of which the real fighting took place.

The troops intended for the western attack advanced under the protection of the fire of Fort Charenton and the redoubt of La Gravelle, in the direction of Mesly and Bonneuil. Between these two places there is a solitary hill, commanding the surrounding plain by fully a hundred feet, called Mont Mesly, and necessarily the first object of the French advance. The force told off for this purpose is put down in a telegram from General Oberrnitz, commanding the Württemberg division, as "a division^b;" but as it at first drove in the 2nd and 3rd Württemberg brigades who opposed it and could not be repelled until reinforcements had come to hand, and as it is moreover evident that Ducrot, who had troops enough in hand, would not make such an important attack with two brigades only, we may safely assume that this is another of the too many cases where the word *Abtheilung* which means any subdivision of an army, is mistranslated by "division," which means a particular subdivision consisting of two or at most three brigades. Anyhow, the French carried Mont Mesly and with it the villages at its foot, and if they could have held and entrenched it,

^a German report "Chelles, Dec. 1", *The Times*, No. 26924, December 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b H. Oberrnitz, "Chateau-le-Piple, Nov. 30", *The Times*, No. 26923, December 2, 1870.—*Ed.*

they would have obtained a result worth the day's fighting. But reinforcements arrived in the shape of Prussian troops from the Second Corps, namely the seventh brigade; the lost positions were reconquered and the French driven back under the shelter of Fort Charenton.

Further to their left the French attempted the second attack. Covered by the fire of the Redoute de la Faisanderie and of Fort Nogent, they passed the Marne at the upper bend of the S, and took the villages of Brie and Champigny, which mark its two open ends. The real position of the 1st Württemberg Brigade, which held this district, lay a little to the rear, on the edge of the high ground stretching from Villiers to Coeuilly. Whether the French ever took Villiers is doubtful; King William says yes,^a General Obernitz says no. Certain it is that they did not hold it, and that the advance beyond the immediate range of the forts was repelled.

The result of this day's fighting of Ducrot's army, "with its back to the Marne," that is, south of it, is thus summed up in the French official despatch:—

"The army then crossed the Marne by eight bridges, and maintained the positions taken, after capturing two guns."^b

That is to say, it retreated again to the right or northern bank of the river, where it "maintained" some positions or other, which were, of course, "taken" by it, but not from the enemy. Evidently, the men who manufacture bulletins for Gambetta are still the same who did that kind of work for Napoleon.

On the 1st of December the French gave another sign that they considered the sortie as defeated. Although the *Moniteur* announced that on that day the attack from the south was to be made under the command of General Vinoy,^c we hear from Versailles, December 1 (time of day not stated), that no movement had been made by the French on that day; on the contrary, they had asked for an armistice to allow them to attend to the killed and wounded on the battlefield between the positions of both armies.^d Had they considered themselves in a position to reconquer that battlefield, they would no doubt have renewed the struggle at once. There can be, then, no reasonable doubt that this

^a William I's telegram "Royal Head-Quarters, Versailles, Nov. 30", *The Times*, No. 26923, December 2, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b "Tours, Dec. 2, 12.15 A.M.", *The Times*, No. 26923, December 2, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c Here and below the reference is to "Tours, le 1^{er} décembre 1870", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 330, December 2, 1870. Extraordinary edition.—*Ed.*

^d "Royal Head-Quarters, Versailles, Dec. 1", *The Times*, No. 26924, December 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

first sortie of Trochu's has been beaten off, and by considerably inferior numbers too. We may assume that he will soon renew his efforts. We know too little of the way in which this first attempt was managed to be able to judge whether he may then have a better chance; but if he be again driven back, the effect upon both the troops and the population of Paris must be very demoralizing.

In the meantime the Army of the Loire, as we expected,^a has been stirring again. The engagements near Loigny and Patay, reported from Tours,^b are evidently the same as referred to in a telegram from Munich,^c according to which von der Tann was successful west of Orléans. In this case, too, both parties claim the victory. We shall probably hear more from this quarter in a day or two; and as we are still in the dark about the relative positions of the combatants, it would be idle to prognosticate.¹⁰⁶

^a See this volume, p. 188.—*Ed.*

^b "Tours, December 2", *The Times*, No. 26924, December 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c "Munich, Dec. 2", *The Times*, No. 26924, December 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

THE CHANCES OF THE WAR ^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1816, December 8, 1870]

The last defeat of the French Army of the Loire and the retreat of Ducrot behind the Marne—supposing that movement to be as decisive as was represented on Saturday^b—finally settle the fate of the first combined operation for the relief of Paris. It has completely miscarried, and people begin again to ask whether this new series of misfortunes does not prove the inability of the French for further successful resistance—whether it would not be better to give up the game at once, surrender Paris, and sign the cession of Alsace and Lorraine.

The fact is, people have lost all remembrance of a real war. The Crimean, the Italian, and the Austro-Prussian war were all of them mere conventional wars—wars of Governments which made peace as soon as their military machinery had broken down or become worn out. A real war, one in which the nation itself participates, we have not seen in the heart of Europe for a couple of generations. We have seen it in the Caucasus, in Algeria, where fighting lasted more than twenty years with scarcely any interruption⁵⁹; we should have seen it in Turkey if the Turks had been allowed, by their allies, to defend themselves in their own home-spun way. But the fact is, our conventionalities allow to barbarians only the right of actual self-defence; we expect that civilized States will fight according to etiquette, and that the real nation will not be guilty of such rudeness as to go on fighting after the official nation has had to give in.

^a Written between December 4 and 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 189-92.—*Ed.*

The French are actually committing this piece of rudeness. To the disgust of the Prussians, who consider themselves the best judges in military etiquette, they have been positively fighting for three months after the official army of France was driven from the field; and they have even done what their official army never could do in this campaign. They have obtained one important success and numerous small ones; and have taken guns, convoys, prisoners from their enemies. It is true they have just suffered a series of severe reverses; but these are as nothing when compared with the fate their late official army was in the habit of meeting with at the hands of the same opponents. It is true their first attempt to free Paris from the investing army, by an attack from within and from without at the same time, has signally failed; but is it a necessary sequel that there are no chances left for a second attempt?

The two French armies, that of Paris as well as that of the Loire, have both fought well, according to the testimony of the Germans themselves. They have certainly been beaten by inferior numbers, but that is what was to be expected from young and newly organized troops confronting veterans. Their tactical movements under fire, according to a correspondent in *The Daily News*, who knows what he writes about, were rapid and steady; if they lacked precision that was a fault which they had in common with many a victorious French army. There is no mistake about it: these armies have proved that they *are* armies, and will have to be treated with due respect by their opponents. They are no doubt composed of very different elements. There are battalions of the line, containing old soldiers in various proportions; there are Mobiles of all degrees of military efficiency, from battalions well officered, drilled, and equipped to battalions of raw recruits, still ignorant of the elements of the "manual and platoon;" there are francs-tireurs of all sorts, good, bad, and indifferent—probably most of them the latter. But there is, at all events, a nucleus of good fighting battalions, around which the others may be grouped; and a month of desultory fighting, with avoidance of crushing defeats, will make capital soldiers out of the whole of them. With better strategy, they might even now have been successful; and all the strategy required for the moment is to delay all decisive fighting, and that, we think, can be done.

But the troops concentrated at Le Mans and near the Loire are far from representing the whole armed force of France. There are at least 200,000 to 300,000 more men undergoing the process of organization at points farther away to the rear. Every day brings

these nearer to the fighting standard. Every day must send, for a time at least, constantly increasing numbers of fresh soldiers to the front. And there are plenty more men behind them to take their places. Arms and ammunition are coming in every day in large quantities: with modern gun factories and cannon foundries, with telegraphs and steamers, and the command of the sea, there is no fear of their falling short. A month's time will also make an immense difference in the efficiency of these men; and if two months were allowed them, they would represent armies which might well trouble Moltke's repose.

Behind all these more or less regular forces there is the great landsturm, the mass of the people whom the Prussians have driven to that war of self-defence which, according to the father of King William,^a sanctions every means.^b When Fritz^c marched from Metz to Reims, from Reims to Sedan, and thence to Paris, there was not a word said about a rising of the people. The defeats of the Imperial armies were accepted with a kind of stupor; twenty years of Imperial régime had used the mass of the people to dull and passive dependence upon official leadership. There were here and there peasants who participated in actual fighting, as at Bazeilles, but they were the exception. But no sooner had the Prussians settled down round Paris, and placed the surrounding country under a crushing system of requisitions, carried out with no consideration whatever—no sooner had they begun to shoot francs-tireurs and burn villages which had given aid to the latter—and no sooner had they refused the French offers of peace and declared their intention to carry on a war of conquest, when all this changed. The guerilla war broke out all around them, thanks to their own severities, and they have now but to advance into a new department in order to raise the landsturm far and wide. Whoever reads in the German papers the reports of the advance of Mecklenburg's^d and Frederick Charles's armies will see at a glance what an extraordinary effect this impalpable, ever disappearing and reappearing, but ever impeding insurrection of the people has upon the movements of these armies. Even their numerous cavalry, to which the French have scarcely any to oppose, is neutralized to a great extent by this general active and passive hostility of the inhabitants.

^a Frederick William III.—*Ed.*

^b Frederick William III, "Verordnung über den Landsturm. Vom 21sten April 1813", *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten*, Berlin [1813].—*Ed.*

^c Crown Prince of Prussia Frederick William.—*Ed.*

^d Frederick Francis II.—*Ed.*

Now let us examine the position of the Prussians. Of the seventeen divisions before Paris, they certainly cannot spare a single one while Trochu may repeat any day his sorties *en masse*. Manteuffel's four divisions will have more work than they can execute in Normandy and Picardy for some time to come, and they may even be called away from them. Werder's two divisions and a half cannot get on beyond Dijon, except on raids, and this will last until at least Belfort shall have been reduced. The long thin line of communication marked by the railway from Nancy to Paris cannot send a single man out of those told off to guard it. The 7th Corps has plenty to do with garrisoning the Lorraine fortresses and besieging Longwy and Montmédy. There remain for field operations against the bulk of central and southern France the eleven infantry divisions of Frederick Charles and Mecklenburg, certainly not more than 150,000 men, including cavalry.

The Prussians thus employ about six-and-twenty divisions in holding Alsace, Lorraine, and the two long lines of communication to Paris and Dijon, and in investing Paris, and still they hold directly perhaps not one-eighth, and indirectly certainly not more than one-fourth, of France. For the rest of the country they have fifteen divisions left, four of which are under Manteuffel. How far these will be able to go depends entirely upon the energy of the popular resistance they may find. But with all their communications going by way of Versailles—for the march of Frederick Charles has not opened to him a new line *viâ Troyes*—and in the midst of an insurgent country, these troops will have to spread out on a broad front, to leave detachments behind to secure the roads and keep down the people; and thus they will soon arrive at a point where their forces become so reduced as to be balanced by the French forces opposing them, and then the chances are again favourable to the French; or else these German armies will have to act as large flying columns, marching up and down the country without definitely occupying it; and in that case the French regulars can give way before them for a time, and will find plenty of opportunities to fall on their flanks and rear.

A few flying corps, such as Blücher sent in 1813 round the flanks of the French, would be very effective if employed to interrupt the line of communication of the Germans. That line is vulnerable almost the whole of its length from Paris to Nancy. A few corps, each consisting of one or two squadrons of cavalry and some sharpshooters, falling upon that line, destroying the rails, tunnels, and bridges, attacking trains, &c., would go far to recall

the German cavalry from the front where it is most dangerous. But the regular "Hussar dash" does certainly not belong to the French.

All this is on the supposition that Paris continues to hold out. There is nothing to compel Paris to give in, so far, except starvation. But the news we had in yesterday's *Daily News* from a correspondent inside that city would dispel many apprehensions if correct. There are still 25,000 horses besides those of the army in Paris, which at 500 kilos each would give $6\frac{1}{4}$ kilo, or 14 lb. of meat for every inhabitant, or nearly a $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. per day for two months. With that, bread and wine *ad libitum*,^a and a good quantity of salt meat and other eatables, Paris may well hold out until the beginning of February. And that would give to France two months, worth more to her, now, than two years in time of peace. With anything like intelligent and energetic direction, both central and local, France, by then, ought to be in a position to relieve Paris and to right herself.

And if Paris should fall? It will be time enough to consider this chance when it becomes more probable. Anyhow, France has managed to do without Paris for more than two months, and may fight on without her. Of course, the fall of Paris may demoralize the spirit of resistance, but so may, even now, the unlucky news of the last seven days. Neither the one nor the other need do so. If the French entrench a few good manoeuvring positions, such as Nevers, near the junction of the Loire and Allier—if they throw up advanced works round Lyons so as to make it as strong as Paris, the war may be carried on even after the fall of Paris; but it is not yet time to talk of that.

Thus we make bold to say that, if the spirit of resistance among the people does not flag, the position of the French, even after their recent defeats, is a very strong one. With the command of the sea to import arms, with plenty of men to make soldiers of, with three months—the first and worst three months—of the work of organization behind them, and with a fair chance of having one month more, if not two, of breathing-time allowed them—and that at a time when the Prussians show signs of exhaustion—with all that, to give in now would be rank treason. And who knows what accidents may happen, what further European complications may occur, in the meantime? Let them fight on, by all means.

^a In plenty.—Ed.

PRUSSIAN FRANCS-TIREURS^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1817, December 9, 1870]

For some time past the reports of village-burning by the Prussians in France had pretty nearly disappeared from the press. We began to hope that the Prussian authorities had discovered their mistake and stopped such proceedings in the interest of their own troops. We were mistaken. The papers again teem with news about the shooting of prisoners and the destroying of villages. The Berlin *Börsen Courier* reports, under date Versailles, Nov. 20:—

Yesterday the first wounded and prisoners arrived from the action near Dreux on the 17th. Short work was made with the francs-tireurs, and an example was made of them; they were placed in a row, and one after the other got a bullet through his head. A general order for the whole army has been published forbidding most expressly to bring them in as prisoners, and ordering to shoot them down by drumhead court-martial wherever they show themselves. Against these disgracefully cowardly brigands and ragamuffins [Lumpengesindel] such a proceeding has become an absolute necessity.

Again, the Vienna *Tages-Presse* says, under the same date:—

"In the forest of Villeneuve you could have seen, for the last week, four francs-tireurs strung up for shooting at our Uhlans from the woods."

An official report dated Versailles, the 26th of November,^b states that the country people all around Orléans, instigated to fight by the priests, who have been ordered by Bishop Dupanloup to preach a crusade, have begun a guerilla warfare against the Germans; patrols are fired at, officers carrying orders shot down by labourers seemingly working in the field: to avenge which

^a Written between December 4 and 9, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b "Aus den Hauptquartieren in Versailles. 26. November", *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 282, December 3, 1870.—*Ed.*

assassinations all non-soldiers carrying arms are immediately executed. Not a few priests are now awaiting trial—seventy-seven.

These are but a few instances, which might be multiplied almost infinitely, so that it appears a settled purpose with the Prussians to carry on these brutalities up to the end of the war. Under these circumstances, it may be as well to call their attention once more to some facts in modern Prussian history.^a

The present King of Prussia^b can perfectly recollect the time of his country's deepest degradation, the Battle of Jena, the long flight to the Oder, the successive capitulations of almost the whole of the Prussian troops, the retreat of the remainder behind the Vistula, the complete downbreak of the whole military and political system of the country. Then it was that, under the shelter of a Pomeranian coast fortress, private initiative, private patriotism, commenced a new active resistance against the enemy. A simple cornet of dragoons, Schill, began at Kolberg to form a free corps (*Gallice*,^c francs-tireurs), with which, assisted by the inhabitants, he surprised patrols, detachments, and field-posts, secured public moneys, provisions, war matériel, took the French General Victor prisoner, prepared a general insurrection of the country in the rear of the French and on their line of communication, and generally did all those things which are now laid to the charge of the French francs-tireurs, and which are visited on the part of the Prussians by the titles of brigands and ragamuffins, and by a "bullet through the head" of disarmed prisoners. But the father of the present King of Prussia^d sanctioned them expressly and promoted Schill. It is well known that this same Schill in 1809, when Prussia was at peace but Austria at war with France, led his regiment out on a campaign of his own against Napoleon, quite Garibaldi-like; that he was killed at Stralsund and his men taken prisoner. Out of these, all of whom Napoleon, according to Prussian war rules, had a perfect right to shoot, he merely had eleven officers shot at Wesel. Over the graves of these eleven francs-tireurs the father of the present King of Prussia, much against his will, but compelled by public feeling in the army and out of it, had to erect a memorial in their honour.

No sooner had there been a practical beginning of freeshooting among the Prussians than they, as becomes a nation of thinkers,

^a See this volume, p. 166.—*Ed.*

^b William I.—*Ed.*

^c In Gallic, i.e. in French.—*Ed.*

^d Frederick William III.—*Ed.*

proceeded to bring the thing into a system and work out the theory of it. The theorist of freeshooting, the great philosophical franc-tireur among them, was no other than Anton Neithardt von Gneisenau, some time field marshal in the service of his Prussian Majesty. Gneisenau had defended Kolberg in 1807; he had had some of Schill's francs-tireurs under him; he had been assisted vigorously in his defence by the inhabitants of the place, who could not even lay claim to the title of national guards, mobile or sedentary, and who therefore, according to recent Prussian notions, clearly deserved to be "immediately executed."^a But Gneisenau was so impressed by the greatness of the resources which an invaded country possessed in an energetic popular resistance that he made it his study for a series of years how this resistance could be best organized. The guerilla war in Spain, the rising of the Russian peasants on the line of the French retreat from Moscow, gave him fresh examples; and in 1813 he could proceed to put his theory in practice.

In August, 1811, already Gneisenau had formed a plan for the preparation of a popular insurrection. A militia is to be organized which is to have no uniform but a military cap (*Gallice*, képi) and black and white belt, perhaps a military great-coat; in short, as near as can be, the uniform of the present French francs-tireurs.

"If the enemy should appear in superior strength, the arms, caps, and belt, are hid, and the militiamen appear as simple inhabitants of the country."^b

The very thing which the Prussians now consider a crime to be punished by a bullet or a rope. These militia troops are to harass the enemy, to interrupt his communications, to take or destroy his convoys of supplies, to avoid regular attacks, and to retire into woods or bogs before masses of regular soldiers.

"The clergy of all denominations are to be ordered, as soon as the war breaks out, to preach insurrection, to paint French oppression in the blackest colours, to remind the people of the Jews under the Maccabees, and to call upon them to follow their example.... Every clergyman is to administer an oath to his parishioners that they will not surrender any provisions, arms, &c., to the enemy until compelled by actual force"—

in fact, they are to preach the same crusade which the Bishop of Orléans^c has ordered his priests to preach, and for which not a few French priests are now awaiting their trial.

^a Order of a Prussian general "Den 25. September", *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 275, October 4, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Here and below Engels cites from G. H. Pertz, *Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neithardt von Gneisenau*, Vol. II, Berlin, 1865. Engels gives a free rendering of the text.—*Ed.*

^c F.A.P. Dupanloup.—*Ed.*

Whoever will take up the second volume of Professor Pertz's "Life of Gneisenau"^a will find, facing the title-page of the second volume, a reproduction of part of the above passage as a facsimile of Gneisenau's handwriting. Facing it is the facsimile of King Frederick William's marginal note to it:—

"As soon as one clergyman shall have been shot this will come to an end."

Evidently the King had no great faith in the heroism of his clergy. But this did not prevent him from expressly sanctioning Gneisenau's plans; nor did it prevent, a few years later, when the very men who had driven out the French were arrested and prosecuted as "demagogues,"¹⁰⁷ one of the intelligent demagogue-hunters of the time, into whose hands the original document had fallen, from instituting proceedings against the unknown author of this attempt to excite people to the shooting of the clergy!

Up to 1813 Gneisenau never tired in preparing not only the regular army but also popular insurrection as a means to shake off the French yoke. When at last the war came, it was at once accompanied by insurrection, peasant resistance, and francs-tireurs. The country between the Weser and Elbe rose to arms in April; a little later on the people about Magdeburg rose; Gneisenau himself wrote to friends in Franconia—the letter is published by Pertz—calling on them to rise upon the enemy's line of communications. Then at last came the official recognition of this popular warfare, the Landsturm-Ordnung of the 21st of April, 1813^b (published in July only), in which every able-bodied man who is not in the ranks of either line or landwehr is called upon to join his landsturm battalion, to prepare for the sacred struggle of self-defence which sanctions every means. The landsturm is to harass both the advance and the retreat of the enemy, to keep him constantly on the alert, to fall upon his trains of ammunition and provisions, his couriers, recruits, and hospitals, to surprise him at nights, to annihilate his stragglers and detachments, to lame and to bring insecurity into his every movement; on the other hand, to assist the Prussian army, to escort money, provisions, ammunition, prisoners, &c. In fact, this law may be called a complete vade-mecum for the franc-tireur,

^a G. H. Pertz, *Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neithardt von Gneisenau*, Vol. II, Berlin, 1865.—Ed.

^b Frederick William III, "Verordnung über den Landsturm. Vom 21sten April 1813", *Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten*. Berlin [1813]. See this volume, pp. 166-67.—Ed.

and, drawn up as it is by no mean strategist, it is as applicable to-day in France as it was at that time in Germany.

Fortunately for Napoleon, it was but very imperfectly carried out. The King was frightened by his own handiwork. To allow the people to fight for themselves, without the King's command, was too anti-Prussian. Thus the landsturm was suspended until the King was to call upon it, which he never did. Gneisenau chafed, but managed finally to do without the landsturm. If he were alive now, with all his Prussian after-experiences, perhaps he would see his beau-ideal of popular resistance approached, if not realized, in the French *francs-tireurs*. For Gneisenau was a man—and a man of genius.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXXI^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1824, December 17, 1870]

The campaign on the Loire appears to have come to a momentary standstill, which allows us time to compare reports and dates, and to form the very confused and contradictory materials into as clear a narrative of actual events as can be expected under the circumstances.

The Army of the Loire began to exist as a distinct body on the 15th of November, when D'Aurelle de Paladines, hitherto commander of the 15th and 16th Corps, obtained command of the new organization formed under this name. What other troops entered into its composition at that date we cannot tell; in fact, this army received constant reinforcements, at least up to the end of November, when it consisted nominally of the following corps:—15th (Pallières), 16th (Chanzy), 17th (Sônis), 18th (Bourbaki), 19th (Barral, according to Prussian accounts), and 20th (Crouzat). Of these the 19th Corps never appeared either in the French or Prussian reports, and cannot therefore be supposed to have been engaged. Besides these, there were at Le Mans and the neighbouring camp of Conlie, the 21st Army Corps (Jaurès) and the Army of Brittany, which, on the resignation of Kératry, was attached to Jaurès' command. A 22nd Corps, we may add, is commanded by General Faidherbe in the North, with Lille for its base of operations. In the above we have omitted General Michel's corps of cavalry attached to the Army of the Loire: this body of horse, though said to be very numerous, cannot rank, from its recent formation and crude material, otherwise than as volunteer or amateur cavalry.

^a Written between December 13 and 17, 1870.—*Ed.*

The elements of which this army was composed were of the most varied kinds, from old troopers recalled to the ranks, to raw recruits and volunteers averse to all discipline; from solid battalions such as the Papal Zouaves¹⁰⁸ to crowds which were battalions only in name. Some kind of discipline, however, had been established, but the whole still bore the stamp of the great hurry which had presided at its formation. "Had this army been allowed four weeks more for preparation, it would have been a formidable opponent,"^a said the German officers who had made its acquaintance on the field of battle. Deducting all those quite raw levies which were only in the way, we may set down the whole of D'Aurelle's five fighting corps (omitting the 19th) at somewhere about 120,000 to 130,000 men fit to be called combatants. The troops at Le Mans may have furnished about 40,000 more.

Against these we find pitted the army of Prince Frederick Charles, including the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's^b command; their numbers we now know, through Capt. Hozier, to have been rather less than 90,000 all told. But these 90,000 were, by their experience of war, their organization, and the proved generalship of their leaders, quite competent to engage twice their number of such troops as were opposed to them. Thus, the chances were about even; and that they were so is immensely to the credit of the French people, who created this new army out of nothing in three months.

The campaign began, on the part of the French, with the attack on von der Tann at Coulmiers and the reconquest of Orléans, on November 9; the march of Mecklenburg to the aid of von der Tann; the manoeuvring of D'Aurelle in the direction of Dreux, which drew off Mecklenburg's whole force in that direction, and made him enter upon a march towards Le Mans. This march was harassed by the French irregular troops in a degree hitherto unknown in the present war; the population showed a most determined resistance, francs-tireurs hovered round the flanks of the invaders; but the regular troops confined themselves to demonstrations, and could not be brought to bay. The letters of the German correspondents with Mecklenburg's army, their rage and indignation at those wicked French who insist upon fighting in the way most convenient to themselves and most inconvenient to the enemy, are the best proof that this short campaign about Le

^a "Artenay, 3. Dezember", *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 341, December 9, 1870. Second edition.—*Ed.*

^b Frederick Francis II.—*Ed.*

Mans was conducted exceedingly well by the defence. The French led Mecklenburg a perfect wild-goose chase after an invisible army up to about twenty-five miles from Le Mans: arrived thus far, he hesitated to go any farther, and turned south. The original plan had evidently been to deal a crushing blow at the Army of Le Mans, then to turn south upon Blois, and turn the left of the Army of the Loire; while Frederick Charles, just then coming up, attacked its front and rear. But this plan, and many others since, miscarried. D'Aurelle left Mecklenburg to his fate, marched against Frederick Charles, and attacked the 10th Prussian Corps on the 24th November at Ladon and Mézières, and a large body of Prussians on the 28th at Beaune-la-Rolande. It is evident that here he handled his troops badly. He had but a small portion of them in readiness, though this was his first attempt to break through the Prussian army and force his way to Paris. All he did was to inspire the enemy with respect for his troops. He fell back into entrenched positions in front of Orléans, where he concentrated all his forces. These he disposed, from right to left, as follows: the 18th Corps on the extreme right; then the 20th and 15th, all of them east of the Paris-Orléans railway; west of it the 16th; and on the extreme left the 17th. Had these masses been brought together in time, there is scarcely any doubt that they might have crushed Frederick Charles's army, then under 50,000 men. But by the time D'Aurelle was well established in his work, Mecklenburg had marched south again, and joined the right wing of his cousin,^a who now took the supreme command. Thus Mecklenburg's 40,000 men had now come up to join in the attack against D'Aurelle, while the French army of Le Mans, satisfied with the glory of having "repulsed" its opponent, quietly remained in its quarters, some sixty miles away from the point where the campaign was decided.

Then all of a sudden came the news of Trochu's sortie of the 30th of November.^b A fresh effort had to be made to support him. On the 1st D'Aurelle commenced a general advance against the Prussians, but it was too late. While the Germans met him with all their forces, his 18th Corps—on the extreme right—appeared to have been sent astray, and never to have been engaged. Thus he fought with but four corps, that is to say, with numbers (of actual combatants) probably little superior to those of his opponents. He was beaten; he appears to have felt himself beaten even before he

^a Frederick Charles.—*Ed.*

^b "Versailles, Dec. 1, 12.16 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26923, December 2, 1870.—*Ed.*

was so. Hence the irresolution he displayed when, after having on the evening of the 3rd of December ordered a retreat across the Loire, he countermanded it next morning and resolved to defend Orléans.^a The usual result followed: order, counter-order, disorder. The Prussian attack being concentrated on his left and centre, his two right corps, evidently in consequence of the contradictory orders they had received, lost their line of retreat upon Orléans, and had to cross the river, the 20th at Jargeau and the 18th still further east, at Sully. A small portion of the latter appears to have been driven still more eastward, as it was found by the 3rd Prussian Corps on the 7th of December at Nevoy, near Gien, and thence pursued in the direction of Briare, always on the right bank of the river. Orléans fell into the hands of the Germans on the evening of the 4th, and the pursuit was at once organized. While the 3rd Corps was to skirt the upper course of the Loire on the right bank, the 10th was sent to Vierzon, and the Mecklenburg command on the right bank towards Blois. Before reaching that place, this latter force was met at Beaugency by at least a portion of the army of Le Mans, which now at last had joined Chanzy's command, and offered a pertinacious and partly successful resistance. But this was soon broken, for the 9th Prussian Corps was marching, on the left bank of the river, towards Blois, where it would have cut off Chanzy's retreat towards Tours. This turning movement had its effect. Chanzy retired out of harm's way, and Blois fell into the hands of the invaders. The thaw and heavy rains about this time broke up the roads, and thus stopped further pursuit.

Prince Frederick Charles has telegraphed to headquarters that the Army of the Loire is totally dispersed in various directions, that its centre is broken, and that it has ceased to exist as an army.^b All this sounds well, but it is far from being correct. There can be no doubt, even from the German accounts, that the seventy-seven guns taken before Orléans were almost all naval guns abandoned in the entrenchments.^c There may be 10,000, and, including the wounded, 14,000 prisoners, most of them very much demoralized; but the state of the Bavarians who on the 5th of December thronged the road from Artenay to Chartres, utterly disorganized, without arms or knapsacks, was not so much better.

^a "Tours, Dec. 5, 1 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26926, December 6, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Frederick Charles, "Versailles, Dec. 6, 12.10 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26927, December 7, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c "Versailles, Dec. 6", *The Times*, No. 26928, December 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

There is an utter absence of trophies gathered during the pursuit on and after the 5th; and if an army has broken up, its soldiery cannot fail to be brought in wholesale by an active and numerous cavalry such as we know the Prussians to possess. There is extreme inaccuracy here, to say the least of it. The thaw is no excuse; that set in about the 9th, and would leave four or five days of fine frozen roads and fields for active pursuit. It is not so much the thaw which stops the advance of the Prussians; it is the consciousness that the force of these 90,000 men, now reduced to about 60,000 by losses and garrisons left behind, is nearly spent. The point beyond which it is imprudent to follow up even a beaten enemy has very nearly been reached. There may be raids on a large scale further south, but there will be scarcely any further occupation of territory. The Army of the Loire, now divided into two armies under Bourbaki and Chanzy, will have plenty of time and room to re-form, and to draw towards it newly formed battalions. By its division it has ceased to exist as an army, but it is the first French army in this campaign which has done so not ingloriously. We shall probably hear of its two successors again.

In the meantime, Prussia shows signs of exhaustion. The men of the landwehr up to forty years and more—legally free from service after their thirty-second year—are called in. The drilled reserves of the country are exhausted. In January the recruits—about 90,000 from North Germany—will be sent out to France. This *may* give altogether the 150,000 men of whom we hear so much, but they are not yet there; and when they do come they will alter the character of the army materially. The wear and tear of the campaign has been terrible, and is becoming more so every day. The melancholy tone of the letters from the army shows it, as well as the lists of losses. It is no longer the great battles which make up the bulk of these lists, it is the small encounters where one, two, five men are shot down. This constant erosion by the waves of popular warfare in the long run melts down or washes away the largest army in detail, and, what is the chief point, without any visible equivalent. While Paris holds out, every day improves the position of the French, and the impatience at Versailles about the surrender of Paris shows best that that city may yet become dangerous to the besiegers.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXXII^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1829, December 23, 1870]

The last week's fighting has proved how correctly we judged the relative positions of the combatants when we said that the armies arrived from Metz on the Loire and in Normandy had then already expended the greater part of their capability for occupying fresh territory.^b The extent of ground occupied by the German forces has scarcely received any addition since. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg,^c with von der Tann's Bavarians (who, in spite of their disorganization and want of shoes, cannot be spared at the front), with the 10th Corps and 17th and 22nd divisions, has followed up Chanzy's slowly retreating and constantly fighting troops from Beaugency to Blois, from Blois to Vendôme, and Epuisay and beyond. Chanzy defended every position offered by the rivulets falling from the north into the Loire; and when the 9th Corps (or at least its Hessian division) turned his right at Blois, arriving from the left bank of the river, he retreated upon Vendôme, and took up a position on the line of the Loire. This he held on the 14th and 15th against the attacks of the enemy, but abandoned it on the evening of the latter day, and retreated slowly, and still showing a bold front, towards Le Mans. On the 17th he had another rear-guard affair with von der Tann at Epuisay; where the roads from Vendôme and Morée to Saint-Calais unite, and then withdrew, apparently without being followed up much farther.

The whole of this retreat appears to have been conducted with great discretion. After it was once settled that the old Army of the

^a Written on December 22 or 23, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, p. 196.—*Ed.*

^c Frederick Francis II.—*Ed.*

Loire was to be split up into two bodies, one of which, under Bourbaki, was to act south of Orléans, and the other, under Chanzy, to whom also the troops near Le Mans were given, to defend Western France north of the Loire—after this arrangement was once made, it could not be Chanzy's object to provoke decisive actions. On the contrary, his plan necessarily was to dispute every inch of ground as long as he safely could without being entangled into such; to inflict thereby as heavy losses as he could upon the enemy, and break in his own young troops to order and steadiness under fire. He would naturally lose more men than the enemy in this retreat, especially in stragglers; but these would be the worst men of his battalions, which he could well do without. He would keep up the morale of his troops, while he maintained on the part of the enemy that respect which the Army of the Loire had already conquered for the Republican troops. And he would soon arrive at a point where the pursuers, weakened by losses in battle, by sickness, and by detachments left behind on their line of supply, must give up the pursuit or risk defeat in their turn. That point, in all probability, would be Le Mans; here were the two camps of instruction at Yvre-l'Évêque and at Conlie, with troops in various states of organization and armament, and of unknown numbers; but there must have certainly been more organized battalions there than Chanzy would require to repel any attack Mecklenburg could make on him. This appears to have been felt by the Prussian commander, or rather his chief of the staff, General Stosch, who actually directs the movements of Mecklenburg's army. For after having learned that the 10th North German Corps, on the 18th, pursued Chanzy beyond Epuisay, we hear now that General Voigts-Rhetz (who commands this same 10th Corps) on the 21st has defeated a body of French near Monnaie, and driven them beyond Notre Dame d'Oé. Now, Monnaie is about five-and-thirty miles south of Epuisay, on the road from Vendôme to Tours, and Notre Dame d'Oé is a few miles nearer Tours. So that after following up Chanzy's principal forces towards and close to Le Mans, Mecklenburg's troops appear now to be directed—at least in part—towards Tours, which they probably will have reached ere now, but which it is not likely that they will be able to occupy permanently.

Prussian critics blamed the eccentric retreat of the Army of the Loire after the battles before Orléans, and pretended that such a faulty step could only have been forced on the French by the vigorous action of Prince Frederick Charles, by which he "broke

their centre.”^a That the mismanagement of D'Aurelle, at the very moment when he received the shock of the enemy, had a good deal to do with this eccentric retreat, and even with the subsequent division of the army into two distinct commands, we may readily believe. But there was another motive for it. France, above all things, wants time to organize forces, and space—that is to say, as much territory as possible—from which to collect the means of organization in men and matériel. Not being as yet in a position to court decisive battles, she must attempt to save as much territory as possible from the occupation of the enemy. And as the invasion has now reached that line where the forces of the attack and those of the defence are nearly balanced, there is no necessity to concentrate the troops of the defence as for a decisive action. On the contrary, they may without great risk be divided into several large masses, so as to cover as much territory as possible, and so as to oppose to the enemy, in whatever direction he may advance, a force large enough to prevent permanent occupation. And as there are still some 60,000, or perhaps 100,000, men near Le Mans (in a very backward state of equipment, drill, and discipline, it is true, but yet improving daily), and as the means to equip, arm, and supply them have been organized and are being brought together in western France—it would be a great blunder to abandon these merely because strategic theory demands that under ordinary circumstances a defeated army should withdraw in one body; which could in this case have been done only by going south and leaving the west unprotected. On the contrary, the camps near Le Mans contain in themselves the stuff to render the new Army of the West, in course of time, stronger than even the old Army of the Loire was, while the whole south is organizing reinforcements for Bourbaki's command. Thus, what at the first glance appears as a mistake, was in reality a very proper and necessary measure, which does not in any way preclude the possibility of having the whole of the French forces, at some later time, in a position to co-operate for decisive action.

The importance of Tours is in the fact that it forms the most westerly railway junction between the north-west and the south of France. If Tours be permanently held by the Prussians, Chanz y has no longer any railway communication with either the Government at Bordeaux or Bourbaki at Bourges. But with their present forces, the Prussians have no chance of holding it. They

^a “Die Loire-Armee ist durch ihre Niederlagen...”, *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 289, December 11, 1870.—Ed.

would be weaker there than von der Tann was at Orléans early in November. And a temporary loss of Tours, though inconvenient, may be borne.

There is not much news from the other German columns. Prince Frederick Charles, with the Third Corps, and perhaps half of the Ninth, has completely disappeared from sight, which does not prove much for his powers to advance. Manteuffel is reduced to play the part of a huge flying column for requisitions; his force of permanent occupation does not appear to go beyond Rouen. Werder is surrounded by petty warfare on all sides, and while he can hold out at Dijon by sheer activity only, now finds out that he has to blockade Langres too if he wants his rear secured. Where he is to find the troops for this work we do not learn; he himself has none to spare, and the landwehr about Belfort and in Alsace have fully as much on their hands as they can manage. Thus everywhere the forces appear to be nearly balanced. It is now a race of reinforcements, but a race in which the chances are immensely more favourable to France than they were three months ago. If we could say with safety that Paris will hold out till the end of February, we might almost believe that France would win the race.

THE GERMAN POSITION IN FRANCE^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1830, December 24, 1870]

The wear and tear of this war is beginning to tell upon Germany. The first army of invasion, comprising the whole of the line troops of both North and South, was of the strength of about 640,000 men. Two months of campaigning had reduced that army so much that the first batch of men from the depot battalions and squadrons—about one-third of the original strength—had to be ordered forward. They arrived towards the end of September and beginning of October, and though they must have amounted to some 200,000 men, yet the field battalions were far from being again raised to their original strength of 1,000 men each. Those before Paris counted from 700 to 800 men, while those before Metz were weaker still. Sickness and fighting soon made further inroads, and when Prince Frederick Charles reached the Loire, his three corps were reduced to less than half their normal strength, averaging 450 men per battalion. The fighting of this month and the severe and changeable weather must have told severely upon the troops both before Paris and in the armies covering the investment; so that the battalions must now certainly average below 400 men. Early in January the recruits of the levy of 1870 will be ready to be sent into the field, after three months' drill. These would number about 110,000, and give rather less than 300 men per battalion. We now hear that part of these have already passed Nancy, and that new bodies are arriving daily; thus the battalions may soon be again raised to about 650 men. If, indeed, as is probable from several indications, the disposable remainder of the younger undrilled men of the depot-reserve (Ersatz

^a Written on December 23 or 24, 1870.—*Ed.*

Reserve) have been drilled along with the recruits of the regular levy, this reinforcement would be increased by some 100 men per battalion more, making in all 750 men per battalion. This would be about three-fourths of the original strength, giving an army of 480,000 effectives, out of one million of men sent out from Germany to the front. Thus, rather more than one-half of the men who left Germany with the line regiments or joined them since, have been killed or invalided in less than four months. If this should appear incredible to any one, let him compare the wear and tear of former campaigns, that of 1813 and 1814 for instance, and consider that the continued long and rapid marches of the Prussians during this war must have told terribly upon their troops.

So far we have dealt with the line only. Besides them, nearly the whole of the landwehr has been marched off into France. The landwehr battalions had originally 800 men for the Guards and 500 men for the other battalions; but they were gradually raised to the strength of 1,000 men all round. This would make a grand total of 240,000 men, including cavalry and artillery. By far the greater part of these have been in France for some time, keeping up the communications, blockading fortresses, &c. And even for this they are not numerous enough; for there are at present in process of organization four more landwehr divisions (probably by forming a third battalion to every landwehr regiment), comprising at least fifty battalions, or 50,000 men more. All these are now to be sent into France; those that were still in Germany, guarding the French prisoners, are to be relieved in that duty by newly formed "garrison battalions." What these may be composed of we cannot positively tell before we receive the full text of the order creating them, the contents of which, so far, are known by a telegraphic summary only.^a But if, as we know to be the fact, the above four new landwehr divisions cannot be raised without calling out men of forty and even above, then what remains for the garrison battalions of drilled soldiers but men from forty to fifty years of age? There is no doubt the reserve of drilled men in Germany is by this measure fully exhausted, and, beyond that, a whole year's levy of recruits.

The landwehr force in France has had far less marching, bivouacking, and fighting than the line. It has mostly had decent quarters, fair feeding, and moderate duty; so that the whole of its losses may be put down at about 40,000 men, dead or invalided.

^a "Berlin, Dec. 21. Evening", *The Times*, No. 26940, December 22, 1870.—Ed.

This would leave, including the new battalions now forming, 250,000 men; but it is very uncertain how soon, even if ever, the whole of these can be set free for service abroad. For the next two months we should say 200,000 would be a high estimate of the effective landwehr force in France.

Line and landwehr together, we shall thus have in the second half of January a force of some 650,000 to 680,000 Germans under arms in France, of which from 150,000 to 200,000 are now on the road or preparing for it. But this force will be of a far different character from that which has hitherto been employed there. Fully one-half of the line battalions will consist of young men of twenty or twenty-one years—untried men of an age at which the hardships of a winter campaign tell most fearfully upon the constitution. These men will soon fill the hospitals, while the battalions will again melt down in strength. On the other hand, the landwehr will consist more and more of men above thirty-two, married men and fathers of families almost without exception, and of an age at which open-air camping in cold or wet weather is almost sure to produce rheumatism rapidly and by wholesale. And there can be no doubt that the greater portion of this landwehr will have to do a deal more marching and fighting than hitherto, in consequence of the extension of the territory which is to be given into its keeping. The line is getting considerably younger, the landwehr considerably older than hitherto; the recruits sent to the line have barely had time to learn their drill and discipline, the new reinforcements for the landwehr have had plenty of time to forget both. Thus the German army is receiving elements which bring its character much nearer than heretofore to the new French levies opposed to it; with this advantage, however, on the side of the Germans that these elements are being incorporated into the strong and solid cadres of the old army.

After these, what resources in men remain to Prussia? The recruits attaining their twentieth year in 1871, and the older men of the Ersatz Reserve, the latter all undrilled, almost all of them married, and at an age when people have little inclination or ability to begin soldiering. To call these out, men who have been induced by long precedent to consider their relation to the army an all but nominal one, would be very unpopular. Still more unpopular would it be if those able-bodied men were called out who for one reason or another have escaped the liability to service altogether. In a purely defensive war all these would march unhesitatingly; but in a war of conquest, and at a time when the success of that policy of conquest is becoming doubtful, they

cannot be expected to do so. A war of conquest, with anything like varying fortunes, cannot be carried out, in the long run, by an army consisting chiefly of married men; one or two great reverses must demoralize such troops on such an errand. The more the Prussian army, by the lengthening out of the war, becomes in reality a "nation in arms," the more incapable does it become for conquest. Let the German Philistine shout ever so boisterously about Alsace and Lorraine, it still remains certain that Germany cannot for the sake of their conquest undergo the same privations, the same social disorganization, the same suspension of national production, that France willingly suffers in her own self-defence. That same German Philistine, once put in uniform and marched off, may come to his cool senses again on some French battlefield or in some frozen bivouac. And thus it may be, in the end, for the best if both nations are, in reality, placed face to face with each other in full armour.

NOTES ON THE WAR—XXXIII^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1841, January 6, 1871]

Christmas has ushered in the commencement of the real siege of Paris. Up to that time there had only been an investment of the giant fortress. Batteries had been constructed, it is true, for heavy siege guns; a siege park had been collected, but not a gun had been placed in position, not an embrasure cut, not a shot fired. All these preparations had been made on the southern and south-western front. On the other fronts there were breastworks thrown up as well, but these seem to have been intended for defensive purposes only, to check sorties, and to protect the infantry and field artillery of the besiegers. These entrenchments were naturally at a greater distance from the Paris forts than regular siege batteries would have to be; there was between them and the forts a larger belt of debatable ground on which sorties could take place. When Trochu's great sortie of the 30th of November had been repelled, he still remained master of a certain portion of this debatable ground on the eastern side of Paris, especially of the isolated plateau of Avron, in front of Fort Rosny. This he began to fortify; at what exact date we do not know, but we find it mentioned on the 17th of December that both Mont Avron and the heights of Varennes (in the loop of the Marne) had been fortified and armed with heavy guns.

Barring a few advanced redoubts on the south front, near Vitry and Villejuif, which do not appear to be of much importance, we have here the first attempt, on a large scale, of the defenders to extend their positions by counter-approaches. And here we are naturally referred, for a comparison, to Sebastopol. More than

^a Written between January 2 and 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

four months after the opening of the trenches by the Allies, towards the end of February, 1855, when the besiegers had suffered terribly by the winter, Todleben began to construct advanced works at what were then considerable distances in front of his lines. On the 23rd of February he had constructed the redoubt Selenginsk, 1,100 yards from the main rampart; on the same day an assault of the Allies on the new work failed; on the 1st of March, another redoubt (Volynsk) was completed in a still more forward position, and 1,450 yards from the rampart. These two works were called by the Allies the "ouvrages blancs."^a On the 12th of March, the Kamtschatka lunette, 800 yards from the ramparts, was completed, the "Mamelon vert"^b of the Allies, and in front of all these works rifle-pits were dug out. An assault, on the 22nd of March, was beaten off, and the whole of the works, as well as another to the (proper) right of the Mamelon, the "Quarry," was completed, and all these redoubts connected by a covered way. During the whole of April and May the Allies in vain attempted to recover the ground occupied by these works. They had to advance against them by regular siege approaches, and it was only on the 7th of June, when considerable reinforcements had arrived, that they were enabled to storm them. Thus, the fall of Sebastopol had been delayed fully three months by these advanced field works, attacked though they were by the most powerful naval guns of the period.

The defence of Mont Avron looks very paltry side by side with this story. On the 17th, when the French had had above fourteen days for the construction of their works, the batteries are completed. The besiegers in the meantime sent for siege artillery, chiefly old guns already used in the previous sieges. On the 22nd the batteries against Mont Avron are completed, but no action is taken until every danger of a sortie *en masse* of the French has passed away, and the encampments of the Army of Paris, round Drancy, are broken up on the 26th. Then on the 27th the German batteries open their fire, which is continued on the 28th and 29th. The fire of the French works is soon silenced, and the works abandoned on the 29th, because, as the official French report says, there were no casemates in them to shelter the garrison.^c

This is undoubtedly a poor defence and a still poorer excuse for it. The chief fault seems to rest with the construction of the works. From all descriptions we are led to conclude that there was not on

^a White redoubts.—*Ed.*

^b Green hill, Mamelon.—*Ed.*

^c "Bordeaux, January 1", *The Times*, No. 26949, January 2, 1871.—*Ed.*

the hill a single closed redoubt, but only batteries open to the rear, and even without efficient protection on the flanks. These batteries, moreover, appear to have been facing one way only, towards the south or south-east, while close by, to the north-east, lay the heights of Raincy and Montfermeil, the most eligible sites of all for batteries against Avron. The besiegers took advantage of these to surround Avron with a semicircle of batteries which soon silenced its fire and drove away its garrison. Then why was there no shelter for the garrison? The frost is but half an excuse, for the French had time enough; and what the Russians could do in a Crimean winter and on rocky soil must have been possible too this December before Paris. The artillery employed against Avron was certainly far more efficient than that of the Allies before Sebastopol; but it was the same as that used against the redoubts of Düppel,⁷⁹ also field-works, and they held out three weeks. It is surmised that the infantry garrison ran away and left the artillery uncovered. That may be so, but it would not excuse the engineers who constructed the works. The engineering staff inside Paris must be very badly organized if we are to judge it from this sample of its handiwork.

The rapid demolition of Mont Avron has sharpened the appetite of the besiegers for more successes of a similar sort. Their fire has been opened upon the eastern forts, especially Noisy, Rosny, and Nogent. After two days' bombardment these forts were all but silenced. What more there is being done against them we do not hear. Neither is there any mention of the fire of the entrenchments which had been constructed in the intervals between these forts. But we may be certain that the besiegers are doing their best to push forward approaches, if only in a rough way, against these forts, and to secure a firm lodgment on Mont Avron. We should not wonder if they succeeded better in this than the French, in spite of the weather.

But what is the effect of all this upon the course of the siege? No doubt, if these three forts should fall into the hands of the Prussians, that would be an important success, and enable them to bring their batteries to within 3,000 or 4,000 yards of the enceinte. There is, however, no necessity that they should fall so soon. These forts all have bomb-proof casemates for their garrisons, and the besiegers, so far, have not got any rifled mortars, of which they altogether possess but a small stock. These mortars are the only sort of artillery which can destroy bomb-proof shelter in a very short time; the old mortars are too uncertain in their range to have a very rapid effect, and the 24-pounders (with 64 lb. shell)

cannot be sufficiently elevated to produce the effect of vertical fire. If the fire of these forts appears to be silenced, that signifies merely that the guns have been placed under shelter so as to keep them available for an assault. The Prussian batteries may demolish the parapets of the ramparts, but that will not constitute a breach. To breach the very well-covered masonry of the escarp, even by indirect fire, they will have to construct batteries within at least 1,000 yards from the forts, and that can be done by regular parallels and approaches only. The "abridged" process of besieging, of which the Prussians talk so much, consists in nothing but the silencing of the enemy's fire from a greater distance, so that the approaches can be made with less danger and loss of time; this is followed up by a violent bombardment, and a breaching of the rampart by indirect fire. If all this does not compel surrender—and in the case of the Paris forts it is difficult to see how it could do so—nothing remains but to push up the approaches in the usual way to the glacis and risk an assault. The assault of Düppel was undertaken after the approaches had been pushed to about 250 yards from the ruined works, and at Strasbourg the saps had to be driven quite in the old-fashioned way up to the crest of the glacis and beyond.

With all this, we must recur again and again to the point so often urged in these columns, that the defence of Paris must be carried on actively, and not passively only.^a If ever there was a time for sorties, that time is now. It is not, at this moment, a question of breaking through the enemy's lines; it is this—to accept a localized combat which the besieger forces upon the besieged. That the fire of the besieger can, under almost any circumstances, be made superior, on any given point, to that of the besieged, is an old and uncontested axiom; and unless the besieged make up for this his inherent deficiency by activity, boldness and energy in sorties, he gives up his best chance. Some say the troops inside Paris have lost heart; but there is no reason why they should. They may have lost confidence in their leader, but that is another thing altogether; and if Trochu persists in his inactivity, they may well do so.

We may as well advert in a word or two to the ingenious hypothesis of some people that Trochu intends to withdraw, with his troops, to the fortified peninsula of Mont Valérien, as to a citadel, after the fall of Paris. This profound surmise has been concocted by some of the super-clever hangers-on of the staff at

^a See this volume, pp. 89-90, 109-10 and 129.—*Ed.*

Versailles, and is based chiefly on the fact that a good many carts go backwards and forwards between Paris and that peninsula. He must certainly be an uncommonly clever general who chooses to construct for himself a citadel on a low alluvial peninsula, surrounded on all sides by commanding heights, from which the camps of his troops can be surveyed like a panorama, and consequently fired into at easy ranges. But as long as the Prussian staff has existed, it has been troubled with the presence of some men of superhuman sharpness. With them the enemy is always most likely to do the very unlikeliest thing of all. As the German saying goes, "they hear the grass growing." Whoever has occupied himself with Prussian military literature must have stumbled over this sort of people, and the only wonder is that they should find anybody to believe them.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXXIV^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1842, January 7, 1871]

Although there has been a fair amount of fighting since we last surveyed the relative positions of the combatants in the provinces,^b there has been very little change, thus proving the correctness of our view that the forces of both were nearly balanced for the time being.

Chanzý's Army of the West has maintained itself in front of Le Mans; the army of Mecklenburg opposes it on a line stretching from Blois by Vendôme to Verneuîl. There has been a good deal of desultory fighting about Vendôme, but nothing has been changed in the relative position of the armies. In the meantime Chanzý has drawn towards himself all the drilled and armed men from the camp of Conlie, which has been broken up; he is reported to have entrenched a strong position around Le Mans, as a stronghold to fall back upon, and is now again expected to assume the offensive.^c As M. Gambetta left Bordeaux on the 5th for Le Mans this may be quite correct. Of the actual strength and organisation of Chanzý's forces we have no knowledge whatever beyond the fact that he had, previous to his retreat upon Le Mans, three army corps. Nor are we much better informed as to the forces immediately opposed to him; the troops of Mecklenburg and those of Prince Frederick Charles's original army have been so much intermixed that the original *ordre de bataille*^d is no longer in

^a Written on January 6 or 7, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 208-11.—*Ed.*

^c Report of the Berlin Correspondent of *The Times*, "Berlin, Dec. 29", *The Times*, No. 26949, January 2, 1871; Report of a Correspondent of *The Times* "Bordeaux, Dec. 25", *The Times*, No. 26950, January 3, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d Battle array.—*Ed.*

force. We shall have to treat both as one army, which they indeed are, since Frederick Charles has the command of the whole; the only distinction is, that Mecklenburg commands those troops which, *à cheval*^a of the Loir, face west, while the Prince has under his immediate orders those which, along the Loire from Blois to Gien, face south and watch Bourbaki. The whole of both these bodies counts ten divisions of infantry and three of cavalry, but considerable detachments have been left on the line of march from Commercy, by Troyes, to the Loire; these are only gradually coming up, as they are being relieved by the new arrivals of landwehr.

On the 11th of December Prince Frederick Charles had arrived at Briare, with intent to advance upon Nevers, in order to turn Bourbaki's right and to cut off his direct communication with the troops opposed to Werder. But we have only recently learned that on receiving the news of the resolute and unexpected resistance which Mecklenburg encountered on the part of Chanzy, he gave up his plan at once and turned back with the mass of his troops in the direction of Tours^b; which, as we know, his troops came in sight of but never entered. Thus we now learn that Chanzy's clever and gallant retreat was the cause not only of his own safety, but of Bourbaki's too. This latter general must still be in the neighbourhood of Bourges and Nevers. If, as has been presumed, he had marched off eastwards against Werder or against the Prussian line of communications, we should have heard of him ere now. Most probably he is reorganizing and reinforcing his army, and if Chanzy should advance we are sure to hear of him too.

North of the Seine Manteuffel, with the 1st Corps, holds Rouen and neighbourhood, while he has sent the 8th Corps into Picardy. This latter corps has had a hard time of it. General Faidherbe does not allow his Northern Army much rest. The three northernmost departments of France, from the Somme to the Belgian frontier, hold about twenty fortresses of various sizes, which, though wholly useless nowadays against a large invasion from Belgium, yet form a most welcome and almost unattackable basis of operations in this case. When Vauban planned this triple belt of fortresses, nearly two hundred years ago, he surely never thought that they would serve as a great entrenched camp, a sort of multiplied quadrilateral, to a French army against an enemy advancing from the heart of France. But so it is, and, small as this

^a On both banks.—*Ed.*

^b "Berlin, Dec. 27", *The Times*, No. 26947, December 30, 1870.—*Ed.*

piece of territory is, it is for the nonce impregnable, and an important piece of ground too, on account of its manufacturing resources and its dense population. Driven back into this safe retreat by the battle of Villers-Bretonneux (27th of November),¹⁰⁹ Faidherbe reorganized and strengthened his army; towards the end of December he again advanced upon Amiens, and delivered on the 23rd an undecided battle to Manteuffel on the Hallue. In this battle he had four divisions (35,000 men as he counts them) against the two divisions of the 8th Prussian Corps (24,000 men by Prussian accounts). That with such a proportion of forces, and against as renowned a general as von Goeben, he should have held his own, is a sign that his Mobiles and Mobilisés are improving. In consequence of the frost and of shortcomings of his commissariat and train, as he says, but probably also because he did not trust in the steadiness of his men for a second day's hard fighting, he retreated almost unmolested behind the Scarpe.^a Von Goeben followed, left the greater part of the 16th division to keep the communications and to invest Péronne, and advanced with only the 15th division and Prince Albert the younger's flying column (which at most was equivalent to a brigade) to Bapaume and beyond. Here, then, was a chance for Faidherbe's four divisions. Without hesitating a moment, he advanced from his sheltered position and attacked the Prussians. After a preliminary engagement on the 2nd of January, the main bodies fought in front of Bapaume on the following day. The clear reports of Faidherbe,^b the great numerical superiority of the French (eight brigades—or 33,000 men at least—against three Prussian brigades, or 16,000 to 18,000 men, to calculate the numbers according to the data given above for the two armies), the indefinite language of Manteuffel,^c leave no doubt that in this battle the French had the best of it. Besides, Manteuffel's bragging is well known in Germany: everybody there recollects how as Governor of Sleswig, and being rather tall, he offered "to cover every seven feet of the country with his body." His reports, even after censorship in Versailles, are certainly the least trustworthy of all Prussian accounts. On the other hand, Faidherbe did not follow up his success, but retired after the battle to a village some miles in rear of the battle-field, so

^a L.-L. Faidherbe's despatch to the Prefect of North "Lille, Dec. 25", *The Times*, No. 26944, December 27, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b L.-L. Faidherbe, "Arras, Jan. 4", *The Times*, No. 26953, January 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c E. Manteuffel, "Versailles, Jan. 5", *The Times*, No. 26953, January 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

that Péronne was not relieved and, as has already been pointed out in these columns, the fruits of the fighting were all for the Prussians. It is impossible to take Faidherbe's excuses for his retreat as being meant seriously.^a But, whatever his reasons may have been, unless he can do more with his troops than beat three Prussian brigades and then retire, he will not relieve Paris.

In the meantime, Manteuffel has an important reinforcement at hand. The 14th division (Kameke) of the 7th Corps, after reducing Montmédy and Mézières, is approaching his fighting-ground accompanied by its siege train. The fighting near Guise seems to mark a stage in this advance; Guise is on the direct road from Mézières to Péronne, which naturally seems to be the next fortress set down for bombardment. After Péronne, probably Cambrai, if all be well with the Prussians.

In the south-east, Werder has been in full retreat since the 27th of December, when he evacuated Dijon. It took some time before the Germans mentioned a word about this, and then the Prussians were quite silent; it leaked out in a quiet corner of the *Karlsruher Zeitung*.^b On the 31st he evacuated Gray also, after an engagement, and is now covering the siege of Belfort at Vesoul. The Army of Lyons, under Crémier (said to be an emigrated Hanoverian officer) is following him up, while Garibaldi seems to be acting more westward against the Prussian chief line of communications. Werder, who is said to expect a reinforcement of 36,000 men, will be pretty safe at Vesoul,^c but the line of communications appears anything but secure. We now learn that General Zastrow, commander of the 7th Corps, has been sent thither, and is in communication with Werder. Unless he is appointed to quite a new command, he will have the 13th division with him, which has been relieved, in Metz, by landwehr, and he will also dispose of other forces for active operations. It must be one of his battalions which has been attacked, and is said to have been routed, near Saulieu, on the road from Auxerre to Chalon-sur-Saône. What the state of the communications is on the secondary lines of railway (always excepting the main line from Nancy to Paris, which is well guarded and so far safe) is shown by a letter from Chaumont (Haute-Marne) to the *Cologne Gazette*,^d complaining that now for

^a L.-L. Faidherbe, "Arras, Jan. 4", *The Times*, No. 26953, January 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b This report is mentioned in the item "Incidents of the War", *The Times*, No. 26953, January 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Telegram from a correspondent of *The Times* "Berlin, Jan. 5, 10.30 P.M.", *The Times*, No. 26953, January 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d The reference is to the *Kölnische Zeitung*.—*Ed.*

the third time the francs-tireurs have broken up the railway between Chaumont and Troyes; the last time, on the 24th of December, they replaced the rails loosely, so that a train with 500 landwehr got off the rails and was stopped, upon which the francs-tireurs opened fire from a wood, but were beaten off. The correspondent considers this not only unfair but "infamous."^a Just like the Austrian cuirassier in Hungary in 1849: "Are not these hussars infamous scoundrels? They see my cuirass, and yet they cut me across the face."

The state of these communications is a matter of life and death to the army besieging Paris. A few days' interruption would affect it for weeks. The Prussians know this, and are now concentrating all their landwehr in north-western France to hold in subjection a belt of country sufficiently broad to ensure safety to their railways. The fall of Mézières opens them a second line of rails from the frontier by Thionville, Mézières, and Reims; but this line dangerously offers its flank to the Army of the North. If Paris is to be relieved, it might perhaps be done easiest by breaking this line of communications.

^a "Chaumont, 29. Dez.", *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 1, January 1, 1871.—Ed.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXXV^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1848, January 14, 1871]

The armies in the field have entered upon two operations which might easily bring on a crisis of the war. The first of these is Bourbaki's march against Werder; the second, Prince Frederick Charles's march against Chanzy.

The rumour of Bourbaki's march eastward has been current for nearly a week, but there was nothing in it to distinguish it from the rest of the rumours which are now flying about so plentifully. That the movement might be good in itself was no reason to believe in its reality. However, there can be now no doubt that Bourbaki, with at least the 18th and 20th Corps, and the 24th, a new corps, has arrived in the East of France, and has turned Werder's position at Vesoul by a movement *viâ* Besançon upon Lure, between Vesoul and Belfort. Near Lure, Werder attacked him at Villersexel on the 9th, and an engagement ensued, in which both parties claim the victory. It was evidently a rearguard-engagement, in which Werder apparently has made good his retreat. Whichever may have won in this first encounter, other and more general battles are sure to follow in a day or two, and to bring matters here to a crisis.¹¹⁰

If this movement of Bourbaki be undertaken with sufficient forces—that is to say, with every man, horse, and gun that was not absolutely required elsewhere—and if it be carried out with the necessary vigour, it may prove the turning point of the war. We have before now pointed out the weakness of the long line of the German communications, and the possibility of Paris being relieved by an attack in force upon that line.^b This is now upon

^a Written on January 13 or 14, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, p. 225.—*Ed.*

the cards, and it will depend on the playing of them whether it is really to come off.

Of the forces now invading France, nearly the whole of the troops of the line are engaged either in the siege of Paris or in the covering of that siege. Out of thirty-five divisions (including the landwehr of the Guard, who have all the time been used as line troops), thirty-two are thus employed. Two are with Werder (three Baden and one Prussian brigade), and one, under Zastrow, has gone to join him. Besides these, Werder has at least two divisions of landwehr to carry on the siege of Belfort and to occupy the fortresses in Southern Alsace. Thus the whole length and breadth of country north-east of the line from Mézières by Laon and Soissons to Paris, and thence by Auxerre and Châtillon to Hüningen, near Basel, with all its reduced fortresses, has to be held by the remainder of the landwehr, as far as it has been made disposable. And when we consider that there are also the prisoners of war in Germany to be watched and the fortresses at home to be garrisoned; that only nine Prussian army corps (those existing before 1866) had old soldiers enough to fill up the landwehr battalions, while the others will have to wait five years yet before they can do this—we may imagine that the forces remaining disposable for the occupation of this part of France cannot have been over-numerous. True, eighteen *depôt* battalions are now being sent to garrison the fortresses in Alsace and Lorraine, and the newly forming “garrison battalions” are to relieve the landwehr in the interior of Prussia. But the formation of these garrison battalions is reported in the German press to proceed but slowly, and thus the army of occupation will still for some time be comparatively weak and barely able to hold in check the population of the provinces it has to guard.

It is against this portion of the German army that Bourbaki is moving. He evidently attempted to interpose his troops between Vesoul and Belfort, whereby he would isolate Werder, whom he might beat singly, driving him in a north-westerly direction. But as Werder now probably is before Belfort and united with Tresckow, Bourbaki has to defeat both in order to raise the siege; to drive the besiegers back into the Rhine valley, after which he might advance on the eastern side of the Vosges towards Lunéville, where he would be on the main line of the German communications. The destruction of the railway tunnels near Phalsbourg would block up the Strasbourg line for a considerable period; that of the Frouard Junction would stop the line from Saarbrücken and Metz; and it might even be possible to send a flying column

towards Thionville to destroy the line near that place too, so as to break the last through line the Germans have. That column could always retire into Luxembourg or Belgium and lay down its arms; it would have amply repaid itself.

These are the objects which Bourbaki must have in view. With the neighbourhood of Paris exhausted, the interruption of the communications from Paris to Germany even for a few days would be a very serious matter for the 240,000 Germans before Paris, and the presence of 120,000 to 150,000 French soldiers in Lorraine might be a more effective means of raising the siege than even a victory of Chanzy over Frederick Charles, by which the latter would after all be driven back upon the besieging forces, to be backed up by them. True, the Germans have another line of railway communication by Thionville, Mézières, and Reims, which Bourbaki might probably not be able to reach even with flying columns; but then there is the absolute certainty of a general rising of the people in the occupied districts as soon as Bourbaki would have succeeded in penetrating into Lorraine; and what the safety for traffic of that second line of railway would be under such circumstances we need not explain any further. Besides, Bourbaki's success would, as a first consequence, compel Goeben to fall back, and thus the Army of the North might find a chance of cutting off this line between Soissons and Mézières.

We consider this movement of Bourbaki as the most important and the most promising one which has been made by any French general in this war. But, we repeat, it must be carried out adequately. The best plans are worthless if they be executed feebly and irresolutely; and we shall probably not learn anything positive about Bourbaki's forces or the way he handles them until his struggles with Werder have been decided.

But we are informed that in view of some such contingency, the Corps of Werder is to be enlarged into a great "fifth army," under Manteuffel, who is to hand over his "first army" to Goeben, and to bring to Werder's assistance the 2nd, 7th, and 14th Corps.^a Now, of the 7th Corps, the 13th division has already been sent towards Vesoul, under Zastrow; the 14th division has only just taken Mézières and Rocroi, and cannot, therefore, be expected at Vesoul so very soon; the 14th Corps is the very one which Werder has had all along (the Baden division and the 30th and 34th Prussian regiments, under Goltz); and, as to the 2nd Corps, which

^a "Berlin, Jan. 11", *The Times*, No. 26958, January 12, 1871; "Versailles, Jan. 11", *The Times*, No. 26959, January 13, 1871.—*Ed.*

is before Paris, we expect that it will not start before that city shall have surrendered, because it cannot be well spared there. But even if it were sent off now it would only arrive after Werder's decisive action with Bourbaki had taken place. As to other reinforcements for Werder from reserves which may be supposed to exist in Germany, we have to consider, firstly, that whatever landwehr can be made disposable has already been, or is being, forwarded now; and, secondly, that the *depôt* battalions, the only other reserve force in existence, have just been emptied of their drilled men, and are at this moment mere cadres. Thus, Bourbaki will at all events have to fight his first and most decisive actions before the intended reinforcements can have arrived; and, if victorious, he will be in the favourable position to deal with these reinforcements one after another as they arrive successively and from very different directions.

On the other hand, Prince Frederick Charles, in spite of his victorious march to Le Mans, may yet have made the first mistake committed by the Germans in this war, when he left Bourbaki entirely free, in order to concentrate all his forces against Chanzy. Now, Chanzy was no doubt his more immediate opponent, and for the moment the most dangerous one too. But Chanzy's country is not the one where decisive successes can be had over the French. Chanzy has just suffered a severe defeat¹¹¹; that settles his attempts for the relief of Paris for the present. But it so far settles nothing else. Chanzy may withdraw if he likes either towards Brittany or towards the Calvados. In either case he finds at the extreme end of his retreat a great naval arsenal, Brest or Cherbourg, with detached forts to shelter him until the French fleet can transport his men south of the Loire or north of the Somme. In consequence, the West of France is a country where the French can carry on a war to amuse the enemy—a war of alternate advances and retreats—without ever being brought to bay against their will. We should not wonder if Chanzy had been urged on to fight by Gambetta, who was reported to have joined him,^a and who would be sure to subordinate military to political considerations. After his reverse, and the loss of Le Mans, Chanzy could do nothing better than draw off Frederick Charles as far away to the westward as possible, so that this portion of the Prussian forces may be quite out of harm's way when Bourbaki's campaign begins to develop itself.

^a "Bordeaux, Jan. 5", *The Times*, No. 26954, January 7, 1871.—Ed.

Faidherbe, in the north, is evidently too weak to do anything decisive against Goeben. As it appears that Chanzy cannot defeat Frederick Charles and thereby relieve Paris, it would be better to send plenty of men to the north, to get rid of Goeben both at Amiens and Rouen, and to attempt with concentrated forces an advance upon the railway line from Mézières to Paris; especially now, while Bourbaki is threatening the other German line of railway. The communications are the tenderest part of an army's position; and if the northern line, which lies so much exposed to an attack from the north both at Soissons and Rethel, should once be seriously menaced while Bourbaki is at work on the southern edge of Lorraine, we might see all of a sudden a very pretty commotion in Versailles.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXXVI^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1852, January 19, 1871]

Ever since, after Sedan, Paris was first seriously menaced by hostile attack, we have insisted upon the great strength of a fortified capital like Paris; but we have never omitted to add that, for the full development of its defensive powers, it required a large regular army to defend it^b; an army too powerful to be shut up in the works of the place, or to be prevented from manoeuvring in the open around the fortress, which would serve as its pivot and partly as its base of operations.

Under normal conditions, this army would almost always be at hand, as a matter of course. The French armies, defeated near the frontier, would fall back upon Paris as their last and chief stronghold; they would under ordinary circumstances arrive here in sufficient strength, and find sufficient reinforcements to be able to fulfil the task assigned to them. But this time the strategy of the Second Empire had caused the whole of the French armies to disappear from the field. One of them it had managed to get shut up, to all appearance hopelessly, in Metz; the other had just surrendered at Sedan. When the Prussians arrived before Paris, a few half-filled dépôts, a number of provincial Mobiles (just levied), and the local National Guard (not half formed), were all the forces ready for its defence.

Even under these circumstances the intrinsic strength of the place proved so formidable to the invaders, the task of attacking *lege artis*^c this immense city and its outworks appeared so gigantic

^a Written between January 14 and 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 89-90, 109-10 and 129.—*Ed.*

^c According to the rules.—*Ed.*

to them, that they abandoned it at once, and chose to reduce the place by famine. At that time Henri Rochefort and others were formed into a "Commission of Barricades,"⁸⁴ charged with the construction of a third interior line of defence, which should prepare the ground for that line of fighting so peculiarly Parisian—the defence of barricades and the struggle from house to house. The press at the time made great fun of this commission; but the semi-official publications of the Prussian staff leave no doubt that it was above all the certainty of having to encounter a determined struggle at the barricades which caused them to decide in favour of reduction by famine. The Prussians knew very well that the forts, and after them the enceinte, if defended by artillery alone, must fall within a certain time; but then would come a stage of the struggle in which new levies and even civilians would be a match for veterans; in which house after house, street after street, would have to be conquered, and, considering the great number of the defenders, with the certainty of an immense loss of life. Whoever will refer to the papers on the subject in the Prussian *Staats-Anzeiger* will find this reason to be stated as the decisive one against a regular siege.

The investment began on September 19, exactly four months ago to-day. On the following day General Ducrot, who commanded the regular troops in Paris, made a sortie with three divisions in the direction of Clamart, and lost seven guns and 3,000 prisoners. This was followed by similar sorties on the 23rd and 30th of September, 13th and 21st of October, all of which resulted in considerable loss to the French without other advantages than, perhaps, accustoming the young troops to the enemy's fire. On the 28th another sortie was made against Le Bourget with better success; the village was taken and held for two days; but on the 30th the second division of the Prussian guards—thirteen battalions, then less than 10,000 men—retook the village. The French had evidently made very poor use of the two days, during which they might have converted the massively built village into a fortress, and neglected to keep reserves at hand to support the defenders in time, otherwise such a moderate force could not have wrested the place from them.

After this effort there followed a month of quietness. Trochu evidently intended to improve the drill and discipline of his men before again risking great sorties, and very properly so. But, at the same time, he neglected to carry on that war of outposts, reconnaissances and patrols, of ambushes and surprises, which is now the regular occupation of the men on the French front round

Paris—a kind of warfare than which none is more adapted to give young troops confidence in their officers and in themselves, and the habit of meeting the enemy with composure. Troops which have found out that in small bodies, in single sections, half companies, or companies, they can surprise, defeat, or take prisoner similar small bodies of the enemy will soon learn to meet him battalion against battalion. Besides, they will thus learn what outpost duty really is, which many of them appeared to be ignorant of as late as December.

On the 28th of November, at last, was inaugurated that series of sorties which culminated in the grand sortie of the 30th of November across the Marne, and the advance of the whole eastern front of Paris. On the 2nd of December the Germans retook Briey and part of Champigny, and on the following day the French recrossed the Marne. As an attempt to break through the entrenched lines of circumvallation which the besiegers had thrown up, the attack completely failed; it had been carried out without the necessary energy. But it left in the hands of the French a considerable portion of hitherto debatable ground in front of their lines. A strip of ground about two miles in width, from Drancy to the Marne, near Neuilly, came into their possession; a country completely commanded by the fire of the forts, covered with massively built villages easy of defence, and possessing a fresh commanding position in the plateau of Avron. Here, then, was a chance of permanently enlarging the circle of defence; from this ground, once well secured, a further advance might have been attempted, and either the line of the besiegers so much “bulged in” that a successful attack on their lines became possible, or that, by concentrating a strong force here, they were compelled to weaken their line at other points, and thus facilitate a French attack. Well, this ground remained in the hands of the French for a full month. The Germans were compelled to erect siege batteries against Avron, and yet two days’ fire from these batteries sufficed to drive the French from it; and, Avron once lost, the other positions were also abandoned. Fresh attacks had indeed been made on the whole north-east and east front on the 21st; Le Bourget was half-carried, Maison Blanche and Ville-Evrard were taken; but all this vantage-ground was lost again the same night. The troops were left on the ground outside the forts, where they bivouacked at a temperature varying from nine to twenty-one degrees below freezing point, and were at last withdrawn under shelter because they naturally could not stand the exposure. The whole of this episode is more characteristic

than any other of the want of decision and energy—the *mollesse*,^a we might almost say the drowsiness—with which this defence of Paris is conducted.

The Avron incident at last induced the Prussians to turn the investment into a real siege, and to make use of the siege artillery which, for unforeseen cases, had been provided. On the 30th of December the regular bombardment of the north-eastern and eastern forts commenced; on the 5th of January that of the southern forts. Both have been continued without interruption, and of late have been accompanied by a bombardment of the town itself, which is a wanton piece of cruelty. Nobody knows better than the staff at Versailles, and nobody has caused it oftener to be asserted in the press, that the bombardment of a town as extensive as Paris cannot hasten its surrender by one moment. The cannonade of the forts is being followed up by the opening of regular parallels, at least against Issy; we hear of the guns being moved into batteries nearer to the forts, and unless the defence acts on the offensive more unhesitatingly than hitherto, we may soon hear of actual damage being done to one or more forts.

Trochu, however, continues in his inactivity, masterly or otherwise. The few sorties made during the last few days appear to have been but too “platonic”, as Trochu’s accuser in the *Siècle*^b calls the whole of them. We are told the soldiers refused to follow their officers. If so, this proves nothing but that they have lost all confidence in the supreme direction. And, indeed, we cannot resist the conclusion that a change in the chief command in Paris has become a necessity. There is an indecision, a lethargy, a want of sustained energy in all the proceedings of this defence which cannot entirely be laid to the charge of the quality of the troops. That the positions, held for a month, during which there occurred only about ten days of severe frost, were not properly entrenched, cannot be blamed upon any one but Trochu, whose business it was to see to its being done. And that month, too, was the critical period of the siege; at its close the question was to be decided which party, besiegers or besieged, would gain ground. Inactivity and indecision, not of the troops but of the commander-in-chief, have turned the scale against the besieged.

And why is this inactivity and indecision continued even now? The forts are under the enemy’s fire, the besiegers’ batteries are being brought nearer and nearer; the French artillery, as is owned

^a Irresolution.—Ed.

^b The article from *Le Siècle* is set forth in the item “Bordeaux, 7. Januar”, *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*, No. 8, January 9, 1871.—Ed.

by Trochu himself, is inferior to that of the attack. Defended by artillery alone, the very day may be calculated when, under these circumstances, the ramparts—masonry and all—of the forts will give way. Inactivity and indecision cannot save them. Something must be done; and if Trochu cannot do it, he had better let some one else try.

Kinglake has preserved a transaction in which Trochu's character appears in the same light as in this defence of Paris. When the advance to Varna had been resolved upon by both Lord Raglan and Saint-Arnaud,¹¹² and the British Light Division had already been despatched, Colonel Trochu—"a cautious thinking man, well versed in strategic science," of whom

"it was surmised that it was part of his mission to check anything like wildness in the movements of the French Marshal"

— Colonel Trochu called upon Lord Raglan, and entered upon negotiations, the upshot of which was that Saint-Arnaud declared he had resolved to send to

"Varna but one division, and to place the rest of his army in position, not in advance, but in the rear of the Balkan range,"^a

and invited Lord Raglan to follow his example. And that at a moment when the Turks were all but victorious on the Danube without foreign aid!

It may be said that the troops in Paris have lost heart, and are no longer fit for great sorties, that it is too late to sally forth against the Prussian siege works, that Trochu may save his troops for one great effort at the last moment, and so forth. But if the 500,000 armed men in Paris are to surrender to an enemy not half their number, placed moreover in a position most unfavourable for defence, they will surely not do so until their inferiority is brought home to all the world and to themselves. Surely they are not to sit down, eat up the last meal of their provisions, and then surrender! And if they have lost heart, is it because they acknowledge themselves hopelessly beaten, or because they have no longer any trust in Trochu? If it is too late to make sorties now, in another month they will be still more impracticable. And as to Trochu's grand finale, the sooner it is made the better; at present the men are still tolerably fed and strong, and there is no telling what they will be in February.

^a A. W. Kinglake, *The Invasion of the Crimea: Its Origin, and an Account of Its Progress down to the Death of Lord Raglan*, Vol. II, Edinburgh and London, 1863, pp. 40, 42.—*Ed.*

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXXVII^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1854, January 21, 1871]

This has been a most unfortunate week for the French arms. After Chanzy's defeat came the repulse of Bourbaki before Belfort, and now comes the check which, according to Prussian accounts,^b Faidherbe has just suffered in front of St. Quentin.¹¹³

There can be no mistake about Bourbaki's failure. Ever since the affair at Villersexel on the 9th, he has displayed a slowness of movement which indicated either indecision on the part of the General or insufficient strength on the part of the troops. The attack upon the entrenched positions which Werder had prepared for the protection of the siege of Belfort beyond the Lisaine (or Isel on other maps) was not commenced before the 15th, and on the evening of the 17th Bourbaki gave it up in despair. There can be no doubt now that the expedition had been undertaken with insufficient forces. The 15th Corps had been left near Nevers; of the 19th we have not heard for a month; the troops brought up from Lyons reduce themselves to one army corps, the 24th. We now hear of considerable reinforcements being hurried up to Dijon, but, in the face of the strong reinforcements rapidly arriving on the other side, they will not enable Bourbaki at once to resume the offensive.

It may be questioned whether Bourbaki ought to have led his young troops to the assault of entrenched positions defended by breech-loaders; but we know little as yet of the tactical conditions under which the three days' fight took place: he may have been unable to act otherwise.

^a Written on January 21, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Royal Head-Quarters, Versailles, Jan. 20", *The Times*, No. 26966, January 21, 1871.—*Ed.*

That the Prussian headquarters did not look upon Bourbaki's expedition with the same contemptuous shrug as most people did here in London is shown by the extreme eagerness with which they took steps to meet it. From these steps there can be no doubt that Bourbaki's move was known in Versailles as soon as he began his eastward march, if not before. On the 2nd of January the 2nd Corps received orders to march from Paris in a south-easterly direction, towards the basin of the Upper Seine. About the same time Zastrow left the neighbourhood of Metz with the 13th division for Châtillon. Immediately after the reduction of Rocroi, on the 9th, the 14th division (the remaining one of Zastrow's 7th Corps) was ordered from Charleville towards Paris, thence to follow the 2nd Corps; and on the 15th already we find its advance (a battalion of the 77th regiment) engaged near Langres. At the same time landwehr troops were hurried on towards southern Alsace from Germany, and Manteuffel evidently owes his new command^a to no other cause than this first serious movement against the weakest point of the whole German line. Had Bourbaki brought sufficient forces to overthrow Werder, he might have cast him back into the Rhine valley, placed the chain of the Vosges between Werder and his own troops, and marched with the greater part of his forces against these reinforcements, which he might have attacked in detail as they arrived from different directions. He might have penetrated as far as the Paris-Strasbourg Railway, in which case it is very doubtful whether the investment of Paris could have been continued. His defeat proves nothing against the strategy of his movement: it proves merely that it was carried on with insufficient forces. The writer of these Notes is still of opinion that the shortest and safest plan to relieve Paris is an attack upon the Strasbourg-Paris Railway,^b the only through line of rail the Germans have, for we know now that the other line, viâ Thionville and Mézières, is still impracticable, and will remain so for some time yet, on account of the blowing-up of a tunnel in the Ardennes. This, by the way, is the second instance in this war in which the demolition of a tunnel stops a railway for months, while the destruction of bridges and viaducts has been in every case repaired in an incredibly short time.

As to Chanzy, he evidently made a very great mistake in accepting a pitched battle at all. He must have been aware of Bourbaki's move for nearly a month; he must have known that

^a See this volume, p. 228.—*Ed.*

^b *Ibid.*

this was the real move for the relief of Paris, and that in the meantime he might have the whole weight of Frederick Charles's army brought to bear against himself. He was not compelled to accept battle; on the contrary, he might have drawn on his opponent farther than was safe for the latter, by a slow retreat under continuous rear-guard engagements, such as those by which he first established his reputation in December. He had plenty of time to get his stores sent off to places of safety, and he had the choice of retiring either upon Brittany with its fortified naval ports, or by Nantes to the south of the Loire. Moreover, Frederick Charles, with all his forces, could not have followed him very far. Such a military retreat would be more in keeping with our previous experience of Chanzky; and as he must have known that the new reinforcements he had received were not yet fit for a general action either by equipment, armament, or discipline, we cannot but come to the conclusion that the battle before Le Mans was fought not for military but for political reasons, and that the man responsible for it is not Chanzky but Gambetta. As to Chanzky's retreat now, it is, of course, rendered far more difficult by the preceding defeat; but Chanzky excels in retreats, and, so far, the victors do not appear to have materially damaged the cohesion of his army. Otherwise they would have substantial proofs to show for their assertion that this army "shows signs of dissolution."^a Whether the retreat of Chanzky's army is really an eccentric one is not certain. At all events, from the fact that part of his troops retreated towards Alençon, and another part towards Laval, it does not necessarily follow that the first portion will be driven into the peninsula of the Cotentin towards Cherbourg, and the other into that of Brittany towards Brest. As the French fleet can steam from the one port to the other in a few hours, even this would be no severe disaster. In Brittany, the country, by its numerous thickset hedges—as thick as those in the Isle of Wight, only far more plentiful—is eminently adapted for defence, especially by raw troops, whose inferiority almost disappears there. Frederick Charles is not likely to entangle himself in a labyrinth where the armies of the first Republic fought for years against a mere peasant insurrection.¹¹⁴

The conclusion we must come to upon the whole of the campaign of January is this—that the French lost it everywhere by trying to do too many different things at the same time. They can

^a "Saarbrücken, 19. Jan.", *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 20, January 20, 1871. First edition.—Ed.

hope to win only by concentrating their masses upon one point, at the risk of being temporarily driven back on the other points, where, of course, they should avoid pitched battles. Unless they do this, and soon, Paris may be considered doomed. But if they act on this old-established principle they may still win—however black things may look for them to-day. The Germans now have received all the reinforcements they can expect for three months to come; while the French must have in their camps of instruction at least from two to three hundred thousand men, who during that time will be got ready to meet the enemy.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXXVIII^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1858, January 26, 1871]

We are again in a critical period of the war, which may turn out to be *the* critical period. From the moment we heard that bread had been rationed out in Paris by the Government, there could be no longer any doubt that the beginning of the end had come. How soon after that the offer of surrender would follow was a mere question of detail. We suppose, then, that it is intended to surrender to some 220,000 besiegers a besieged force of some 500,000 armed men on any terms the besiegers choose to impose. Whether it will be possible to carry this out without another struggle remains to be seen; at all events, any such struggle could not materially alter the state of things. Whether Paris holds out another fortnight, or whether a portion of these 500,000 armed men succeed in forcing a road across the lines of investment, will not much affect the ulterior course of the war.

We cannot but hold General Trochu mainly responsible for this result of the siege. He certainly was not the man to form an army out of the undoubtedly excellent material under his hands. He had nearly five months' time to make soldiers out of his men; yet at the end they appear to fight no better than at the beginning of the siege. The final sortie from Valérien¹¹⁵ was carried out with far less dash than the previous one across the Marne; there appears a good deal of theatrical display in it—little of the rage of despair. It will not do to say that the troops were not fit to be sent out to storm breastworks manned by the German veterans. Why were they not? Five months are a sufficient time to make very respectable soldiers out of the men Trochu had at his command,

^a Written on January 25 or 26, 1871.—*Ed.*

and there are no circumstances better adapted for that purpose than those of the siege of a large entrenched camp. No doubt the men after the sorties of November and December had lost heart; but was it because they knew their inferiority with regard to their opponents, or because they had lost all faith in the pretended determination of Trochu to fight the matter out? All reports from Paris agree in ascribing the want of success to the absence of confidence of the soldiers in the supreme command. And rightly so. Trochu, we must not forget, is an Orleanist, and, as such, lives in bodily fear of La Villette, Belleville, and the other "revolutionary" quarters of Paris. He feared them more than the Prussians. This is not a mere supposition or deduction on our part. We know, from a source which admits of no doubt, of a letter sent out of Paris by a member of the Government^a in which it is stated that Trochu was on every side urged on to take the offensive energetically, but that he constantly refused, because such a course might hand over Paris to the "demagogues."

The fall of Paris, then, appears now all but certain. It will be a hard blow to the French nation, immediately after St. Quentin, Le Mans, and Héricourt, and its moral effect under these circumstances will be very great. Moreover, there are events impending in the south-east which may render this blow morally crushing. Bourbaki appears to be tarrying in the neighbourhood of Belfort in a way which seems to imply that he does not at all comprehend his situation. The 24th Corps, under Bressolles, on the 24th was still at Blâmont, about twelve miles south of Montbéliard, and close to the Swiss frontier; and even supposing that this was Bourbaki's rearguard, it is not to be expected that the other two corps he had with him would be far away. In the meantime, we find that Prussian detachments, as early as the 21st, had cut, at Dôle, the railway between Besançon and Dijon; that they have since occupied St. Vith, another station on the same line nearer to Besançon; and that they are thus confining Bourbaki's retreat, towards Lyons, to the narrow strip between the Doubs and the Swiss frontier, a country of parallel longitudinal mountain chains and valleys where a comparatively small force may find plenty of positions in which it can stop the retreat of an army such as Bourbaki's has shown itself to be. These detachments on the Doubs we take to be the 13th Division of Zastrow's 7th Corps, or perhaps a portion of Fransecky's 2nd Corps, which has turned up on the 23rd at Dijon. The 60th regiment, which with the 21st

^a J. Favre.—*Ed.*

forms the 8th Brigade (or 4th brigade of the 2nd Corps), was repulsed before that town by Garibaldi, and lost its colours. As Garibaldi has but 15,000 men at the utmost, he will not be able to hold the town against the superior forces which are sure to have arrived before it in the meantime. He will be driven back, and the Prussian advance will be continued towards and beyond the Doubs. Unless Bourbaki has in the meantime used the legs of his men to good advantage, he may be driven, with all his army, into the fortress of Besançon to play Metz over again, or into a corner of the Jura abutting on Swiss territory, and compelled to lay down his arms either on this side or on the other of the frontier.¹¹⁶ And if he should escape with the greater portion of his troops, it is almost certain that large numbers of stragglers, much baggage, and perhaps artillery, will have to be sacrificed.

After the three days' fighting at Héricourt, Bourbaki had no business to remain a day longer in his exposed position near the frontier, with Prussian reinforcements marching towards his communications. His attempts to relieve Belfort had failed; every chance of a further offensive movement in that direction had disappeared; his position became every day more dangerous, and nothing but rapid retreat could save him. By all appearances he has neglected that too, and if his imprudence should lead to a second Sedan, the blow to the French people might be morally overwhelming.

Morally, we say, for materially it need not be. Germany is certainly not so exhausted as Gambetta pretends,^a but Germany is at this very moment displaying a greater absolute and relative strength than she will again display for months to come. For some time the German forces must decline, while nothing prevents the French forces, even after the surrender of the Paris garrison and Bourbaki, should it come to that, from again increasing. The Prussians themselves appear to have given up all hopes of being able to conquer and occupy the whole of France; and as long as the compact block of territory in the South remains free, and as long as resistance, passive and occasionally active (like the blowing up of the Moselle bridge near Toul), is not given up in the North, we do not see how France can be compelled to give in unless she be tired of the war.

^a Gambetta's despatch to Trochu from Lyons, December 23, 1870, *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 9, January 9, 1871; Gambetta's despatch to Jules Favre, December 31, 1870, *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 10, January 10, 1871.—*Ed.*

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XXXIX^a[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1860, January 28, 1871]

Twice only since Sedan have the operations of a French army caused serious uneasiness to General Moltke. The first instance occurred about the middle of November, when the Army of the Loire, after the defeat of von der Tann at Coulmiers, filed off to the left in order to approach Paris from the west, and advanced to Dreux. Then Moltke, with a resolution worthy of such a crisis, prepared for the immediate raising of the siege in case Mecklenburg,^b even with all the temporary reinforcements detached to his aid, should not be strong enough to stem the enemy's advance. That advance was stemmed, and the siege could continue. The second time it was Bourbaki's march towards the east which troubled the repose of the headquarters at Versailles. How serious this move was considered to be was shown by the steps taken at once to meet it. Werder's troops—the 14th Corps and the reserve divisions of Tresckow and Schmeling—were at once reinforced by two more corps, of which one, the second, marched off from Paris as early as the 2nd of January. The language of the semi-official communications became guarded; on the 11th the *Provinzial-Correspondenz* calls attention to the fact that "in the east of France important and decisive battles are impending," and that Bourbaki intends, after relieving Belfort, to break through the Prussian line of communication at Nancy.^c Non-official correspondents, though still guarded, speak more plainly; we will only quote one of them, Wickede, of the *Cologne Gazette*.^d Immediately after the engage-

^a Written on January 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Frederick Francis II.—*Ed.*

^c The news is reported in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 12, January 12, 1871, Second edition, with reference to the *Provinzial-Correspondenz*.—*Ed.*

^d The reference is to the *Kölnische Zeitung*.—*Ed.*

ment of Villersexel, by which Werder had secured his communications with and retreat upon Tresckow's troops before Belfort, he says,

"Care has been taken that the French shall not relieve Belfort, and after the late successful engagements we may with probability hope that they will not succeed in advancing by Chaumont to Nancy or some other point of our railway line, which a short time ago there was some reason to fear they might do."^a

And on the 16th of January, from Nancy, he writes that, after the arrival of Manteuffel with three divisions beyond Châtillon,

"the apprehension that a hostile corps ... might take possession of Nancy—an apprehension which we justly (mit Recht) might have felt a few days ago—has now quite disappeared."^b (Immediately after this letter there is one from Baden beginning with the words: "There can be no doubt that the situation before Belfort looks very serious.")^c

But Herr Wickede was doomed to further apprehensions, for on the following day he had to communicate that news had arrived of the occupation of Flavigny^d (eleven miles from Nancy) by French troops. Immediately the guards were reinforced, strong patrols were sent out, the whole of the twenty engines at the station got their steam up, officers, Government employés and other Germans packed their trunks, and got ready for immediate departure. The men at Flavigny were expected to be Garibaldi's advanced guard; they turned out to be some twenty francs-tireurs from the Vosges, and soon disappeared again. But the Prussian garrison of Nancy was not completely tranquillized until the 19th, when the news of Bourbaki's final repulse on the Lisaine came to hand, and then at last Wickede could again resume his former strain.

Ought not the French, after all these defeats, to arrive at the conviction that further resistance is hopeless? Such was the opinion of those most directly concerned about an operation which, after its failure, *The Times* classifies as simply absurd.^e There might have been a difference of opinion as to whether the

^a J. Wickede, "Die letzten Kriegereignisse in Frankreich", *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 16, January 16, 1871. First edition.—*Ed.*

^b "Aus Lothringen. 16. Jan.", *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 18, January 18, 1871. First edition.—*Ed.*

^c "Aus Baden. 17. Jan.", *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 18, January 18, 1871. First edition.—*Ed.*

^d "Aus Lothringen. 17. Jan.", *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 19, January 19, 1871. Second edition.—*Ed.*

^e "M. Gambetta has put forth...", *The Times*, No. 26967, January 23, 1871.—*Ed.*

operation was likely to have been undertaken with sufficient forces; or whether, in case of success, its consequences could be developed in time to save Paris before starvation compelled surrender; or whether or not this was the best direction for a move against the German communications. But to put down such a move, the most effective one known to strategy, as simply absurd was left to the Moltkes of *The Times*.

In the meantime Count Moltke has operated with his usual mastery. He was too late to reinforce Werder before the arrival of Bourbaki; he chose the next best thing, and concentrated his reinforcements at Châtillon, where Manteuffel had three divisions (3rd, 4th, and 13th) on or before the 15th, and where they were joined by the 60th regiment (of the 3rd Corps), left in the neighbourhood by Prince Frederick Charles. We may expect that, by this time, he will have been joined by the 14th division too. At all events, on his advance south, he had at least forty-one if not fifty-three, battalions with him. With these troops he marched upon the river Doubs, leaving to the south the town of Dijon, where he merely occupied Garibaldi by the attack on the 23rd, but evidently without any intention to delay his advance by seriously engaging him or carrying the town. On the contrary, he steadily pursued the main object—the cutting off of Bourbaki's retreat. According to the latest telegrams that object was nearly attained.^a His troops were across the Doubs, at Quingey and Mouchard, at which latter place the railway from Dijon to Pontarlier and Switzerland crosses that from Besançon to Lyons. There still remains one good road by which Bourbaki might escape, but that road is, at Champagnole, not more than twenty-five miles from Mouchard, and may be occupied by this time. In that case there would only remain to Bourbaki the country road passing by the source of the Doubs, where he could scarcely get on with his artillery; and even that road may be cut off before he is out of harm's way. And if he does not succeed in breaking through the opposing troops in a country very favourable to the defence, he has but the choice of withdrawing under the shelter of the forts of Besançon or of surrendering in the open—the choice between Metz and Sedan, unless he surrenders to the Swiss.

It is inconceivable that he should have tarried so long near Belfort, for the latest Prussian telegrams represent him still to be north-east of Besançon. If he could not defeat Werder before

^a "Imperial Head-Quarters, Versailles, January 26", *The Times*, No. 26972, January 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

Manteuffel's arrival, how much less could he expect to do so afterwards? Bourbaki's duty evidently was to withdraw at once to a position of safety after his final repulse before Belfort. Why he has not done so is totally inexplicable. But if the worst should befall him, after his mysterious journey from Metz to Chiselhurst,¹¹⁷ after his refusal to salute the Republic at Lille, the late commander of the Imperial Guard is sure to have doubts raised as to his loyalty.

NOTES ON THE WAR.—XL^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1864, February 2, 1871]

If we are to believe the latest telegram from Berne^b—and there is now no room to discredit it—our anticipations regarding the fate of Bourbaki's army^c have been realized. The Swiss Federal Council is reported to have received the official news that this army, about 80,000 strong, had passed upon Swiss territory, where, of course, it would have to lay down its arms. The exact points at which this took place have not been stated, but it must have been somewhere south of Blâmont and not more south than Pontarlier. The various detachments would pass the frontier at different points, the greatest mass of the troops probably at Les Brenets, where the road from Besançon to Neuchâtel enters Swiss territory.

Thus another French army has passed away, through—to use the mildest phrase—the irresolution of its chief. Bourbaki may be a dashing officer at the head of a division; but the nerve required to brace oneself up to a bold resolution in a decisive moment is quite a different thing from the nerve which enables a man to command a division with *éclat* under fire; and like many men of undoubted and brilliant personal courage, Bourbaki seems deficient in the moral courage necessary to come to a decisive resolution. On the evening of the 17th at latest, when his inability to pierce Werder's lines became fully evident to himself, his mind ought to have been made up at once as to his line of conduct. He must have known that Prussian reinforcements were approaching

^a Written on February 2, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Berne, Feb. 1", *The Times*, No. 26976, February 2, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c See this volume, p. 242.—*Ed.*

his line of retreat from the north-west; that his position with a victorious enemy in his front, and a long line of retreat, close to a neutral frontier, in his rear, was extremely dangerous; that the object of his expedition had irretrievably failed; and that his most pressing, nay, his only duty, under the circumstances, was to save his army. In other words, that he must retire as hastily as the state of his army would allow. But this resolution to retire, to confess by deeds that he had failed in his expedition, appears to have been too much for him. He dallied about the scene of his last battles, unable to advance, unwilling to retire, and thus gave Manteuffel the time to cut off his retreat. Had he marched off at once, and only done fifteen miles a day, he could have reached Besançon on the 20th, and the neighbourhood of Dôle on the 21st, just about the time when the first Prussians made their appearance there. These Prussians could not be very strong; and even Bourbaki's advanced guard must have been sufficient if not to drive them off entirely, still to confine them to the right or western bank of the Doubs, which would have been quite sufficient to secure Bourbaki's line of retreat, especially with an adversary of the force of Manteuffel, who will act correctly enough so long as the execution of Moltke's orders meets with no resistance, but who sinks below the level of mediocrity as soon as that resistance calls into play his own mental powers.

It is one of the most curious points in the document agreed to between Bismarck and Jules Favre,¹¹⁸ that the four departments where Bourbaki and Garibaldi are acting are not included in the general armistice, but that the Prussians virtually reserve to themselves the power of continuing to fight there as long as they please.^a It is an unprecedented stipulation, which shows more than any other that the conqueror, in the true Prussian fashion, exacted to the full every concession his momentary superiority enabled him to impose. The armistice is to extend to the West, where Frederick Charles finds that he had better not advance beyond Le Mans; to the North, where Goeben is arrested by the fortresses; but not to the south-east, where Manteuffel's advance promised a second Sedan. Jules Favre, in consenting to this clause, virtually consented to the surrender of Bourbaki, either to the Prussians or to the Swiss; the only difference in his favour being that he shifted the responsibility of the act from his shoulders to those of Bourbaki.

^a The main terms of the armistice and capitulation of Paris are set forth in the report "Imperial Head-Quarters, Versailles, Jan. 30", *The Times*, No. 26974, January 31, 1871.—*Ed.*

Altogether, the capitulation of Paris is an unprecedented document. When Napoleon surrendered at Sedan he declined entering on negotiations beyond those for the surrender of himself and army; he, as a prisoner, being disabled from binding the Government and France. When M. Jules Favre surrenders Paris and its army he enters upon stipulations binding the rest of France, though exactly in the same position as Napoleon at Sedan. Nay, worse. Napoleon, almost up to the day of his capitulation, had been in free communication with the rest of France; M. Jules Favre, for five or six weeks, has enjoyed but rare and fragmentary opportunities of learning what was going on outside Paris. His information as to the military situation outside the forts could be supplied to him by Bismarck only; and upon this one-sided statement, furnished by the enemy, he ventured to act.

M. Jules Favre had a choice between two evils. He could do as he has done, secure a three weeks' armistice on the enemy's terms, and bind the real Government of France, that of Bordeaux,⁸⁷ to it. Or he could refuse to act for the rest of France, offer to treat for Paris alone, and in case of difficulties raised by the besiegers, do as the commandant of Phalsbourg did—throw open the gates and invite the conquerors to enter. The latter course would have been more in the interest of his dignity and of his political future.

As to the Bordeaux Government, it will have to adhere to the armistice and to the election of a National Assembly. It has no means to compel the generals to repudiate the armistice, it will hesitate to create divisions among the people. The surrender of Bourbaki to the Swiss adds another crushing blow to the many the French have lately received; and, as we stated in anticipation of the event,^a we believe that this blow, following immediately upon the surrender of Paris, will so much depress the spirits of the nation that peace will be made. As to the material resources of France, they are so far from being exhausted that the struggle might be continued for months. There is one striking fact which shows how immense are the difficulties in the way of a complete conquest of France. Prince Frederick Charles, after seven days' fighting, had driven back Chanzy's army, in a state of utter dissolution. With the exception of a few brigades, there were positively no troops left to oppose him. The country in his front was rich and comparatively unexhausted. Yet he stops his march at Le Mans, pursuing beyond with his advanced guard only, and not beyond short distances. Our readers will recollect that we were

^a See this volume, p. 242.—*Ed.*

prepared for no other result^a; for it may be said, with a certain amount of truth that in conquering a large country, while the extent to be occupied increases arithmetically, the difficulties of occupation increase geometrically.

Still we think that the repeated disasters of the January campaign must have shaken the morale of the nation to such an extent that the proposed National Assembly will not only meet, but also probably make peace; and thus, along with the war, these Notes upon it will come to a close.

^a See this volume, p. 238.—*Ed.*

THE MILITARY ASPECT OF AFFAIRS IN FRANCE^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1869, February 8, 1871]

If the series of disasters to the French arms which mark the January campaign—the defeats of Faidherbe and Chanzy, the fall of Paris, the defeat and surrender to the Swiss of Bourbaki—if all these crushing events, concentrated in the short period of three weeks, may well be considered to have broken the spirit of resistance in France, it now seems not improbable that the Germans, by their extravagant demands,¹¹⁹ may rouse that spirit again. If the country is to be thoroughly ruined by peace as well as by war, why make peace at all? The propertied classes, the middle class of the towns and the larger landed proprietors, with part of the smaller peasantry, hitherto formed the peace party; they might have been reckoned upon to elect peace deputies for the National Assembly; but if such unheard-of demands are persisted in, the cry of war to the knife may rise from their ranks as well as from those of the workmen of the large towns. At any rate, it is well not to neglect whatever chance there may be that the war may be resumed after the 19th of February¹²⁰; especially since the Germans themselves, if we may trust *The Daily News* of to-day, are not so satisfied with the prospect of affairs as to abstain from serious preparations for the resumption of hostilities. Let us, therefore, cast another glance at the military aspect of affairs.

The twenty-seven departments of France now occupied by the Prussians contain an area of 15,800,000 hectares, with a population (allowing for the fortresses still unsundered) of rather less than 12,500,000. The extent of all France comprises 54,240,000 hectares, and its population is 37,382,000. It thus appears that, in

^a Written on February 7 or 8, 1871.—*Ed.*

round numbers, thirty-eight and a half millions of hectares, with a population of 25,000,000, remain still unconquered,—fully two-thirds of the people, considerably more than two-thirds of the soil. Paris and Metz, the resistance of which so long retarded further hostile advance, have certainly fallen. The interior of the unconquered country contains no other entrenched camp—Lyons excepted—capable of playing the same part which these two fortresses have played. Rather less than 700,000 Frenchmen (not counting the National Guard of Paris) are prisoners of war or interned in Switzerland. But there are other circumstances which may make up for this deficiency, even if the three weeks' armistice should not be used for the creation of new camps, surrounded by field works; for which there is ample time.

The great bulk of unconquered France lies south of the line Nantes-Besançon; it forms a compact block, covered on three sides by the sea or by neutral frontiers, with only its northern boundary line open to the enemy's attack. Here is the strength of the national resistance; here are to be found the men and the material to carry on the war if it is resumed. To conquer and occupy this immense rectangle of 450 miles by 250 against a desperate resistance—regular and irregular—of the inhabitants, the present forces of the Prussians would not suffice. The surrender of Paris, leaving four corps for the garrison of that capital, will set free nine divisions; Bourbaki's surrender sets free Manteuffel's six line divisions; in all, fifteen divisions, or 150,000 to 170,000 additional soldiers for operations in the field, added to Goeben's four and Frederick Charles's eight divisions. But Goeben has plenty on his hands in the north, and Frederick Charles has shown by his halt at Tours and Le Mans that his offensive powers are exhausted to the full, so that for the conquest of the South there remain but the above fifteen divisions; and for some months to come no further reinforcements can arrive.

To these fifteen divisions the French will have to oppose in the beginning mostly new formations. There were about Nevers and Bourges the 15th and 25th Corps; there must have been in the same neighbourhood the 19th Corps, of which we have heard nothing since the beginning of December. Then there is the 24th Corps, escaped from Bourbaki's shipwreck, and Garibaldi's troops, recently reinforced to 50,000 men, but by what bodies and from what quarters we do not know. The whole comprises some thirteen or fourteen divisions, perhaps even sixteen, but quite insufficient as to quantity and quality to arrest the progress of the new armies which are sure to be sent against them if the armistice

should expire without peace having been made. But the three weeks' armistice will not only give these French divisions time to consolidate themselves; it will also permit the more or less raw levies now in the camps of instruction, and estimated by Gambetta at 250,000 men, to transform at least the best of their battalions into useful corps fit to meet the enemy; and thus, if the war should be renewed, the French may be in a position to ward off any serious invasion of the South, not perhaps at the boundary line of the Loire or much north of Lyons, but yet at points where the presence of the enemy will not efficiently impair their force of resistance.

As a matter of course, the armistice gives ample time to restore the equipment, the discipline, and the morale of Faidherbe's and Chanzy's armies, as well as of all the other troops in Cherbourg, Havre, &c. The question is whether the time will be so employed. While thus the strength of the French will be considerably increased, both as to numbers and quality, that of the Germans will scarcely receive any increment at all. So far, the armistice will be a boon to the French side.

But beside the compact block of southern France, there remain unconquered the two peninsulas of the Bretagne with Brest, and of the Cotentin with Cherbourg, and, moreover, the two northern departments with their fortresses. Havre, too, forms an unconquered, well-fortified spot on the coast. Every one of these four districts is provided with at least one well-fortified place of safety on the coast for a retreating army; so that the fleet, which at this moment has nothing, absolutely nothing, else to do, can keep up the communications between the South and all of them, transport troops from one place to another, as the case may require, and thereby all of a sudden enable a beaten army to resume the offensive with superior forces. Thus while these four western and northern districts are in a measure unassailable, they form so many weak points on the flanks of the Prussians. The line of actual danger for the French extends from Angers to Besançon; for the Germans it extends, in addition to this, from Angers by Le Mans, Rouen, and Amiens to the Belgian frontier. Advantages on this latter line gained over the French can never become decisive if moderate common sense be used by them; but those gained over the Germans may, under certain conditions, become so.

Such is the strategical situation. By using the fleet to advantage the French might move their men in the West and North, so as to compel the Germans to keep largely superior forces in that neighbourhood, and to weaken the forces sent out for the

conquest of the South, which it would be their chief object to prevent. By concentrating their armies more than they have hitherto done, and, on the other hand, by sending out more numerous small partisan bands, they might increase the effect to be obtained by the forces on hand. There appear to have been many more troops at Cherbourg and Havre than were necessary for the defence; and the well executed destruction of the bridge of Fontenoy, near Toul, in the centre of the country occupied by the conquerors, shows what may be done by bold partisans. For, if the war is to be resumed at all after the 19th of February, it must be in reality a war to the knife, a war like that of Spain against Napoleon; a war in which no amount of shootings and burnings will prove sufficient to break the spirit of resistance.

BOURBAKI'S DISASTER^a

[*The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1878, February 18, 1871]

By the correspondent of *The Standard* we are at last furnished with an eyewitness's report of what took place in Bourbaki's army during its disastrous January campaign. The correspondent was with General Cr  mer's division, which formed the extreme left during the advance, and the rearguard during the retreat. His account, though naturally one-sided and full of inaccuracies in matters which did not occur under his eyes, is very valuable because it furnishes facts and dates hitherto unknown, and thus throws much light upon this phase of the war.

Bourbaki's army, 133,000 men with 330 guns, was, it appears, scarcely deserving the name of an army. The linesmen, with passable officers, were inferior in physique to the Mobiles, but the latter had scarcely any officers acquainted even with the rudiments of their duties. The accounts received from Switzerland confirm this^b; if they give a worse account of the physique of the men, we must not forget the effect of a month's campaigning under hunger and cold. The equipment as to clothing and shoes appears to have been by all accounts miserable. A commissariat or even a mere organization for carrying out with some order and regularity the levying of requisitions and the distribution of the food thus procured, appears to have been as good as totally absent.

Now of the four-and-a-half corps employed, three (the 15th, 18th, and 20th) had been handed over to Bourbaki as early as the 5th of December; and very soon after that date the plan to march

^a Written about February 18, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b [Letter to the Editor of *The Times* from Lausanne, dated Feb. 9], *The Times*, No. 26989, February 17, 1871.—*Ed.*

eastwards must have been resolved upon. All his movements, up to the 5th of January, were mere marches for concentration, undisturbed by the enemy; they therefore were no obstacle in the way of improving the organization of this army—quite the contrary. Napoleon, in 1813, formed his raw levies into soldiers on the march to Germany. Thus Bourbaki had a full month to work in; and when after the time thus given him his troops arrived in presence of the enemy in the state described, he cannot possibly be considered free from blame. He does not appear to advantage as an organizer.

The original plan is said to have been to march upon Belfort in four columns—one on the eastern side of the Doubs through the Jura, to take or turn Montbéliard and the Prussian left; a second column along the valley of the river, for the front attack; a third column by a more westerly route, through Rougemont and Villersexel, against the enemy's right; and Crémér's division to arrive from Dijon by Lure beyond the Prussian right. But this was altered. The whole of the first three columns advanced on the one road through the valley, by which it is asserted that five days were lost, during which Werder was reinforced, and that the whole army being thrown upon one line of retreat, again lost time, and thus was cut off from Lyons and forced upon the Swiss frontier. Now, it is quite evident that throwing some 120,000 men—and men so loosely organized as these—in one column on one single line of march, would cause confusion and delay; but it is not so certain that this blunder was actually committed to the extent here implied. From all previous reports, Bourbaki's troops arrived before Belfort in a broad front, extending from Villersexel to the Swiss boundary line,^a which implies the use of the various roads mentioned in the original plan. But whatever may have been the cause, the delay did occur, and was the chief cause of the loss of the battle at Héricourt. The engagement of Villersexel took place on the 9th. Villersexel is about twenty miles from the Prussian position at Héricourt, and it took Bourbaki five days—up to the evening of the 14th—to bring his troops up in front of that position so as to be able to attack it next morning! This we pointed out in a previous article as the first great mistake in the campaign,^b and we now see from the correspondent's report that it was felt to be so by Crémér's officers even before the battle of Héricourt began.

^a See, e.g. the item "Onans, Jan. 13", *The Times*, No. 26961, January 16, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, p. 236.—*Ed.*

In that three days' battle 130,000 Frenchmen fought against 35,000 to 40,000 Germans, and could not force their entrenched position. With such a numerical superiority, the boldest flank movements were possible. Forty or fifty thousand men thrown resolutely upon the rear of the Germans while the rest occupied them in front could scarcely have failed to force them from their position. But instead of that merely the front, the entrenched front, of the position was attacked, and thus an immense and barren loss was caused. The flank attacks were carried out so weakly that a single German brigade (Keller's) not only sufficed to repel that on the German right, but was enabled to hold Frahier and Chenebier so as in turn to outflank the French. Bourbaki's young troops were thus put to the severest task which can be found for a soldier in battle, while their own superior numbers would have rendered it easier to carry the position by manoeuvring. But probably the last five days' experience had proved to Bourbaki that it was useless to expect mobility from his army.

After the final repulse on the 17th of January followed the retreat to Besançon. That this retreat may have taken place mainly by the one road in the Doubs valley is probable; but we know that large bodies retreated by other roads nearer the Swiss frontier. Anyhow, on the afternoon of the 22nd the rearguard, under Crémier, arrived in Besançon. Thus the advanced guard must have arrived there as early as the 20th, and have been ready to march on the 21st against the Prussians, who on that day reached Dôle. But no. No notice is taken of them until after Crémier's arrival, who all at once, changing his place from the rear to the vanguard, is sent out to meet them on the 23rd towards Saint Vit. On the following day Crémier is ordered back to Besançon; two days are wasted in indecision and inactivity, until, on the 26th, Bourbaki, after passing in review the 18th Corps, attempts suicide. Then a disorderly retreat commences in the direction of Pontarlier. But on that day the Germans at Mouchard and Salins were nearer the Swiss frontier than the fugitives, and their retreat was virtually cut off. It was no longer a race; the Germans could occupy leisurely the outlets of all the longitudinal valleys by which escape was still possible; while other troops pressed on the French rear. Then followed the engagements around Pontarlier, which brought this fact home to the defeated army; the result of which was the Convention of Les Verrières and the surrender of the whole body to the Swiss.¹²¹

The whole behaviour of Bourbaki, from the 15th to the 26th, seems to prove that he had lost all confidence in his men, and that

consequently he also lost all confidence in himself. Why he suspended the march of his columns at Besançon until Crémier's arrival, thus throwing away every chance of escape; why he recalled Crémier's division, the best in the army, immediately after sending it out of Besançon to meet the Prussians, who blocked the direct road to Lyons; why after that he dallied another two days, which brings the time lost in Besançon to fully six days—it is impossible to explain unless by supposing that Bourbaki was eminently deficient in that resolution which is the very first quality of an independent commander. It is the old tale of the August campaign over again¹²²; and it is curious that this singular hesitation should again show itself in a general inherited from the Empire, while none of the generals of the Republic—whatever else may have been their faults—have shown such indecision, or suffered such punishment for it.

Karl Marx

TO THE COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC
WORKERS' PARTY¹²³

London, August 2, 1870

Friends,

First my thanks for the detailed report on the Workers' Party in Germany. I immediately communicated it to the General Council.

The work which I was asked to write on the relations of land ownership in Germany had to be put to one side for the time being owing to sheer lack of time.¹²⁴

As you will have seen from the Address of the General Council which I sent to you last week, I have incorporated into this address parts of the *appeal* issued at the Brunswick MEETING (of 16th July, 1870)^a...

According to article 3 of the Rules^b the General Council cannot defer the date of the Congress. In the present, *exceptional*, circumstances, however, it would accept responsibility for such a step, if the necessary support from the sections was forthcoming. It would therefore be desirable for a reasoned application to this effect to be sent to us *officially* from Germany.

First published in an abbreviated form in the book: C. Koch, *Der Process gegen den Ausschuss der social-demokratischen Arbeiter-partei...*, Braunschweig, 1871

Printed according to W. Bracke's book *Der Braunschweiger Ausschuss der socialdemokratischen Arbeiter-Partei in Lötzen und vor dem Gericht*, Braunschweig, 1872

Published in English for the first time

^a See this volume, p. 6. The appeal was published in the column "Politische Uebersicht" in *Der Volksstaat*, No. 58, July 20, 1870.—Ed.

^b See present edition, Vol. 20, p. 15.—Ed.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

[LETTER TO THE COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIAL-
DEMOCRATIC WORKERS' PARTY]¹²⁵

...The military camarilla, professors, middle-class people and public-house politicians are pretending this^a is the way to protect Germany from war with France forever. On the contrary, it is the most tried and tested way of turning war into a *European institution*. It is, in fact, the surest means of perpetuating military despotism in the rejuvenated Germany, as a necessity for maintaining a *western Poland*—Alsace and Lorraine. It is the most infallible way of turning the imminent peace into a mere armistice, until France is sufficiently recovered to demand the lost territory back. It is the most infallible way of ruining Germany and France through internecine strife.

The villains and fools, who have discovered these guarantees for eternal peace, should surely know from Prussian history, from Napoleon's drastic remedy in the Peace of Tilsit,¹²⁶ how such coercive measures to silence a viable people have precisely the opposite effect to that intended. And what is France, even after losing Alsace and Lorraine, compared with Prussia after the Peace of Tilsit!

If French chauvinism had some material justification, as long as the *old state* relations persisted, in the fact that since 1815 the capital, Paris, and thus France itself, were exposed after a few lost battles—will it not derive new vigour once the eastern border runs along the Vosges and northern at Metz?

Not even the most rabid^b Teuton dares to claim that the people of Alsace and Lorraine desire the blessings of *German* govern-

^a The reference is to the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine.—*Ed.*

^b "Most rabid" was written down in Engels' hand in his copy instead of the dots in the printed text.—*Ed.*

ment. It is the principle of pan-Germanism and "secure" borders which is being proclaimed here, and which would lead to fine results for Germany and Europe from the eastern side!"

Anyone who is not deafened by the clamour of the hour, and has *no interest* in deafening the German people, must realise that the war of 1870 just as necessarily carries within it the seed of a *war between Germany and Russia*, as the war of 1866 does the war of 1870.

I say *necessarily, inevitably*, except in the unlikely event of *revolution in Russia* breaking out first.

Should this unlikely event not occur, the war between Germany and Russia must already be treated as a *fait accompli* (an accomplished fact).

It depends entirely on the present conduct of the German victors whether the war will prove useful or harmful.

If they take Alsace and Lorraine, France will join *with* Russia to wage war on Germany. There is no need to point out the disastrous consequences.

If they conclude an honourable peace with France, that war will emancipate Europe from the Muscovite dictatorship, make Prussia merge into Germany, allow the western continent peaceful development and, finally, help a social revolution to break out in Russia, whose elements only need such an impulse from without for their development—thus benefitting the Russian people, too.

But I fear that the villains and fools will play their mad game unhindered unless the German working class en masse raises its voice.

The present war is opening up a new epoch in the history of the world in that Germany has proved that, even without German Austria, it is capable of going its own way, *independently of foreign countries*. That, to begin with, it is finding its *unity* in the *Prussian barracks* is a punishment which it amply deserves. But one result has been achieved immediately. Petty trifles, such as, for example, the conflict between North German National Liberals and South German supporters of the People's Party,¹²⁷ will no longer pointlessly get in the way. The state of affairs will develop and become simpler on a grand scale. If the German working class then fails to play the historic role allotted to it, it will only have itself to blame. *This war has shifted the centre of gravity of the*

^a See the Appeal of a group of German political figures to the King and the German people of August 30, 1870, "Berlin, 31. Aug.", *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 242; September, 1, 1870. Second edition.—*Ed.*

continental labour movement from France to Germany. This means that greater responsibility now rests with the German working class...

Written between August 22 and 30, 1870

Included in the text of the Manifesto of the Committee of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party published as a leaflet on September 5 and in the newspaper *Der Volksstaat*, No. 73, September 11, 1870

Printed according to Engels' copy of the leaflet

Karl Marx

SECOND ADDRESS OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING
MEN'S ASSOCIATION
ON THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR ¹²⁸

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S
ASSOCIATION
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

In our first Manifesto of the 23rd of July we said:— "The death knell of the Second Empire has already sounded at Paris. It will end as it began, by a parody. But let us not forget that it is the Governments and the ruling classes of Europe who enabled Louis Napoleon to play during eighteen years the ferocious farce of the *Restored Empire*." ^a

Thus, even before war operations had actually set in, we treated the Bonapartist bubble as a thing of the past.

If we were not mistaken as to the vitality of the Second Empire, we were not wrong in our apprehension lest the German war should "lose its strictly defensive character and degenerate into a war against the French people".^b The war of defence ended, in point of fact, with the surrender of Louis Bonaparte, the Sedan capitulation, and the proclamation of the Republic at Paris. But long before these events, the very moment that the utter rottenness of the Imperialist arms became evident, the Prussian military *camarilla* had resolved upon conquest. There lay an ugly obstacle in their way—*King William's own proclamations at the commencement of the war*. In his speech from the throne to the North German Diet, he had solemnly declared to make war upon the emperor of the French, and not upon the French people.^c On the 11th of August he had issued a manifesto to the French nation, where he said:^d

^a See this volume, p. 5.—*Ed.*

^b *Ibid.*, p. 6.—*Ed.*

^c William I's speech from the throne to the North-German Diet on July 19, 1870, *The Times*, No. 26807, July 20, 1870.—*Ed.*

^d This sentence and the following quotation from the Manifesto are omitted in Marx's German translation published as a separate edition in 1870. The further text up to the words "They at once gave the cue..." is abbreviated.—*Ed.*

"The Emperor Napoleon having made, by land and sea, an attack on the German nation, which desired and still desires to live in peace with the French people, I have assumed the command of the German armies *to repel his aggression*, and I have been led by *military events to cross the frontiers of France*."^a

Not content to assert the defensive character of the war by the statement that he only assumed the command of the German armies "*to repel aggression*", he added that he was only "led by military events" to cross the frontiers of France. A defensive war does, of course, not exclude offensive operations dictated by "military events".

Thus this pious king stood pledged before France and the world to a strictly defensive war. How to release him from his solemn pledge? The stage-managers had to exhibit him as giving, reluctantly, way to the irresistible behest of the German nation. They at once gave the cue to the liberal German middle class, with its professors, its capitalists, its aldermen, and its penmen. That middle class which in its struggle for civil liberty had, from 1846 to 1870, been exhibiting an unexampled spectacle of irresolution, incapacity, and cowardice, felt, of course, highly delighted to bestride the European scene as the roaring lion of German patriotism. It revindicated its civic independence by affecting to force upon the Prussian Government the secret designs of that same government. It does penance for its long-continued and almost religious faith in Louis Bonaparte's infallibility, by shouting for the dismemberment of the French Republic. Let us for a moment listen to the special pleadings of those stout-hearted patriots!

They dare not pretend that the people of Alsace and Lorraine pant for the German embrace; quite the contrary. To punish their French patriotism, Strasbourg, a town with an independent citadel commanding it, has for six days been wantonly and fiendishly bombarded by "German" explosive shells, setting it on fire, and killing great numbers of its defenceless inhabitants! Yet, the soil of those provinces once upon a time belonged to the whilom German Empire. Hence, it seems, the soil and the human beings grown on it must be confiscated as imprescriptible German property. If the map of Europe is to be remade in the antiquary's vein, let us by no means forget that the Elector of Brandenburg, for his Prussian dominions, was the vassal of the Polish Republic.¹²⁹

The more knowing patriots, however, require Alsace and the German-speaking part of Lorraine as a "material guarantee"

^a William I's proclamation to the French nation of August 11, 1870, *Kölnische Zeitung*, No. 222, August 12, 1870.—*Ed.*

against French aggression. As this contemptible plea has bewildered many weak-minded people, we are bound to enter more fully upon it.

There is no doubt that the general configuration of Alsace, as compared with the opposite bank of the Rhine, and the presence of a large fortified town like Strasbourg, about halfway between Basle and Gernersheim, very much favour a French invasion of South Germany, while they offer peculiar difficulties to an invasion of France from South Germany. There is, further, no doubt that the addition of Alsace and German-speaking Lorraine would give South Germany a much stronger frontier, inasmuch as she would then be master of the crest of the Vosges mountains in its whole length, and of the fortresses which cover its northern passes. If Metz were annexed as well, France would certainly for the moment be deprived of her two principal bases of operation against Germany, but that would not prevent her from constructing a fresh one at Nancy or Verdun. While Germany owns Coblenz, Mainz, Gernersheim, Rastatt, and Ulm, all bases of operation against France, and plentifully made use of in this war, with what show of fair play can she begrudge France Strasbourg and Metz, the only two fortresses of any importance she has on that side? Moreover, Strasbourg endangers South Germany only while South Germany is a separate power from North Germany. From 1792-95 South Germany was never invaded from that direction, because Prussia was a party to the war against the French Revolution; but as soon as Prussia made a peace of her own in 1795,¹³⁰ and left the South to shift for itself, the invasions of South Germany, with Strasbourg for a base, began, and continued till 1809. The fact is, a *united* Germany can always render Strasbourg and any French army in Alsace innocuous by concentrating all her troops, as was done in the present war, between Saarlouis and Landau, and advancing, or accepting battle, on the line of road between Mainz and Metz. While the mass of the German troops is stationed there, any French army advancing from Strasbourg into South Germany would be outflanked, and have its communications threatened. If the present campaign has proved anything, it is the facility of invading France from Germany.

But, in good faith, is it not altogether an absurdity and an anachronism to make military considerations the principle by which the boundaries of nations are to be fixed? If this rule were to prevail, Austria would still be entitled to Venetia and the line of the Mincio, and France to the line of the Rhine, in order to

protect Paris, which lies certainly more open to an attack from the North East than Berlin does from the South West. If limits are to be fixed by military interests, there will be no end to claims, because every military line is necessarily faulty, and may be improved by annexing some more outlying territory; and, moreover, they can never be fixed finally and fairly, because they always must be imposed by the conqueror upon the conquered, and consequently carry within them the seed of fresh wars.

Such is the lesson of all history. Thus with nations as with individuals. To deprive them of the power of offence, you must deprive them of the means of defence. You must not only garrotte but murder. If ever conqueror took "material guarantees" for breaking the sinews of a nation, the first Napoleon did so by the Tilsit treaty,¹²⁶ and the way he executed it against Prussia and the rest of Germany. Yet, a few years later, his gigantic power split like a rotten reed upon the German people. What are the "material guarantees" Prussia, in her wildest dreams, can, or dare impose upon France, compared to the "material guarantees" the first Napoleon had wrenched from herself? The result will not prove the less disastrous. History will measure its retribution, not by the extent of the square miles conquered from France, but by the intensity of the crime of reviving, in the second half of the 19th century, *the policy of conquest!*

But, say the mouthpieces of Teutonic patriotism, you must not confound Germans with Frenchmen. What *we* want is not glory, but safety. The Germans are an essentially peaceful people. In their sober guardianship, conquest itself changes from a condition of future war into a pledge of perpetual peace. Of course, it is not Germans that invaded France in 1792, for the sublime purpose of bayonetting the revolution of the 18th century. It is not Germans that befouled their hands by the subjugation of Italy, the oppression of Hungary, and the dismemberment of Poland. Their present military system, which divides the whole adult male population into two parts—one standing army on service, and another standing army on furlough, both equally bound in passive obedience to rulers by divine right—such a military system is, of course, a "material guarantee" for keeping the peace, and the ultimate goal of civilising tendencies! In Germany, as everywhere else, the sycophants of the powers that be poison the popular mind by the incense of mendacious self-praise.

Indignant as they pretend to be at the sight of French fortresses in Metz and Strasbourg, those German patriots see no harm in the vast system of Moscovite fortifications at Warsaw, Modlin, and

Ivangorod. While gloating at the terrors of imperialist invasion, they blink at the infamy of autocratic tutelage.

As in 1865 promises were exchanged between Louis Bonaparte and Bismarck, so in 1870 promises have been exchanged between Gorchakov and Bismarck.¹³¹ As Louis Bonaparte flattered himself that the war of 1866, resulting in the common exhaustion of Austria and Prussia, would make him the supreme arbiter of Germany, so Alexander flattered himself that the war of 1870, resulting in the common exhaustion of Germany and France, would make him the supreme arbiter of the Western Continent. As the Second Empire thought the North German Confederation incompatible with its existence, so autocratic Russia must think herself endangered by a German empire under Prussian leadership. Such is the law of the old political system. Within its pale the gain of one state is the loss of the other. The Czar's paramount influence over Europe roots in his traditional hold on Germany. At a moment when in Russia herself volcanic social agencies threaten to shake the very base of autocracy, could the Czar afford to bear with such a loss of foreign prestige? Already the Moscovite journals repeat the language of the Bonapartist journals after the war of 1866. Do the Teuton patriots really believe that liberty and peace^a will be guaranteed to Germany by forcing France into the arms of Russia? If the fortune of her arms, the arrogance of success, and dynastic intrigue lead Germany to a dismemberment of France, there will then only remain two courses open to her. She must at all risks become the *avowed* tool of Russian aggrandisement,^b or, after some short respite, make again ready for another "defensive" war, not one of those new-fangled "localised" wars, but a *war of races*—a war with the combined Slavonian and Roman races.^c

The German working class has resolutely supported the war, which it was not in their power to prevent, as a war for German independence and the liberation of France and Europe from that pestilential incubus, the Second Empire. It was the German workmen who, together with the rural labourers, furnished the sinews and muscles of heroic hosts, leaving behind their half-

^a The 1870 German edition has "independence" before the words "liberty and peace".—*Ed.*

^b The 1870 German edition has here: "a course which is in accord with the tradition of the Hohenzollerns".—*Ed.*

^c The German edition of 1870 contains the following sentence: "This is the prospect of peace which is 'guaranteed' by the brain-sick patriots of the German middle class."—*Ed.*

starved families. Decimated by the battles abroad, they will be once more decimated by misery at home.^a In their turn they are now coming forward to ask for "guarantees",—guarantees that their immense sacrifices have not been brought in vain, that they have conquered liberty, that the victory over the Imperialist armies will not, as in 1815, be turned into the defeat of the German people¹³²; and, as the first of these guarantees, they claim an *honourable peace for France*, and the *recognition of the French Republic*.

The Central Committee^b of the German Socialist-Democratic Workmen's Party issued, on the 5th of September, a manifesto, energetically insisting upon these guarantees.

"We," they say, "we protest against the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. And we are conscious of speaking in the name of the German working class. In the common interest of France and Germany, in the interest of peace and liberty, in the interest of Western civilisation against Eastern barbarism, the German workmen will not patiently tolerate the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine.... We shall faithfully stand by our fellow-workmen in all countries for the common international cause of the Proletariat!"^c

Unfortunately, we cannot feel sanguine of their immediate success. If the French workmen amidst peace failed to stop the aggressor, are the German workmen more likely to stop the victor amidst the clangour of arms? The German workmen's manifesto demands the extradition of Louis Bonaparte as a common felon to the French Republic. Their rulers are, on the contrary, already trying hard to restore him to the Tuileries as the best man to ruin France. However that may be, history will prove that the German working class are not made of the same malleable stuff as the German middle class. They will do their duty.

Like them, we hail the advent of the Republic in France, but at the same time we labour under misgivings which we hope will prove groundless. That Republic has not subverted the throne, but only taken its place become vacant.^d It has been proclaimed, not as a social conquest, but as a national measure of defence. It is in the

^a The 1870 German edition has: "And the patriotic clamourers will say, to comfort them, that capital has no native country and that wages are regulated by the *non-patriotic international law* of demand and supply. Is it, therefore, not the high time for the German working class to raise its voice and no longer allow the gentlemen of the middle class to speak *in its name*."—*Ed.*

^b In the 1870 German edition the word "central" is omitted.—*Ed.*

^c "Manifest des Ausschusses der sozial-demokratischen Arbeiterpartei. An alle deutschen Arbeiter! Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, 5. Sept. 1870", *Der Volksstaat*, No. 73, September 11, 1870.—*Ed.*

^d The 1870 German edition has: "its place made vacant by German bayonets".—*Ed.*

hands of a Provisional Government composed partly of notorious Orleanists, partly of middle-class Republicans, upon some of whom the insurrection of June, 1848,¹³³ has left its indelible stigma. The division of labour amongst the members of that Government looks awkward. The Orleanists have seized the strongholds of the army and the police, while to the professed Republicans have fallen the talking departments. Some of their first acts go far to show that they have inherited from the Empire, not only ruins, but also its dread of the working class. If eventual impossibilities are in wild phraseology demanded from the Republic, is it not with a view to prepare the cry for a "possible" government? Is the Republic, by some of its middle-class managers, not intended to serve as a mere stopgap and bridge over an Orleanist Restoration?

The French working class moves, therefore, under circumstances of extreme difficulty. Any attempt at upsetting the new Government in the present crisis, when the enemy is almost knocking at the doors of Paris, would be a desperate folly. The French workmen must perform their duties as citizens^a; but, at the same time, they must not allow themselves to be deluded by the national *souvenirs*^b of 1792, as the French peasants allowed themselves to be deluded by the national *souvenirs* of the First Empire. They have not to recapitulate the past, but to build up the future. Let them calmly and resolutely improve the opportunities of Republican liberty, for the work of their own class organisation. It will gift them with fresh Herculean powers for the regeneration of France, and our common task—the emancipation of labour. Upon their energies and wisdom hinges the fate of the Republic.

The English workmen have already taken measures to overcome, by a wholesome pressure from without, the reluctance of their Government to recognise the French Republic.¹³⁴ The present dilatoriness of the British Government is probably intended to atone for the Anti-Jacobin war and its former indecent haste in sanctioning the *coup d'état*.¹³⁵ The English workmen call also upon their Government to oppose by all its power the dismemberment of France, which part of the English press is shameless enough to howl for.^c It is the same press that for twenty years deified Louis Bonaparte as the providence of

^a The 1870 German edition has: "and they do it".—*Ed.*

^b Remembrances.—*Ed.*

^c The 1870 German edition has: "which part of the English press of course supports just as noisily as do the German patriots".—*Ed.*

Europe, that frantically cheered on the slaveholders' rebellion.¹³⁶ Now, as then, it drudges for the slaveholder.

Let the sections of the *International Working Men's Association* in every country stir the working classes to action. If they forsake their duty, if they remain passive, the present tremendous war will be but the harbinger of still deadlier international feuds, and lead in every nation to a renewed triumph over the workman by the lords of the sword, of the soil, and of capital.

Vive la République!

The General Council:

Robert Applegarth; Martin J. Boon; Fred. Bradnick; Caihil; John Hales; William Hales; George Harris; Fred. Lessner; Lopatin; B. Lucraft; George Milner; Thomas Mottershead; Charles Murray; George Odger; James Parnell; Pfänder; Rühl; Joseph Shepherd; Cowell Stepney; Stoll; Schmutz

Corresponding Secretaries:

<i>Eugène Dupont</i>for France	<i>Giovanni Bora</i> for Italy
<i>Karl Marx</i>for Germany	<i>Zévy Maurice</i> for Hungary
and Russia	<i>Anton Zabicki</i> for Poland
<i>A. Serrailier</i> for Belgium,	<i>James Cohen</i> for Denmark
Holland and Spain	<i>J. G. Eccarius</i> for the United
<i>Hermann Jung</i> ..for Switzerland	States

William Townshend, Chairman

John Weston, Treasurer

J. George Eccarius, General Secretary

Office: 256, High Holborn, London, W.C.,
September 9th, 1870

Written between September 6 and 9,
1870

Approved at the meeting of the General
Council on September 9, 1870

Published as a leaflet in English on
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and French in September-December 1870

Reproduced from the text of the
1870 English leaflet (second edi-
tion), verified with the text of the
1870 German edition

Karl Marx

[CONCERNING THE ARREST OF THE MEMBERS
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC WORKERS' PARTY]¹³⁷

The Central Committee of the German section of the "International Workmen's Association" resident at Brunswick issued on the 5th inst. a manifesto to the German working class, calling upon them to prevent the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, and to bring about an honourable peace with the French Republic.^a Not only has their manifesto been confiscated by the order of the commanding-general, Vogel von Falckenstein, but all the members of the committee, even the unfortunate printer of the document, were arrested and chained like common felons, and sent to Lötzen, in Eastern Prussia.

Written about September 14, 1870

Reproduced from *The Pall Mall Gazette*

Published in *The Pall Mall Gazette*,
No. 1744, September 15, 1870 and *The Echo*, September 15, 1870

^a "Manifest des Ausschusses der sozial-demokratischen Arbeiterpartei. An alle deutschen Arbeiter! Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, 5. Sept. 1870", *Der Volksstaat*, No. 73, September 11, 1870.—*Ed.*

L'INTERNATIONALE

ORGANE DES SECTIONS BELGES

DE L'ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DES TRAVAILLEURS.

PARAISANT LE SAMEDI.

Frederick Engels

TO THE SIXTH CONGRESS OF THE BELGIAN SECTIONS OF
THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION¹³⁸

London, December 23, 1870

Citizens!

The General Council of the International Working Men's Association extends its congratulations on your Sixth Congress. The very fact that this Congress is meeting proves once again that the Belgian proletariat is continuing without respite in its efforts to emancipate the working class, even while a murderous, fratricidal war is filling the whole of Europe with horror, displacing for the time being all other topics in the minds of the public.

With particular satisfaction we have seen the Belgian sections follow, with regard to this war, the line of action and proclaim the ideas prescribed by the interests of the proletariat of all countries: to repudiate any idea of conquest and to preserve the French Republic. Moreover, in this respect our Belgian friends are in perfect harmony with the workers of other countries.

Since the occupation of Rouen by the Prussians, our last remaining links with France have been temporarily severed. But in England, America and Germany the movement among the workers against the war of conquest and for the preservation of the French Republic has developed very rapidly. In Germany, particularly, this movement has grown to such an extent that the Prussian government has seen itself obliged, for the sake of its policy of conquest and reaction, to deal harshly with the workers. The Central Committee of German Socialist-Democracy, meeting in Brunswick, have been arrested, and many members of this party have suffered the same fate; finally two deputies of the North German Parliament, citizens Bebel and Liebknecht, who

represented there the views and interests of the working class, have been put behind bars. The International is accused of having given all these citizens the password for a vast revolutionary conspiracy; here we have, without a shadow of doubt, the second edition of the famous plot by the International in Paris, a plot which the Bonapartist police claimed to have discovered and which later went up in smoke in such a pitiful fashion.² Despite these persecutions the international workers' movement is advancing and gaining in strength all the time.

The current congress will provide you with the opportunity to ascertain the number of sections and other affiliated societies, as well as the membership of each of them, and so to get a precise idea of the progress being made by our movement in Belgium. We would like you to communicate to the General Council the result of these statistics on the state of our association in Belgium, statistics that we intend to complete for other countries as well. It goes without saying that we consider this communication to be confidential, and the facts that it will make known to us will not be made public.

Further, the General Council allows itself to hope that in the course of the year 1871 the Belgian sections will likewise feel able to recall the resolutions of the various international congresses regarding the remittances intended for it. The present war makes remittances from most of the continental countries out of the question, and we are well aware that the workers of Belgium are also affected by the general depression which is ensuing from this war; the General Council is also raising this question to remind the Belgian sections that without material support it is impossible for it to disseminate propaganda on the scale it would wish.

Owing to the absence of the secretary for Belgium, citizen Serrailier, the General Council has charged the undersigned with sending this communication to the congress.

Greetings and Fraternity,^a

Frederick Engels

Written on December 23, 1870 on the instruction of the General Council given at the meeting of December 20, 1870

First published, without the last three paragraphs, in *L'Internationale*, No. 103, January 1, 1871

Printed according to the newspaper, verified with the manuscript; the paragraphs omitted in the newspaper are printed according to the manuscript

Translated from the French

^a The newspaper has further: "For the General Council."—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

ON THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND
MEETINGS IN GERMANY

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE DAILY NEWS*

Sir,

In accusing the French Government of

"having rendered impossible the free expression of opinion in France through the medium of the press and of national representatives",^a

Bismarck did evidently but intend to crack a Berlin Witz.^b If you want to become acquainted with "true" French opinion please apply to Herr Stieber, the editor of the Versailles *Moniteur*, and the notorious Prussian police spy!

At Bismarck's express command Messrs. Bebel and Liebknecht have been arrested, on the charge of high treason, simply because they dared to fulfil their duties as German national representatives, viz., to protest in the Reichstag against the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, vote against new war subsidies, express their sympathy with the French Republic, and denounce the attempt at the conversion of Germany into one Prussian barrack.^c For the utterance of the same opinions the members of the Brunswick Socialist Democratic Committee have, since the beginning of last September, been treated like galley-slaves, and are still undergoing a mock prosecution for high treason. The same lot has befallen

^a O. Bismarck's despatch headlined "Versailles, den 9. Januar 1871", *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*, No. 15, January 14, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Joke.—*Ed.*

^c A. Bebel's speech in the Reichstag on November 26, 1870. *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages des Norddeutschen Bundes*. I. Legislatur-Periode. II. Ausserordentliche Session 1870. Berlin, 1870; W. Liebknecht's speech in the Reichstag on November 26, 1870, *ibid.*—*Ed.*

numerous workmen who propagated the Brunswick manifesto.^a On similar pretexts, Mr. Hepner, the sub-editor of the Leipzig *Volksstaat*, is prosecuted for high treason. The few independent German journals existing outside Prussia are forbidden admission into the Hohenzollern estates. German workmen's meetings in favour of a peace honourable for France are daily dispersed by the police. According to the official Prussian doctrine, as naively laid down by General Vogel von Falckenstein, every German "trying to counteract the prospective aims of the Prussian warfare in France", is guilty of high treason. If M. Gambetta and Co. were, like the Hohenzollern, forced to violently put down popular opinion, they would only have to apply the Prussian method, and, on the plea of war, proclaim throughout France the state of siege. The only French soldiers on German soil moulder in Prussian gaols. Still the Prussian Government feels itself bound to rigorously maintain the state of siege, that is to say, the crudest and most revolting form of military despotism, the suspension of all law. The French soil is infested by about a million of German invaders. Yet the French Government can safely dispense with that Prussian method of "rendering possible the free expression of opinion". Look at this picture and at that! Germany, however, has proved too petty a field for Bismarck's all-absorbing love of independent opinion. When the Luxemburgers gave vent to their sympathies with France, Bismarck made this expression of sentiment one of his pretexts for renouncing the London neutrality treaty.¹³⁹ When the Belgian press committed a similar sin, the Prussian ambassador at Brussels, Herr von Balan, invited the Belgian ministry to put down not only all anti-Prussian newspaper articles, but even the printing of mere news calculated to cheer on the French in their war of independence. A very modest request this, indeed, to suspend the Belgian Constitution, "pour le roi de Prusse!"^b No sooner had some Stockholm papers indulged in some mild jokes at the notorious "piety" of Wilhelm Annexander,^c than Bismarck came down on the Swedish cabinet with grim missives. Even under the meridian of St. Petersburg he contrived to spy too licentious a press. At his humble supplication, the editors of the principal Petersburg papers were summoned

^a "Manifest des Ausschusses der sozial-demokratischen Arbeiterpartei. An alle deutschen Arbeiter! Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, 5. September, 1870", *Der Volksstaat*, No. 73, September 11, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Literally: for the sake of Prussian King, and figuratively: for nothing.

^c A blend of the words "annexion" and "Alexander", an ironical comparison with Alexander of Macedon.—*Ed.*

before the Censor-in-Chief, who bid them beware of all strictures upon the feal Borussian vassal of the Czar. One of those editors, M. Saguljajew, was imprudent enough to emit the secret of this *avertissement* through the columns of the *Golos*. He was at once pounced upon by the Russian police, and bundled off to some remote province.^a It would be a mistake to believe that those gendarme proceedings are only due to the paroxysm of war fever. They are, on the contrary, the true methodical application of Prussian law principles. There exists in point of fact an odd proviso in the Prussian criminal code, by dint of which every foreigner, on account of his doings or writings in his own or any other foreign country, may be prosecuted for "insult against the Prussian King" and "high treason against Prussia"!^b France—and her cause is fortunately far from desperate—fights at this moment not only for her own national independence, but for the liberty of Germany and Europe.

I am, Sir, yours respectfully,

Karl Marx

London, January 16, 1871

First published in *The Daily News*,
January 19, 1871

Reproduced from the newspaper

^a Marx learned of this from a letter by the Russian revolutionary Lopatin, dated December 15, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b *Entwurf des Strafgesetzbuchs für die Preussischen Staaten, nach den Beschlüssen des Königlichen Staatsraths*, Berlin, 1843.—*Ed.*

Frederick Engels

TO THE SPANISH FEDERAL COUNCIL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S
ASSOCIATION^{a 140}

London, 13 February 1871

Citizens,

The General Council was very pleased to receive your letter of December 14. Your previous letter dated 30 July also reached us; it was passed to Citizen Serrailier,^b the Secretary for Spain, with the instruction to forward our answer to you. But soon Citizen Serrailier went to France to fight for the Republic, and then he was confined in Paris. If, therefore, you have not received any answer to your letter of 30 July, which is still in his hands, it is due to these circumstances. Now, the General Council, at its meeting of the 7th inst. has charged the undersigned F. E. to handle correspondence with Spain in the interim and has passed on your last letter to him.^c

In the meantime, we have been regularly receiving the Spanish workers' newspapers *La Federacion* from Barcelona, *La Solidaridad* from Madrid (until December 1870), *El Obrero* from Palma (until its suspension) and recently *La Revolucion social* from Palma (first issue only). These newspapers have kept us up-to-date with what is happening in Spain with regard to the labour movement; we have seen with much satisfaction that the ideas of social revolution are increasingly becoming the common property of the working class of your country.

Without doubt the empty rantings of the old political parties have, as you say, attracted too much popular attention, thus

^a The title is in Spanish.—*Ed.*

^b Serrailier informed the General Council of this at its meeting of August 9, 1870.—*Ed.*

^c The General Council took this decision at its meeting of January 31 and approved it at its meeting of February 7, 1871.—*Ed.*

constituting a major obstacle to our propaganda. This happened everywhere in the first years of the proletarian movement. In France, in England, in Germany the socialists had to, and still have to, combat the influence and the action of the old political parties, whether aristocratic or bourgeois, monarchist or even republican. Everywhere experience has shown that the best means of freeing the workers from this domination by the old parties is to found in each country a proletarian party with a political programme of its own, a political programme that is very clearly distinguished from those of the other parties since it must express the conditions for the emancipation of the working class. The details of this political programme might vary according to the special circumstances in each country; but the fundamental relations between labour and capital being everywhere the same, and the fact of political domination by the propertied classes over the exploited classes existing everywhere, the principles and the goal of the proletarian political programme will be identical, at least in all the western countries. The propertied classes, landed aristocracy and bourgeoisie, hold the working people in thralldom, not only by virtue of their wealth, by the simple exploitation of labour by capital, but also through the coercive power of the state, the army, the bureaucracy, the courts. To refrain from fighting our enemies in the political arena would be to abandon one of the most powerful means of action, and particularly of organisation and propaganda. Universal suffrage gives us an excellent means of action. In Germany the workers, strongly organised as a political party, have succeeded in sending six deputies to the self-styled national assembly; and the opposition which our friends Bebel and Liebknecht have been also able to put up against the war of conquest has had a more powerful effect on behalf of our international propaganda than years of propaganda by the press and by meetings would have had. In France, too, at this moment workers' representatives have just been elected and will proclaim out loud our principles to the national assembly. At the next elections the same thing will happen in England.

We are pleased to hear that you wish to send us the contributions from the branches in your country; we shall receive them with thanks. Please send them in the form of a banker's draft drawn on a bank here in London, payable to John Weston, our treasurer, by registered letter to the undersigned either at 256 High Holborn, London (seat of our Council) or to his home address 122 R.P.R.^a

^a Regent's Park Road.—Ed.

We wait with great interest the statistics of your federation which you promise to send us.

As for the Congress of the International, it is pointless to think about it as long as the present war continues. But if, as seems likely, peace is soon restored, the Council will take up this important matter straightaway and will consider your kind invitation to hold it in Barcelona.

We have no sections yet in Portugal; perhaps it would be easier for you than for us to open relations with the workers of that country. If this is so, would you please write to us again on this matter. Likewise, we believe that it would be best, to begin with at any rate, if you yourselves will make contact with the typesetters of Buenos Aires, provided you let us know later on what results have been achieved. Meanwhile, you would render us a kind service and further the cause by sending us a copy of *Anales de la Sociedad tipografica de Buenos Aires* for our information.

For the rest, the international movement continues to make progress despite all obstacles. In England the central Trades' Councils^a of Birmingham and Manchester, and through them the workers of the two most important manufacturing cities in the country, have just affiliated direct to our Association. In Germany we are currently suffering the same persecution at the hands of the governments there as Louis Bonaparte subjected us to in France a year ago. Our German friends, more than fifty of whom are in prison, are literally suffering for the international cause; they have been arrested and persecuted because they opposed the policy of conquest with all their strength and because they demanded that the German people should fraternise with the French people. In Austria many of our friends have been imprisoned but the movement is making progress nevertheless. Everywhere in France our sections have been the life and soul of the resistance against the invasion. They have seized local power in the big cities of the South, and if Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux and Toulouse have evinced an energy unknown elsewhere, it was thanks to the efforts of the Internationals. In Belgium we are well organised; our Belgian sections have just celebrated their sixth regional Congress. In Switzerland the differences which had arisen between our sections some time ago seem to be sorting themselves out. From America we have received the membership of new French, German and Czech (Bohemian) sections, and, as regards

^a Engels gives the English name "Trades' Councils" in parentheses, after the French one.—*Ed.*

the others, we continue to maintain fraternal relations with the great organisation of American workers, the Labor League.^{a 141}

Hoping to receive more news from you soon, we send you our fraternal greetings.

For the General Council of the
International Working Men's Association

F.E.

Written on February 13, 1871 by the
General Council's decision of January 31,
1871

Printed according to the manuscript
Translated from the French

First published in: Marx and Engels,
Works, First Russian Edition, Vol. XXVI,
1935

^a Engels gives the English name "The Labor League" in parentheses, after the French one.—*Ed.*

Frederick Engels

THE ASPECT OF AFFAIRS IN RUSSIA ¹⁴²

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE PALL MALL GAZETTE*^a

Sir,—

The English Government declare that they know nothing of an alliance between Russia and Prussia.^b In Germany nobody disputes the existence of such an alliance; on the contrary, the pro-Prussian press exults in the fact, the anti-Prussian papers are indignant at it. One of the latter, the *Volksstaat*, thinks that Mr. Gladstone merely intended to insinuate by his denegations that this was not a treaty of alliance, but rather of vassalage,^c and that in this case he would be in the right. Indeed, the telegrams exchanged between Versailles and St. Petersburg, between "Yours till death, William," and his more reserved nephew Alexander, leave no longer any room for doubt as to the relations existing between what are now the two great military monarchies of the Continent. These telegrams, by the way, were first published in the *Journal de St. Pétersbourg*^d; and what is quite as significant is the fact that they have not been reprinted in their full tenor in the German press, the Emperor William's assurance of devotion till death being especially suppressed. At all events, the full context of the correspondence cannot leave a doubt that the Emperor William means to express the deep sense of the obligation under which he

^a F. Greenwood.—*Ed.*

^b The reference is to the speech of W. E. Gladstone in the House of Commons on March 7, 1871 published in *The Times*, No. 27005, March 8, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c "Politische Uebersicht", *Der Volksstaat*, No. 21, March 11, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d William I's telegram to the Emperor Alexander II datelined "Versailles, 26 février, 2 heures 7 m.", *Journal de St.-Pétersbourg*, No. 37, February 17 (March 1), 1871; Alexander II's telegram to William I datelined "Pétersbourg, 15 (27) février 1871", *Journal de St.-Pétersbourg* (same issue).—*Ed.*

considers himself to be towards Russia, and his readiness to place his services in return at Russia's disposal. The Emperor being past seventy, and his presumptive heir's^a sentiments being doubtful, there is certainly a strong incentive for Russia to strike the iron while it is hot.

Moreover, the internal situation in Russia is far from satisfactory. The finances are almost helplessly deranged; the peculiar form in which the emancipation of the serfs and the other social and political changes connected with it have been carried out has disturbed agricultural production to an almost incredible degree. The half-measures of a liberal character which in turn have been accorded, retracted, and again accorded, have given to the educated classes just elbow-room enough to develop a distinct public opinion; and that public opinion is upon all points opposed to the foreign policy the present Government have hitherto appeared to follow. Public opinion in Russia is essentially and violently Panslavist—that is to say, antagonistic to the three great “oppressors” of the Slavonic race: the Germans, the Hungarians, and the Turks. A Prussian alliance is as distasteful to it as would be an Austrian or a Turkish alliance. It demands, besides, immediate warlike action, in a Panslavist sense. The quiet, slow, but eminently safe underground action of Russian traditional diplomacy sorely tries its patience. Such successes as were obtained at the Conference,¹⁴³ important though they be in themselves, are as nought to the Russian Panslavists. They hear nothing but the “cry of anguish” of their oppressed brethren in race; they feel nothing more intensely than the necessity of restoring the lost supremacy of holy Russia by a grand coup, a war of conquest. They know, moreover, that the Heir Presumptive^b is one of them. All this considered, and the grand strategic railway lines towards the south and south-west having now been completed far enough to serve efficiently for purposes of attack against Austria or Turkey, or both, is there not a strong inducement for the Russian Government and for the Emperor Alexander personally to apply the old Bonapartist means, and to stave off internal difficulties by a foreign war while the Prussian alliance appears still safe?

Under such circumstances the new Russian loan of twelve millions sterling obtains a very peculiar significance. It is true, a patriotic protest has been circulated at the Stock Exchange—it is stated to have been without signatures, and appears to have

^a Frederick William.—*Ed.*

^b Alexander, the future Emperor Alexander III.—*Ed.*

remained so—and we are told that the amount of the loan has been more than covered. What purposes, among others, these twelve millions are to be used for we are informed by the *Ostsee Zeitung*, of Stettin, a paper which for many years not only has had the very best information about Russian affairs, but which also has had the independence to publish it. The Franco-German war, says the Petersburg correspondent of this paper (under date of March 4, new style), has convinced the Russian military authorities of the total inefficiency of the system of fortification hitherto followed in the construction of the Russian fortresses, and the Ministry of War has already settled the plan for the necessary alterations.

“It is reported that the new system, based upon the introduction of detached forts, is to be applied, in the first instance, to the more important frontier fortresses, the reconstruction of which is to be commenced forthwith. The first fortresses which are to be provided with detached forts are Brest-Litowski, Demblin, and Modlin.”

Now, Brest-Litowski, Demblin (or Iwangorod), and Modlin (or Nowo-Georgiewsk, by its official Russian name), are exactly the three fortresses which, with Warsaw as a central point, command the greater portion of the kingdom of Poland; and Warsaw does not receive any detached forts now, for the very good reason that it has had them for many a year past. Russia, then, loses no time in fastening her hold upon Poland, and in strengthening her base of operations against Austria, and the hurry with which this is done is of no good augury for the peace of Europe.

All this may still be called purely defensive armament. But the correspondent in question has not done yet:—

“The warlike preparations in Russia, which were commenced at the outbreak of the Franco-German war, are continued with unabated zeal. Lately the Ministry of War has ordered the formation of the fourth battalions. The execution of this order has already begun with all regiments, those in the kingdom of Poland included. The detachments set apart for the railway and telegraph service in the field, as well as the sanitary companies, have already been organized. The men are actively instructed and drilled in their various duties, and the sanitary companies are even taught how to apply the first bandages to wounded, how to stop bleeding, and how to bring round men who have fainted.”

Now in almost every great continental army the regiments of infantry consist, on the peace footing, of three battalions, and the first unmistakable step from the peace-footing to the war-footing is the formation of the fourth battalions. On the day Louis Napoleon declared war, he also ordered the formation of the fourth battalions.^a In Prussia, their formation is the very first thing

^a The reference is to the order on the formation of the fourth battalions of July 14, 1870, reported in *Le Temps*, No. 3427, July 17, 1870.—Ed.

done after the receipt of the order for mobilization.^a In Austria it is the same, and so it is in Russia. Whatever may be thought of the suddenly revealed necessity of detached forts for the Polish fortresses, or of the equally sudden *empressement*^b to introduce into the Russian service the Prussian *Krankenträger*^c and railway and telegraph detachments (in a country where both railways and telegraphs are rather scarce)—here, in the formation of the fourth battalions, we have an unmistakable sign that Russia has actually passed the line which divides the peace footing from the war footing. Nobody can imagine that Russia has taken this step without a purpose; and if this step means anything, it means attack against somebody. Perhaps that explains what the twelve millions sterling are wanted for.—

Yours, &c.,
E.

Written about March 15, 1871
First published in *The Pall Mall Gazette*,
No. 1900, March 16, 1871

Reproduced from the newspaper

^a The reference is to the order on mobilisation of July 16, 1870, reported in *The Times*, No. 26805, July 18, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Zeal.—*Ed.*

^c Stretcher-bearer.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels
TO THE EDITOR OF *THE TIMES*^{a 144}

Sir,

In your impression of the 16th March your Paris correspondent states:

"Karl Marx...has written a letter to one of his principal affiliés in Paris, stating that he is not satisfied with the attitude which the members of that society (the "International") have taken up in that city etc."^b

This statement your correspondent has evidently taken from the *Paris-Journal* of the 14th March where also the publication, in full, of the pretended letter^c is promised. The *Paris-Journal* of the 19th March does indeed contain a letter dated London, 28th February 1871^d and purporting to be signed by me, the contents of which agree with the statement of your correspondent. I now beg to declare that this letter is, from beginning to end, an impudent forgery.

Drafted by F. Engels on March 21, 1871

Reproduced from Engels' draft

First published in *The Times*, No. 27017,
March 22, 1871 as an item on Marx's letter

^a J. T. Delane.—*Ed.*

^b "The State of Paris", *The Times*, No. 27012. March 16, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c "Le Grand Chef de l'Internationale", *Paris-Journal*, No. 71, March 14, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d "Lettre du Grand Chef de l'Internationale", *Paris-Journal*, No. 76, March 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

[STATEMENT BY THE GENERAL COUNCIL TO THE
EDITOR OF
THE TIMES AND OTHER PAPERS]¹⁴⁵

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE TIMES*

Sir,—

I am directed by the General Council of the International Working Men's Association to solicit your favour to publish the following in the columns of your journal:—

A statement has gone the round of the English press that the Paris members of the International Working Men's Association had in so far joined the so-called Anti-German League¹⁴⁶ as to declare all Germans to be henceforth excluded from our association.^a

This statement is the very reverse of fact. Neither the Federal Council of our association in Paris, nor any of the Paris sections represented by that council, have ever passed any such resolution. The so-called Anti-German League, as far as it exists at all, is the exclusive work of the upper and middle classes: it was started by the Jockey Club,¹⁴⁷ and kept up by the adhesions of the Academy, of the Stock Exchange, of some bankers and manufacturers, etc. The working-classes have nothing whatever to do with it.

The object of these calumnies is evident. A short time before the outbreak of the late war the International was made the general scapegoat for all untoward events. This is now repeated over again. While the Swiss and the Prussian press accuses it of having created the late outrages upon Germans in Zurich,¹⁴⁸ French papers, such as the *Courrier de Lyon*, *Courrier de la Gironde*, *La Liberté*, etc., tell of certain secret meetings of Internationals

^a This statement entitled "Les scrupules de l'Internationale" was first published in *Paris-Journal*, No. 67, March 10, 1871.—*Ed.*

having been held at Geneva and Berne, the Prussian Ambassador in the chair, in which meetings a plan was concocted to hand over Lyons to the united Prussians and Internationals for the sake of common plunder.^a

Yours respectfully,

J. George Eccarius,
General Secretary of the
International Working Men's Association

256, High Holborn, March 22

Written on March 21, 1871

Approved at the meeting of the General Council on March 21, 1871^b

Reproduced from *The Times*, verified with the General Council's Minute Book

Published in *The Times*, No. 27018, March 23, 1871, in *The Eastern Post*, No. 130, March 25, 1871 and in other press organs of the International

^a "On lit dans le Courrier de Lyon...", *Courrier de la Gironde*, March 14, 1871; "On lit dans le Courrier de Lyon...", *Courrier de la Gironde*, March 16, 1871; "Chronique des Départements", *La Liberté*, March 18, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Before its despatch to the Editor of *The Times*, the statement was datelined March 22.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARDS
OF THE *VOLKSSTAAT* AND THE *ZUKUNFT*¹⁴⁹

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE *VOLKSSTAAT*

The *Paris-Journal*, one of the most successful organs of the Paris police press, published an article in its March 14 issue, under the sensational heading "Le Grand Chef de l'Internationale"^a ("Grand Chef" is probably the French translation of Stieber's "Haupt-Chef"¹⁵⁰).

"He," begins the article, "is, as everyone knows, a German, what is even worse, a Prussian. He calls himself Karl Marx, lives in *Berlin*," etc. "Well now. This Karl Marx is displeased with the behaviour of the French members of the *International*. This in itself shows what he is like. He finds that they continually spend too much time dealing with politics and not enough with social questions. This is his opinion, he has formulated it quite categorically in a letter to his brother and friend, Citizen *Servailier*, one of the Paris high priests of the *International*. Marx begs the French members, especially those affiliated to the Paris association, not to lose sight of the fact that their association has a single goal: to organise the work and the future of the workers' societies. But people are disorganising the work rather than organising it, and he believes that the offenders must be reminded again of the association's rules. We declare that we are in a position to publish this remarkable letter from Mr. Karl Marx as soon as it is passed on to the members of the *International*."

In its issue of March 19, the *Paris-Journal* does indeed have a letter allegedly signed by me^b which was immediately reprinted by the whole of the reactionary press in Paris and then found its way into the London papers. In the meantime, however, the *Paris-Journal* has got wind of the fact that I live in *London* and not in *Berlin*. Therefore, it has marked the letter as coming from London this time, in contradiction to its first announcement. This

^a "Le Grand Chef de l'Internationale", *Paris-Journal*, No. 71, March 14, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Lettre du Grand Chef de l'Internationale", *Paris-Journal*, No. 76, March 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

additional correction suffers, however, from the nuisance that my friend *Serraillier*, who is in London, and myself had to correspond with each other in a roundabout way via Paris. The letter, as I have already explained in *The Times*,^a is a brazen *fake* from beginning to end.

That same *Paris-Journal* and other organs of Paris's "good Press" are spreading the rumour that the Federal Council of the *International* in Paris has taken the decision, which is not within its competence, to expel the Germans from the International Working Men's Association.^b The London dailies hastily grabbed the welcome news and published it in malicious instigating leaders about the suicide of the *International* at long last. Unfortunately, today *The Times* contains the following announcement by the *General Council of the International Working Men's Association*:^c

"A communication according to which the Paris members of the International Working Men's Association declared that all Germans were to be expelled from the *International*, thereby behaving in the manner of the *Anti-German League*, is doing the rounds in the English press. The communication stands in absolutely glaring contradiction to the facts. Neither the Federal Council of our association in Paris nor any of the Paris sections that it represents have ever dreamed of taking such a decision. The so-called Anti-German League, in so far as it exists at all, is exclusively the work of the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. It was brought to life by the Jockey Club and kept going with the consent of the Academy, the Stock Exchange, some of the bankers and factory owners, and so forth. The working class has never had anything to do with it.

"The purpose of this calumny is immediately obvious. Shortly before the recent war broke out, the *International* had to be the scapegoat for all the unpopular events. The same tactics are now being repeated. While Swiss and Prussian papers, e.g., are denouncing it as the originator of the injustices against the Germans in Zürich, the French papers, like the *Courrier de Lyon*, the *Courrier de la Gironde*, the *Paris Liberté* and so forth, are simultaneously reporting on certain secret meetings of the *Internationals* in Geneva and Berne, under the chairmanship of the Prussian ambassador, at which the plan is to be devised of handing

^a See this volume, p. 285.—*Ed.*

^b "Les scrupules de l'Internationale", *Paris-Journal*, No. 67, March 10, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c See this volume, pp. 286-87.—*Ed.*

over *Lyon* to the united Prussians and the Internationals for the purpose of jointly plundering it.”

So much for the statement of the General Council. It is quite natural that the important dignitaries and the ruling classes of the old society who can only maintain their own power and the exploitation of the productive masses of the people by *national* conflicts and antagonisms, recognise their common adversary in the *International Working Men's Association*. *All and any* means are good to destroy it.

London, March 23, 1871

Karl Marx

Secretary of the General Council of the
International Working Men's Association
for Germany

Published in the newspapers *Der Volksstaat*, No. 26, March 29, 1871, *Die Zukunft*, No. 73, March 26, 1871, *L'Egalité* (in an abbreviated form), No. 6, March 31, 1871, and in the magazine *Der Vorbote*, No. 4, April 23, 1871

Printed according to *Der Volksstaat*

Karl Marx

[TO THE EDITOR OF *DE WERKER*]¹⁵¹

London, March 31, 1871

Citizen,

My so-called letter addressed to the Paris members of the International is quite simply, as I have already stated in *The Times* of the 22nd March,^a a fabrication by the *Paris-Journal*,^b one of these disreputable papers spawned in the imperialist gutter. Moreover, all the organs of the "good press" throughout Europe have, so it seems, received the order to employ *falsification* as their major weapon of war against the *International*. In the eyes of these honest advocates of religion, order, the family and property the crime of *falsification* is not even a peccadillo.

Greetings and Fraternity,

Karl Marx

First published in the newspaper
De Werker, No. 23, April 8, 1871

Printed according to the manu-
script, verified with the newspaper

Translated from the French

Published in English for the first
time

^a See this volume, p. 285.—*Ed.*

^b "Lettre du Grand Chef de l'Internationale", *Paris-Journal*, No. 76, March 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx
TO THE EDITOR OF *THE TIMES*¹⁵²

Sir,—

Will you allow me to again intrude upon your columns in order to contradict widely-spread falsehoods?

A Lombard telegram, dated Paris, March 30, contains an extract from the *Gaulois*^a which, under the sensational heading, "Alleged Organization of the Paris Revolution in London," has adorned the London papers of Saturday last.^b Having during the late war successfully rivalled the *Figaro* and the *Paris-Journal* in the concoction of Munchausiades that made the Paris *petite presse*^c a byword all over the world, the *Gaulois* seems more than ever convinced that the news-reading public will always cling to the tenet, "*Credo quia absurdum est.*"^d Baron Munchausen himself, would he have undertaken to organize at London "in the early part of February," when M. Thiers did not yet hold any official post, "the insurrection of the 18th of March," called into life by the attempt of the same M. Thiers to disarm the Paris National Guard? Not content to send MM. Assi and Blanqui on an imaginary voyage to London, there to conspire with myself in secret conclave, the *Gaulois* adds to that conclave two imaginary persons—one "Bentini, general agent for Italy," and one "Dermott, general agent for England." It also graciously confirms the

^a "The 'Internationale' and the Commune", *The Times*, No. 27027, April 3, 1871; "C'est paraît-il, à Londres...", *Le Gaulois*, No. 997, March 31, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b See e. g. "Alleged Organization of the Paris Revolution in London", *The Daily News*, No. 7776, April 1, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Yellow press.—*Ed.*

^d "I believe because it is impossible" (Tertullian, *De carne Christi* 5, 4).—*Ed.*

dignity of "supreme chief of the *Internationale*," first bestowed upon me by the *Paris-Journal*.^a These two worthies notwithstanding, the General Council of the International Working Men's Association will, I am afraid, continue to transact its business without the incumbrance of either "chief" or "president."

I have the honour to be, Sir, your obediently,

Karl Marx

London, April 3

First published in *The Times*, No. 27028,
April 4, 1871 and *The Daily News*,
No. 7780, April 6, 1871

Reproduced from *The Times*

^a See "Le Grand Chef de l'Internationale", *Paris-Journal*, No. 71, March 14, 1871.—*Ed.*

Frederick Engels

[ON THE CIGAR-WORKERS' STRIKE IN ANTWERP]¹⁵³

In *Antwerp* 500 *cigar-workers* are out of work. The manufacturers gave them the choice: either to dissolve their trade union (which belongs to the International Working Men's Association) or to be dismissed. Every one of them without exception decisively rejected this unreasonable demand, and so the manufacturers closed their workshops.

The workers have funds of 6,000 Fr. (1,600 Talers); they have already established contact with the cigar-workers of Holland and England and any influx of workers from these countries is being prevented. From England they are to receive fairly considerable financial aid. £176 (1,200 Talers) has already been sent, and further assistance will be provided. Anyway, the Antwerpers are only asking for an *advance*, since they say they are in a position to pay back any aid which they are given. If the German cigar-workers or any other trade unions are in a position to offer assistance to their brothers in Antwerp, it is to be hoped that they will not hold back. Remittances should be made to Ph. Coenen, Boomgaardsstraat 3, Antwerp. But, at any rate, it is their duty to stop German cigar-workers moving to Antwerp as long as the manufacturers there insist on their demands.

Written on April 5, 1871

First published in *Der Volksstaat*, No. 30,
April 12, 1871

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time

Frederick Engels

[OUTLINE OF AN APPEAL OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL TO THE WEAVERS' AND SPINNERS' TRADE UNIONS OF MANCHESTER FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE SPANISH TEXTILE WORKERS' STRIKE] ¹⁵⁴

Messrs Batlló Brothers, Barcelona, own a large Cotton spinning and weaving concern and employ about 900 workpeople. Not only do they pay, by far, worse wages than any other firm in the trade, but they have also continually attempted to reduce wages still more by superseding men by women and grown up people by children. Lately, they have without exception discharged all such hands as were suspected of belonging to the Trades' Union of the United Carders, Spinners and Weavers. On the 26th February a large meeting was held by the members of this Union to consider the state of things in Messrs Batlló's works. A new list of wages was unanimously adopted which, although establishing a slight rise upon the prices hitherto paid, was still very much below the very lowest rates paid by others; and a deputation was appointed to demand the adoption of this list and in case of this being refused, the people employed at the mill were to strike work.

The deputation was not even received, Messrs B. refusing to receive any but a deputation from their own workmen. This fresh deputation submitted the new list of prices but met with a flat refusal. The whole of the workpeople at once struck, with the exception of about 25, most of whom have since joined the strike. This took place on the 27th February, and consequently, the hands have now been on strike for nearly nine weeks, and the funds at the disposal of the Union are beginning to run slow. The remaining branches of the International in Spain are doing their best to collect money for them, but they have just now a good many strikes to support. Not to mention minor affairs, the coopers of Santander and the Tanners of Valencia are on strike because

their masters insist upon their giving up their Trades' Unions as well as the International; and thus, there are altogether some 1500 men out at present in Spain whom the various branches of the International there have to support.

Barcelona and neighbourhood are the South Lancashire of Spain, there are large and numerous Cotton Spinning and Weaving establishments there and the greater part of the population of this district lives upon the Cotton Trade. They have lately suffered much from the competition of English yarns and it would make a particularly good impression in Spain if the Lancashire Cotton Trade could do something in favour of the Cotton Spinners and Powerloom Weavers of Spain. The active and intimate commercial relation between the different countries of the world have led to this that every event affecting society in one country necessarily produces its effects upon all other countries; and it would not at all be astonishing if a general reduction of wages in the Spanish Cotton Trade (such as appears inevitable if this strike be unsuccessful) should in the long run contribute to keep wages low in South Lancashire also.

First published in: Marx and Engels,
Works, First Russian Edition, Vol. XXVI,
1935

Reproduced from the manuscript

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

[RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL EXPELLING HENRI LOUIS TOLAIN FROM THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION]¹⁵⁵

The General Council of the I.W.M.A.

Considering the resolution of the Federal Council of the Paris Sections expelling Citizen Tolain from the Association^a because, after having been elected to the National Assembly as a representative of the Working Classes, he has deserted their cause in the most disgraceful manner; which resolution the General Council is called upon to confirm;

Considering that the place of every French member of the I.W.M.A. is undoubtedly on the side of the Commune of Paris and not in the usurpatory and counter-revolutionary Assembly of Versailles;

Confirms the resolution of the Paris Federal Council and declares that Citizen Tolain is expelled from the I.W.M.A.

The General Council was prevented from taking action in this matter sooner by the fact that the above resolution of the Paris Federal Council was laid before them, in an authentic shape, on the 25th April only.

Written between April 22 and 25, 1871

Approved at the meeting of the General Council on April 25, 1871

Reproduced from the manuscript,
verified with the newspapers

Published in the newspapers *The Eastern Post*, No. 135, April 29, 1871; *L'Internationale*, No. 122, May 14, 1871; *Der Volksstaat*, No. 42, May 24, 1871 and *Vorbote*, No. 7, July 1871

^a [Resolution of the Federal Council of the Paris Sections of the I.W.M.A. expelling Tolain] *La Révolution politique et sociale*, No. 3, April 16, 1871.—Ed.

Frederick Engels

ONCE AGAIN "HERR VOGT"¹⁵⁶

Ever since the Augsburg Campaign of 1859 had brought him such a sound drubbing,¹⁵⁷ Herr Vogt appeared to have had his fill of politics. He put all his energy into the natural sciences where he already had, in his own words, such "astounding" discoveries to his credit. Thus, at the same time as Küchenmeister and Leuckart had described the immensely complex evolution of the intestinal worm and thereby made a really great advance in science, he had made the astounding discovery that intestinal worms fall into two classes: round-worms, which are round, and flat-worms, which are flat. Now he has made an even greater discovery beside the first one. The discovery of large numbers of fossilised human bones from pre-historic times had started a fashion for the comparative study of the skulls of different human races. Skulls were measured from every conceivable angle, the measurements were compared, they were discussed, but no conclusion was reached until Vogt, confident of victory as ever, announced the solution to the riddle: all human skulls fall into two classes, namely those which are long (dolichocephalic) and those which are rounded (brachycephalic). What the most scrupulous and diligent observers had not achieved in the course of laborious studies over a period of years, was solved by Vogt by dint of the simple application of his worm principle. If, in addition to these astounding discoveries, we also mention the discovery of a new species in the realm of political zoology, the discovery namely of the Brimstone Gang,¹⁵⁸ even the least modest person would have to allow that Vogt had done as much as could be done in a lifetime.

But the great spirit of our Vogt was still restless. Politics retained its irresistible charm for the man who had already achieved so much in the ale-houses. The wounds from the drubbing of Anno^a sixty had by now happily healed; Marx's *Herr Vogt*^b was no longer obtainable in the book shops, and all the rotten scandals were long since dead and buried. Our Vogt had undertaken lecture tours and received the plaudits of the German philistines, had swaggered around at every scientific conference, at all ethnographic and antiquarian congresses, forcing his company on the true giants of science. Consequently, he could again think himself "respectable" after a fashion, and believe himself called upon to coach the German philistines, whom he had coached in scientific matters, in political affairs as well. Great events were underway: Napoléon le Petit¹⁵⁹ had capitulated at Sedan, the Prussians were at the gates of Paris, Bismarck was demanding Alsace and Lorraine. It was high time for Vogt to make his weighty contribution.

This contribution was called: *Carl Vogt's Political Letters to Friedrich Kolb*, Biel, 1870. It consisted of twelve letters that first appeared in the Vienna *Tages-Presse* and were reprinted in Vogt's *Moniteur*, the Biel *Handels-Courier*.¹⁶⁰ Vogt came out against the annexation and against the Prussianization of Germany, and he was furious that in these views he was simply following in the footsteps of the hated Social-Democrats, i.e. the Brimstone Gang. There is no need to go into the general content of the pamphlet, since Vogt's opinion on such matters is quite immaterial. Moreover, the arguments he adduces are just those of the most banal beer-swilling philistines with their political claptrap, except that on this occasion Vogt reflects the views of the Swiss rather than the German philistines. What interests us is solely the agreeable personality of Herr Vogt himself as it winds its way through its various phases and transformations.

So, we take Vogt's little pamphlet and compare it with that other unfortunate product of his pen, the *Studies on the Present Situation in Europe* of 1859,¹⁶¹ the after-effects of which had caused him so much distress for so long. Here we find that for all the intellectual affinity between the two, for quite the same slovenliness of his style—on page 10 Vogt reaches his "views with his own ears", and ears like that must indeed be quite remarkable^c—we find that Herr Vogt today maintains the exact opposite of what he preached

^a In the year.—*Ed.*

^b See present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 21-329.—*Ed.*

^c A pun: "eigene" means "one's own" and also "remarkable".—*Ed.*

eleven years ago. The *Studies* were intended to persuade the German philistine that Germany had no interest in intervening in the war that Louis Bonaparte planned against Austria at that time. To this end, Louis Bonaparte had to be represented as a "Man Appointed by Destiny", who was to liberate peoples, and had to be defended against the current attacks from Republican quarters and even from various bourgeois liberals. And the would-be Republican Vogt allows himself to descend to this—admittedly with an extremely bitter-sweet expression and not without people seeing how much it pained him, but he did so, nevertheless. Malicious tongues and members of the Brimstone Gang wanted to maintain that the good Vogt only submitted to all these belly-aches and grimaces in return for what the English call a CONSIDERATION, i.e. hard cash, from the Bonapartist camp. And indeed all manner of suspicious things had occurred. Vogt had made offers of money to various people on condition that they would support his views in the press, i.e. that they would praise Louis Bonaparte's liberationist intentions.^a Herr Brass whose virtue is well known to be above suspicion ever since he took over the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, publicly spurned the "French feeding-trough Vogt wished to put before him".^b But we prefer to say no more about these disagreeable matters and instead surmise that Vogt's belly-aches and grimaces were his by nature. Now, in the meantime, the disaster of Sedan⁴⁹ had taken place and with it everything has changed for Herr Vogt. The French liberator emperor himself is now treated with a certain reserve, and all that we learn about him is that

"the revolution was at his heels. Even without the war the Empire would not have seen the New Year of 1871 at the Tuileries" (p. 1).

But his wife! Just listen:

"Of course, if Eugénie had been victorious (for this uneducated Spanish woman who cannot even spell correctly, stands, or rather stood in the field with an entire dragon's tail of fanatical priests and peasants behind her), if Eugénie had been victorious, the situation would for a moment have become even more terrible" than after the Prussian victories, etc.

So, what it amounts to is this: when the French defeated the Austrians in 1859,¹⁸ it was Bonaparte the liberator who conquered; if they had been victorious over the Prussians in 1870, it would

^a C. Vogt, *Mein Prozess gegen die Allgemeine Zeitung. Stenographischer Bericht, Dokumente und Erläuterungen*, Geneva, 1859.—Ed.

^b "Neues aus Kantonen", *Neue Schweizer Zeitung*, No. 11, November 12, 1859.—Ed.

have been uneducated Eugénie with her dragon's tail who was victorious. The progress can be seen.

An even worse fate is in store for the dragon's tail of Louis Bonaparte, for it turns out now that he has one, too. Already on p. 4 we find a reference to his "terrible squandering of the resources of the Empire", and on p. 16, to the "rabble that stood at the head of the Imperial army and administration". This squandering and this rabble were already fully apparent in 1859 and long before. Vogt, who overlooked them at the time, now sees them quite clearly. Further progress. But even this is not sufficient. Even though Vogt does not exactly abuse his erstwhile liberator, he still cannot refrain from quoting from a letter by a French scholar who writes:

"If you have any influence at all, try to save us from the worst disgrace of all—*celle de ramener l'infâme*" (that of bringing the *infamous* one. Louis Bonaparte, back). "Rather Henri V, the Orléans, a Hohenzollern, anyone rather than this crowned *Traupmann*¹⁶² who contaminates everything he touches" (p. 13).

For all that, however bad the Ex-Emperor and his uneducated spouse with their respective dragon's tails might be, Vogt consoles us that at least one member of the family is an exception: Prince Napoleon, better known by the name of Plon-Plon. Of him Vogt says on p. 33 that Plon-Plon himself told Vogt that "he would have no respect for the South Germans if they were to act otherwise" (i.e. if they did not join in the war against the French); that he was also convinced that the war would end in failure and had made no secret of it. So, who would venture to accuse Vogt of ingratitude? Is it not touching to see how the "republican" extends a fraternal hand to the "Prince" even in misfortune, and writes him a reference to which the latter may appeal when the great competition opens to find a replacement for the "infamous one"?

In the *Studies* Russia and Russian politics are commended throughout. Since the abolition of serfdom the Russian Empire has been "an ally of the liberation movement rather than its opponent"; Poland is well on the way to merging with Russia (as was demonstrated by the uprising of 1863!), and Vogt thinks it perfectly natural that Russia should

"form the strong point around which the Slav nations strive increasingly to unite".

And the fact that at that time, in 1859, Russian policies and those of Louis Napoleon went hand in hand, was, of course, a great virtue in Vogt's eyes. Now, however, all is changed—we now

hear:

"I do not doubt for a moment that a conflict between the Slav and the Germanic world is imminent ... and that Russia will assume the leadership of one side in it" (pp. 30, 31).

And he goes on to argue that, after the annexation of Alsace, France will immediately take the side of the Slavs in this conflict, and will even do everything possible to hasten the breaking out of the conflict in order to regain Alsace. Thus, the same Franco-Russian alliance that had been deemed a piece of good fortune for Germany in 1859 is now held out as a bugbear and nightmare. But Vogt knows his German philistine. He knows he can say anything to him and even contradict himself a dozen times over. But we can't help asking ourselves how Vogt could have had the effrontery eleven years previously to praise to the skies an alliance between Russia and Bonapartist France as the best guarantee of the free development of Germany and Europe?

And as for Prussia! In the *Studies* Prussia is clearly given to understand that she should lend in direct support to Louis Napoleon's plans against Austria and confine herself to the defence of the territory of the German Confederation, and then "she would receive her reward at the subsequent peace negotiations in the form of concessions in the North German plains". The frontiers of the later North German Confederation⁹—the Erzgebirge, the Main and the sea—were already being held out to Prussia as bait even at this time. And in the Postscript to the second edition which appeared during the Italian War, at a time when the flames were already licking at the Bonapartists' fingernails and there was no time to be wasted on circumlocutions and figures of speech, Vogt suddenly bursts out with the candid demands that Prussia launch a civil war in Germany in order to set up a unified central government and incorporate Germany into Prussia—such a unification of Germany would not cost as many weeks as the war in Italy^a would cost months. Well and good. Exactly seven years later, and likewise in agreement with Louis Napoleon, Prussia acts precisely in accordance with the Bonapartist insinuations mechanically echoed by Vogt; she plunges into a civil war, seizes her reward in the North German plains in the meantime, establishes a unified central government at least for the North—and what does Herr Vogt do? Herr Vogt suddenly comes up to us, whining and bewailing the fact that "the war of 1870 was

^a C. Vogt, *Studien zur gegenwärtigen Lage Europas*, Geneva and Berne, 1859.—Ed.

the necessary and inexorable consequence of the war of 1866"⁵¹ (P. 3.) He complains about the policy of insatiable conquest pursued by Prussia which always "bites at a proffered conquest like a shark at a piece of bacon" (p. 20).

"Nowhere have I ever seen a state and a people who so deserved this name (robber state) as Prussia" (p. 35).

He deplores the incorporation of Germany into Prussia as the greatest misfortune that could happen to Germany and Europe (Letters 8 and 9). So, that's what Bismarck gets for following Vogt's advice, and that's what Vogt gets for offering advice to Bismarck.

Thus far, all seemed to be going fine for our Vogt for the present. The old scandals really had been forgotten by the philistines, the *Studies* were long since dead and buried. Vogt could again present himself as a respectable citizen and a passable democrat, and he could even flatter himself that his *Political Letters* were helping to stem the tide of ordinary philistinism in Germany. Even the fatal coincidence of his views with those of the Social-Democrats on the annexation issue could only redound to his credit: since Vogt had not gone over to the Brimstone Gang, the Brimstone Gang must have gone over to Vogt! But all at once a narrow, thin line catches the eye in the recently published appropriations lists of the secret funds of Louis Napoleon:

"Vogt—il lui a été remis en Août 1859 ... frs 40,000."

"Vogt—in August 1859 has been sent a remittance of 40,000 francs."^a

Vogt? Who is Vogt? What a misfortune for Vogt that the description was not more specific! Had it said, Professor Karl Vogt in Geneva, giving the name of the street and the number of his house, Vogt could have said: It's not me, it's my brother, my wife, my eldest son—anyone but me—but as things stand! Just plain Vogt without title, first name, address—well, that can only be the one Vogt, the world-famous scholar, the great discoverer of the round-worms and the flat-worms, of the long skulls and the short skulls, and of the Brimstone Gang, the man whose reputation is so well known, even to the police administering the secret fund, that any more detailed description would be superfluous! And then—is there any other Vogt who could have rendered such services to the Bonapartist government in 1859 that it should have paid him 40,000 francs in the August of that year (*and Vogt just happened to be in Paris at the time*)? That you rendered the services, Herr Vogt, is public

^a *Papiers et correspondance de la famille impériale*. Edition collationnée sur le texte de l'imprimerie nationale. T. 2. Paris, 1871.—Ed.

knowledge. Your *Studies* are the proof of it. The first edition of those *Studies* came out in the spring, the second appeared in the summer. You yourself have admitted that you offered many people money to act in the Bonapartist interests from April 1, 1859 until well into the summer of that year.^a *In August 1859, after the war had come to an end, you were in Paris*—and are we now supposed to believe that the Vogt to whom Bonaparte paid out 40,000 francs in August 1859 was another, wholly unknown Vogt? Impossible. We swear by all round-worms and flat-worms: until you can prove the opposite to us, we must assume that you are the Vogt in question.

But you will perhaps say, that is an assertion based on nothing but the word of the present French government, that is to say, of the members of the Commune, or what amounts to the same thing, the communists, also known as the Brimstone Gang. Who can believe such people? But the answer to this is that the publication of the *Correspondence and papers of the Imperial family* was arranged by the *Government of National Defence*, whose official act it is for which it takes responsibility. And what was your opinion of this government, of Jules Favre, Trochu, etc.?

"The men who have been expedited to the top, are second to no one in their intelligence, energy and tested principles—but they cannot achieve the impossible."

That is what you say on p. 52. No, Herr Vogt, they cannot achieve the impossible, but they could at least have suppressed your name in gratitude for your warm recognition, something which it has rarely been their lot to receive!

But, as you yourself point out, Herr Vogt, "Money is still the equivalent of the damage which the individual suffers to his person" (p. 24), and if your worthy person has suffered any "damage", hopefully only "moral" damage, in consequence of your political somersaults of 1859, you can at least console yourself with the "equivalent".

When the alarms of war broke loose last summer you were

"convinced that the entire performance of the French Government was designed to conceal the tremendous squandering of the resources of the Empire by pretending war preparations. Under Louis Philipp it was the *wood-worm* that was called upon to perform the same function: all the outgoings of the secret budget were attributed to the timber account of the navy. Under the Empire the wood-worms of the entire globe would not have sufficed to conceal the deficit" (p. 4).

^a Vogt's letter of April 21, 1871 entitled "An die Redaktion des schweiz. Handels-Couriers", *Schweizer Handels-Courier*, No. 113, April 23, 1871.—Ed.

So, we have arrived back to our beloved worms, the wood-worms in this case. To which class do they belong, to the round-worms or the flat-worms? Who could resolve this riddle? Only you, Herr Vogt, and you resolve it in reality. According to the *Correspondence etc.*, you are yourself one of the "wood-worms" and have helped to consume "the outgoings of the secret budget" to the tune of 40,000 francs. And that you are a "round-worm" is evident to everyone who knows you.

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time

Karl Marx

THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE

**ADDRESS OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION ¹⁶³**

Written between the middle of April and
the end of May 1871

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THE
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ADDRESS
OF
THE GENERAL COUNCIL
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THIRD EDITION, REVISED.

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The title-page of the third English edition
of *The Civil War in France*

TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE ASSOCIATION
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES

I

On the 4th of September, 1870, when the working men of Paris proclaimed the Republic, which was almost instantaneously acclaimed throughout France, without a single voice of dissent, a cabal of place-hunting barristers, with Thiers for their statesman and Trochu for their general, took hold of the Hôtel de Ville. At that time they were imbued with so fanatical a faith in the mission of Paris to represent France in all epochs of historical crisis, that, to legitimate their usurped titles as Governors of France, they thought it quite sufficient to produce their lapsed mandates as representatives of Paris. In our second address on the late War, five days after the rise of these men, we told you who they were.^a Yet, in the turmoil of surprise, with the real leaders of the working class still shut up in Bonapartist prisons and the Prussians already marching upon Paris, Paris bore with their assumption of power, on the express condition that it was to be wielded for the single purpose of national defence. Paris, however, was not to be defended without arming its working class, organizing them into an effective force, and training their ranks by the war itself. But Paris armed was the Revolution armed. A victory of Paris over the Prussian aggressor would have been a victory of the French workman over the French capitalist and his State parasites. In this conflict between national duty and class interest, the Government of National Defence did not hesitate one moment to turn into a Government of National Defection.

The first step they took was to send Thiers on a roving tour to all the courts of Europe, there to beg mediation by offering the

^a See this volume, p. 268.—*Ed.*

barter of the Republic for a king. Four months after the commencement of the siege, when they thought the opportune moment come for breaking the first word of capitulation, Trochu, in the presence of Jules Favre and others of his colleagues, addressed the assembled mayors of Paris in these terms:—

"The first question put to me by my colleagues on the very evening of the 4th of September was this: Paris, can it, with any chance of success stand a siege by the Prussian army? I did not hesitate to answer in the negative. Some of my colleagues here present will warrant the truth of my words and the persistence of my opinion. I told them, in these very terms, that, under the existing state of things, the attempt of Paris to hold out a siege by the Prussian army, would be a folly. Without doubt, I added, it would be an heroic folly; but that would be all.... The events" (managed by himself) "have not given the lie to my prevision."^a

This nice little speech of Trochu was afterwards published by M. Corbon, one of the mayors present.

Thus, on the very evening of the proclamation of the Republic, Trochu's "plan" was known to his colleagues to be the capitulation of Paris. If national defence had been more than a pretext for the personal government of Thiers, Favre, & Co., the upstarts of the 4th of September would have abdicated on the 5th—would have initiated the Paris people into Trochu's "plan," and called upon them to surrender at once, or to take their own fate into their own hands. Instead of this, the infamous impostors resolved upon curing the heroic folly of Paris by a regimen of famine and broken heads, and to dupe her in the meanwhile by ranting manifestoes, holding forth that Trochu, "the Governor of Paris, will never capitulate,"^b and Jules Favre, the Foreign Minister, will "not cede an inch of our territory, nor a stone of our fortresses."^c In a letter to Gambetta, that very same Jules Favre avows that what they were "defending" against were not the Prussian soldiers, but the working men of Paris. During the whole continuance of the siege the Bonapartist cut-throats, whom Trochu had wisely intrusted with the command of the Paris army, exchanged, in their intimate correspondence, ribald jokes at the well-understood mockery of defence (see, for instance, the correspondence of Alphonse Simon Guiod, supreme commander of the artillery of the Army of Defence of Paris and Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, to

^a "Paris au jour le jour", *Le Figaro*, No. 74, March 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b L. J. Trochu, [Proclamation aux habitants de Paris. Paris, 6 janvier 1871], *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 7, January 7, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c J. Favre, "Circulaire adressée aux agents diplomatiques de France... Le 6 septembre 1870", *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 246, September 7, 1870.—*Ed.*

Susane, general of division of artillery, a correspondence published by the *Journal officiel* of the Commune^a). The mask of imposture was at last dropped on the 28th of January, 1871.¹⁶⁴ With the true heroism of utter self-debasement, the Government of National Defence, in their capitulation, came out as the Government of France by Bismarck's prisoners—a part so base that Louis Bonaparte himself had, at Sedan, shrunk from accepting it. After the events of the 18th of March, on their wild flight to Versailles, the *capitulards*¹⁶⁵ left in the hands of Paris the documentary evidence of their treason, to destroy which, as the Commune says in its manifesto to the provinces,

“those men would not recoil from battering Paris into a heap of ruins washed by a sea of blood.”^b

To be eagerly bent upon such a consummation, some of the leading members of the Government of Defence had, besides, most peculiar reasons of their own.

Shortly after the conclusion of the armistice, M. Millière, one of the representatives of Paris to the National Assembly, now shot by express order of Jules Favre, published a series of authentic legal documents^c in proof that Jules Favre, living in concubinage with the wife of a drunkard resident at Algiers,^d had, by a most daring concoction of forgeries, spread over many years, contrived to grasp, in the name of the children of his adultery, a large succession, which made him a rich man, and that, in a lawsuit undertaken by the legitimate heirs, he only escaped exposure by the connivance of the Bonapartist tribunals. As these dry legal documents were not to be got rid of by any amount of rhetorical horse-power, Jules Favre, for the first time in his life, held his tongue, quietly awaiting the outbreak of the civil war, in order, then, frantically to denounce the people of Paris as a band of escaped convicts in utter revolt against family, religion, order, and property. This same forger had hardly got into power, after the 4th of September, when he sympathetically let loose upon society Pic and Taillefer, convicted, even under the Empire, of forgery, in the scandalous affair of the *Étendard*.¹⁶⁶ One of these men, Taillefer, having dared to return to Paris under the Commune,

^a See “Le Gouvernement de la Défense nationale”, *La Situation*, No. 189, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b “Manifeste”, *Le Vengeur*, No. 30, April 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c See J.-B. E. Millière, “Le Faussaire”, *Le Vengeur*, No. 6, February 8, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d Jeanne Charmont, who lived separate from her husband Vernier.—*Ed.*

was at once reinstated in prison; and then Jules Favre exclaimed, from the tribune of the National Assembly, that Paris was setting free all her jailbirds!

Ernest Picard, the Joe Miller^a of the Government of National Defence, who appointed himself Finance Minister of the Republic after having in vain striven to become the Home Minister of the Empire, is the brother of one Arthur Picard, an individual expelled from the Paris Bourse as a blackleg (see report of the Prefecture of Police, dated 31st July, 1867), and convicted, on his own confession, of a theft of 300,000 francs, while manager of one of the branches of the *Société Générale*,¹⁶⁷ rue Palestro, No. 5 (see report of the Prefecture of Police, 11th December, 1868).^b This Arthur Picard was made by Ernest Picard the editor of his paper, *L'Électeur libre*. While the common run of stockjobbers were led astray by the official lies of this Finance-Office paper, Arthur was running backwards and forwards between the Finance Office and the Bourse, there to discount the disasters of the French army. The whole financial correspondence of that worthy pair of brothers fell into the hands of the Commune.

Jules Ferry, a penniless barrister before the 4th of September, contrived, as Mayor of Paris during the siege, to job a fortune out of famine. The day on which he would have to give an account of his maladministration would be the day of his conviction.

These men, then, could find, in the ruins of Paris only, their tickets-of-leave*: they were the very men Bismarck wanted. With the help of some shuffling of cards, Thiers, hitherto the secret prompter of the Government, now appeared at its head, with the ticket-of-leave men for his Ministers.

Thiers, that monstrous gnome, has charmed the French bourgeoisie for almost half a century, because he is the most consummate intellectual expression of their own class-corruption. Before he became a statesman he had already proved his lying powers as an historian. The chronicle of his public life is the record of the misfortunes of France. Banded, before 1830, with the Republicans, he slipped into office under Louis Philippe by betraying his protector Laffitte, ingratiating himself with the king by exciting mob-riots against the clergy, during which the church

* In England common criminals, after serving the greater part of their terms, are often given TICKETS-OF-LEAVE authorising them to live under the surveillance of the police. They are called TICKET-OF-LEAVE MEN. (*Engels' Note to the 1871 German edition.*)

^a The 1871 and 1891 German editions have "Karl Vogt" instead of "Joe Miller" and the 1871 French edition has "Falstaff".—*Ed.*

^b See "Le Sieur Picard", *La Situation*, No. 168, April 4, 1871.—*Ed.*

of Saint Germain l'Auxerrois and the Archbishop's palace were plundered, and by acting the minister-spy upon, and the jail-accoucheur of, the Duchess de Berry.¹⁶⁸ The massacre of the Republicans in the Rue Transnonain, and the subsequent infamous laws of September against the press and the right of association, were his work.¹⁶⁹ Reappearing as the chief of the Cabinet in March, 1840, he astonished France with his plan of fortifying Paris.¹⁷⁰ To the Republicans, who denounced this plan as a sinister plot against the liberty of Paris, he replied from the tribune of the Chamber of Deputies:—

"What! to fancy that any works of fortification could ever endanger liberty! And first of all you calumniate any possible Government in supposing that it could some day attempt to maintain itself by bombarding the capital:... but that government would be a hundred times more impossible after its victory than before."^a

Indeed, no Government would ever have dared to bombard Paris from the forts, but that Government which had previously surrendered these forts to the Prussians.

When King Bomba tried his hand at Palermo,¹⁷¹ in January, 1848, Thiers, then long since out of office, again rose in the Chamber of Deputies:

"You know, gentlemen, what is happening at Palermo. You, all of you, shake with horror" (in the parliamentary sense) "on hearing that during forty-eight hours a large town has been bombarded—by whom? Was it by a foreign enemy exercising the rights of war? No, gentlemen, it was by its own Government. And why? Because that unfortunate town demanded its rights. Well, then, for the demand of its rights it has got forty-eight hours of bombardment.... Allow me to appeal to the opinion of Europe. It is doing a service to mankind to arise, and to make reverberate, from what is perhaps the greatest tribune in Europe, some words" (indeed words) "of indignation against such acts.... When the Regent Espartero, who had rendered services to his country," (which M. Thiers never did) "intended bombarding Barcelona, in order to suppress its insurrection, there arose from all parts of the world a general outcry of indignation."^b

Eighteen months afterwards, M. Thiers was amongst the fiercest defenders of the bombardment of Rome by a French army.¹⁷² In fact, the fault of King Bomba seems to have consisted in this only, that he limited his bombardment to forty-eight hours.

A few days before the Revolution of February, fretting at the long exile from place and pelf to which Guizot had condemned him, and sniffing in the air the scent of an approaching popular

^a L. A. Thiers' speech at the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies, on January 13, 1841, *Le Vengeur*, No. 14, April 12, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b L. A. Thiers' speech at the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies on January 31, 1848, *Le Rappel*, No. 673, April 17, 1871; *Le Vengeur*, No. 21, April 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

commotion, Thiers, in that pseudo-heroic style which won him the nickname of *Mirabeau-mouche*, declared to the Chamber of Deputies:

"I am of the party of Revolution, not only in France, but in Europe. I wish the Government of the Revolution to remain in the hands of moderate men ... but if that Government should fall into the hands of ardent minds, even into those of Radicals, I shall, for all that, not desert my cause. I shall always be of the party of the Revolution."^a

The Revolution of February came. Instead of displacing the Guizot Cabinet by the Thiers Cabinet, as the little man had dreamt, it superseded Louis Philippe by the Republic. On the first day of the popular victory he carefully hid himself, forgetting that the contempt of the working men screened him from their hatred. Still, with his legendary courage, he continued to shy the public stage, until the June massacres¹³³ had cleared it for his sort of action. Then he became the leading mind of the "Party of Order"¹⁷³ and its Parliamentary Republic, that anonymous interregnum, in which all the rival factions of the ruling class conspired together to crush the people, and conspired against each other to restore each of them its own monarchy. Then, as now, Thiers denounced the Republicans as the only obstacle to the consolidation of the Republic; then, as now, he spoke to the Republic as the hangman spoke to Don Carlos—"I shall assassinate thee, but for thy own good." Now, as then, he will have to exclaim on the day after his victory: *L'Empire est fait*—the Empire is consummated. Despite his hypocritical homilies about necessary liberties¹⁷⁴ and his personal grudge against Louis Bonaparte, who had made a dupe of him, and kicked out parliamentarism—and outside of its factitious atmosphere the little man is conscious of withering into nothingness—he had a hand in all the infamies of the Second Empire, from the occupation of Rome by French troops to the war with Prussia, which he incited by his fierce invective against German unity—not as a cloak of Prussian despotism, but as an encroachment upon the vested right of France in German disunion. Fond of brandishing, with his dwarfish arms, in the face of Europe the sword of the first Napoleon, whose historical shoe-black he had become,^b his foreign policy always culminated in the utter humiliation of France, from the London convention of 1840¹⁰⁰ to the Paris capitulation of 1871, and the present civil war,

^a L. A. Thiers' speech at the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies on February 2, 1848, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 34, February 3, 1848.—Ed.

^b The reference is to Thiers' books *Histoire de la Révolution française* and *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*.—Ed.

where he hounds on the prisoners of Sedan and Metz against Paris by special permission of Bismarck.¹⁷⁵ Despite his versatility of talent and shiftiness of purpose, this man has his whole lifetime been wedded to the most fossil routine. It is self-evident that to him the deeper under-currents of modern society remained for ever hidden; but even the most palpable changes on its surface were abhorrent to a brain all the vitality of which had fled to the tongue. Thus he never tired of denouncing as a sacrilege any deviation from the old French protective system. When a minister of Louis Philippe, he railed at railways as a wild chimera; and when in opposition under Louis Bonaparte, he branded as a profanation every attempt to reform the rotten French army system. Never in his long political career has he been guilty of a single—even the smallest—measure of any practical use. Thiers was consistent only in his greed for wealth and his hatred of the men that produce it. Having entered his first ministry under Louis Philippe poor as Job, he left it a millionaire. His last ministry under the same king (of the 1st of March, 1840) exposed him to public taunts of speculation in the Chamber of Deputies, to which he was content to reply by tears—a commodity he deals in as freely as Jules Favre, or any other crocodile. At Bordeaux^a his first measure for saving France from impending financial ruin was to endow himself with three millions a year,^b the first and the last word of the "Economical Republic," the vista of which he had opened to his Paris electors in 1869. One of his former colleagues of the Chamber of Deputies of 1830, himself a capitalist and, nevertheless, a devoted member of the Paris Commune, M. Beslay, lately addressed Thiers thus in a public placard:—

"The enslavement of labour by capital has always been the corner-stone of your policy, and from the very day you saw the Republic of Labour installed at the Hôtel de Ville, you have never ceased to cry out to France: 'These are criminals!'"^c

A master in small state roguery, a virtuoso in perjury and treason, a craftsman in all the petty stratagems, cunning devices, and base perfidies of Parliamentary party-warfare; never scrupling, when out of office, to fan a revolution, and to stifle it in blood when at the helm of the State; with class prejudices standing him in the place of ideas, and vanity in the place of a heart; his private life as infamous as his public life is odious—even now, when

^a The 1891 German edition has "in 1871".—*Ed.*

^b "All the Government officials...", *The Daily News*, No. 7763, March 18, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Ch. Beslay, "Au citoyen Thiers...", *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 64, April 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

playing the part of a French Sulla, he cannot help setting off the abomination of his deeds by the ridicule of his ostentation.

The capitulation of Paris, by surrendering to Prussia not only Paris, but all France, closed the long-continued intrigues of treason with the enemy, which the usurpers of the 4th September had begun, as Trochu himself said, on that very same day.^a On the other hand, it initiated the civil war they were now to wage, with the assistance of Prussia, against the Republic and Paris. The trap was laid in the very terms of the capitulation. At that time above one-third of the territory was in the hands of the enemy, the capital was cut off from the provinces, all communications were disorganized. To elect under such circumstances a real representation of France was impossible, unless ample time were given for preparation. In view of this, the capitulation stipulated that a National Assembly must be elected within eight days; so that in many parts of France the news of the impending election arrived on its eve only. This Assembly, moreover, was, by an express clause of the capitulation, to be elected for the sole purpose of deciding on peace or war, and, eventually, to conclude a treaty of peace.^b The population could not but feel that the terms of the armistice rendered the continuation of the war impossible, and that for sanctioning the peace imposed by Bismarck, the worst men in France were the best. But not content with these precautions, Thiers, even before the secret of the armistice had been broached to Paris, set out for an electioneering tour through the provinces, there to galvanize back into life the Legitimist party,¹⁷⁶ which now, along with the Orleanists, had to take the place of the then impossible Bonapartists. He was not afraid of them. Impossible as a government of modern France, and, therefore, contemptible as rivals, what party were more eligible as tools of counter-revolution^c than the party whose action, in the words of Thiers himself (Chamber of Deputies, 5th January, 1833),

"had always been confined to the three resources of foreign invasion, civil war, and anarchy"?^d

They verily believed in the advent of their long-expected retrospective millennium. There were the heels of foreign invasion

^a See "Paris au jour le jour", *Le Figaro*, No. 74, March 19, 1871.—Ed.

^b See *Convention entre l'Allemagne et la France pour la suspension des hostilités et la capitulation de Paris; signée à Versailles, le 28 janvier 1871*, art. 2.—Ed.

^c The 1871 and 1891 German editions have "reaction".—Ed.

^d Cited in *La Tribune de Bordeaux*, April 25, 1871.—Ed.

trampling upon France; there was the downfall of an Empire, and the captivity of a Bonaparte; and there they were themselves. The wheel of history had evidently rolled back to stop at the "chambre introuvable"^a of 1816.¹⁷⁷ In the Assemblies of the Republic, 1848 to '51, they had been represented by their educated and trained Parliamentary champions; it was the rank-and-file of the party which now rushed in—all the Pourceaugnacs of France.

As soon as this assembly of "Rurals" had met at Bordeaux,¹⁷⁸ Thiers made it clear to them that the peace preliminaries must be assented to at once, without even the honours of a Parliamentary debate, as the only condition on which Prussia would permit them to open the war against the Republic and Paris, its stronghold.^b The counter-revolution had, in fact, no time to lose. The Second Empire had more than doubled the national debt, and plunged all the large towns into heavy municipal debts. The war had fearfully swelled the liabilities, and mercilessly ravaged the resources of the nation. To complete the ruin, the Prussian Shylock was there with his bond for the keep of half a million of his soldiers on French soil, his indemnity of five milliards, and interest at 5 per cent on the unpaid instalments thereof.¹⁷⁹ Who was to pay the bill? It was only by the violent overthrow of the Republic that the appropriators of wealth could hope to shift on to the shoulders of its producers the cost of a war which they, the appropriators, had themselves originated. Thus, the immense ruin of France spurred on these patriotic representatives of land and capital, under the very eyes and patronage of the invader, to graft upon the foreign war a civil war—a slaveholders' rebellion.

There stood in the way of this conspiracy one great obstacle—Paris. To disarm Paris was the first condition of success. Paris was therefore summoned by Thiers to surrender its arms. Then Paris was exasperated by the frantic anti-republican demonstrations of the "Rural" Assembly and by Thiers's own equivocations about the legal status of the Republic; by the threat to decapitate and decapitalize Paris; the appointment of Orleanist ambassadors; Dufaure's laws on over-due commercial bills and house-rents,¹⁸⁰ inflicting ruin on the commerce and industry of Paris; Pouyer-Quertier's tax of two centimes upon every copy of every imaginable publication; the sentences of death against Blanqui and

^a The 1871 and 1891 German editions have further: "the Chamber of Landraths and Junkers".—*Ed.*

^b L. A. Thiers' speech in the National Assembly on February 28, 1871. *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 60, March 1, 1871.—*Ed.*

Flourens; the suppression of the Republican journals; the transfer of the National Assembly to Versailles; the renewal of the state of siege declared by Palikao, and expired on the 4th of September; the appointment of Vinoy, the *Décembriseur*,¹⁸¹ as governor of Paris—of Valentin, the Imperialist *gendarme*, as its prefect of police—and of D'Aurelle de Paladines, the Jesuit general, as the commander-in-chief of its National Guard.^a

And now we have to address a question to M. Thiers and the men of national defence, his understrappers. It is known that, through the agency of M. Pouyer-Quertier, his finance minister, Thiers had contracted a loan of two milliards. Now, is it true, or not,—

1. That the business was so managed that a consideration of several hundred millions was secured for the private benefit of Thiers, Jules Favre, Ernest Picard, Pouyer-Quertier, and Jules Simon? and—

2. That no money was to be paid down until after the “pacification” of Paris?¹⁸²

At all events, there must have been something very pressing in the matter, for Thiers and Jules Favre, in the name of the majority of the Bordeaux Assembly, unblushingly solicited the immediate occupation of Paris by Prussian troops. Such, however, was not the game of Bismarck, as he sneeringly, and in public, told the admiring Frankfort Philistines on his return to Germany.^b

II

Armed Paris was the only serious obstacle in the way of the counter-revolutionary conspiracy. Paris was, therefore, to be disarmed. On this point the Bordeaux Assembly was sincerity itself. If the roaring rant of its Rurals had not been audible enough, the surrender of Paris by Thiers to the tender mercies of the triumvirate of Vinoy the *Décembriseur*, Valentin the Bonapartist *gendarme*, and Aurelle de Paladines the Jesuit general, would have cut off even the last subterfuge of doubt. But while insultingly exhibiting the true purpose of the disarmament of Paris, the conspirators asked her to lay down her arms on a pretext which was the most glaring, the most barefaced of lies. The artillery of

^a See “The scanty news from the capital of Revolution...”, *The Daily News*, No. 7774, March 30, 1871.—Ed.

^b See report from Germany in the column “Révélations”, *La Situation*, No. 156, March 21, 1871.—Ed.

the Paris National Guard, said Thiers, belonged to the State, and to the State it must be returned.^a The fact was this:—From the very day of the capitulation, by which Bismarck's prisoners had signed the surrender of France, but reserved to themselves a numerous body-guard for the express purpose of cowing Paris, Paris stood on the watch. The National Guard reorganized themselves and intrusted their supreme control to a Central Committee elected by their whole body, save some fragments of the old Bonapartist formations. On the eve of the entrance of the Prussians into Paris, the Central Committee took measures for the removal to Montmartre, Belleville, and La Villette of the cannon and mitrailleuses treacherously abandoned by the capitulards in and about the very quarters the Prussians were to occupy. That artillery had been furnished by the subscriptions of the National Guard. As their private property, it was officially recognized in the capitulation of the 28th of January, and on that very title exempted from the general surrender, into the hands of the conqueror, of arms belonging to the Government.^b And Thiers was so utterly destitute of even the flimsiest pretext for initiating the war against Paris, that he had to resort to the flagrant lie of the artillery of the National Guard being State property!

The seizure of her artillery was evidently but to serve as the preliminary to the general disarmament of Paris, and, therefore, of the Revolution of the 4th of September. But that Revolution had become the legal status of France. The republic, its work, was recognized by the conqueror in the terms of the capitulation. After the capitulation, it was acknowledged by all the foreign Powers, and in its name the National Assembly had been summoned. The Paris working men's revolution of the 4th of September was the only legal title of the National Assembly seated at Bordeaux, and of its executive. Without it, the National Assembly would at once have to give way to the Corps Législatif, elected in 1869 by universal suffrage under French, not under Prussian, rule, and forcibly dispersed by the arm of the Revolution. Thiers and his ticket-of-leave men^c would have had to capitulate for safe-conducts signed by Louis Bonaparte, to save them from a voyage to Cayenne.¹⁸³ The National Assembly, with its power of attorney to settle the terms of peace with Prussia, was

^a L. A. Thiers' proclamation of March 17, 1871 to the inhabitants of Paris, *The Daily News*, No. 7765, March 20, 1871.—Ed.

^b *Convention entre l'Allemagne et la France pour la suspension des hostilités et la capitulation de Paris; signée à Versailles, le 28 janvier 1871, art. 7.*—Ed.

^c See this volume, p. 314.—Ed.

but an incident of that Revolution, the true embodiment of which was still armed Paris, which had initiated it, undergone for it a five months' siege, with its horrors of famine, and made her prolonged resistance, despite Trochu's plan, the basis of an obstinate war of defence in the provinces. And Paris was now either to lay down her arms at the insulting behest of the rebellious slaveholders of Bordeaux, and acknowledge that her Revolution of the 4th of September meant nothing but a simple transfer of power from Louis Bonaparte to his Royal rivals; or she had to stand forward as the self-sacrificing champion of France, whose salvation from ruin, and whose regeneration were impossible, without the revolutionary overthrow of the political and social conditions that had engendered the second Empire, and, under its fostering care, matured into utter rottenness. Paris, emaciated by a five months' famine, did not hesitate one moment. She heroically resolved to run all the hazards of a resistance against the French conspirators, even with Prussian cannon frowning upon her from her own forts. Still, in its abhorrence of the civil war into which Paris was to be goaded, the Central Committee continued to persist in a merely defensive attitude, despite the provocations of the Assembly, the usurpations of the Executive, and the menacing concentration of troops in and around Paris.

Thiers opened the civil war by sending Vinoy, at the head of a multitude of *sergents-de-ville* and some regiments of the line, upon a nocturnal expedition^a against Montmartre, there to seize, by surprise, the artillery of the National Guard. It is well known how this attempt broke down before the resistance of the National Guard and the fraternization of the line with the people. Aurelle de Paladines had printed beforehand his bulletin of victory, and Thiers held ready the placards announcing his measures of *coup d'état*. Now these had to be replaced by Thiers' appeals, imparting his magnanimous resolve to leave the National Guard in the possession of their arms, with which, he said, he felt sure they would rally round the Government against the rebels.^b Out of 300,000 National Guards only 300 responded to this summons to rally round little Thiers against themselves. The glorious working men's Revolution of the 18th March took undisputed sway of Paris. The Central Committee was its provisional Government. Europe seemed, for a moment, to doubt whether its recent

^a The 1871 and 1891 German editions have "night raids".— *Ed.*

^b See L. A. Thiers' proclamation of March 17, 1871 to the inhabitants of Paris, *The Daily News*, No. 7765, March 20, 1871.— *Ed.*

sensational performances of state and war had any reality in them, or whether they were the dreams of a long bygone past.

From the 18th of March to the entrance of the Versailles troops into Paris, the proletarian revolution remained so free from the acts of violence in which the revolutions, and still more the counter-revolutions, of the "better classes" abound, that no facts were left to its opponents to cry out about, but the execution of Generals Lecomte and Clément Thomas, and the affair of the Place Vendôme.

One of the Bonapartist officers engaged in the nocturnal attempt against Montmartre, General Lecomte, had four times ordered the 81st line regiment to fire at an unarmed gathering in the Place Pigalle, and on their refusal fiercely insulted them. Instead of shooting women and children, his own men shot him. The inveterate habits acquired by the soldiery under the training of the enemies of the working class are, of course, not likely to change the very moment these soldiers change sides. The same men executed Clément Thomas.

"General" Clément Thomas, a malcontent ex-quartermaster-sergeant, had, in the latter times of Louis Philippe's reign, enlisted at the office of the Republican newspaper *Le National*, there to serve in the double capacity of responsible man-of-straw (*gérant responsable*^a) and of duelling bully to that very combative journal. After the revolution of February, the men of the *National* having got into power, they metamorphosed this old quartermaster-sergeant into a general on the eve of the butchery of June, of which he, like Jules Favre, was one of the sinister plotters, and became one of the most dastardly executioners. Then he and his generalship disappeared for a long time, to again rise to the surface on the 1st November, 1870. The day before the Government of Defence, caught at the Hôtel de Ville, had solemnly pledged their parole to Blanqui, Flourens, and other representatives of the working class, to abdicate their usurped power into the hands of a commune to be freely elected by Paris.¹⁸⁴ Instead of keeping their word they let loose on Paris the Bretons of Trochu, who now replaced the Corsicans of Bonaparte.¹⁸⁵ General Tamisier alone, refusing to sully his name by such a breach of faith, resigned the commandership-in-chief of the National Guard, and in his place Clément Thomas for once became again a general. During the whole of his tenure of

^a Responsible editor. The 1871 and 1891 German editions have further: "who takes upon himself the responsibility including imprisonment".—*Ed.*

command, he made war, not upon the Prussians, but upon the Paris National Guard. He prevented their general armament, pitted the bourgeois battalions against the working men's battalions, weeded out the officers hostile to Trochu's "plan," and disbanded, under the stigma of cowardice, the very same proletarian battalions whose heroism has now astonished their most inveterate enemies. Clément Thomas felt quite proud of having reconquered his June^a pre-eminence as the personal enemy of the working class of Paris. Only a few days before the 18th of March, he laid before the War Minister, Le Flô, a plan of his own for "finishing off *la fine fleur* (the cream) of the Paris *canaille*."^b After Vinoy's rout, he must needs appear upon the scene of action in the quality of an amateur spy. The Central Committee and the Paris working men were as much responsible for the killing of Clément Thomas and Lecomte as the Princess of Wales^c was for the fate of the people crushed to death on the day of her entrance into London.

The massacre of unarmed citizens in the Place Vendôme is a myth which M. Thiers and the Rurals persistently ignored in the Assembly, intrusting its propagation exclusively to the servants' hall of European journalism. "The men of order," the reactionists of Paris, trembled at the victory of the 18th of March. To them it was the signal of popular retribution at last arriving. The ghosts of the victims assassinated at their hands from the days of June, 1848, down to the 22nd of January, 1871,¹⁸⁶ arose before their faces. Their panic was their only punishment. Even the sergeants-de-ville, instead of being disarmed and locked up, as ought to have been done, had the gates of Paris flung wide open for their safe retreat to Versailles. The men of order were left not only unharmed, but allowed to rally and quietly to seize more than one stronghold in the very centre of Paris. This indulgence of the Central Committee—this magnanimity of the armed working men—so strangely at variance with the habits of the "party of order," the latter misinterpreted as mere symptoms of conscious weakness. Hence their silly plan to try, under the cloak of an unarmed demonstration, what Vinoy had failed to perform with his cannon and mitrailleuses. On the 22nd of March a riotous mob of swells started from the quarters of luxury, all the *petits crevés*^d in

^a 1848.—*Ed.*

^b "*La Sociale* public une curieuse lettre...", *Le Vengeur*, No. 21, April 19, 1871. *Canaille*—rabble.—*Ed.*

^c Alexandra.—*Ed.*

^d Dandy, swell.—*Ed.*

their ranks, and at their head the notorious familiars of the Empire—the Heeckeren, Coëtlogon, Henri de Pène, etc. Under the cowardly pretence of a pacific demonstration, this rabble, secretly armed with the weapons of the bravo, fell into marching order, ill-treated and disarmed the detached patrols and sentries of the National Guards they met with on their progress, and, on debouching from the Rue de la Paix, with the cry of “Down with the Central Committee! Down with the assassins! The National Assembly for ever!” attempted to break through the line drawn up there, and thus to carry by a surprise the head-quarters of the National Guard in the Place Vendôme. In reply to their pistol-shots, the regular *sommations* (the French equivalent of the English Riot Act)¹⁸⁷ were made, and, proving ineffective, fire was commanded by the general of the National Guard.^a One volley dispersed into wild flight the silly coxcombs, who expected that the mere exhibition of their “respectability” would have the same effect upon the Revolution of Paris as Joshua’s trumpets upon the walls of Jericho.^b The runaways left behind them two National Guards killed, nine severely wounded (among them a member of the Central Committee^c), and the whole scene of their exploit strewn with revolvers, daggers, and sword-canes, in evidence of the “unarmed” character of their “pacific” demonstration.^d When, on the 13th of June 1849, the National Guard made a really pacific demonstration in protest against the felonious assault of French troops upon Rome, Changarnier, then general of the Party of Order, was acclaimed by the National Assembly, and especially by M. Thiers, as the saviour of society, for having launched his troops from all sides upon these unarmed men, to shoot and sabre them down, and to trample them under their horses’ feet. Paris, then, was placed under a state of siege. Dufaure hurried through the Assembly new laws of repression.¹⁸⁸ New arrests, new proscriptions—a new reign of terror set in.^e But the lower orders manage these things otherwise. The Central Committee of 1871 simply ignored the heroes of the “pacific demonstration;” so much so, that only two days later they were enabled to muster,

^a Jules Bergeret.—*Ed.*

^b Joshua 6:20.—*Ed.*

^c Louis Charles Maljournal.—*Ed.*

^d See “Le Journal officiel de Paris raconte...”, *Le Rappel*, No. 650, March 25, 1871.—*Ed.*

^e Marx gives a detailed analysis of the events of June 13, 1849 in *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850*, Ch. II (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 71-100).—*Ed.*

under Admiral Saisset, for that *armed* demonstration, crowned by the famous stampede to Versailles. In their reluctance to continue the civil war opened by Thiers' burglarious attempt on Montmartre, the Central Committee made themselves, this time, guilty of a decisive mistake in not at once marching upon Versailles, then completely helpless, and thus putting an end to the conspiracies of Thiers and his Rurals. Instead of this, the Party of Order was again allowed to try its strength at the ballot-box, on the 26th of March, the day of the election of the Commune. Then, in the mairies of Paris, they exchanged bland words of conciliation with their too generous conquerors, muttering in their hearts solemn vows to exterminate them in due time.

Now, look at the reverse of the medal. Thiers opened his second campaign against Paris in the beginning of April. The first batch of Parisian prisoners brought into Versailles was subjected to revolting atrocities, while Ernest Picard, with his hands in his trousers' pockets, strolled about jeering them, and while Mesdames Thiers and Favre, in the midst of their ladies of honour (?) applauded, from the balcony, the outrages of the Versailles mob.^a The captured soldiers of the line were massacred in cold blood; our brave friend, General Duval, the ironfounder, was shot without any form of trial. Galliffet, the kept man of his wife, so notorious for her shameless exhibitions at the orgies of the Second Empire, boasted in a proclamation of having commanded the murder of a small troop of National Guards, with their captain and lieutenant, surprised and disarmed by his Chasseurs.^b Vinoy, the runaway, was appointed by Thiers Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, for his general order to shoot down every soldier of the line taken in the ranks of the Federals. Desmarests, the gendarme, was decorated for the treacherous butcher-like chopping in pieces of the high-souled and chivalrous Flourens, who had saved the heads of the Government of Defence on the 31st of October 1870.¹⁸⁹ "The encouraging particulars" of his assassination were triumphantly expatiated upon by Thiers in the National Assembly.^c With the elated vanity of a parliamentary Tom Thumb, permitted to play the part of a Tamerlane, he denied the rebels against his littleness every right of civilized warfare, up to the right

^a See "The Advance of the Insurgents on Versailles", *The Daily News*, No. 7781, April 7, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b See notice on proclamation of General de Galliffet, April 3, 1871, *The Daily News*, No. 7783, April 10, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Marx gives a rendering of Thiers' speech in the National Assembly on April 3, 1871 according to *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 4932, April 5, 1871.—*Ed.*

of neutrality for ambulances.¹⁹⁰ Nothing more horrid than that monkey allowed for a time to give full fling to his tigerish instincts, as foreseen by Voltaire.^a (See note, p. 35.^b)

After the decree of the Commune of the 7th April,¹⁹¹ ordering reprisals and declaring it to be its duty "to protect Paris against the cannibal exploits of the Versailles banditti, and to demand an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth," Thiers did not stop the barbarous treatment of prisoners, moreover insulting them in his bulletins as follows:—"Never have more degraded countenances of a degraded democracy met the afflicted gazes of honest men,"^c—honest like Thiers himself and his ministerial ticket-of-leave men. Still the shooting of prisoners was suspended for a time. Hardly, however, had Thiers and his Decembrist generals become aware that the Communal decree of reprisals was but an empty threat, that even their gendarme spies caught in Paris under the disguise of National Guards, that even sergents-de-ville taken with incendiary shells upon them, were spared,—when the wholesale shooting of prisoners was resumed and carried on uninterruptedly to the end. Houses to which National Guards had fled were surrounded by gendarmes, inundated with petroleum (which here occurs for the first time in this war), and then set fire to, the charred corpses being afterwards brought out by the ambulance of the Press at the Ternes.^d Four National Guards having surrendered to a troop of mounted Chasseurs at Belle Epine, on the 25th of April, were afterwards shot down, one after another, by the captain, a worthy man of Galliffet's. One of his four victims, left for dead, Scheffer, crawled back to the Parisian outposts, and deposed to this fact before a commission of the Commune.^e When Tolain interpellated the War Minister upon the report of this commission, the Rurals drowned his voice and forbade Le Flô to answer. It would be an insult to their "glorious" army to speak of its deeds. The flippant tone in which Thiers' bulletins announced the bayoneting of the Federals surprised asleep at Moulin Saquet, and the wholesale fusillades at Clamart shocked the nerves even of the not oversensitive London *Times*.^f

^a Voltaire, *Candide ou l'optimisme*, Ch. 22.—Ed.

^b See this volume, pp. 356-57.—Ed.

^c L. A. Thiers' proclamation of April 4, 1871, *The Daily News*, No. 7779, April 5, 1871.—Ed.

^d See "Les gendarmes usent...", *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 56, April 20, 1871.—Ed.

^e See [Rapport de la Commission d'enquête de la Commune], *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 65, April 29, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 118, April 28, 1871.—Ed.

^f See "Voici, sur le même fait, le bulletin...", *Le Rappel*, No. 692, May 6, 1871; "The Massacre at Clamart", *The Times*, No. 27056, May 6, 1871.—Ed.

But it would be ludicrous to-day to attempt recounting the merely preliminary atrocities committed by the bombardiers of Paris and the fomenters of a slaveholders' rebellion protected by foreign invasion. Amidst all these horrors, Thiers, forgetful of his parliamentary laments on the terrible responsibility weighing down his dwarfish shoulders, boasts in his bulletins that *l'Assemblée siège paisiblement* (the Assembly continues meeting in peace),^a and proves by his constant carousals, now with Decembrist generals, now with German princes, that his digestion is not troubled in the least, not even by the ghosts of Lecomte and Clément Thomas.

III

On the dawn of the 18th of March, Paris arose to the thunderburst of "Vive la Commune!" What is the Commune, that sphinx so tantalizing to the bourgeois mind?

"The proletarians of Paris," said the Central Committee in its manifesto of the 18th March, "amidst the failures and treasons of the ruling classes, have understood that the hour has struck for them to save the situation by taking into their own hands the direction of public affairs. ...They have understood that it is their imperious duty and their absolute right to render themselves masters of their own destinies, by seizing upon the governmental power."^b

But the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made State machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.^c

The centralized State power, with its ubiquitous organs of standing army, police, bureaucracy, clergy, and judicature—organs wrought after the plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labour—originates from the days of absolute monarchy, serving nascent middle-class society as a mighty weapon in its struggles against feudalism. Still, its development remained clogged by all manner of mediaeval rubbish, seigniorial rights, local privileges, municipal and guild monopolies and provincial constitutions. The gigantic broom of the French Revolution of the eighteenth century swept away all these relics of bygone times, thus clearing simultaneously the social soil of its last hindrances to the superstructure of the modern State edifice raised under the

^a Cited in: Th. Astrie, "L'homme rouge", *La Situation*, No. 176, April 14, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Marx quotes from "La Révolution du 18 mars", *Le Petit Journal*, No. 3002, March 22, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 80, March 21, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c See Marx's letter to Ludwig Kugelmann of April 12, 1871 (present edition, Vol. 44).—*Ed.*

First Empire, itself the offspring of the coalition wars of old semi-feudal Europe against modern France. During the subsequent *régimes* the Government, placed under parliamentary control—that is, under the direct control of the propertied classes—became not only a hotbed of huge national debts and crushing taxes; with its irresistible allurements of place, pelf, and patronage, it became not only the bone of contention between the rival factions and adventurers of the ruling classes; but its political character changed simultaneously with the economic changes of society. At the same pace at which the progress of modern industry developed, widened, intensified the class antagonism between capital and labour, the State power assumed more and more the character of the national power of capital over labour, of a public force organized for social enslavement, of an engine of class despotism.^a After every revolution marking a progressive phase in the class struggle, the purely repressive character of the State power stands out in bolder and bolder relief. The Revolution of 1830, resulting in the transfer of Government from the landlords to the capitalists, transferred it from the more remote to the more direct antagonists of the working men. The bourgeois Republicans, who, in the name of the Revolution of February, took the State power, used it for the June massacres, in order to convince the working class that “social” republic meant the republic ensuring their social subjection, and in order to convince the royalist bulk of the bourgeois and landlord class that they might safely leave the cares and emoluments of government to the bourgeois “Republicans.” However, after their one heroic exploit of June, the bourgeois Republicans had, from the front, to fall back to the rear of the “Party of Order”—a combination formed by all the rival fractions and factions of the appropriating class in their now openly declared antagonism to the producing classes. The proper form of their joint-stock Government was the *Parliamentary Republic*, with Louis Bonaparte for its President. Theirs was a *régime* of avowed class terrorism and deliberate insult towards the “vile multitude.” If the Parliamentary Republic, as M. Thiers said, “divided them (the different fractions of the ruling class) least,” it opened an abyss between that class and the whole body of society outside their spare ranks. The restraints by which their own divisions had under former *régimes* still checked

^a In the 1871 German edition the end of this sentence reads as follows: “the state power more and more assumed the character of public power for the oppression of labour, the character of a machine of class domination”.—*Ed.*

the State power, were removed by their union; and in view of the threatening upheaval of the proletariat, they now used that State power mercilessly and ostentatiously as the national war-engine of capital against labour. In their uninterrupted crusade against the producing masses they were, however, bound not only to invest the executive with continually increased powers of repression, but at the same time to divest their own parliamentary stronghold—the National Assembly—one by one, of all its own means of defence against the Executive. The Executive, in the person of Louis Bonaparte, turned them out. The natural offspring of the “Party-of-Order” Republic was the Second Empire.

The Empire, with the *coup d'état* for its certificate of birth, universal suffrage for its sanction, and the sword for its sceptre, professed to rest upon the peasantry, the large mass of producers not directly involved in the struggle of capital and labour. It professed to save the working class by breaking down Parliamentarism, and, with it, the undisguised subserviency of Government to the propertied classes. It professed to save the propertied classes by upholding their economic supremacy over the working class; and, finally, it professed to unite all classes by reviving for all the chimera of national glory. In reality, it was the only form of government possible at a time when the bourgeoisie had already lost, and the working class had not yet acquired, the faculty of ruling the nation. It was acclaimed throughout the world as the saviour of society. Under its sway, bourgeois society, freed from political cares, attained a development unexpected even by itself. Its industry and commerce expanded to colossal dimensions; financial swindling celebrated cosmopolitan orgies; the misery of the masses was set off by a shameless display of gorgeous, meretricious, and debased luxury. The State power, apparently soaring high above society, was at the same time itself the greatest scandal of that society and the very hotbed of all its corruptions. Its own rottenness, and the rottenness of the society it had saved, were laid bare by the bayonet of Prussia, herself eagerly bent upon transferring the supreme seat of that *régime* from Paris to Berlin. Imperialism is, at the same time, the most prostitute and the ultimate form of the State power which nascent middle-class society had commenced to elaborate as a means of its own emancipation from feudalism, and which full-grown bourgeois society had finally transformed into a means for the enslavement of labour by capital.

The direct antithesis to the Empire was the Commune. The cry of “Social Republic,” with which the revolution of February was

ushered in by the Paris proletariat, did but express a vague aspiration after a Republic that was not only to supersede the monarchical form of class-rule, but class-rule itself. The Commune was the positive form of that Republic.

Paris, the central seat of the old governmental power, and, at the same time, the social stronghold of the French working class, had risen in arms against the attempt of Thiers and the Rurals to restore and perpetuate that old governmental power bequeathed to them by the Empire. Paris could resist only because, in consequence of the siege, it had got rid of the army, and replaced it by a National Guard, the bulk of which consisted of working men. This fact was now to be transformed into an institution. The first decree of the Commune, therefore, was the suppression of the standing army, and the substitution for it of the armed people.^a

The Commune was formed of the municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage in the various wards of the town, responsible and revocable at short terms. The majority of its members were naturally working men, of acknowledged representatives of the working class. The Commune was to be a working, not a parliamentary, body, executive and legislative at the same time. Instead of continuing to be the agent of the Central Government, the police was at once stripped of its political attributes, and turned into the responsible and at all times revocable agent of the Commune. So were the officials of all other branches of the Administration. From the members of the Commune downwards, the public service had to be done at *workmen's wages*. The vested interests and the representation allowances of the high dignitaries of State disappeared along with the high dignitaries themselves.^b Public functions ceased to be the private property of the tools of the Central Government. Not only municipal administration, but the whole initiative hitherto exercised by the State was laid into the hands of the Commune.

Having once got rid of the standing army and the police, the physical force elements of the old Government, the Commune was anxious to break the spiritual force of repression, the "parson-power," by the disestablishment^c and disendowment of all

^a Decree abolishing conscription of March 29, 1871, *The Daily News*, No. 7776, April 1, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 1 (89), March 30, 1871.—Ed.

^b The source from which Marx cites this has not been established. See [Decret sur les traitements publics. Paris, 2 avril 1871], *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 92, April 2, 1871.—Ed.

^c Decree of April 2, 1871 separating the church from the state, *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 4931, April 4, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 93, April 3, 1871.—Ed.

churches as proprietary bodies. The priests were sent back to the recesses of private life, there to feed upon the alms of the faithful in imitation of their predecessors, the Apostles. The whole of the educational institutions were opened to the people gratuitously, and at the same time cleared of all interference of Church and State. Thus, not only was education made accessible to all, but science itself freed from the fetters which class prejudice and governmental force had imposed upon it.

The judicial functionaries were to be divested of that sham independence which had but served to mask their abject subserviency to all succeeding governments to which, in turn, they had taken, and broken, the oaths of allegiance. Like the rest of public servants, magistrates and judges were to be elective, responsible, and revocable.

The Paris Commune was, of course, to serve as a model to all the great industrial centres of France. The communal *régime* once established in Paris and the secondary centres, the old centralized Government would in the provinces, too, have to give way to the self-government of the producers. In a rough sketch of national organization which the Commune had no time to develop,^a it states clearly that the Commune was to be the political form of even the smallest country hamlet, and that in the rural districts the standing army was to be replaced by a national militia, with an extremely short term of service. The rural communes of every district were to administer their common affairs by an assembly of delegates in the central town, and these district assemblies were again to send deputies to the National Delegation in Paris, each delegate to be at any time revocable and bound by the *mandat impératif* (formal instructions) of his constituents. The few but important functions which still would remain for a central government were not to be suppressed, as has been intentionally mis-stated, but were to be discharged by Communal, and therefore strictly responsible agents. The unity of the nation was not to be broken, but, on the contrary, to be organized by the Communal constitution, and to become a reality by the destruction of the State power which claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation itself, from which it was but a parasitic excrescence. While the merely repressive organs of the old governmental power were to be amputated, its legitimate functions were to be wrested from an authority

^a "Déclaration au peuple français", adopted at the sitting of the Commune on April 19, is quoted according to the report in *The Daily News*, No. 7793, April 21, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 110, April 20, 1871.—Ed.

usurping pre-eminence over society itself, and restored to the responsible agents of society. Instead of deciding once in three or six years which member of the ruling class was to misrepresent the people in Parliament, universal suffrage was to serve the people, constituted in Communes, as individual suffrage serves every other employer in the search for the workmen and managers in his business. And it is well known that companies, like individuals, in matters of real business generally know how to put the right man in the right place, and, if they for once make a mistake, to redress it promptly. On the other hand, nothing could be more foreign to the spirit of the Commune than to supersede universal suffrage by hierarchic investiture.

It is generally the fate of completely new historical creations to be mistaken for the counterpart of older and even defunct forms of social life, to which they may bear a certain likeness. Thus, this new Commune, which breaks the modern State power, has been mistaken for a reproduction of the mediaeval Communes, which first preceded, and afterwards became the substratum of, that very State power.—The communal constitution has been mistaken for an attempt to break up into a federation of small States, as dreamt of by Montesquieu^a and the Girondins,¹⁹² that unity of great nations which, if originally brought about by political force, has now become a powerful coefficient of social production.—The antagonism of the Commune against the State power has been mistaken for an exaggerated form of the ancient struggle against over-centralization. Peculiar historical circumstances may have prevented the classical development, as in France, of the bourgeois form of government, and may have allowed, as in England, to complete the great central State organs by corrupt vestries, jobbing councillors, and ferocious poor-law guardians in the towns, and virtually hereditary magistrates in the counties. The Communal Constitution would have restored to the social body all the forces hitherto absorbed by the State parasite feeding upon, and clogging the free movement of, society. By this one act it would have initiated the regeneration of France.—The provincial French middle-class saw in the Commune an attempt to restore the sway their order had held over the country under Louis Philippe, and which, under Louis Napoleon, was supplanted by the pretended rule of the country over the towns. In reality, the Communal Constitution brought the rural producers under the intellectual lead of the central towns of their districts, and there

^a Ch. L. de Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des Loix*, London, 1769, Book 9, Ch. 1.—*Ed.*

secured to them, in the working men, the natural trustees of their interests.—The very existence of the Commune involved, as a matter of course, local municipal liberty, but no longer as a check upon the, now superseded, State power. It could only enter into the head of a Bismarck, who, when not engaged on his intrigues of blood and iron, always likes to resume his old trade, so befitting his mental calibre, of contributor to *Kladderadatsch* (the Berlin *Punch*), it could only enter into such a head, to ascribe to the Paris Commune aspirations after that caricature of the old French municipal organization of 1791, the Prussian municipal constitution which degrades the town governments to mere secondary wheels in the police-machinery of the Prussian State.^a The Commune made that catch-word of bourgeois revolutions, cheap government, a reality, by destroying the two greatest sources of expenditure—the standing^b army and State functionarism. Its very existence presupposed the non-existence of monarchy, which, in Europe at least, is the normal incumbrance and indispensable cloak of class-rule. It supplied the Republic with the basis of really democratic institutions. But neither cheap government nor the “true Republic” was its ultimate aim; they were its mere concomitants.

The multiplicity of interpretations to which the Commune has been subjected, and the multiplicity of interests which construed it in their favour, show that it was a thoroughly expansive political form, while all previous forms of government had been emphatically repressive. Its true secret was this. It was essentially a working-class government,^c the produce of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation of Labour.

Except on this last condition, the Communal Constitution would have been an impossibility and a delusion. The political rule of the producer cannot coexist with the perpetuation of his social slavery. The Commune was therefore to serve as a lever for uprooting the economical foundations upon which rests the existence of classes, and therefore of class rule. With labour emancipated, every man

^a O. von Bismarck's speech in the Diet on May 2, 1871, *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*. 1. Legislatur-Periode. 1. Session 1871, Bd. 1, Berlin, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b This word is omitted in the 1871 and 1891 German editions.—*Ed.*

^c The phrase “working-class government” is italicised in the 1871 and 1891 German editions.—*Ed.*

becomes a working man, and productive labour ceases to be a class attribute.

It is a strange fact. In spite of all the tall talk and all the immense literature, for the last sixty years, about Emancipation of Labour, no sooner do the working men anywhere take the subject into their own hands with a will, than uprises at once all the apologetic phraseology of the mouthpieces of present society with its two poles of Capital and Wage-slavery (the landlord now is but the sleeping partner of the capitalist), as if capitalist society was still in its purest state of virgin innocence, with its antagonisms still undeveloped, with its delusions still unexploded, with its prostitute realities not yet laid bare. The Commune, they exclaim, intends to abolish property, the basis of all civilization! Yes, gentlemen, the Commune intended to abolish that class-property which makes the labour of the many the wealth of the few. It aimed at the expropriation of the expropriators. It wanted to make individual property a truth by transforming the means of production, land and capital, now chiefly the means of enslaving and exploiting labour, into mere instruments of free and associated labour.—But this is Communism, “impossible” Communism! Why, those members of the ruling classes who are intelligent enough to perceive the impossibility of continuing the present system—and they are many—have become the obtrusive and full-mouthed apostles of co-operative production. If co-operative production is not to remain a sham and a snare; if it is to supersede the Capitalist system; if united co-operative societies are to regulate national production upon a common plan, thus taking it under their own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the fatality of Capitalist production—what else, gentlemen, would it be but Communism, “possible” Communism?

The working class did not expect miracles from the Commune. They have no ready-made utopias to introduce *par décret du peuple*.^a They know that in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it that higher form to which present society is irresistibly tending by its own economical agencies, they will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of historic processes, transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideals to realize, but to set free elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant. In the full consciousness of their historic mission, and

^a By the people's decree.—Ed.

with the heroic resolve to act up to it, the working class can afford to smile at the coarse invective of the gentlemen's gentlemen with the pen and inkhorn, and at the didactic patronage of well-wishing bourgeois-doctrinaires, pouring forth their ignorant platitudes and sectarian crotchets in the oracular tone of scientific infallibility.

When the Paris Commune took the management of the revolution in its own hands; when plain working men for the first time dared to infringe upon the Governmental privilege of their "natural superiors,"^a and, under circumstances of unexampled difficulty, performed their work modestly, conscientiously, and efficiently,—performed it at salaries the highest of which barely amounted to one-fifth of what, according to high scientific authority,^b is the minimum required for a secretary to a certain metropolitan school-board,¹⁹³—the old world writhed in convulsions of rage at the sight of the Red Flag, the symbol of the Republic of Labour, floating over the Hôtel de Ville.

And yet, this was the first revolution in which the working class was openly acknowledged as the only class capable of social initiative, even by the great bulk of the Paris middle class—shopkeepers, tradesmen, merchants—the wealthy capitalists alone excepted. The Commune had saved them by a sagacious settlement of that ever-recurring cause of dispute among the middle classes themselves—the debtor and creditor accounts.¹⁹⁴ The same portion of the middle class, after they had assisted in putting down the working men's insurrection of June, 1848, had been at once unceremoniously sacrificed to their creditors by the then Constituent Assembly.¹⁹⁵ But this was not their motive for now rallying round the working class. They felt that there was but one alternative—the Commune, or the Empire—under whatever name it might reappear. The Empire had ruined them economically by the havoc it made of public wealth, by the wholesale financial swindling it fostered, by the props it lent to the artificially accelerated centralization of capital, and the concomitant expropriation of their own ranks. It had suppressed them politically, it had shocked them morally by its orgies, it had insulted their Voltairianism by handing over the education of their children to the *frères Ignorantins*,¹⁹⁶ it had revolted their national feeling as Frenchmen by precipitating them headlong into a war which left only one equivalent for the ruins it made—the disappearance of

^a In the 1871 and 1891 German editions this phrase is followed by the phrase "of the propertied".—*Ed.*

^b The German editions have further "Professor Huxley".—*Ed.*

the Empire. In fact, after the exodus from Paris of the high Bonapartist and capitalist *Bohême*, the true middle-class Party of Order came out in the shape of the "Union Républicaine,"¹⁹⁷ enrolling themselves under the colours of the Commune and defending it against the wilful misconstruction of Thiers. Whether the gratitude of this great body of the middle class will stand the present severe trial, time must show.

The Commune was perfectly right in telling the peasants that "its victory was their only hope."¹⁹⁸ Of all the lies hatched at Versailles and re-echoed by the glorious European penny-a-liner, one of the most tremendous was that the Rurals represented the French peasantry. Think only of the love of the French peasant for the men to whom, after 1815, he had to pay the milliard of indemnity!¹⁹⁹ In the eyes of the French peasant, the very existence of a great landed proprietor is in itself an encroachment on his conquests of 1789. The bourgeois, in 1848, had burthened his plot of land with the additional tax of forty-five cents in the franc²⁰⁰; but then he did so in the name of the revolution; while now he had fomented a civil war against the revolution, to shift on to the peasant's shoulders the chief load of the five milliards of indemnity to be paid to the Prussians. The Commune, on the other hand, in one of its first proclamations, declared that the true originators of the war would be made to pay its cost.^a The Commune would have delivered the peasant of the blood tax,—would have given him a cheap government,—transformed his present blood-suckers, the notary, advocate, executor, and other judicial vampires, into salaried communal agents, elected by, and responsible to, himself. It would have freed him of the tyranny of the *garde champêtre*,^b the gendarme, and the prefect, would have put enlightenment by the schoolmaster in the place of stultification by the priest. And the French peasant is, above all, a man of reckoning. He would find it extremely reasonable that the pay of the priest, instead of being extorted by the tax-gatherer, should only depend upon the spontaneous action of the parishioners' religious instincts. Such were the great immediate boons which the rule of the Commune—and that rule alone—held out to the French peasantry. It is, therefore, quite superfluous here to expatiate upon the more complicated but vital problems which the

^a [V.] Grêlier, "Le comité central de la garde nationale est décidé...", *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 80, March 21, 1871.—Ed.

^b Village police.—Ed.

Commune alone was able, and at the same time compelled, to solve in favour of the peasant, viz., the hypothecary debt, lying like an incubus upon his parcel of soil, the *prolétariat foncier* (the rural proletariat), daily growing upon it, and his expropriation from it enforced, at a more and more rapid rate, by the very development of modern agriculture and the competition of capitalist farming.

The French peasant had elected Louis Bonaparte president of the Republic; but the Party of Order created the Empire. What the French peasant really wants he commenced to show in 1849 and 1850, by opposing his maire to the Government's prefect, his schoolmaster to the Government's priest, and himself to the Government's gendarme. All the laws made by the Party of Order in January and February, 1850,²⁰¹ were avowed measures of repression against the peasant. The peasant was a Bonapartist, because the great Revolution, with all its benefits to him, was, in his eyes, personified in Napoleon. This delusion, rapidly breaking down under the Second Empire (and in its very nature hostile to the Rurals), this prejudice of the past, how could it have withstood the appeal of the Commune to the living interests and urgent wants of the peasantry?

The Rurals—this was, in fact, their chief apprehension—knew that three months' free communication of Communal Paris with the provinces would bring about a general rising of the peasants, and hence their anxiety to establish a police blockade around Paris, so as to stop the spread of the rinderpest.

If the Commune was thus the true representative of all the healthy elements of French society, and therefore the truly national Government, it was, at the same time, as a working men's Government, as the bold champion of the emancipation of labour, emphatically international. Within sight of the Prussian army, that had annexed to Germany two French provinces, the Commune annexed to France the working people all over the world.

The Second Empire had been the jubilee of cosmopolitan blacklegism, the rakes of all countries rushing in at its call for a share in its orgies and in the plunder of the French people. Even at this moment the right hand of Thiers is Ganesco, the foul Wallachian, and his left hand is Markowski, the Russian spy. The Commune admitted all foreigners to the honour of dying for an immortal cause. Between the foreign war lost by their treason, and the civil war fomented by their conspiracy with the foreign invader, the bourgeoisie had found the time to display their patriotism by organizing police-hunts upon the Germans in

France. The Commune made a German working-man^a its Minister of Labour. Thiers, the bourgeoisie, the Second Empire, had continually deluded Poland by loud professions of sympathy, while in reality betraying her to, and doing the dirty work of, Russia. The Commune honoured the heroic sons of Poland^b by placing them at the head of the defenders of Paris. And, to broadly mark the new era of history it was conscious of initiating, under the eyes of the conquering Prussians on the one side, and of the Bonapartist army, led by Bonapartist generals, on the other, the Commune pulled down that colossal symbol of martial glory, the Vendôme column.^{c 202}

The great social measure of the Commune was its own working existence. Its special measures could but betoken the tendency of a government of the people by the people. Such were the abolition of the nightwork of journeymen bakers^d; the prohibition, under penalty, of the employers' practice to reduce wages by levying upon their workpeople fines under manifold pretexts,^e—a process in which the employer combines in his own person the parts of legislator, judge, and executor, and filches the money to boot. Another measure of this class was the surrender, to associations of workmen, under reserve of compensation, of all closed workshops and factories, no matter whether the respective capitalists had absconded or preferred to strike work.^f

The financial measures of the Commune, remarkable for their sagacity and moderation, could only be such as were compatible with the state of a besieged town. Considering the colossal robberies committed upon the city of Paris by the great financial companies and contractors, under the protection^g of Haussmann,²⁰³ the Commune would have had an incomparably better title to confiscate their property than Louis Napoleon had against the

^a Leo Frankel.—*Ed.*

^b J. Dombrowski and W. Wróblewski.—*Ed.*

^c [Décret sur la démolition de la colonne Vendôme. Paris, 12 avril 1871], *Le Rappel*, No. 670, April 14, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 103, April 13, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d [Arrêté sur la suppression du travail de nuit dans les boulangeries. Paris, 20 avril 1871], *L'Avant-Garde*, No. 451, April 22, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 111, April 21, 1871.—*Ed.*

^e [Arrêté sur abolition des amendes ou retenues sur les salaires. Paris, 27 avril 1871], *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 119, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^f Decree of April 16, 1871 on handing over the workshops and manufactories to cooperative workmen societies, *The Daily News*, No. 7790, April 18, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 107, April 17, 1871.—*Ed.*

^g The 1871 and 1891 German editions have "rule".—*Ed.*

Orléans family. The Hohenzollern and the English oligarchs who both have derived a good deal of their estates from Church plunder, were, of course, greatly shocked at the Commune clearing but 8,000f. out of secularisation.

While the Versailles Government, as soon as it had recovered some spirit and strength, used the most violent means against the Commune; while it put down the free expression of opinion all over France, even to the forbidding of meetings of delegates from the large towns; while it subjected Versailles and the rest of France to an espionage far surpassing that of the Second Empire; while it burned by its gendarme inquisitors all papers printed at Paris, and sifted all correspondence from and to Paris; while in the National Assembly the most timid attempts to put in a word for Paris were howled down in a manner unknown even to the *Chambre introuvable*¹⁷⁷ of 1816^a; with the savage warfare of Versailles outside, and its attempts at corruption and conspiracy inside Paris—would the Commune not have shamefully betrayed its trust by affecting to keep up all the decencies and appearances of liberalism as in a time of profound peace? Had the Government of the Commune been akin to that of M. Thiers, there would have been no more occasion to suppress Party-of-Order papers at Paris than there was to suppress Communal papers at Versailles.

It was irritating indeed to the Rurals that at the very same time they declared the return to the Church to be the only means of salvation for France, the infidel Commune unearthed the peculiar mysteries of the Picpus nunnery, and of the Church of Saint Laurent.²⁰⁴ It was a satire upon M. Thiers that, while he showered grand crosses upon the Bonapartist generals in acknowledgment of their mastery in losing battles, signing capitulations, and turning cigarettes at Wilhelmshöhe,²⁰⁵ the Commune dismissed and arrested its generals whenever they were suspected of neglecting their duties. The expulsion from, and arrest by, the Commune of one of its members²⁰⁶ who had slipped in under a false name, and had undergone at Lyons six days' imprisonment for simple bankruptcy, was it not a deliberate insult hurled at the forger, Jules Favre, then still the foreign minister of France, still selling France to Bismarck, and still dictating his orders to that paragon Government of Belgium? But indeed the Commune did not pretend to infallibility, the invariable attribute of all governments of the old stamp. It published its doings and sayings, it initiated the public into all its shortcomings.

^a The 1871 and 1891 German editions have "Chamber of Junkers".—Ed.

In every revolution there intrude, at the side of its true agents, men of a different stamp; some of them survivors of and devotees to past revolutions, without insight into the present movement, but preserving popular influence by their known honesty and courage, or by the sheer force of tradition; others mere bawlers, who, by dint of repeating year after year the same set of stereotyped declamations against the Government of the day, have sneaked into the reputation of revolutionists of the first water. After the 18th of March, some such men did also turn up, and in some cases contrived to play pre-eminent parts. As far as their power went, they hampered the real action of the working class, exactly as men of that sort have hampered the full development of every previous revolution. They are an unavoidable evil; with time they are shaken off; but time was not allowed to the Commune.

Wonderful, indeed, was the change the Commune had wrought in Paris! No longer any trace of the meretricious Paris of the Second Empire. No longer was Paris the rendezvous of British landlords, Irish absentees,²⁰⁷ American ex-slaveholders and shoddy men, Russian ex-serfowners, and Wallachian boyards. No more corpses at the Morgue, no nocturnal burglaries, scarcely any robberies; in fact, for the first time since the days of February, 1848, the streets of Paris were safe, and that without any police of any kind.

"We," said a member of the Commune, "hear no longer of assassination, theft, and personal assault; it seems indeed as if the police had dragged along with it to Versailles all its Conservative friends."^a

The *cocottes* had refound the scent of their protectors—the absconding men of family, religion, and, above all, of property. In their stead, the real women of Paris showed again at the surface—heroic, noble, and devoted, like the women of antiquity. Working, thinking, fighting, bleeding Paris—almost forgetful, in its incubation of a new society, of the cannibals at its gates—radiant in the enthusiasm of its historic initiative!

Opposed to this new world at Paris, behold the old world at Versailles—that assembly of the ghouls of all defunct *régimes*, Legitimists and Orleanists, eager to feed upon the carcass of the nation,—with a tail of antediluvian Republicans, sanctioning, by their presence in the Assembly, the slaveholders' rebellion, relying for the maintenance of their Parliamentary Republic upon the

^a P. Lafargue, "Une visite à Paris. Du 7 au 18 avril", *La Tribune de Bordeaux*, April 24, 1871.—Ed.

vanity of the senile mountebank at its head, and caricaturing 1789 by holding their ghastly meetings in the *Jeu de Paume*.^{*} There it was, this Assembly, the representative of everything dead in France, propped up to the semblance of life by nothing but the swords of the generals of Louis Bonaparte. Paris all truth, Versailles all lie; and that lie vented through the mouth of Thiers.

Thiers tells a deputation of the mayors of the Seine-et-Oise,—

“You may rely upon my word, which I have *never* broken!”^a

He tells the Assembly itself that “it was the most freely elected and most Liberal Assembly France ever possessed”^b; he tells his motley soldiery that it was “the admiration of the world, and the finest army France ever possessed”^c; he tells the provinces that the bombardment of Paris by him was a myth:

“If some cannon-shots have been fired, it is not the deed of the army of Versailles, but of some insurgents trying to make believe that they are fighting, while they dare not show their faces.”^d

He again tells the provinces that

“the artillery of Versailles does not bombard Paris, but only cannonades it.”^e

He tells the Archbishop of Paris^f that the pretended executions and reprisals (!) attributed to the Versailles troops were all moonshine.^g He tells Paris that he was only anxious “to free it from the hideous tyrants who oppress it,”^h and that, in fact, the Paris of the Commune was “but a handful of criminals.”ⁱ

The Paris of M. Thiers was not the real Paris of the “vile multitude,” but a phantom Paris, the Paris of the *francs-fileurs*,²⁰⁸ the Paris of the Boulevards, male and female—the rich, the

* “The tennis court where the National Assembly of 1789 adopted its famous decisions.” (*Engels’ Note to the 1871 German edition.*)

^a “Méditation des municipalités de la Seine”, *Le Rappel*, No. 684, April 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b L. A. Thiers’ speech in the National Assembly on April 27, 1871, *Le Rappel*, No. 685, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Quoted in: Th. Astrie, “L’homme rouge”, *La Situation*, No. 176, April 14, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d “La circulaire de M. Thiers”, *Le Vengeur*, No. 21, April 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

^e “Le Moniteur des communes contient...”, *Le Rappel*, No. 692, May 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

^f G. Darboy.—*Ed.*

^g “La commission des Quinze...”, *Le Rappel*, No. 673, April 17, 1871; L. A. Thiers’ letter to G. Darboy of April 14, 1871, *Le Rappel*, No. 676, April 20, 1871.—*Ed.*

^h “Voici, sur le même fait, le bulletin...”, *Le Rappel*, No. 692, May 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

ⁱ L. A. Thiers’ speech in the National Assembly on April 27, 1871, *Le Rappel*, No. 685, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

capitalist, the gilded, the idle Paris, now thronging with its lackeys, its blacklegs, its literary *bohème*, and its *cocottes* at Versailles, Saint-Denis, Rueil, and Saint-Germain; considering the civil war but an agreeable diversion, eyeing the battle going on through telescopes, counting the rounds of cannon, and swearing by their own honour and that of their prostitutes, that the performance was far better got up than it used to be at the Porte St. Martin.²⁰⁹ The men who fell were really dead; the cries of the wounded were cries in good earnest; and, besides, the whole thing was so intensely historical.

This is the Paris of M. Thiers, as the Emigration of Coblenz was the France of M. de Calonne.²¹⁰

IV

The first attempt of the slaveholders' conspiracy to put down Paris by getting the Prussians to occupy it, was frustrated by Bismarck's refusal. The second attempt, that of the 18th of March, ended in the rout of the army and the flight to Versailles of the Government, which ordered the whole administration to break up and follow in its track. By the semblance of peace-negotiations with Paris, Thiers found the time to prepare for war against it. But where to find an army? The remnants of the line regiments were weak in number and unsafe in character. His urgent appeal to the provinces to succour Versailles, by their National Guards and volunteers, met with a flat refusal.^a Brittany alone furnished a handful of *Chouans*²¹¹ fighting under a white flag, every one of them wearing on his breast the heart of Jesus in white cloth, and shouting "Vive le Roi!" (Long live the King!)^b Thiers was, therefore, compelled to collect, in hot haste, a motley crew, composed of sailors, marines, Pontifical Zouaves,¹⁰⁸ Valentin's gendarmes, and Piétri's sergents-de-ville and *mouchards*.^c This army, however, would have been ridiculously ineffective without the instalments of imperialist war-prisoners, which Bismarck granted in numbers just sufficient to keep the civil war a-going, and keep the Versailles Government in abject dependence on Prussia. During the war itself, the Versailles police had to look after the Versailles army, while the gendarmes had to drag it on by

^a Report from *La Défense républicaine, Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 65, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "The Communal Delegation...", *The Daily News*, No. 7779, April 5, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Agents provocateurs.—*Ed.*

exposing themselves at all posts of danger. The forts which fell were not taken, but bought. The heroism of the Federals convinced Thiers that the resistance of Paris was not to be broken by his own strategic genius and the bayonets at his disposal.

Meanwhile, his relations with the provinces became more and more difficult. Not one single address of approval came in to gladden Thiers and his Rurals. Quite the contrary. Deputations and addresses demanding, in a tone anything but respectful, conciliation with Paris on the basis of the unequivocal recognition of the Republic, the acknowledgment of the Communal liberties, and the dissolution of the National Assembly, whose mandate was extinct,^a poured in from all sides, and in such numbers that Dufaure, Thiers's Minister of Justice, in his circular of April 23rd to the public prosecutors, commanded them to treat "the cry of conciliation" as a crime!^b In regard, however, of the hopeless prospect held out by his campaign, Thiers resolved to shift his tactics by ordering, all over the country, municipal elections to take place on the 30th of April, on the basis of the new municipal law dictated by himself to the National Assembly. What with the intrigues of his prefects, what with police intimidation, he felt quite sanguine of imparting, by the verdict of the provinces, to the National Assembly that moral power it had never possessed, and of getting at last from the provinces the physical force required for the conquest of Paris.

His banditti-warfare against Paris, exalted in his own bulletins, and the attempts of his ministers at the establishment, throughout France, of a reign of terror, Thiers was from the beginning anxious to accompany with a little byplay of conciliation, which had to serve more than one purpose. It was to dupe the provinces, to inveigle the middle-class element in Paris, and, above all, to afford the professed Republicans in the National Assembly the opportunity of hiding their treason against Paris behind their faith in Thiers. On the 21st of March, when still without an army, he had declared to the Assembly:

"Come what may, I will not send an army to Paris."^c

On the 27th March he rose again:

^a J. Dufaure's speech in the National Assembly, April 26, 1871, *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 65, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b J. Dufaure, [Circulaire aux procureurs généraux. Versailles, 23 avril 1871], *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 62, April 26, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c L. A. Thiers' speech in the National Assembly, March 21, 1871, *The Daily News*, No. 7768, March 23, 1871.—*Ed.*

"I have found the Republic an accomplished fact, and I am firmly resolved to maintain it."

In reality, he put down the revolution at Lyons and Marseilles²¹² in the name of the Republic, while the roars of his Rurals drowned the very mention of its name at Versailles. After this exploit, he toned down the "accomplished fact" into an hypothetical fact. The Orléans princes, whom he had cautiously warned off Bordeaux, were now, in flagrant breach of the law, permitted to intrigue at Dreux. The concessions held out by Thiers in his interminable interviews with the delegates from Paris and the provinces, although constantly varied in tone and colour, according to time and circumstances, did in fact never come to more than the prospective restriction of revenge to the

"handful of criminals implicated in the murder of Lecomte and Clément Thomas,"^a

on the well-understood premiss that Paris and France were unreservedly to accept M. Thiers himself as the best of possible Republics, as he, in 1830, had done with Louis Philippe. Even these concessions he not only took care to render doubtful by the official comments put upon them in the Assembly through his Ministers. He had his Dufaure to act. Dufaure, this old Orleanist lawyer, had always been the justiciary of the state of siege, as now in 1871, under Thiers, so in 1839 under Louis Philippe, and in 1849 under Louis Bonaparte's presidency.²¹³ While out of office he made a fortune by pleading for the Paris capitalists, and made political capital by pleading against the laws he had himself originated. He now hurried through the National Assembly not only a set of repressive laws which were, after the fall of Paris, to extirpate the last remnants of Republican liberty in France²¹⁴; he foreshadowed the fate of Paris by abridging the, for him, too slow procedure of courts-martial,²¹⁵ and by a new-fangled, Draconic code of deportation. The Revolution of 1848, abolishing the penalty of death for political crimes, had replaced it by deportation. Louis Bonaparte did not dare, at least not in theory, to re-establish the *régime* of the guillotine. The Rural Assembly, not yet bold enough even to hint that the Parisians were not rebels, but assassins, had therefore to confine its prospective vengeance against Paris to Dufaure's new code of deportation. Under all these circumstances Thiers himself could not have gone on with his comedy of conciliation, had it not, as he intended it to do,

^a L. A. Thiers' speech in the National Assembly, April 27, 1871, *Le Rappel*, No. 685, April 29, 1871.—Ed.

drawn forth shrieks of rage from the Rurals, whose ruminating mind did neither understand the play, nor its necessities of hypocrisy, tergiversation, and procrastination.

In sight of the impending municipal elections of the 30th April, Thiers enacted one of his great conciliation scenes of the 27th April. Amidst a flood of sentimental rhetoric, he exclaimed from the tribune of the Assembly:

"There exists no conspiracy against the Republic but that of Paris, which compels us to shed French blood. I repeat it again and again. Let those impious arms fall from the hands which hold them, and chastisement will be arrested at once by an act of peace excluding only the small number of criminals."

To the violent interruption of the Rurals he replied:

"Gentlemen, tell me, I implore you, am I wrong? Do you really regret that I could have stated the truth that the criminals are only a handful? Is it not fortunate in the midst of our misfortunes that those who have been capable to shed the blood of Clément Thomas and General Lecomte are but rare exceptions?"^a

France, however, turned a deaf ear to what Thiers flattered himself to be a parliamentary siren's song. Out of 700,000 municipal councillors returned by the 35,000 communes still left to France, the united Legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists did not carry 8,000. The supplementary elections which followed were still more decidedly hostile. Thus, instead of getting from the provinces the badly-needed physical force, the National Assembly lost even its last claim to moral force, that of being the expression of the universal suffrage of the country. To complete the discomfiture, the newly-chosen municipal councils of all the cities of France openly threatened the usurping Assembly at Versailles with a counter Assembly at Bordeaux.

Then the long-expected moment of decisive action had at last come for Bismarck. He peremptorily summoned Thiers to send to Frankfort plenipotentiaries for the definitive settlement of peace. In humble obedience to the call of his master, Thiers hastened to despatch his trusty Jules Favre, backed by Pouyer-Quertier. Pouyer-Quertier, an "eminent" Rouen cotton-spinner, a fervent and even servile partisan of the Second Empire, had never found any fault with it save its commercial treaty with England,²¹⁶ prejudicial to his own shop-interest. Hardly installed at Bordeaux as Thiers's Minister of Finance, he denounced that "unholy" treaty, hinted at its near abrogation, and had even the effrontery to try, although in vain (having counted without Bismarck), the immediate enforcement of the old protective duties against Alsace,

^a L. A. Thiers' speech in the National Assembly on April 27, 1871, *Le Rappel*, No. 685, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

where, he said, no previous international treaties stood in the way. This man, who considered counter-revolution as a means to put down wages at Rouen, and the surrender of French provinces as a means to bring up the price of his wares in France, was he not *the one* predestined to be picked out by Thiers as the helpmate of Jules Favre in his last and crowning treason?

On the arrival at Frankfort of this exquisite pair of plenipotentiaries, bully Bismarck at once met them with the imperious alternative: Either the restoration of the Empire, or the unconditional acceptance of my own peace terms! These terms included a shortening of the intervals in which the war indemnity was to be paid, and the continued occupation of the Paris forts by Prussian troops until Bismarck should feel satisfied with the state of things in France; Prussia thus being recognized as the supreme arbiter in internal French politics! In return for this he offered to let loose, for the extermination of Paris, the captive Bonapartist army, and to lend them the direct assistance of Emperor William's troops. He pledged his good faith by making payment of the first instalment of the indemnity dependent on the "pacification" of Paris. Such a bait was, of course, eagerly swallowed by Thiers and his plenipotentiaries. They signed the treaty of peace on the 10th of May,^a and had it endorsed by the Versailles Assembly on the 18th.

In the interval between the conclusion of peace and the arrival of the Bonapartist prisoners, Thiers felt the more bound to resume his comedy of conciliation, as his Republican tools stood in sore need of a pretext for blinking their eyes at the preparations for the carnage of Paris. As late as the 8th May he replied to a deputation of middle-class conciliators—

"Whenever the insurgents will make up their minds for capitulation, the gates of Paris shall be flung wide open during a week for all except the murderers of Generals Clément Thomas and Lecomte."

A few days afterwards, when violently interpellated on these promises by the Rurals, he refused to enter into any explanations; not, however, without giving them this significant hint:—

"I tell you there are impatient men amongst you, men who are in too great a hurry. They must have another eight days; at the end of these eight days there will be no more danger, and the task will be proportionate to their courage and to their capacities."^b

^a *Traité de paix entre l'Empire Allemand et la France, signé à Francfort s. m., le 10 mai 1871...—Ed.*

^b The source from which Marx quotes this text has not been established. See L. A. Thiers' speech in the National Assembly on May 11, 1871, *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 132, May 12, 1871.—Ed.

As soon as MacMahon was able to assure him that he could shortly enter Paris, Thiers declared to the Assembly that

"he would enter Paris with the *laws* in his hands, and demand a full expiation from the wretches who had sacrificed the lives of soldiers and destroyed public monuments."^a

As the moment of decision drew near he said—to the Assembly, "I shall be pitiless!"^b—to Paris, that it was doomed; and to his Bonapartist banditti, that they had State license to wreak vengeance upon Paris to their hearts' content.^c At last, when treachery had opened the gates of Paris to General Douay, on the 21st May, Thiers, on the 22nd, revealed to the Rurals the "goal" of his conciliation comedy, which they had so obstinately persisted in not understanding.

"I told you a few days ago that we were approaching *our goal*; to-day I come to tell you *the goal* is reached. The victory of order, justice, and civilization is at last won!"^d

So it was. The civilization and justice of bourgeois order comes out in its lurid light whenever the slaves and drudges of that order rise against their masters. Then this civilization and justice stand forth as undisguised savagery and lawless revenge. Each new crisis in the class struggle between the appropriator and the producer brings out this fact more glaringly. Even the atrocities of the bourgeois in June, 1848, vanish before the ineffable infamy of 1871. The self-sacrificing heroism with which the population of Paris—men, women, and children—fought for eight days after the entrance of the Versaillese, reflects as much the grandeur of their cause, as the infernal deeds of the soldiery reflect the innate spirit of that civilization of which they are the mercenary vindicators. A glorious civilization, indeed, the great problem of which is how to get rid of the heaps of corpses it made after the battle was over!

To find a parallel for the conduct of Thiers and, his

^a The source from which Marx quotes here has not been established. See L. A. Thiers' speech in the National Assembly on May 22, 1871, *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 143, May 23, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b L. A. Thiers' speech in the National Assembly on May 24, 1871, *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 145, May 25, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c L. A. Thiers, [Circulaire aux préfets et aux autorités civiles, judiciaires et militaires. Versailles, 25 mai 1871], *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 146, May 26, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d The source from which Marx quotes here has not been established. See L. A. Thiers' speech in the National Assembly on May 22, 1871, *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 143, May 23, 1871.—*Ed.*

bloodhounds we must go back to the times of Sulla and the two Triumvirates of Rome.²¹⁷ The same wholesale slaughter in cold blood; the same disregard, in massacre, of age and sex; the same system of torturing prisoners; the same proscriptions, but this time of a whole class; the same savage hunt after concealed leaders, lest one might escape; the same denunciations of political and private enemies; the same indifference for the butchery of entire strangers to the feud. There is but this difference, that the Romans had no mitrailleuses for the despatch, in the lump, of the proscribed, and that they had not "the law in their hands," nor on their lips the cry of "civilization."

And after those horrors, look upon the other, still more hideous, face of that bourgeois civilization as described by its own press!

"With stray shots," writes the Paris correspondent of a London Tory paper, "still ringing in the distance, and untended wounded wretches dying amid the tombstones of Père la Chaise—with 6,000 terror-stricken insurgents wandering in an agony of despair in the labyrinth of the catacombs, and wretches hurried through the streets to be shot down in scores by the mitrailleuse—it is revolting to see the *cafés* filled with the votaries of absinthe, billiards, and dominoes; female profligacy perambulating the boulevards, and the sound of revelry disturbing the night from the *cabinets particuliers*^a of fashionable restaurants."^b

M. Edouard Hervé writes in the *Journal de Paris*, a Versaillist journal suppressed by the Commune:—

"The way in which the population of Paris (!) manifested its satisfaction yesterday was rather more than frivolous, and we fear it will grow worse as time progresses. Paris has now a *fête* day appearance, which is sadly out of place; and, unless we are to be called the *Parisiens de la décadence*,^c this sort of thing must come to an end."

And then he quotes the passage from Tacitus:—

"Yet, on the morrow of that horrible struggle, even before it was completely over, Rome—degraded and corrupt—began once more to wallow in the voluptuous slough which was destroying its body and polluting its soul—*alibi proelia et vulnera, alibi balneae popinaeque*—(here fights and wounds, there baths and restaurants)."^d

M. Hervé only forgets to say that the "population of Paris" he speaks of is but the population of the Paris of M. Thiers—the

^a Private rooms.—*Ed.*

^b "The End of the Insurrection", *The Standard*, No. 14613, June 2, 1871. It also quotes from Hervé's article published in the *Journal de Paris*, No. 138, May 31, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Parisians of the period of decadence.—*Ed.*

^d Tacitus, *Histories*, III, 83.—*Ed.*

*francs-fileurs*²⁰⁸ returning in throngs from Versailles, Saint-Denis, Rueil, and Saint-Germain—the Paris of the “Decline.”

In all its bloody triumphs over the self-sacrificing champions of a new and better society, that nefarious civilization, based upon the enslavement of labour, drowns the moans of its victims in a hue-and-cry of calumny, reverberated by a world-wide echo. The serene working men’s Paris of the Commune is suddenly changed into a pandemonium by the bloodhounds of “order.” And what does this tremendous change prove to the bourgeois mind of all countries? Why, that the Commune has conspired against civilization! The Paris people die enthusiastically for the Commune in numbers unequalled in any battle known to history. What does that prove? Why, that the Commune was not the people’s own government, but the usurpation of a handful of criminals! The women of Paris joyfully give up their lives at the barricades and on the place of execution. What does this prove? Why, that the demon of the Commune has changed them into Megaeras and Hecates! The moderation of the Commune during two months of undisputed sway is equalled only by the heroism of its defence. What does that prove? Why, that for months the Commune carefully hid, under a mask of moderation and humanity, the blood-thirstiness of its fiendish instincts, to be let loose in the hour of its agony!

The working men’s Paris, in the act of its heroic self-holocaust, involved in its flames buildings and monuments. While tearing to pieces the living body of the proletariat, its rulers must no longer expect to return triumphantly into the intact architecture of their abodes. The Government of Versailles cries, “Incendiarism!” and whispers this cue to all its agents, down to the remotest hamlet, to hunt up its enemies everywhere as suspect of professional incendiarism. The bourgeoisie of the whole world, which looks complacently upon the wholesale massacre after the battle, is convulsed by horror at the desecration of brick and mortar!

When governments give state-licenses to their navies to “kill, burn, and destroy,” is that a license for incendiarism? When the British troops wantonly set fire to the Capitol at Washington and to the summer palace of the Chinese Emperor,²¹⁸ was that incendiarism? When the Prussians, not for military reasons, but out of the mere spite of revenge, burnt down, by the help of petroleum, towns like Châteaudun and innumerable villages, was that incendiarism?^a When Thiers, during six weeks, bombarded

^a This phrase is omitted in the 1871 and 1891 German editions.—Ed.

Paris, under the pretext that he wanted to set fire to those houses only in which there were people, was that incendiarism?—In war, fire is an arm as legitimate as any. Buildings held by the enemy are shelled to set them on fire. If their defenders have to retire, they themselves light the flames to prevent the attack from making use of the buildings. To be burnt down has always been the inevitable fate of all buildings situated in the front of battle of all the regular armies of the world. But in the war of the enslaved against their enslavers, the only justifiable war in history, this is by no means to hold good! The Commune used fire strictly as a means of defence. They used it to stop up to the Versailles troops those long straight avenues which Haussmann had expressly opened to artillery-fire²⁰³; they used it to cover their retreat, in the same way as the Versaillese, in their advance, used their shells which destroyed at least as many buildings as the fire of the Commune. It is a matter of dispute, even now, which buildings were set fire to by the defence, and which by the attack. And the defence resorted to fire only then, when the Versaillese troops had already commenced their wholesale murdering of prisoners.—Besides, the Commune had, long before, given full public notice^a that, if driven to extremities, they would bury themselves under the ruins of Paris, and make Paris a second Moscow,²¹⁹ as the Government of Defence, but only as a cloak for its treason, had promised to do. For this purpose Trochu had found them the petroleum. The Commune knew that its opponents cared nothing for the lives of the Paris people, but cared much for their own Paris buildings. And Thiers, on the other hand, had given them notice that he would be implacable in his vengeance. No sooner had he got his army ready on one side, and the Prussians shutting up the trap on the other, than he proclaimed: "I shall be pitiless! The expiation will be complete, and justice will be stern!"^b If the acts of the Paris working men were vandalism, it was the vandalism of defence in despair, not the vandalism of triumph, like that which the Christians perpetrated upon the really priceless art treasures of heathen antiquity; and even that vandalism has been justified by the historian as an unavoidable and comparatively trifling concomitant to the Titanic struggle between a new society arising and an old one breaking down. It was still less the vandalism of Haussmann, razing historic Paris to make place for the Paris of the sightseer!

^a "Aux grandes villes", *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 136, May 16, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b From L. A. Thiers' speeches in the National Assembly on May 22 and 24, 1871. See this volume, p. 348.—*Ed.*

But the execution by the Commune of the sixty-four hostages, with the Archbishop of Paris^a at their head! The bourgeoisie and its army in June, 1848, re-established a custom which had long disappeared from the practice of war—the shooting of their defenceless prisoners. This brutal custom has since been more or less strictly adhered to by the suppressors of all popular commotions in Europe and India; thus proving that it constitutes a real “progress of civilization”! On the other hand, the Prussians, in France, had re-established the practice of taking hostages—innocent men, who, with their lives, were to answer to them for the acts of others. When Thiers, as we have seen, from the very beginning of the conflict, enforced the humane practice of shooting down the Communal prisoners, the Commune, to protect their lives, was obliged to resort to the Prussian practice of securing hostages. The lives of the hostages had been forfeited over and over again by the continued shooting of prisoners on the part of the Versaillese. How could they be spared any longer after the carnage with which MacMahon’s praetorians²²⁰ celebrated their entrance into Paris? Was even the last check upon the unscrupulous ferocity of bourgeois governments—the taking of hostages—to be made a mere sham of? The real murderer of Archbishop Darboy is Thiers. The Commune again and again had offered to exchange the archbishop, and ever so many priests into the bargain, against the single Blanqui, then in the hands of Thiers. Thiers obstinately refused. He knew that with Blanqui he would give to the Commune a head; while the archbishop would serve his purpose best in the shape of a corpse. Thiers acted upon the precedent of Cavaignac. How, in June, 1848, did not Cavaignac and his men of order raise shouts of horror by stigmatizing the insurgents as the assassins of Archbishop Affre! They knew perfectly well that the archbishop had been shot by the soldiers of order. M. Jacquemet, the archbishop’s vicar-general, present on the spot, had immediately afterwards handed them in his evidence to that effect.^b

All this chorus of calumny which the Party of Order never fail, in their orgies of blood, to raise against their victims, only proves that the bourgeois of our days considers himself the legitimate successor to the baron of old, who thought every weapon in his own hand fair against the plebeian, while in the hands of the plebeian a weapon of any kind constituted in itself a crime.

^a G. Darboy.—*Ed.*

^b The reference is to Jacquemet’s statement of June 26, 1848, published in *La Situation*, No. 185, April 25, 1871.—*Ed.*

The conspiracy of the ruling class to break down the Revolution by a civil war carried on under the patronage of the foreign invader—a conspiracy which we have traced from the very 4th of September down to the entrance of MacMahon's praetorians through the gate of St. Cloud—culminated in the carnage of Paris. Bismarck gloats over the ruins of Paris, in which he saw perhaps the first instalment of that general destructions of great cities he had prayed for when still a simple Rural in the Prussian *Chambre introuvable* of 1849.²²¹ He gloats over the cadavres of the Paris proletariat. For him this is not only the extermination of revolution, but the extinction of France, now decapitated in reality, and by the French Government itself. With the shallowness characteristic of all successful statesmen, he sees but the surface of this tremendous historic event. Whenever before has history exhibited the spectacle of a conqueror crowning his victory by turning into, not only the gendarme, but the hired bravo of the conquered Government? There existed no war between Prussia and the Commune of Paris. On the contrary, the Commune had accepted the peace preliminaries, and Prussia had announced her neutrality. Prussia was, therefore, no belligerent. She acted the part of bravo, a cowardly bravo, because incurring no danger; a hired bravo, because stipulating beforehand the payment of her blood-money of 500 millions on the fall of Paris. And thus, at last, came out the true character of the war, ordained by Providence as a chastisement of godless and debauched France by pious and moral Germany! And this unparalleled breach of the law of nations, even as understood by the old world lawyers, instead of arousing the "civilized" Governments of Europe to declare the felonious Prussian Government, the mere tool of the St. Petersburg Cabinet, an outlaw amongst nations, only incites them to consider whether the few victims who escape the double cordon around Paris are not to be given up to the hangman at Versailles!

That after the most tremendous war of modern times, the conquering and the conquered hosts should fraternize for the common massacre of the proletariat—this unparalleled event does indicate, not, as Bismarck thinks, the final repression of a new society upheaving, but the crumbling into dust of bourgeois society. The highest heroic effort of which old society is still capable is national war; and this is now proved to be a mere governmental humbug, intended to defer the struggle of classes, and to be thrown aside as soon as that class struggle bursts out into civil war. Class rule is no longer able to disguise itself in a

national uniform; the national Governments are *one* as against the proletariat!

After Whit-Sunday, 1871, there can be neither peace nor truce possible between the working men of France and the appropriators of their produce. The iron hand of a mercenary soldiery may keep for a time both classes tied down in common oppression. But the battle must break out again and again in evergrowing dimensions, and there can be no doubt as to who will be the victor in the end,—the appropriating few, or the immense working majority. And the French working class is only the advanced guard of the modern proletariat.

While the European Governments thus testify, before Paris, to the international character of class rule, they cry down the International Working Men's Association—the international counter-organization of labour against the cosmopolitan conspiracy of capital—as the head fountain of all these disasters. Thiers denounced it as the despot of labour, pretending to be its liberator.^a Picard ordered that all communications between the French Internationals and those abroad should be cut off^b; Count Jaubert, Thiers's mummified accomplice of 1835, declares it the great problem of all civilized governments to weed it out.^c The Rurals roar against it, and the whole European press joins the chorus. An honourable French writer, completely foreign to our Association, speaks as follows:—

"The members of the Central Committee of the National Guard, as well as the greater part of the members of the Commune, are the most active, intelligent, and energetic minds of the International Working Men's Association;men who are thoroughly honest, sincere, intelligent, devoted, pure, and fanatical in the good sense of the word."^d

The police-tinged bourgeois mind naturally figures to itself the International Working Men's Association as acting in the manner of a secret conspiracy, its central body ordering, from time to time, explosions in different countries. Our Association is, in fact, nothing but the international bond between the most advanced working men in the various countries of the civilized world.

^a L. A. Thiers, [Circulaire à préfets et sous-préfets. Versailles, 28 mars 1871], *Le Rappel*, No. 655, March 30, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "The French Assembly", *The Daily News*, No. 7774, March 30, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c The source from which Marx cites this has not been established. See H. F. Jaubert's speech in the National Assembly on May 12, 1871, *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 133, May 13, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d [J. F. E. Robinet,] *Political Notes on the Present Situation of France and Paris*. By a French Positivist, London [1871].—*Ed.*

Wherever, in whatever shape, and under whatever conditions the class struggle obtains any consistency, it is but natural that members of our association should stand in the foreground. The soil out of which it grows is modern society itself. It cannot be stamped out by any amount of carnage. To stamp it out, the Governments would have to stamp out the despotism of capital over labour—the condition of their own parasitical existence.

Working men's Paris, with its Commune, will be for ever celebrated as the glorious harbinger of a new society. Its martyrs are enshrined in the great heart of the working class. Its exterminators history has already nailed to that eternal pillory from which all the prayers of their priests will not avail to redeem them.

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J. G. Eccarius, for the United
 States.

Hermann Jung, Chairman.
John Weston, Treasurer.

George Harris, Financial Sec.
John Hales, General Sec.

Office—256, High Holborn, London, W.C.,
 May 30th, 1871.

NOTES

I.

"The column of prisoners halted in the Avenue Uhrich, and was drawn up, four or five deep, on the footway facing to the road. General Marquis de Galliffet and his staff dismounted and commenced an inspection from the left of the line. Waling down slowly and eyeing the ranks, the General stopped here and there, tapping a man on the shoulder or beckoning him out of the rear ranks. In most cases, without further parley, the individual thus selected was marched out into the centre of the road, where a small supplementary column was, thus, soon formed.... It was evident that there was considerable room for error. A mounted officer pointed out to General Galliffet a man and woman for some particular offence. The woman, rushing out of the ranks, threw herself on her knees, and, with outstretched arms, protested her innocence in passionate terms. The general waited for a pause, and then with most impassible face and unmoved demeanour, said, 'Madame, I have visited every theatre in Paris, your acting will have no effect on me' ('ce n'est pas la peine de jouer la comédie').... It was not a good thing on that day to be noticeably taller, dirtier, cleaner, older, or uglier than one's neighbours. One individual in particular struck me as probably owing his speedy release from the ills of this world to his having a broken nose.... Over a hundred being thus chosen, a firing party told off, and the column resumed its march, leaving them behind. A few minutes afterwards a dropping fire, in our rear commenced, and continued for over a quarter of an hour. It was the execution of these summarily-convicted wretches."—*Paris Correspondent "Daily News,"* June 8th.^a—

This Galliffet, "the kept man of his wife, so notorious for her shameless exhibitions at the orgies of the Second Empire," went, during the war, by the name of the French "Ensign Pistol."

"*The Temps*, which is a careful journal, and not given to sensation, tells a dreadful story of people imperfectly shot and buried before life was extinct. A great number were buried in the square round St. Jacques-la-Boucherie; some of them very superficially. In the daytime the roar of the busy streets prevented any notice being taken; but in the stillness of the night the inhabitants of the houses in the neighbourhood were roused by distant moans, and in the morning a clenched

^a "An Adventure in Paris", *The Daily News*, No. 7834, June 8, 1871.—*Ed.*

hand was seen protruding through the soil. In consequence of this, exhumations were ordered to take place.... That many wounded have been buried alive I have not the slightest doubt. One case I can vouch for. When Brunel was shot with his mistress on the 24th ult. in the courtyard of a house in the Place Vendôme, the bodies lay there until the afternoon of the 27th. When the burial party came to remove the corpses, they found the woman living still, and took her to an ambulance. Though she had received four bullets she is now out of danger.”—*Paris Correspondent “Evening Standard,”*^a June 8th.

II.

The following letter appeared in *The Times* of June 13th²²²:—

“To the Editor of ‘*The Times*.’

“Sir,—

“On June 6, 1871, M. Jules Favre issued a circular to all the European Powers, calling upon them to hunt down the International Working-Men’s Association.^b A few remarks will suffice to characterize that document.

“In the very preamble of our statutes it is stated that the International was founded ‘September 28, 1864, at a public meeting held at St. Martin’s Hall, Long Acre, London’.^c For purposes of his own Jules Favre puts back the date of its origin behind 1862.

“In order to explain our principles, he professes to quote ‘their (the International’s) sheet of the 25th of March, 1869.’ And then what does he quote? The sheet of a society which is not the International.^d This sort of manoeuvre he already recurred to when, still a comparatively young lawyer, he had to defend the *National* newspaper, prosecuted for libel by Cabet.²²³ Then he pretended to read extracts from Cabet’s pamphlets while reading interpolations of his own—a trick exposed while the Court was sitting, and which, but for the indulgence of Cabet, would have

^a “M. Jules Favre’s Reply to Prince Napoleon. The International Society”, *The Evening Standard*, No. 14619, June 9, 1871; see also *Le Temps*, No. 3718, June 7, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b J. Favre, [Circularaire adressée aux agents diplomatiques de la République française], “Versailles, le 6 juin 1871”, *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 159, June 8, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Karl Marx, *Provisional Rules of the Association* (see present edition, Vol. 20, p. 15).—*Ed.*

^d *Programme de l’Alliance internationale de la Démocratie Socialiste*, Geneva, 1868.—*Ed.*

been punished by Jules Favre's expulsion from the Paris bar. Of all the documents quoted by him as documents of the International, not one belongs to the International. He says, for instance,

"The Alliance declares itself Atheist, says the General Council, constituted in London in July, 1869."

"The General Council never issued such a document. On the contrary, it issued a document^a which quashed the original statutes of the 'Alliance'—L'Alliance de la Démocratie Socialiste at Geneva—quoted by Jules Favre.

"Throughout his circular, which pretends in part also to be directed against the Empire, Jules Favre repeats against the International but the police inventions of the public prosecutors of the Empire, and which broke down miserably even before the law courts of that Empire.

"It is known that in its two addresses (of July and September last) on the late war,^b the General Council of the International denounced the Prussian plans of conquest against France. Later on, Mr. Reitlinger, Jules Favre's private secretary, applied, though of course in vain, to some members of the General Council for getting up by the Council a demonstration against Bismarck, in favour of the Government of National Defence; they were particularly requested not to mention the Republic. The preparations for a demonstration with regard to the expected arrival of Jules Favre in London were made—certainly with the best of intentions—in spite of the General Council, which, in its address of the 9th of September, had distinctly forewarned the Paris workmen against Jules Favre and his colleagues.

"What would Jules Favre say if, in its turn, the International were to send a circular^c on Jules Favre to all the Cabinets of Europe, drawing their particular attention to the documents published at Paris by the late M. Millière?"

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

"John Hales,

"Secretary to the General Council of the International
"Working Men's Association.

"256, High Holborn, W.C., June 12th."

^a The reference is to Marx's "The International Working Men's Association and the International Alliance of Socialist Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 34).—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 3-8 and 263-70.—*Ed.*

^c J.-B. E. Millière, "Le Faussaire", *Le Vengeur*, No. 6, February 8, 1871.—*Ed.*

In an article on "The International Society and its aims," that pious informer, the London *Spectator* (June 24th), amongst other similar tricks, quotes, even more fully than Jules Favre has done, the above document of the "Alliance" as the work of the International, and that eleven days after the refutation had been published in *The Times*. We do not wonder at this. Frederick the Great used to say that of all Jesuits the worst are the Protestant ones.

Karl Marx

[TO THE EDITOR OF *THE PALL MALL GAZETTE*]

F. GREENWOOD, ESQ.

8 June 1871

My dear Sir,

Would you oblige me by inserting the following few lines in your next publication?

Yours faithfully,

K. Marx

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE PALL MALL GAZETTE*

Sir,

From the Paris correspondence of your yesterday's publication^a I see that while fancying to live at London, I was, in reality, arrested in Holland on the request of Bismarck-Favre. But, maybe, this is but one of the innumerable sensational stories about the *International* which for the last two months the Franco-Prussian police has never tired of fabricating, the Versailles press of publishing, and the rest of the European press of reproducing.

I have the honour, Sir, to be

Yours obediently,

Karl Marx

1, Modena Villas, Maitland Park.
June 8, 1871

First published in *The Pall Mall Gazette*,
No. 1972, June 9, 1871

Reproduced from the newspaper,
verified with the manuscript; the
covering letter is reproduced from
the manuscript

^a "The Interregnum", *The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1970, June 7, 1871.—Ed.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

[STATEMENT BY THE GENERAL COUNCIL ON JULES FAVRE'S CIRCULAR]²²⁴

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE TIMES*

Sir,—

On June 6, 1871, M. Jules Favre issued a circular to all the European Powers, calling upon them to hunt down the International Working Men's Association.^a A few remarks will suffice to characterize that document.

In the very preamble of our statutes it is stated that the International was founded "September 28, 1864, at a public meeting held at St. Martin's Hall, London."^b For purposes of his own Jules Favre puts back the date of its origin behind 1862.

In order to explain our principles, he professes to quote "their (the International's) sheet of the 25th of March, 1869." And then what does he quote? The sheet of a society which is not the International.^c This sort of manoeuvre he already recurred to when, still a comparatively young lawyer, he had to defend the *National* newspaper, prosecuted for libel by Cabet. Then he pretended to read extracts from Cabet's pamphlets while reading interpolations of his own—a trick exposed while the court was

^a J. Favre, [Circulaire adressée aux agents diplomatiques de la République française], "Versailles, le 6 juin 1871", *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 159, June 8, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b See present edition, Vol. 20, p. 15.—*Ed.*

^c *Programme de l'Alliance internationale de la Démocratie Socialiste*, Geneva, 1868.—*Ed.*

sitting, and which but for the indulgence of Cabet, would have been punished by Jules Favre's expulsion from the Paris bar. Of all the documents quoted by him as documents of the International not one belongs to the International. He says, for instance,

"The Alliance declares itself Atheist, says the General Council, constituted in London in July, 1869."

The General Council never issued such a document. On the contrary, it issued a document^a which quashed the original statutes of the "Alliance"—L'Alliance de la Démocratie Socialiste at Geneva—quoted by Jules Favre.

Throughout his circular, which pretends in part also to be directed against the Empire, Jules Favre repeats against the International but the police inventions of the public prosecutors of the Empire, and which broke down miserably even before the law courts of that Empire.

It is known that in its two addresses (of July and September last) on the late war^b the General Council of the International denounced the Prussian plans of conquest against France. Later on Mr. Reitlinger, Jules Favre's private secretary, applied, though of course in vain, to some members of the General Council for getting up by the Council a demonstration against Bismarck, in favour of the Government of National Defence; they were particularly requested not to mention the Republic. The preparations for a demonstration with regard to the expected arrival of Jules Favre in London were made—certainly with the best of intentions—in spite of the General Council, which in its address of the 9th of September had distinctly forewarned the Paris workmen against Jules Favre and his colleagues.

What would Jules Favre say if in its turn the International were to send a circular on Jules Favre to all the Cabinets of Europe, drawing their particular attention to the documents published at Paris by the late M. Millière?^c

^a The reference is to the circular letter written by Marx, "The International Working Men's Association and the International Alliance of Socialist Democracy" (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 34).—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 3-8, 263-70.—*Ed.*

^c J.-B. E. Millière, "Le Faussaire", *Le Vengeur*, No. 6, February 8, 1871.—*Ed.*

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

John Hales,
Secretary to the General Council
of the International Working Men's Association

256, High Holborn, W.C., June 12, 1871

Published in *The Times*, No. 27088, June 13, 1871 and also in *The Eastern Post*, No. 142, June 17, 1871; *L'Internationale*, No. 127, June 18, 1871; *Der Volksstaat*, No. 50, June 21, 1871 and other press organs of the International

Reproduced from *The Times*

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

[STATEMENT BY THE GENERAL COUNCIL TO THE EDITOR OF *THE TIMES*]²²⁵

TO *THE TIMES*

The General Council of this Association has instructed me to state, in reply to your leader of June 19, 1871, on the "International"^a the following facts.

The pretended Paris manifestoes, published by the *Paris-Journal*^b and similar journals, manifestoes which you place on the same line as our Address on the Civil war in France, are mere fabrications of the Versailles police.

You say:

"The 'political notes' published by Professor Beesly,^c and quoted the other day in these columns, are quoted also, with entire approval, in the address of the Council, and we can now understand how justly the Ex-Emperor was entitled to be called the saviour of society."

Now, the Council, in its address, quotes nothing from the "political notes" except the testimony of the writer, who is a known and honourable French *savant*, as to the personal character of the "*Internationals*" implicated in the last Paris revolution.^d What has this to do with the "Ex-Emperor" and the society saved by him! The "programme" of the Association was not, as you say, "prepared" by Messrs. Tolain and Odger "seven years ago". It was issued by the Provisional Council, chosen at the public meeting held at St. Martin's Hall, Long Acre, on 28 September 1864.^e

^a "The International Working Men's Association has not...", *The Times*, No. 27093, June 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Le Comité central de l'Internationale", *Paris-Journal*, No. 157, June 17, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c [J. F. E. Robinet,] *Political Notes on the Present Situation of France and Paris*. By a French Positivist (ed. by Edward Spencer Beesly), London [1871].—*Ed.*

^d See this volume, p. 354.—*Ed.*

^e The reference is to Marx's *Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association* (present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 5-13).—*Ed.*

M. Tolain has never been a member of that Council, nor was he present at London, when the programme was drawn up.

You say that "Millière" was "one of the most ferocious members of the Commune". Millière has never been a member of the Commune.

"We," you proceed, "should also point out that Assi, lately President of the Association etc."

Assi has never been a member of the "International", and as to the dignity of "President of the Association", it has been abolished as long ago as 1867.²²⁶

Written on June 19 or 20, 1871

Reproduced from the rough manuscript

First published in: Marx and Engels,
Works, First Russian Edition, Vol. XIII,
Part II, 1940

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

[STATEMENT BY THE GENERAL COUNCIL
TO THE EDITOR OF *THE STANDARD*]²²⁷

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE STANDARD*

In your leader on the "*International*" (of the 19 June)^a you say:

"Of the two programmes (that of London and that of Paris) recently issued in favour of the Commune^b that of the Paris branch has the merit of being the more honest and the more outspoken."

Unfortunately, the "Paris" manifesto has been issued not by our Paris Branch, but by the "Versailles Police".

You say:

"The London Internationalists insist no less earnestly than their Paris brethren that 'the old society must perish and ought to perish'. They speak of the burning of the public buildings and the shooting of the hostages as 'a gigantic effort to bring society down'—which, although unsuccessful once, will be persevered in until it succeeds."

Now the General Council of this Association summons you to quote the exact pages and lines of our Address where the words attributed by you to us do occur!

Written on June 19 or 20, 1871

Reproduced from the rough manuscript

First published in: Marx and Engels,
Works, First Russian Edition, Vol. XIII,
Part II, 1940

^a "If there are any in England...", *The Standard*, No. 14627, June 19, 1871.—*Ed*

^b The reference is to the General Council's Address *The Civil War in France*, written by Marx (pp. 307-59), and the Manifesto, supposedly issued by the International, published in the *Paris-Journal*, No. 157, June 17, 1871 under the heading "Le Comité central de l'Internationale".—*Ed*.

Frederick Engels

[STATEMENT BY THE GENERAL COUNCIL ON GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE'S LETTER]²²⁸

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE DAILY NEWS*

Sir,

I am instructed by the General Council of the International Working Men's Association to state, in reply to Mr. Geo. Jacob Holyoake's Letter in Tuesday's *Daily News*.^a

1. As to the insinuation that the address issued by the Council^b "may become a cause of death or deportation at Versailles", the Council thinks that its Paris friends are better judges than Mr. Holyoake.

2. It is a rule with the Council that the names of all its members whether absent or present are appended to its public documents.^c

3. As to the statement that this address

"cannot be an English production, though manifestly revised by some Saxon or Celtic pen",

the Council begs to observe that, as a matter of course, the productions of an international Society cannot have any national character. However, the Council need not have any secrets in this matter. The address, like many previous publications of the Council, was drawn up by the Corresponding Secretary for Germany, Dr. Karl Marx, was adopted unanimously and "revised" by nobody.

^a G. J. Holyoake, "To the Editor of *The Daily News*", *The Daily News*, No. 7844, June 20, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b The reference is to the General Council's Address *The Civil War in France*, written by Marx (pp. 307-59).—*Ed.*

^c In Engels' manuscript this is followed by the sentence "On this occasion, however, an exception was made, and the consent of absent members was formally requested."—*Ed.*

4. In the course of last year Mr. George Jacob Holyoake presented himself as a Candidate for membership of the Council but was not admitted.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

John Hales,
Secretary to the General Council
of the International Working Men's Association

256, High Holborn, W.C.,
London, June 21, 1871

Written on June 20, 1871

Approved at the General Council meeting
of June 20, 1871

Reproduced from *The Daily News*,
verified with the manuscript

Published in *The Daily News*, No. 7847,
June 23, 1871, in *The Eastern Post*,
No. 143, June 24, 1871 (a slightly different
version) and in *The Pall Mall Gazette*,
No. 1984, June 23, 1871 (as a summary of
the statement)

Frederick Engels

[LETTER FROM THE GENERAL COUNCIL TO THE EDITOR
OF *THE SPECTATOR* (RESP. EXAMINER)]²²⁹

TO THE EDITOR
OF *THE SPECTATOR* (RESP. EXAMINER)

Sir,

You will much oblige the General Council of the International Working Men's Association by giving publicity to the fact that all the pretended Manifestoes and other publications of the "Internationals" of Paris, with which the English Press is now teeming (and which all of them were first published by the notorious *Paris-Journal*) are without one exception pure fabrications of the Versailles Police.

I am etc.

Written on June 20 or 21, 1871

First published in: Marx and Engels,
Works, First Russian Edition, Vol. XIII,
Part II, 1940

Reproduced from the rough manuscript

Karl Marx

[TO THE EDITOR OF *THE DAILY NEWS*]²³⁰

Sir,—

A Council consisting of more than thirty members cannot, of course, draw up its own documents. It must entrust that task to some one or other of its members, reserving to itself the right of rejecting or amending. The address on the "Civil War in France," drawn up by myself,^a was unanimously adopted by the General Council of the International, and is therefore the official embodiment of its own views. With regard, however, to the personal charges brought forward against Jules Favre and Co., the case stands otherwise. On this point the great majority of the Council had to rely upon my trustworthiness. This was the very reason why I supported the motion of another member of the Council^b that Mr. John Hales, in his answer to Mr. Holyoake^c should name me as the author of the address. I hold myself alone responsible for those charges, and hereby challenge Jules Favre and Co. to prosecute me for libel. In his letter Mr. Llewellyn Davies says,

"It is melancholy to read the charges of personal baseness so freely flung by Frenchmen at one another."^d

Does this sentence not somewhat smack of that pharisaical self-righteousness with which William Cobbett had so often taunted the British mind? Let me ask Mr. Llewellyn Davies which

^a See this volume, pp. 307-59.—*Ed.*

^b F. Engels.—*Ed.*

^c See this volume, pp. 367-68.—*Ed.*

^d J. L. Davies, "To the Editor of *The Daily News*", *The Daily News*, No. 7849, June 26, 1871.—*Ed.*

was worse, the French *petite presse*, fabricating in the service of the police the most infamous slanders against the Communals, dead, captive, or hidden, or the English press reproducing them to this day, despite its professed contempt for the *petite presse*. I do not consider it a French inferiority that such serious charges for instance as those brought forward against the late Lord Palmerston, during a quarter of a century, by a man like Mr. David Urquhart,²³¹ could have been burked in England but not in France.

Published in *The Eastern Post*, No. 144, July 1, 1871, *The Daily News*, June 27, 1871 (in abbreviated form), and *The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1987, June 27, 1871 (in abbreviated form)

Reproduced from *The Eastern Post*

Frederick Engels

[STATEMENT BY THE GENERAL COUNCIL ON THE LETTERS OF G. J. HOLYOAKE AND B. LUCRAFT]²³²

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE DAILY NEWS*

Sir,—

I am instructed by the General Council of the International Working Men's Association to reply to the letters of Messrs. G. J. Holyoake and B. Lucraft, which appeared in your issue of Monday last.^a I find, on referring to the minutes of the Council, that Mr. Holyoake attended a meeting of the Council, by permission, on the 16th of November, 1869, and during the sitting expressed his desire to become a member of the Council, and to attend the next General Congress of the International, to be held in Paris, September, 1870. After he had retired, Mr. John Weston proposed him as a candidate for membership, but the proposition was received in such a manner that Mr. Weston did not insist, but withdrew it. With regard to Mr. Lucraft's statement that he was not present when the address was voted upon, I may say that Mr. Lucraft was present at a meeting of the Council held on the 23rd of May, 1871, when it was officially announced that the draught of the address on the "Civil War in France"^b would be read and discussed at the next ordinary meeting of the Council, May the 30th. It was therefore left entirely to Mr. Lucraft to decide whether he would be present or absent upon that occasion, and not only did he know that it was the rule of the Council to append the names of all its members, present or absent, to its public documents, but he was one of the most strenuous supporters of that rule, and resisted on several occasions attempts made to

^a G. J. Holyoake, "To the Editor of *The Daily News*", *The Daily News*, No. 7849, June 26, 1871; B. Lucraft, "To the Editor of *The Daily News*", same issue.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 307-59.—*Ed.*

dispense with it—on May 23, amongst others—and he then voluntarily informed the Council that “his entire sympathy was with the Commune of Paris.” On Tuesday evening, June 20, at a meeting of the Council, Mr. Lucraft was forced to admit that he had not even then read the address itself, but that all his impressions about it were derived from the statements of the press. With respect to Mr. Odger's repudiation, all I can say is that he was waited upon personally and informed that the Council was about to issue an address, and was asked if he objected to his name appearing in connection with it, and he said “No.” The public can draw its own conclusions. I may add that the resignations of Messrs. Lucraft and Odger have been accepted by the Council unanimously.^a

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

John Hales,

Secretary to the General Council
of the International Working Men's Association

256, High Holborn, W.C.

Written about June 27, 1871

Reproduced from *The Daily News*

Approved at the General Council meeting
of June 27, 1871

Published in *The Daily News*, No. 7852,
June 29, 1871 and in *The Eastern Post*,
No. 144, July 1, 1871

^a At the meeting of June 27, 1871.—*Ed*

Karl Marx

[LETTER TO MAX FRIEDLÄNDER,
THE EDITOR OF THE *NEUE FREIE PRESSE*]

Dear Friend,

Would you be so kind as to publish the following statement in your newspaper and to send me a copy of the issue in question.

Yours very sincerely,

Karl Marx

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE *NEUE FREIE PRESSE*

Under the heading "A Socialist Soirée", signed W.,^a the Vienna *Presse* carries a feature article in which I have the honour to figure. W. met me, so he says, at a soirée at Herzen's house. He even recalled the speeches that I made there.

A firm opponent of Herzen, I have always refused to meet him, and have therefore *never* seen the man in my life.

I doubt whether the imaginative W. has ever been to London. As a matter of fact, there are no "*marble steps*" there, except in the palaces, though W. even found some in Herzen's "*COTTAGE*"!

I hereby challenge the imaginative W., whom the laurels of the *Paris-Journal* and similar police newspapers^b will not allow to sleep, to name himself.

Karl Marx

London, June 30, 1871

Published in the newspapers *Neue Freie Presse*, No. 2462, July 4, 1871, *Börse des Lebens*, *Feuilleton und Localblatt der Berliner Börsen-Zeitung*, No. 30, July 23, 1871

Printed according to the *Neue Freie Presse*, verified with the rough manuscript; the covering letter is printed according to the manuscript

Published in English for the first time

^a W., "Eine socialistische Soirée", *Die Presse*, No. 173, June 24, 1871.—Ed.

^b See this volume, pp. 364, 366.—Ed.

Frederick Engels

[THE ADDRESS *THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE* AND THE ENGLISH PRESS]

London, 30 June. No publication in the history of London has caused such a stir as the Address of the General Council of the International.^a In the beginning, the main papers tried to kill it with silence, a favourite method of theirs; but a few days were enough to prove to them that it would not work this time. The *Telegraph*, *Standard*, *Spectator*, *Pall Mall Gazette* and *Times* had to bring themselves, one by one, to mention this "remarkable document" in their leaders.^b Then letters from third parties started to appear in the papers, drawing attention to this and that in particular. Then more leaders, and at the weekend the weeklies returned to it once again. The entire press has had to confess unanimately that the International is a great power in Europe to be reckoned with, which cannot be eliminated by refusing to talk about it. They all had to acknowledge the stylistic mastery with which the Address is written—a language as powerful as William Cobbett's, according to *The Spectator*. It was only to be expected that this bourgeois press would attack, almost to a man, such an energetic assertion of the proletarian point of view, such a decisive justification of the Paris Commune. Likewise, that the Stieberiades²³³ fabricated by the Parisian police papers and the

^a See this volume, pp. 307-59.—Ed.

^b "It is with a feeling of...", *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 4994, June 16, 1871; "If there are any in England...", *The Standard*, No. 14627, June 19, 1871; "The English Communists on Paris", *The Spectator*, No. 2242, June 17, 1871; "The International Working Men's Association", *The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1979, June 17, 1871; "This remarkable document ought to remove all doubts ... as to the political import of the late events in Paris"; "The International Working Men's Association has not...", *The Times*, No. 27093, June 19, 1871.—Ed.

documents of quite a different society (Bakunin's Alliance of Socialist Democracy)^a laid at the door of the International by Jules Favre^b would be attributed to it, despite the public disavowals of the General Council.^c In the meantime, however, the commotion finally became too much even for the philistine. *The Daily News* began to soothe, and *The Examiner*, the only paper to behave really decently, resolutely stood up for the International in a detailed article.^d Two English members of the General Council, *Odger*, who has long been on much too friendly terms with the bourgeoisie, and *Lucraft*, who seems to have grown much more concerned about the opinion of "respectable" people since he was elected on to the London School Board, were swayed by the fuss in the papers to tender their resignations, which were unanimously accepted. They have already been replaced by two other English workers^e and will soon mark what it means to betray the proletariat at the critical moment.

An English parson, Llewellyn Davies, lamented in *The Daily News* about the abuse directed at Jules Favre and consorts in the Address and expressed the desire that the truth or falsehood of these charges be ascertained, as far as I am concerned, by the French Government bringing an action against the General Council.^f On the very next day, *Karl Marx declared in the same paper that as the author of the Address he considered himself personally responsible for the charges*^g; however, the French Embassy does not seem to have any orders to proceed with a libel suit against him. Finally *The Pall Mall Gazette* then declared that this was quite unnecessary, the private character of a statesman was always sacred, and only his public actions could be attacked.^h Of course, if the private characters of the *English* statesmen were brought before the public, the Last Day of the oligarchic and *bourgeois* world would be nigh.

^a *Programme de l'Alliance internationale de la Démocratie Socialiste*, Geneva, 1868.—*Ed.*

^b J. Favre, "Versailles, le 6 juin 1871", *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 159, June 8, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c See this volume, pp. 361-62.—*Ed.*

^d "The International Association", *The Examiner*, No. 3308, June 24, 1871.—*Ed.*

^e J. Roach and A. Taylor.—*Ed.*

^f J. L. Davies, "To the Editor of *The Daily News*", *The Daily News*, No. 7849, June 26, 1871.—*Ed.*

^g See this volume, p. 370.—*Ed.*

^h "England from the Point of View of the Commune", *The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1989, June 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

An article from the *Vienna Wanderer* by and about the scoundrel *Netschajeff* has been doing the rounds of the German press, glorifying his deeds and those of *Serebrennikoff* and *Elpidin*. If this should occur again, we shall come back to this fine threesome for a closer look. For the present, suffice it to say that *Elpidin* is a notorious *Russian spy*.

Written on June 30, 1871

First published in *Der Volksstaat*, No. 54,
July 5, 1871

Printed according to the news-
paper

Published in English for the first
time

Karl Marx

[LETTER TO FREDERICK GREENWOOD, THE EDITOR
OF *THE PALL MALL GAZETTE*]²³⁴

Haverstock-hill, N.W. June 30, 1871

Sir,

I have declared in *The Daily News*—and you have reprinted in *The Pall Mall*—that I hold myself alone responsible for the charges brought forward against “Jules Favre and Co.”^a

In your yesterday’s publication you declare these charges to be “*libels*.”^b I declare you to be a *libeller*. It is no fault of mine that you are as *ignorant* as *arrogant*. If we lived on the Continent, I should call you to account in another way.—

Obediently,

Karl Marx

Published in *The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1992, July 3, 1871, *The Eastern Post*, No. 145, July 8, 1871 and *Neue Freie Presse*, No. 2465, July 7, 1871 (translated from *The Pall Mall Gazette*)

Reproduced from *The Pall Mall Gazette*, verified with the manuscript

^a See this volume, p. 370.—Ed.

^b “England from the Point of View of the Commune”, *The Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1989, June 29, 1871.—Ed.

Karl Marx

MR. WASHBURN,
THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, IN PARIS²³⁵

TO THE NEW YORK CENTRAL COMMITTEE
FOR THE UNITED STATES' SECTIONS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION

Citizens,—

The General Council of the Association consider it their duty to communicate publicly to you evidence on the conduct, during the French Civil War, of Mr. Washburne, the American Ambassador.

I

The following statement is made by Mr. Robert Reid, a Scotchman who has lived for seventeen years in Paris, and acted during the Civil War as a correspondent for the London *Daily Telegraph* and *The New York Herald*. Let us remark, in passing, that *The Daily Telegraph*, in the interests of the Versailles Government, falsified even the short telegraphic despatches transmitted to it by Mr. Reid.

Mr. Reid, now in England, is ready to confirm his statement by affidavit.

"The sounding of the general alarm, mingled with the roar of the cannon, continued all night. To sleep was impossible. Where, I thought, are the representatives of Europe and America? Can it be possible that in the midst of this effusion of innocent blood they should make no effort at conciliation? I could bear the thought no longer; and knowing that Mr. Washburne was in town, I resolved at once to go and see him. This was, I think, on the 17th of April; the exact date may, however, be ascertained from my letter to Lord Lyons, to whom I wrote on the same day. Crossing the Champs Elysées, on my way to Mr. Washburne's residence, I met numerous ambulance-waggons filled with the wounded and dying.

Shells were bursting around the Arc de Triomphe, and many innocent people were added to the long list of M. Thiers's victims.

"Arriving at No. 95, Rue de Chaillot, I inquired at the Concierge's for the United States' Ambassador, and was directed to the second floor. The particular flight or flat you dwell in is, in Paris, an almost unerring indication of your wealth and position,—a sort of social barometer. We find here a marquis on the first front floor, and an humble mechanic on the fifth back floor,—the stairs that divide them represent the social gulf between them. As I climbed up the stairs, meeting no stout flunkies in red breeches and silk stockings, I thought, 'Ah! the Americans lay their money out to the best advantage,—we throw ours away.'

"Entering the secretary's room, I inquired for Mr. Washburne.—Do you wish to see him personally?—I do.—My name having been sent in, I was ushered into his presence. He was lounging in an easy-chair, reading a newspaper. I expected he would rise; but he remained sitting with the paper still before him, an act of gross rudeness in a country where the people are generally so polite.

"I told Mr. Washburne that we were betraying the cause of humanity, if we did not endeavour to bring about a conciliation. Whether we succeeded or not, it was at all events our duty to try; and the moment seemed the more favourable, as the Prussians were just then pressing Versailles for a definitive settlement. The united influence of America and England would turn the balance in favour of peace.

"Mr. Washburne said, '*The men in Paris are rebels. Let them lay down their arms.*' I replied that the National Guards had a legal right to their arms; but that was not the question. When humanity is outraged, the civilized world has a right to interfere, and I ask you to co-operate with Lord Lyons to that effect.—Mr. Washburne: 'These men at Versailles will listen to nothing.'—'If they refuse, the moral responsibility will rest with them.'—Mr. Washburne: 'I don't see that. I can't do anything in the matter. You had better see Lord Lyons.'

"So ended our interview. I left Mr. Washburne sadly disappointed. I found a man rude and haughty, with none of those feelings of fraternity you might expect to find in the representative of a democratic republic. On two occasions I had had the honour of an interview with Lord Cowley, when he was our representative in France. His frank, courteous manner formed a striking contrast to the cold, pretentious, and would-be-aristocratic style of the American Ambassador.

"I also urged upon Lord Lyons that, in the defence of humanity, England was bound to make an earnest effort at reconciliation, feeling convinced that the British Government could not look coldly on such atrocities as the massacres of the Clamart station and Moulin Saquet, not to speak of the horrors of Neuilly, without incurring the malediction of every lover of humanity. Lord Lyons answered me verbally through Mr. Edward Malet, his secretary, that he had forwarded my letter to the Government, and would willingly forward any other communication I might have to make on that subject. At one moment matters were most favourable for reconciliation, and had our Government thrown their weight in the balance, the world would have been spared the carnage of Paris. At all events, it is not the fault of Lord Lyons if the British Government failed in their duty.

"But, to return to Mr. Washburne. On Wednesday forenoon, the 24th of May, I was passing along the Boulevard des Capucines, when I heard my name called, and, turning round, saw Dr. Hossart standing beside Mr. Washburne, who was in an open carriage amidst a great number of Americans. After the usual salutations, I entered into a conversation with Dr. Hossart. Presently the conversation became general on the horrid scenes around; when Mr. Washburne, addressing me with the air of a man who knows the truth of what he is saying,—'*All who belong to the Commune, and those that sympathize with them, will be shot.*' Alas! I knew that they

were killing old and young for the crime of *sympathy*, but I did not expect to hear it semi-officially from Mr. Washburne; yet, while he was *repeating* this sanguinary phrase, there was still time for him to save the Archbishop."²³⁸

II

"On the 24th of May, Mr. Washburne's secretary^a came to offer to the Commune, then assembled at the Mairie of the 11th Arrondissement, on the part of the Prussians, an intervention between the Versailles and the Federals on the following terms:—

"Suspension of hostilities.

"Re-election of the Commune on the one side, and of the National Assembly on the other.

"The Versailles troops to leave Paris, and to take up their quarters in and around the fortifications.

"The National Guard to continue to guard Paris.

"No punishment to be inflicted upon the men serving or having served in the Federal Army.'

"The Commune, in an extraordinary sitting, accepted the propositions, with the proviso that two months should be given to France in order to prepare for the general elections of a Constituent Assembly.

"A second interview with the Secretary of the American Embassy took place. At its morning sitting of the 25th May, the Commune resolved to send five citizens—amongst them Vermorel, Delescluze, and Arnold—as plenipotentiaries to Vincennes, where, according to the information given by Mr. Washburne's secretary, a Prussian delegate would then be found. That deputation was, however, prevented from passing by the National Guards on duty at the gate of Vincennes. Consequent upon another and final interview with the same American Secretary, Citizen Arnold, to whom he had delivered a safe conduct, on the 26th May, went to St. Denis, where he was—not admitted by the Prussians.

"The result of this American intervention (which produced a belief in the renewed neutrality of, and the intended intercession between the belligerents, by the Prussians) was, at the most critical juncture, to paralyze the defence for two days. Despite the precautions taken to keep the negotiations secret, they became soon known to the National Guards, who then, full of confidence in Prussian neutrality, fled to the Prussian lines, there to surrender as prisoners. It is known how this confidence was abused by the Prussians, shooting by their sentries part of the fugitives, and handing over to the Versailles Government those who had surrendered.

"During the whole course of the civil war, Mr. Washburne, through his secretary, never tired of informing the Commune of his ardent sympathies, which only his diplomatic position prevented him from publicly manifesting, and of his decided reprobation of the Versailles Government."

This statement, No. II., is made by a member of the Paris Commune,^b who, like Mr. Reid, will, in case of need, confirm it by affidavit.

^a J. A. McKean.—*Ed.*

^b Au. Serraillier.—*Ed.*

To fully appreciate Mr. Washburne's conduct, the statements of Mr. Robert Reid and that of the member of the Paris Commune must be read as a whole, as part and counterpart of the same scheme. While Mr. Washburne declares to Mr. Reid that the Communals are "rebels" who deserve their fate, he declares to the Commune his sympathies with its cause and his contempt of the Versailles Government. *On the same 24th of May*, while, in presence of Dr. Hossart and many Americans, informing Mr. Reid that not only the Communals but even their mere sympathizers were irrevocably doomed to death, he informed, through his secretary, the Commune that not only its members were to be saved, but every man in the Federal army.

We now request you, dear Citizens, to lay these facts before the Working Class of the United States, and to call upon them to decide whether Mr. Washburne is a proper representative of the American Republic.

The General Council
of the International Working Men's Association:—

M. J. Boon, Fred. Bradnick, G. H. Buttery, Caihill, William Hales, Kolb, F. Lessner, George Milner, Thos. Mottershead, Chas. Murray, P. MacDonnell, Pfänder, John Roach, Rühl, Sadler, Cowell Stepney, Alfred Taylor, W. Townshend.

Corresponding Secretaries:—

Eugène Dupont, for France; *Karl Marx*, for Germany and Holland; *F. Engels*, for Belgium and Spain; *H. Jung*, for Switzerland; *P. Giovacchini*, for Italy; *Zévy Maurice*, for Hungary; *Anton Zabicki*, for Poland; *James Cohen*, for Denmark; *J. G. Eccarius*, for the United States.

Hermann Jung, Chairman. *George Harris*, Financial Sec.
John Weston, Treasurer. *John Hales*, General Secretary.

Office—256, High Holborn, London, W.C.,
July 11th, 1871

Written between July 7 and 11, 1871

Reproduced from the leaflet

Adopted unanimously at the General
Council meeting of July 11, 1871

Published as a leaflet about July 13, 1871
and in a number of press organs of the
International in July-September 1871

Karl Marx

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE MORNING ADVERTISER*

Sir,

In one of your leading articles of to-day^a you quote a string of phrases, such as, "London, Liverpool, and Manchester in revolt against odious capital," etc., with the authorship of which you are kind enough to credit me.

Permit me to state that the whole of the quotations^b upon which you base your article are forgeries from beginning to end. You have probably been misled by some of the fabrications which the Paris police are in the habit of issuing almost daily in my name, in order to procure evidence against the captive "Internationals" at Versailles.

I am, Sir, yours, etc.,

Karl Marx

1, Modena-villas, Maitland Park, Haverstock-hill, N.W.,
July 11, 1871

Published in *The Morning Advertiser*,
No. 24997, July 13, 1871

Reproduced from the newspaper

^a "London, Liverpool, and Manchester in revolt...", *The Morning Advertiser*, No. 24995, July 11, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Cited from "Une lettre de Karl Marx", *Paris-Journal*, No. 175, July 5, 1871; "L'Internationale", *La Gazette de France*, July 11, 1871, and other sources.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx
TO THE EDITOR OF *THE STANDARD*

Sir,

In this morning's *Standard*^a your Paris correspondent translates from the *Gazette de France*^b a letter dated Berlin, April 28, 1871, and purporting to be signed by me. I beg to state that this letter is from beginning to end a forgery, quite as much as all the previous pretended letters of mine lately published in the *Paris-Journal* and other French police papers.^c If the *Gazette de France* professes to have taken the letter from German papers, this must be a falsehood too. A German paper would never have dated that fabrication from Berlin.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

Karl Marx

London, July 13

Published in *The Standard*, No. 14651,
July 17, 1871

Reproduced from the newspaper

^a "France", *The Standard*, No. 14648, July 13, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "L'Internationale", *La Gazette de France*, July 11, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c See this volume, pp. 364, 366.—*Ed.*

Frederick Engels

[MAZZINI'S STATEMENT AGAINST THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION]²³⁷

In his Address to the Italian workers Mazzini says:

"This Association, founded in London some years ago and with which I refused to collaborate from the start.... A nucleus of individuals which takes it upon itself directly to govern a broad multitude of men of different nations, tendencies, political conditions, economic interests and methods of action will always end up by not functioning, or it will have to function tyrannically. For this reason, I withdrew and, shortly afterwards, the Italian workers' section withdrew, etc."^a

Now for the facts. After the foundation meeting of the International Working Men's Association of 28 September 1864, when the Provisional Council elected by that Assembly met, Major L. Wolff presented a manifesto and draft Rules written by Mazzini himself.²³⁸ Not only did this draft not find it difficult *directly to govern a multitude*, etc. and not only did it not say that this *nucleus of individuals ... will always end up by not functioning, or it will have to function tyrannically*, but, on the contrary, the Rules were inspired by a centralised conspiracy which gave *tyrannical* powers to the central body. The manifesto was in Mazzini's usual style: bourgeois democracy offering the workers *political rights* so that the *social privileges* of the middle and upper classes could be preserved.

This manifesto and the draft Rules were naturally rejected. The Italians continued their membership until certain questions were raised anew by a number of French bourgeois in an effort to manipulate the International. When the latter failed, first Wolff

^a G. Mazzini, "Agli operai italiani", *La Roma del popolo*, No. 20, July 13, 1871.—Ed.

and then the others withdrew.²³⁹ And so the International did away with Mazzini. Subsequently, the provisional Central Council, replying to an article by Vésinier,^a stated in the *Journal de Liège* that Mazzini had never been a member of the International Association and that his proposals, manifestoes, and rules had been rejected.²⁴⁰ Mazzini has also made frenzied attacks on the Paris Commune in the English press.^b This is just what he always did when the proletariat rose up. He did the same after the insurrection of June 1848, denouncing the insurgent proletarians in such offensive terms that Louis Blanc himself wrote a pamphlet against him.^c And Louis Blanc repeated on several occasions at that time that the June insurrection was the work of Bonapartist agents!

Mazzini calls Marx a man of *corrosive ... intellect, of domineering temper*, etc., perhaps because Marx knew very well how to corrode away the cabal plotted against the International by Mazzini, *dominating* the old conspirator's poorly disguised lust for authority so effectively that he has been rendered permanently harmless to the Association. This being the case, the International should be delighted to number among its members an *intellect* and a *temper* which, by *corroding* and *domineering* in this way, have kept it going for seven years, one working more than any other man to bring it to its present exalted position.

As for the split in the Association, which has, according to Mazzini, already begun in England, the fact is that two English members of the Council,^d who had been getting on too close terms with the bourgeoisie, found the "Address on the Civil War" too extreme and withdrew. In their place four new English members and one Irishman^e have joined the General Council, which has been more strengthened by this than before.

Rather than being in a state of dissolution, now for the first time the International is being publicly recognised by the whole English press as a great power in Europe, and never has a little pamphlet published in London made such a big impression as the Address of the General Council on the civil war in France, which is now about to be published in its third edition.

^a P. Vésinier, "L'Association Internationale des Travailleurs", *L'Echo de Verviers*, No. 293, December 16, 1865; No. 294, December 18, 1865.—*Ed.*

^b G. Mazzini, "The Commune in Paris", *The Contemporary Review*, Vol. 17, June 1871.—*Ed.*

^c L. Blanc, *Des socialistes français à M. Mazzini*, Brussels, 1852.—*Ed.*

^d G. Odger and B. Lucraft.—*Ed.*

^e A. Taylor, J. Roach, Ch. Mills, G. Lochner and J. P. McDonnell.—*Ed.*

The Italian workers ought to take note of the fact that the great conspirator and agitator, Mazzini, has no other advice for them than: *Educate yourselves, teach yourselves as best you can* (as if this can be done without money!) ... *strive to create more consumer co-operative societies* (not only producer ones!)—*And trust in the future!!!*

Written on July 28, 1871

Published in the magazine *Il Libero Pensiero*, No. 9, August 31, 1871 and in the newspapers *La Favilla*, No. 209, September 7, 1871, *Il Motto d'Ordine*, November 20, 1871, in *Gazzettino Rosa*, No. 255, September 13, 1871 (in part) and in a number of other Italian newspapers

Printed according to the magazine
Il Libero Pensiero

Translated from the Italian

Published in English for the first
time

Karl Marx

[COVERING LETTER TO THE EDITOR
OF *THE TIMES*]²⁴¹

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE TIMES*

7 August 1871

4, Maitland Park, Haverstock Hill, N.W.

Sir—

The note of the *Journal officiel*^a in contradiction to *The Times* article on the postponement of the Versailles trials^b being much commented upon by the Continental Press, the enclosed may perhaps prove of interest for your readers.^c The letter quoted is from a barrister engaged in the defence of some of the prisoners.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

Karl Marx

First published in: Marx and Engels,
Works, First Russian Edition, Vol. XIII,
Part II, 1940

Reproduced from the rough manu-
script

^a "Dans son numéro du 29 juillet...", *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 215, August 3, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Paris is once more busy...", *The Times*, No. 27128, July 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c See this volume, pp. 389-90.—*Ed.*

Frederick Engels
TO THE EDITOR OF *THE TIMES*²⁴²

Sir,—

The remarks of *The Times* on the repeated postponement of the trial of the Communist prisoners at Versailles^a have undoubtedly hit the nail on the head and have expressed the feeling of the French public. The angry note of the *Journal officiel*^b in reply to these remarks is but one of the many proofs of the fact. In consequence of the article in *The Times*, many reclamations have been addressed to the Paris press, reclamations which, under these circumstances, had no chance of being published. I have before me the letter of a Frenchman whose official position enables him to know the facts he is writing about, and whose testimony as to the motives of this unaccountable delay ought to have some value. Here are some extracts from this letter:

"Nobody as yet knows when the 3rd Court-martial will open its sittings. The cause of this appears to be that Captain Grimal, *Commissaire de la République* (public accuser), has been superseded by another and more reliable man; it has been found out at the last moment, on perusal of his general report which was to be read in court, that he was perhaps a little bit of a republican, that he had served under Faiderbe etc in the Army of the North etc—Well; all at once another officer presents himself at his office saying: here is my commission, I am your successor; the poor captain was so surprised that he went nearly mad....

"M. Thiers has the pretention to do everything by himself, this mania goes so far that not only has he called together, contrary to all rules of fairness, all the *juges d'instruction*^c in his cabinet, but he pretends even to regulate the composition of the

^a "Paris is once more busy...", *The Times*, No. 27128, July 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Dans son numéro du 29 juillet...", *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 215, August 3, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Public prosecutors.—*Ed.*

public to be admitted into the Court; he himself, through M. B. St. Hilaire, distributes the tickets of admission....

"In the mean time the prisoners at Satory die like flies—pitiless death works faster than the justice of these little statesmen.... There is in the Versailles Cellular prison a big fellow who does not speak a word of French, he is supposed to be an Irishman. How he got into this trouble is still a mystery.—Amongst the prisoners there is a very honest man called..., he has been in his cell for two months and has not yet been examined. It is infamous."

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Justitia

London 7th August 1871

First published in: Marx and Engels,
Works, First Russian Edition, Vol. XIII,
Part II, 1940

Reproduced from the rough manu-
script

Karl Marx
TO THE EDITOR OF *L'INTERNATIONAL*²⁴³

Sir,

In an article entitled "‘The International’ Society" you say:

“Beside their strict economies, the infatuated workers provide the members of the Council with every desirable comfort for leading a pleasant life in London.”^a

I would point out to you that, with the exception of the General Secretary, who receives a salary of 10 shillings per week, all the members of the Council carry out their duties *gratuitously*, and have always done so.

I demand that you insert these lines in your next issue.

If your paper continues to spread such lies, legal action will be taken against it.

Yours faithfully,

K. Marx

London, August 17, 1871

First published in *Der Volkstaat*, No. 68,
August 23, 1871

Printed according to the rough
manuscript, verified with the
newspaper

Translated from the French

Published in English for the first
time

^a “La Société ‘l’Internationale’”, *L’International*, No. 3031, August 17, 1871.—
Ed.

Karl Marx

[TO THE EDITOR OF *PUBLIC OPINION*]²⁴⁴

PRIVATE LETTER

Sir,

I not only request you to insert the enclosed reply in your next number,^a but I demand an *ample and complete apology* in the same place of your paper where you have inserted the libel.^b

I should regret being forced to take legal proceedings against your paper.

Yours obediently,
K. M.

Written on August 19, 1871

First published in: Marx and Engels,
Works, First Russian Edition, Vol. XXIV,
1931

Reproduced from the rough
manuscript

^a See this volume, p. 393.—*Ed.*

^b "A German View of the Internationale", *Public Opinion*, No. 517, August 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

TO THE EDITOR OF *PUBLIC OPINION*²⁴⁵

Sir,—

In your publication of to-day you translate from the Berlin *National-Zeitung*, a notorious organ of Bismarck's, a most atrocious libel against the International Working Men's Association,^a in which the following passage occurs:

“‘Capital,’ says Karl Marx, ‘trades in the strength and life of the workman;’ but this new Messiah himself is not a step farther advanced; he takes from the mechanic the money paid him by the capitalist for his labour, and generously gives him in exchange a bill on a State that may possibly exist a thousand years hence. What edifying stories are told about the vile corruption of Socialist agitators, what a shameful abuse they make of the money confided to them, and what mutual accusations they throw in each other's faces, are things we have abundantly learned by the Congresses and from the organs of the party. There is here a monstrous volcano of filth, from whose eruptions nothing better could issue than a Parisian Commune.”^b

In reply to the venal writers of the *National-Zeitung*, I consider it quite sufficient to declare that I have never asked or received one single farthing from the working class of this or any other country.

Save the general Secretary, who receives a weekly salary of ten shillings, all the members of the General Council of the “International” do their work *gratuitously*. The financial accounts

^a “Die Internationale”, *National-Zeitung*, No. 351, July 30, 1871, Morning edition.—*Ed.*

^b “A German View of the Internationale”, *Public Opinion*, No. 517, August 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

of the General Council, annually laid before the General Congresses of the Association, have always been sanctioned unanimously without provoking any discussion whatever.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

Karl Marx

Haverstock Hill, Aug. 19, 1871

Published in the *Public Opinion*, No. 518,
August 26, 1871

Reproduced from the newspaper,
verified with the rough manu-
script

Karl Marx

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *GAULOIS*²⁴⁶

Brighton, August 24, 1871

Sir,

Since you have published extracts from the report of a conversation I had with one of the correspondents of *The New York Herald*,^a I hope that you will also publish the following statement, which I have sent to *The New York Herald*. I am sending you this statement in its original form, that is, in English.^b

Yours faithfully,

Karl Marx

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE NEW YORK HERALD*

London, 17 August 1871

Sir,

In the *Herald* of August 3rd, I find a report of a conversation I had with one of your correspondents.^c I beg to say that I must decline all and every responsibility for the statements attributed to me in that report, whether such statements refer to individuals connected with the late events in France, or to any political or economical opinions. Of what I am reported to have said, one part I said differently, and another I never said at all.

Yours obediently,

Karl Marx

First published in *Le Gaulois*, No. 1145,
August 27, 1871

Printed according to the news-
paper

^a G. C., "La Commune jugée par Karl Marx", *Le Gaulois*, No. 1140, August 22, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b This letter was published in English in *Le Gaulois*. The covering letter, written in French, is published in English in this volume.—*Ed.*

^c "The International", *The New York Herald*, No. 12765, August 3, 1871.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx

[LETTER TO THE EDITOR OF *THE SUN*,
CHARLES DANA]²⁴⁷

Brighton, August 25, 1871

My dear Sir:

In the first instance I must beg you to excuse my prolonged silence. I should have answered your letter long ago if I had not been quite overburdened with work, so much so that my health broke down, and my doctor found it necessary to banish me for a few months to this sea-bathing place, with the strict injunction to do nothing.

I shall comply with your wish after my return to London when a favorable occasion occurs for rushing into print.

I have sent a declaration to *The New York Herald*,^a in which I decline all and every responsibility for the trash and positive falsehoods with which its correspondent burdens me.^b I do not know whether the *Herald* has printed it.

The number of the Communal refugees arriving in London is on the increase, while our means of supporting them is daily on the decrease, so that many find themselves in a very deplorable state. We shall make an appeal for assistance to the Americans.²⁴⁸

To give you an inkling of the state of things that under the *République Thiers* prevails in France, I will tell you what has happened to my own daughters.

My second daughter, Laura, is married to Monsieur Lafargue, a medical man. They left Paris a few days before the commencement of the first siege for Bordeaux, where Lafargue's father^c lived. The latter, having fallen very ill, wanted to see his son, who

^a See this volume, p. 395.—*Ed.*

^b "The International", *The New York Herald*, No. 12765, August 3, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c François Lafargue.—*Ed.*

attended him, indeed was at his sick bed until the time of his death. Lafargue and my daughter then continued to stay at Bordeaux, where the former possesses a house. During the time of the Commune, Lafargue acted as Secretary to the Bordeaux branches of the International, and was also sent as a delegate to Paris, where he stayed six days to make himself acquainted with the state of things there. During all the time he was not molested by the Bordeaux police. Toward the middle of May my two unmarried daughters set out for Bordeaux, and thence together with the family Lafargue to Bagnères de Luchon, in the Pyrenees, near the Spanish frontier.... There the eldest daughter, who had suffered from a severe attack of pleurisy, took the mineral waters and underwent regular medical treatment. Lafargue and his wife had to attend to a dying baby, and my youngest daughter amused herself as much in the charming environs of Luchon as the family afflictions permitted. Luchon is a place of resort for patients and for the *beau monde*,^a and above all places the least fitted for political intrigue. My daughter Madame Lafargue had, moreover, the misfortune to lose her child, and shortly after its burial—in the second week of August—who should appear at the dwelling place? The illustrious Kératry, well known by the infamies he committed during the Mexican war, and the equivocal part he played during the Franco-Prussian war, first as Prefect of Police at Paris, and later as a *soi-disant*^b General in Brittany, and now Prefect of the Haute-Garonne, and M. Delpech, Procureur General of Toulouse—both these worthies being accompanied by gendarmes.

Lafargue had received a hint the evening before, and had crossed the Spanish frontier, having provided himself with a Spanish passport at Bordeaux.

Although the son of French parents, he was born in Cuba, and is therefore a Spaniard. A domiciliary visit was made at the dwelling place of my daughters, and they themselves were subjected to a severe cross examination by the two mighty representatives of the République Thiers. They were charged with carrying on an insurrectional correspondence. That correspondence consisted simply in letters to their mother, the contents of which were of course not flattering to the French Government, and in copies of some London newspapers! For about a week their house was watched by gendarmes. They had to promise to leave

^a High society.—*Ed.*

^b So-called.—*Ed.*

France, where their presence was too dangerous, as soon as they could make the preparations necessary for their departure, and in the mean time they were to consider themselves as people placed under the *haute surveillance*^a of the police. Kératry and Delpech had flattered themselves with the hope of finding them unprovided with passports, but fortunately they were possessed of regular English passports. Otherwise they would have had to share the infamous treatment of the sister of Delescluze and other French ladies as innocent as themselves. They have not yet returned, and are probably waiting for news from Lafargue.

Meanwhile the Paris papers told the most incredible lies; the *Gaulois*, for instance, transforming my three daughters into three brothers of mine, well known and dangerous agents of the International Propaganda, though I have no brothers.^b At the same time that *La France*, a Paris organ of Thiers, gave a most varnished tale of the events at Luchon, and asserted that Monsieur Lafargue might quietly return to France without incurring any danger,^c the French Government requested the Spanish Government to arrest Lafargue as a *member* of the *Paris Commune*! to which he had never belonged, and to which, as a resident of Bordeaux, he could not belong. Lafargue was in fact arrested, and under the escort of gendarmes marched to Barbastro, where he had to take his night quarters in the town prison, thence to Huesca, whence the Governor, on telegraphic order from the Spanish Minister of the Interior,^d had to forward him to Madrid. According to *The Daily News* of the 24th August, he has at last been set free.^e

The whole proceedings at Luchon and in the papers^f were nothing but shabby attempts of Mr. Thiers & Co. to revenge themselves upon me as the author of the address of the General Council of the International on the Civil War.^g Between their revenge and my daughters stood the English passport, and Mr. Thiers is as cowardly in his relations to foreign powers as he is unscrupulous in regard to his disarmed countrymen.

^a Strict surveillance.—*Ed.*

^b E. Cardon, "Les nouvelles qui nous arrivent...", *Le Gaulois*, No. 1133, August 14, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c "Luchon, 8 août 1871", *La France*, No. 213, August 12, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d Práxedes Mateo Sagasta.—*Ed.*

^e "The International Society", *The Daily News*, No. 7900, August 24, 1871.—*Ed.*

^f The extant fragment of the manuscript has "and in Spain" instead of "and in the papers".—*Ed.*

^g See this volume, pp. 307-59.—*Ed.*

As to Cluseret, I do not think that he was a traitor, but certainly he undertook to play a part for which he lacked the mettle, and thus he did great harm to the Commune. I know nothing as to his whereabouts. And now addio!

Your old friend,

Karl Marx

Published in *The Sun*, September 9, 1871

Reproduced from the newspaper

Karl Marx

THE COMMUNE AND ARCHBISHOP DARBOY ²⁴⁹

Sir,

The passage of the Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association, *On the Civil War in France*, which gave the signal to shouts of moral indignation on the part of the London press, was this: "The real murderer of the Archbishop is Thiers."^a

From the enclosed letter, addressed to M. Bigot, the counsel for M. Assi at the Versailles Court-martial, by M. Eugène Fondeville, who is ready to confirm his statements by affidavit, you will see that the Archbishop himself actually shared my view of the case. At the time of the publication of the "Address", I was not yet informed of the interview of M. Fondeville with M. Darboy, but even then the correspondence of the Archbishop with M. Thiers revealed his strange misgivings as to the good faith of the Chief of the French Executive. Another fact has now been placed beyond doubt—viz., that at the time of the execution of the hostages the Communal government had already ceased to exist, and ought, therefore, no longer be held responsible for that event.

I am, etc.,

Karl Marx^b

London, August 29

^a See this volume, p. 352.—*Ed.*

^b Marx's letter is written in English. Fondeville's letter reproduced by Marx was published in the newspaper in French.—*Ed.*

London, August 19, 1871

Sir,

I am taking the liberty of writing to you to inform you of the existence of certain documents relating to the events of the Commune and to ask you if you would kindly take advantage of the privileges of your profession and your capacity as defence counsel for one of the accused to have them produced in court.

Around 15 April a Paris newspaper reproduced a letter written to *The Times* in which a certain person stated that he had visited the hostages at Mazas and accused the Commune of behaving barbarously towards them. Strongly desirous of ascertaining the truth of such assertions, I went to the prison where I became convinced of the contrary. That day I talked with Messieurs Darboy, Bonjean and Deguerry, and M. Petit, secretary to the Archbishop, who could give you some information on this subject, since he is alive. Subsequently I made frequent visits to them and a few days before the collapse of the Commune Messieurs Darboy and Bonjean entrusted me with some manuscripts the gist of which I give you below.

Here is a brief résumé of the Darboy document. It is entitled "My Arrest, my Detention, and my Reflections at Mazas". From this it emerges that apart from his arrest, for which he blames the Commune, he places the full responsibility for his detention on the government of Versailles; he accuses it, above all, of sacrificing the hostages to reserve itself a sort of right to take reprisals in the future. In so doing he refers partly to his written requests and partly to the approaches made by his friends to M. Thiers, approaches and talks which led to nothing but refusals, notably that of M. Lagarde. He affirms that it was a question of exchanging the hostages not only for Blanqui, but also for the body of General Duval. He declares in addition that he was well treated and he praises at length the conduct of citizen Garau, the governor of Mazas. He already foresees his death and this is what he writes on the subject: "It is known that Versailles does not want either an exchange or a reconciliation; on the other hand, if the Commune had the power to arrest us, it does not have the power to have us set at liberty, because to set us at liberty without an exchange at this time would start a revolution in Paris that would overthrow the Commune."

As for M. Bonjean, he gave me a long treatise on agricultural economy which he had composed in prison, two letters for his family, and a kind of journal of his detention. Although this document is not as valuable from the point of view of the defence as that of M. Darboy, it proves that the hostages were treated humanely at Mazas.

Since it is pointless to insist on the importance of such documents, I shall now explain to you under what circumstances I was deprived of them.

Obliged to leave the Ministry of Public Works on the morning of Monday, 22 May, I had to take refuge in the only establishment that was open, in the Rue du Temple; it was there that I deposited my briefcase and my papers. On Thursday the 25th the Versaillaise captured this quarter, and I wanted to put these documents in a safe place before going home. The owner of the hotel, whom I thought I could trust, gave me a wall safe in a room on the second floor, the key to which I took with me. Apart from the items mentioned above, I also deposited five letters from MacMahon which had been handed to me at the Prefecture of Police, many official documents, including a certificate saying that I was a delegate at Neuilly during the armistice of 25 April, two currency bills, a letter from London addressed to M. Thiers, and some photographs of various members of the Commune.

On 27 May I sent two men to the Rue du Temple who were to bring me, together with my briefcase, the papers deposited in the safe. In answer to their

request the owner of the hotel replied that since many of his neighbours had said several times that a member of the Commune had taken refuge at his place, he had thought it prudent to force open the safe and burn the papers.

The briefcase was brought to me. It too had been forced open, and my private papers, such as the certificates and others, had been taken. Now despite the fact that the owner of the hotel confirmed to me personally that the documents had been destroyed, I am persuaded of the contrary, and the news that I have had from Paris assures me that the person to whom I confided them is still in possession of them, or handed them to the police a short time ago.

I am sending you information to institute a search for the above-mentioned documents, and the customary salutations. The letter has been sent to Bigot on 19 August 1871.

E. Fondeville,

Householder in St. Macaire

Written on August 29, 1871

First published in *The Examiner*,
No. 3318, September 2, 1871

Printed according to the newspaper, verified with the manuscript

Karl Marx

[TO THE EDITOR OF *LA VÉRITÉ*]²⁵⁰

International Working Men's Association
256, High Holborn, London.—W.C.

30 August 1871

Mr. Editor,

Having read in today's *Daily News* that M. Renaut is attributing to the *International* a manifesto inviting the French peasants to burn all the châteaux they can, etc.,^a Mr. John Hales, the General Secretary of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association, immediately sent this telegram to M. L. Bigot, Assi's defence counsel:

"Incendiary proclamation attributed to the International is a fabrication. We are ready to make a sworn affidavit before an English magistrate."

I now hasten to warn the French public through your respected newspaper that *all the manifestos printed in Paris in the name of the International since the entry of the French government troops into Paris—that all these manifestos without a single exception are fabrications.*²⁵¹

I make this declaration to you not only on my word of honour, but I am ready to give you an affidavit^b sworn before an English magistrate.

I have reason to believe that these vile creations do not even emanate directly from the police, but from Monsieur B...,^c an

^a "Trial of the Communist Prisoners", *The Daily News*, No. 7905, August 30, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Marx gives the English word "the affidavit" in the parentheses after the French one.—*Ed.*

^c Most likely, Ch. Bradlaugh.—*Ed.*

individual attached to one of these Parisian newspapers which *The Standard* (Tory newspaper) in one of its latest issues describes as organs of the demi-monde.^a

Yours faithfully,

Karl Marx

First published in *Le Soir*, No. 862, September 3, 1871, and in other bourgeois newspapers and also in the newspapers *L'Internationale*, No. 139, September 10, 1871, *Der Volksstaat*, No. 74, September 13, 1871, and others

Printed according to the manuscript, verified with the text in *Le Soir*

Translated from the French

Published in English for the first time

^a "Paris, August 18. Evening", *The Standard*, No. 14681, August 21, 1871.— *Ed.*

Karl Marx

[TO THE EDITOR OF *THE EVENING STANDARD*]

TO THE EDITOR

Sir,

In your number of the 2nd September, your Berlin correspondent publishes "the translation of an interesting article on the International, which has appeared in the *Cologne Gazette*,"^a which article charges me with living at the expense of the working classes. Up to the 30th August, the date of your correspondent's letter, no such article appeared in the *Cologne Gazette*, from which paper, therefore, your correspondent could not translate it. On the contrary, the article in question appeared, more than a fortnight ago, in the *Berlin National Zeitung*^b; and an English translation of it, literally identical with the one given by your correspondent, figured in the London weekly paper, *Public Opinion*,^c as far back as the 19th August. The next number of *Public Opinion* contained my reply to these slanders,^d and I hereby summon you to insert that reply, of which I enclose a copy, in the next number of your paper. The Prussian government have reasons of their own why they push, by every means in their power, the spreading of such infamous calumnies through the English press. These articles are but the harbingers of impending government prosecutions against the "International".—

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

Karl Marx

Haverstock-hill, Sept. 4, 1871

Published in *The Evening Standard*,
September 6, 1871

Reproduced from the newspaper

^a "The International", *The Evening Standard*, No. 14692, September 2, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Die Internationale", *National-Zeitung*, No. 351, July 30, 1871, Morning edition.—*Ed.*

^c "A German View of the Internationale", *Public Opinion*, No. 517, August 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d See this volume, p. 393.—*Ed.*

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

[PROPOSITIONS TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL CONCERNING PREPARATIONS FOR THE LONDON CONFERENCE]²⁵²

Financial account.

- 1) To find a room for the meetings of the Conference.
- 2) To find an hotel where the members of the Conference can stay—propose the same as last, Leicester Square.
- 3) A Committee to be appointed to arrange these two points.
- 4) That the entire Council assist at the meetings of the Conference, with the right of taking part in the debate, but that a certain number of the Council only be delegated with the right of voting—such number to be fixed by the Council when the number of delegates to the Conference shall be known.
- 5) That the Frenchmen now resident in London who are acknowledged members of the International, provide for the representation of France at the Conference by three delegates.
- 6) That if the members of any Country should not be represented at the Conference, the Corresponding Secretary for that Country be appointed to represent them.

Written not later than September 5, 1871

Reproduced from Engels' manuscript

Adopted at the General Council meeting
of September 5, 1871

First published, in Russian, in the book
The London Conference of the First International, 1936

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

PROPOSITIONS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE BY THE GENERAL COUNCIL ²⁵³

1) That after the close of the Conference, no branch be acknowledged as belonging to the Association by the General Council and by the Central Councils of the various countries until its annual contribution of 1^d per head for the current year shall have been remitted to the General Council.^a

2) α) For those countries in which the regular organization of the Association may for the moment become impossible by Government interference, the delegates of each Country are invited to propose such plans of organization as may be compatible with the peculiar circumstances of the Case. β) The Association may be re-formed under other names, γ) but all secret organizations are formally excluded.

3) The General Council will submit to the Conference a report of its administration of the affairs of the International since the last Congress.

5) The General Council will propose to the Conference to discuss the propriety of issuing a reply, to the various governments which have prosecuted and are now prosecuting the International; the Conference to name a Committee to be charged with drawing up this reply after its close.

4) *Resolution of Congress of Basle to be enforced:*

That to avoid confusion the Central Councils of the various countries be instructed to designate themselves henceforth as

^a The following text is crossed out in the manuscript: "No exception to this rule shall be allowed until it be proved to the satisfaction of the General Council that the branch in question has been prevented by existing legal obstacles from complying with the rule." — *Ed.*

Federal Councils with the name attached of the country they represent; and that the local branches or their Committees designate themselves as branches or Committees of their respective localities.²⁵⁴

6)^a

7) That all delegates of the General Council appointed to distinct missions shall have the right to attend, and be heard at, all meetings of federal councils and local committees or branches, without however being thereby entitled to vote thereat.

8) That the General Council be instructed to issue a fresh edition of the Statutes including the resolutions of the Congresses having relation thereto; and inasmuch as a mutilated French translation has hitherto been in circulation in France, and re-translated into Spanish and Italian, that it provide an authentic French translation which is to be forwarded to *Spain and Italy* also. *German-Holland*.^b

3 languages printed side by side.

Written between September 5 and 12,
1871

Reproduced from the manuscript

First published, in Russian, in the book
The London Conference of the First International, 1936

^a The text of the sixth point is crossed out in the manuscript: "That in all countries where the Association is regularly organised, the federal councils send regular reports of the amounts levied and received in the shape of local or district contributions."—Ed.

^b The end of the sentence is indecipherable. It looks like "... Spain and Italy, Holland, also Germany."—Ed.

THE LONDON CONFERENCE
OF THE
INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S
ASSOCIATION

September 17-23, 1871²⁵⁵

Karl Marx

[ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE ALLIANCE
OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY]²⁵⁶[RECORD OF THE SPEECH AT THE SITTING
OF THE CONFERENCE COMMISSION OF 18 SEPTEMBER 1871]

Marx: The dispute has its origin in the formation of the Alliance of Socialist Democracy in Geneva, founded by Bakunin and others. He reads the two communications from the General Council to the Alliance of 1868 and March 1869,^a in the second of which the dissolution of the Alliance and the communication on the number of its sections and their numerical strength are laid down as conditions for their admission into the International. These conditions were never met, the Alliance was never really dissolved; it has always maintained a sort of organisation. The organ of the Geneva sections, *L'Egalité*, 11 December 1869,^b blamed the General Council for failing to do its duty by not replying to its articles,^c whereupon the General Council replied that it was not its duty to join in newspaper polemics, but that it was prepared to answer requests or complaints made by the Romance Federal Council, and this circular was communicated to all the sections^d; every one of them approved the conduct of the General Council. The Swiss Council disowned *L'Egalité*, with whose editorial board it had broken off; the editorial board was changed, and subsequently the organ of the Alliance adherents

^a See K. Marx, "The International Working Men's Association and the International Alliance of Socialist Democracy" and "The General Council of the International Working Men's Association to the Central Bureau of the International Alliance of Socialist Democracy" (present edition, Vol. 21).—*Ed.*

^b P. Robin, "Réflexions", *L'Egalité*, No. 47, December 11, 1869.—*Ed.*

^c The reference is to a set of articles published in *Le Progrès* in November 1869.—*Ed.*

^d See K. Marx, "The General Council to the Federal Council of Romance Switzerland" (present edition, Vol. 21).—*Ed.*

was the *Progrès* and later the *Solidarité*. Then came the Congress of Locle where the two parties, the Romance Federation of Geneva and that of the mountains (the Alliance), were openly divided.²⁵⁷ The General Council left things as they were, only forbidding the new council to set itself up as a Romance council alongside the other. Guillaume, who had preached abstention from all politics, contrary to our Statutes,^a the moment the war broke out published a proclamation demanding in the name of the International the formation of an army to come to the aid of France,^b which is even more contrary to our Statutes.

Recorded by F. Engels

First published, in Russian, in the book *The London Conference of the First International*, 1936

Printed according to the manuscript

Translated from the French

Published in English for the first time

^a See K. Marx, *Rules and Administrative Regulations of the International Working Men's Association* (present edition, Vol. 20, Appendices).—Ed.

^b J. Guillaume, "Manifeste aux Sections de l'Internationale", *La Solidarité*, No. 22, September 5, 1870.—Ed.

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

MOTIONS OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE²⁵⁸

1) In order to avoid any misunderstanding the resolution of the Basle Congress^a shall be strictly observed, whereby the central councils in the various countries where the Association has regular organisations shall call themselves Federal Councils or Committees of their respective countries, and the local sections or committees shall call themselves sections or committees of their respective areas.

2) Conference instructs the General Council to publish a new edition of the Rules, with authentic translations into French and German printed opposite the English text.^b All translations into other languages must be approved by the General Council prior to publication.

3) At the suggestion of the General Council, Conference recommends the formation of women's sections among female workers. It is understood that this in no way affects the existence of mixed sections including both sexes.

4) Conference invites the General Council to enforce Clause 5 of the Rules^c ordering general statistical surveys of the working class, and the resolutions of the Geneva Congress to the same effect.^d Working men's societies or branches which refuse to

^a See *Association Internationale des Travailleurs. Compte-rendu de IVe Congrès International, tenu à Bâle, en Septembre 1869*, Brussels, 1869.

^b K. Marx, *General Rules and Administrative Regulations of the International Working Men's Association*, London, 1871 (present edition, Vol. 23).— *Ed.*

^c K. Marx, *Rules and Administrative Regulations of the International Working Men's Association* (present edition, Vol. 20, Appendices).— *Ed.*

^d *Resolutions of the Congress of Geneva, 1866, and the Congress of Brussels, 1868. The International Working Men's Association. Office of General Council, London [1869].— Ed.*

provide the information requested shall be reported to the General Council, which shall give a ruling on them.

5) All the delegates appointed by the General Council to special missions shall be entitled to be present and to be heard at all meetings of the federal councils, district or local committees, and local branches, without, however, having a vote.

6) After the closure of Conference no branch shall be considered by the General Council and the Federal Councils to belong to the Association until it has paid to the General Council its contribution of 10c. per member for the current year.

Recorded on September 19 or 20, 1871

First published in *MEGA*₂, Bd. I/22,
Berlin, 1978

Printed according to the manuscript

Translated from the French

Published in English for the first time

Frederick Engels
[ON THE POLITICAL ACTION
OF THE WORKING CLASS]²⁵⁹

[PLAN FOR SPEECH AT THE CONFERENCE SESSION
ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1871]

- 1) Lorenzo matter of principle—this decided.
- 2) Abstention impossible. Newspaper politics is also politics; all abstaining papers attack the government. The only question is *how* and how far to get involved in politics. This depends on circumstances and cannot be prescribed.

{ 2) Abstention nonsensical; one should abstain because bad people might be elected—so no contributions because the treasurer might abscond. So, no newspaper because the editor is just as likely to sell himself as the deputy.

{ 3) Political freedoms—particularly of association, assembly and press—our means of agitation; is it unimportant whether these are taken from us or not? And should we not resist if they are attacked?

{ 4) Abstention preached, because otherwise one is recognising the status quo. The status quo exists and *se fiche pas mal*^a about our recognition. If we use the means offered us by the status quo to protest against the status quo, is that recognition?^b

- 3) Abstention impossible.^c The Workers' Party as a political party *exists* and wants to act politically, and to preach abstention to it is to ruin the International. The mere contemplation of conditions, of political suppression for social ends *forces* the workers into

^a It could care no less.—*Ed.*

^b Clauses 2,3,4, marked by Engels with a brace in the manuscript, were written as an insertion into the text on the right side.—*Ed.*

^c Then follows the phrase "after the Commune" crossed out by Engels.—*Ed.*

politics; the preachers of abstention are driving them into the arms of bourgeois politicians. After the Commune, which put the political action of the workers on the agenda, abstention impossible.

4) We want the abolition of classes. Sole means is political power in the hands of the proletariat—and we should not go into politics? All abstentionists call themselves revolutionaries. Revolution is the highest act of politics, and anyone who wants it must also want the means of preparing revolution, educate the workers for it, and see to it that he is not cheated again by Favre and Pyat the following day. It is purely a question of *which* politics—the *exclusively proletarian, not as the tail of the bourgeoisie*.

Written on September 20 or 21, 1871

Printed according to the manuscript

First published, in French, in the magazine *Cahiers du Bolchévisme. Revue bimensuelle publiée par le C.C. du Parti communiste français (S.F.I.C.)*, No. 20, 1934

Published in English for the first time

Frederick Engels

[ON THE POLITICAL ACTION OF THE WORKING CLASS]²⁶⁰

[HANDWRITTEN TEXT OF THE SPEECH DELIVERED AT
THE CONFERENCE SESSION ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1871]

Absolute abstention from politics is impossible; all the abstentionist newspapers go in for politics, too. It only depends how one does it and what sort of politics. Moreover, for us abstention is impossible. The workers' party already exists as a political party in most countries. It is not up to us to ruin it by preaching abstention. The experience of real life and the political oppression imposed on them by existing governments—whether for political or social ends—force the workers to concern themselves with politics, whether they wish to or not. To preach abstention would be to push them into the arms of bourgeois politics. Especially in the aftermath of the Paris Commune, which placed the political action of the proletariat on the agenda, abstention is quite impossible.

We seek the abolition of Classes. What is the means of achieving it? The political domination of the proletariat. And when everyone is agreed on that, we are asked not to get involved in politics! All abstentionists call themselves revolutionaries, even revolutionaries *par excellence*. But revolution is the supreme act of politics; whoever wants it must also want the means, political action, which prepares for it, which gives the workers the education for revolution and without which the workers will always be duped by the Favres and the Pyats the day after the struggle. But the politics which are needed are working class politics; the workers' party must be constituted not as the tail of some bourgeois party, but as an independent party with its own objective, its own politics.

The political freedoms, the right of assembly and association and the freedom of the press, these are our weapons—should we

fold our arms and abstain if they seek to take them away from us? It is said that every political act implies recognition of the status quo. But when this status quo gives us the means of protesting against it, then to make use of these means is not to recognise the status quo.

First published in full, in Russian, in the magazine *The Communist International*, No. 29, 1934

Printed according to the manuscript

Translated from the French

SUISSE

Un an 3 fr. 80
 Six mois 2 » 80
 Trois mois 1 » 90
 Par la poste, 20 c. en plus.
 Prix du numéro 15 cent.

L'ÉGALITÉ

ÉTRANGER

France, un an . . . 4 fr. 80
 Belgique — . . . 4 » 80
 Italie — . . . 4 » 40
 Espagne — . . . 6 » —
 Allemagne — . . 4 » 80
 Angleterre — . . 5 » —

Journal de l'Association Internationale des Travailleurs de la Suisse romande

Karl Marx

RESOLUTION OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE RELATING TO THE SPLIT IN ROMANCE SWITZERLAND²⁶¹

With regard to this split:

1. First and foremost, the Conference must consider the demurrers put forward by the Federal Committee of the Societies of the Mountains, which do not belong to the Romance Federation (see the letter of 4 September submitted to the Conference by the Federal Committee of that section):

First demurrer:

"The General Congress," they say, "convened in accordance with the Rules, can alone be competent to judge such a serious matter as the split in the Romance Federation."

Considering:

That when conflicts arise between the societies or branches of a national group, or between groups of different nationalities, the General Council shall have the right to decide on the split, pending appeal to the next Congress, which will take the final decision (see clause VII of the resolutions of the Congress of Basel)^a;

That according to resolution VI of the Congress of Basel, the General Council also has the right to suspend a section of the International until the next Congress;

That these rights of the General Council have been recognised, albeit only in theory, by the Federal Committee of the dissident branches of the Mountains, since Citizen Robin has repeatedly appealed to the General Council in the name of this Committee to come to a final decision on this question (see the minutes of the General Council);

^a Association Internationale des Travailleurs. *Compte-rendu du IV^e Congrès International, tenu à Bâle, en septembre 1869*, Brussels, 1869.—Ed.

That the rights of Conference, while not equal to those of a General Congress, at any rate exceed those of the General Council;

That it is in fact the Federal Committee of the dissident branches of the Mountains, not the Federal Committee of the Romance Federation, which through Citizen Robin has requested that a conference be convened to reach a final decision on this split (see the minutes of the General Council of 25 July 1871).

For these reasons:

The Conference declares the first demurrer invalid.

Second demurrer:

"It would be," they say, "a breach of elementary justice to pass sentence on a federation which has not been given the opportunity to defend itself... Today (4 September 1871) we learn indirectly that an extraordinary Conference is to be held in London on 17 September. [...] It was the duty of the General Council to inform all the regional groups of it; we do not know why it has maintained silence with regard to us."

Considering:

That the General Council had instructed all its secretaries to give notice of the convening of a conference to the sections of the respective countries which they represent;

That Citizen Jung, the corresponding secretary for Switzerland, did not inform the Committee of the Jura branches for the following reasons:

In flagrant breach of the decision of the General Council of 29 June 1870,²⁶² this Committee, as it still does in its last letter addressed to the Conference, continues to call itself the Committee of the *Romance Federation*.

This Committee had the right to appeal against the decision of the General Council at a future Congress, but it did not have the right to ignore the decision of the General Council.

Consequently it had no legal existence as far as the General Council was concerned, and Citizen Jung did not have the right to recognise it by inviting it direct to send delegates to the Conference;

Citizen Jung has not received from the Committee any answers to questions put to it in the name of the General Council; since the admission of Citizen Robin to the General Council^a the requests of the above-mentioned Committee have always been conveyed to the General Council through Citizen Robin, and never by the corresponding secretary for Switzerland.

^a November 8, 1870.—*Ed.*

Considering further:

That on behalf of the above-mentioned Committee Citizen Robin had requested that the conflict be referred first to the General Council and then, on the refusal of the General Council, to a Conference; that the General Council and its corresponding secretary for Switzerland therefore had every reason to suppose that Citizen Robin would inform his correspondents of the convening of a conference, which they themselves had requested;

That the commission of inquiry set up by the Conference to study the Swiss split has heard Citizen Robin as a witness; that all the documents submitted to the General Council by the two parties have been passed on to the commission of inquiry; that it is impossible to concede that the above-mentioned Committee had only been informed of the convening of a conference on 4 September, seeing that in August it had already approached Citizen M...^a with an offer to send him to the Conference as a delegate;

For these reasons:

The Conference declares the second demurrer invalid.

Third demurrer:

"A decision," they say, "annulling the rights of our Federation would have the most disastrous consequences for the existence of the International in our country."

Considering:

That no one has asked for the rights of the above-mentioned Federation to be annulled,

The Conference declares the third demurrer invalid.

2) The Conference confirms the decision of the General Council of 29 June 1870.

At the same time, in view of the persecutions which the International is at present undergoing, the Conference appeals to the feelings of fraternity and union which more than ever ought to animate the working class;

It invites all the brave working men of the Mountain sections to rejoin the sections of the Romance Federation. In case such an amalgamation should prove impracticable it decides that the federated Mountain sections shall henceforth name themselves the "Jurassian Federation".

The Conference gives warning that henceforth the General Council will be bound to publicly denounce and disavow all would-be organs of the *International* which, following the precedents of the

^a Malon.— *Ed.*

Progrès and the *Solidarité*, should discuss in their columns, before the middle-class public, questions exclusively reserved for the local or Federal Committees and the General Council, or for the private and administrative sittings of the Federal or General Congresses.

London, September 26, 1871

Moved on September 21, 1871

First published in *L'Égalité*, No. 20, October 21, 1871

Printed according to the newspaper

Translated from the French

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONFERENCE OF DELEGATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION

ASSEMBLED AT LONDON FROM 17TH TO 23RD SEPTEMBER 1871
(CIRCULAR ISSUED BY THE GENERAL COUNCIL
OF THE ASSOCIATION)²⁶³

I.

COMPOSITION OF GENERAL COUNCIL²⁶⁴

The Conference invites the General Council to limit the number of those members whom it adds to itself, and to take care that such adjunctions be not made too exclusively from citizens belonging to the same nationality.

II.

DESIGNATIONS OF NATIONAL COUNCILS,^a ETC.²⁶⁵

1.—In conformity with a Resolution of the Congress of Basel (1869), the Central Councils of the various countries where the *International* is regularly organised, shall designate themselves henceforth as *Federal Councils* or *Federal Committees* with the names of their respective countries attached, the designation of *General Council* being reserved for the Central Council of the International Working Men's Association.

2.—All local branches, sections, groups and their committees are henceforth to designate and constitute themselves simply and exclusively as branches, sections, groups and committees of the *International Working Men's Association* with the names of their respective localities attached.

3.—Consequently, no branches, sections, or groups will henceforth be allowed to designate themselves by sectarian names such as Positivists, Mutualists, Collectivists, Communists, etc., or to form separatist bodies under the name of *sections of propaganda* etc.,

^a The French and German editions have respectively: "National or regional Councils, local branches, sections, groups and their respective Committees" and "National Councils, local branches, sections, groups and their Committees".—*Ed.*

pretending to accomplish special missions, distinct from the common purposes of the Association.

4.—Resolutions 1 and 2 do not, however, apply to affiliated *Trades' Unions*.

III.

DELEGATES OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL²⁶⁶

All delegates appointed to distinct missions by the General Council shall have the right to attend, and be heard at, all meetings of Federal Councils, or Committees, district and local Committees and branches, without, however, being entitled to vote thereat.

IV.

CONTRIBUTION OF 1D.^a PER MEMBER TO THE GENERAL COUNCIL²⁶⁷

1.—The General Council shall cause to be printed adhesive stamps representing the value of one penny each, which will be annually supplied, in the numbers to be asked for, to the Federal Councils or Committees.

2.—The Federal Councils or Committees shall provide the local Committees, or, in their absence, their respective sections, with the number of stamps corresponding to the number of their members.

3.—These stamps are to be affixed to a special sheet of the *livret* or to the Rules which every member is held to possess.

4.—On the 1st of March of each year, the Federal Councils or Committees of the different countries shall forward to the General Council the amount of the stamps disposed of, and return the unsold stamps remaining on hand.

5.—These stamps, representing the value of the individual contributions, shall bear the date of the current year.

V.

FORMATION OF WORKING WOMEN'S BRANCHES²⁶⁸

The Conference recommends the formation of female branches among the working class. It is, however, understood that this resolution does not at all interfere with the existence or formation of branches composed of both sexes.

^a The German edition has "(Groschen)" after "1d.", and the French one has "10 [centimes]" instead of "1d." here and below.—*Ed.*

VI.

GENERAL STATISTICS OF THE WORKING CLASS²⁶⁹

1.—The Conference invites the General Council to enforce art. 5 of the original Rules relating to a general statistics of the working class, and the resolutions of the Geneva Congress, 1866,^a on the same subject.²⁷⁰

2.—Every local branch is bound to appoint a special committee of statistics, so as to be always ready, within the limits of its means, to answer any questions which may be addressed to it by the Federal Council or Committee of its country, or by the General Council. It is recommended to all branches to remunerate the secretaries of the committees of statistics, considering the general benefit the working class will derive from their labour.

3.—On the first of August of each year the Federal Councils or Committees will transmit the materials collected in their respective countries to the General Council which, in its turn, will have to elaborate them into a general report, to be laid before the Congresses or Conferences annually held in the month of September.

4.—Trades' Unions and international branches refusing to give the information required, shall be reported to the General Council which will take action thereupon.

VII.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF TRADES'
UNIONS²⁷¹

The General Council is invited to assist, as has been done hitherto, the growing tendency of the Trades' Unions of the different countries to enter into relations with the Unions of the same trade in all other countries. The efficiency of its action as the international agent of communication between the national Trades' societies will essentially depend upon the assistance given by these same societies to the General Labour Statistics pursued by the *International*.

The boards of Trades' Unions of all countries are invited to keep the General Council informed of the directions of their respective offices.

^a *Resolutions of the Congress of Geneva, 1866, and the Congress of Brussels, 1868. The International Working Men's Association. Office of General Council, London [1869].—Ed.*

VIII.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS²⁷²

1.—The Conference invites the General Council and the Federal Councils or Committees to prepare, for the next Congress, reports on the means of securing the adhesion of the agricultural producers to the movement of the industrial proletariat.

2.—Meanwhile, the Federal Councils or Committees are invited to send agitators to the rural districts, there to organise public meetings, to propagate the principles of the International and to found rural branches.

IX.

POLITICAL ACTION OF THE WORKING CLASS²⁷³

Considering the following passage of the preamble to the Rules: "The economical emancipation of the working classes is the great end to which every political movement ought to be subordinate *as a means*;"^a

That the Inaugural Address of the International Working Men's Association (1864) states: "The lords of land and the lords of capital will always use their political privileges for the defence and perpetuation of their economical monopolies. So far from promoting, they will continue to lay every possible impediment in the way of the emancipation of labour... To conquer political power has therefore become the great duty of the working classes;"^b

That the Congress of Lausanne (1867) has passed this resolution: "The social emancipation of the workmen is inseparable from their political emancipation;"^c

That the declaration of the General Council relative to the pretended plot of the French Internationals on the eve of the plebiscite (1870) says: "Certainly by the tenor of our Statutes, all our branches in England, on the Continent, and in America have the special mission not only to serve as centres for the militant organisation of the working class, but also to support, in their respective countries, every political movement tending towards the

^a K. Marx, *Rules and Administrative Regulations of the International Working Men's Association* (present edition, Vol. 20, Appendices).—Ed.

^b K. Marx, *Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association* (present edition, Vol. 20, p. 12).—Ed.

^c *Procès-verbaux du Congrès de l'Association Internationale des Travailleurs réuni à Lausanne du 2 au 8 septembre 1867, Chaux-de-Fonds, 1867.*—Ed.

accomplishment of our ultimate end—the economical emancipation of the working class;”^a

That false translations of the original Statutes^b have given rise to various^c interpretations which were mischievous to the development and action of the International Working Men’s Association²⁷⁴;

In presence of an unbridled reaction which violently crushes every effort at emancipation on the part of the working men, and pretends to maintain by brute force the distinction of classes and the political domination of the propertied classes resulting from it^d;

Considering, that against this collective power of the propertied classes the working class cannot act, as a class, except by constituting itself into a political party, distinct from, and opposed to, all old parties formed by the propertied classes;

That this constitution of the working class into a political party is indispensable in order to insure the triumph of the social Revolution and its ultimate end—the abolition of classes;

That the combination of forces which the working class has already effected by its economical struggles ought at the same time to serve as a lever for its struggles against the political power of landlords and capitalists—^e

The Conference recalls to the members of the *International*:

That in the militant state of the working class, its economical movement and its political action are indissolubly united.

X.

GENERAL RESOLUTION AS TO THE COUNTRIES WHERE THE REGULAR ORGANISATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL IS INTERFERED WITH BY THE GOVERNMENTS²⁷⁵

In those countries where the regular organisation of the *International* may for the moment have become impracticable in consequence of government interference, the Association, and its

^a K. Marx, “Concerning the Persecution of the Members of the French Sections” (present edition, Vol. 21, p. 127).—*Ed.*

^b See K. Marx, *Provisional Rules of the Association* (present edition, Vol. 20).—*Ed.*

^c The German and French editions have “false” instead of “various”.—*Ed.*

^d The German edition has “based on it” instead of “resulting from it”.—*Ed.*

^e The German and French editions have “its exploiters” instead of “landlords and capitalists”.—*Ed.*

local groups, may be reformed under various other names, but all secret societies properly so called are and remain formally excluded.

XI.

RESOLUTIONS RELATING TO FRANCE²⁷⁶

1.—The Conference expresses its firm conviction that all persecutions will only double the energy of the adherents of the *International*, and that the branches will continue to organize themselves, if not by great centres, at least by workshops and federations of workshops corresponding with each other by their delegates.

2.—Consequently, the Conference invites all branches vigorously to persist in the propaganda of our principles in France and to import into their country as many copies as possible of the publications and Statutes of the *International*.

XII.

RESOLUTION RELATING TO ENGLAND²⁷⁷

The Conference invites the General Council to call upon the English branches in London to form a Federal Committee for London which, after its recognition by the provincial branches and affiliated societies,^a shall be recognised, by the General Council, as the *Federal Council for England*.

XIII.

SPECIAL VOTES OF THE CONFERENCE²⁷⁸

1.—The Conference approves of the adjunction of the members of the Paris Commune whom the General Council has added to its number.

2.—The Conference declares that German working men have done their duty during the Franco-German war.

3.—The Conference fraternally thanks the members of the Spanish Federation for the memorandum presented by them on the organisation of the *International* by which they have once more proved their devotion to our common work.

^a The German and French editions have "trade unions" instead of "societies".—*Ed.*

4.—The General Council shall immediately publish a declaration to the effect that the International Working Men's Association is utterly foreign to the so-called conspiracy of Netschayeff²⁷⁹ who has fraudulently usurped^a its name.

XIV.

INSTRUCTION TO CITIZEN OUTINE²⁸⁰

Citizen Outine is invited to publish in the journal *L'Égalité* a succinct report, from the Russian papers, of the Netschayeff trial. Before publication, his report will be submitted to the General Council.

XV.

CONVOCAION OF NEXT CONGRESS²⁸¹

The Conference leaves it to the discretion of the General Council to fix, according to events, the day and place of meeting of the next Congress or Conference.^b

XVI.

ALLIANCE DE LA DÉMOCRATIE SOCIALISTE.
(THE ALLIANCE OF SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY)²⁸²

Considering that the "Alliance de la Démocratie socialiste" has declared itself dissolved (see letter to the General Council d.d. Geneva, 10th August 1871 signed by citizen N. Joukowsky, secretary to the "Alliance"),

That in its sitting of the 18th September (see No. II of this circular) the Conference has decided that all existing organisations of the *International* shall, in conformity with the letter and the spirit of the general rules, henceforth designate and constitute themselves simply and exclusively as branches, sections, federations, etc., of the International Working Men's Association with the names of their respective localities attached;

That the existing branches and societies shall therefore no longer be allowed to designate themselves by sectarian names such as Positivists, Mutualists, Collectivists, Communists, etc., or to form separatist bodies under the names of *sections of propaganda*, *Alliance*

^a The German and French editions have "usurped and exploited".—*Ed.*

^b The German and French editions have "or Conference instead of it".—*Ed.*

de la Démocratie socialiste, etc., pretending to accomplish special missions distinct from the common purposes of the Association^a;

That henceforth the General Council of the International Working Men's Association will in this sense have to interpret and apply article 5 of the administrative resolutions of the Basel Congress^b: "The General Council has the right either to accept or to refuse the affiliation of any new section or group," etc.^c;

The Conference declares the question of the "*Alliance de la Démocratie socialiste*" to be settled.

XVII.

SPLIT IN THE FRENCH-SPEAKING PART OF SWITZERLAND²⁸³

1.—The different exceptions taken by the Federal Committee of the Mountain sections as to the competency of the Conference are declared inadmissible. (This is but a resumé of article 1 which will be printed in full in the *Egalité* of Geneva.^d)

2.—The Conference confirms the decision of the General Council of June 29th, 1870.²⁶²

At the same time, in view of the persecutions which the *International* is at present undergoing, the Conference appeals to the feelings of fraternity and union which more than ever ought to animate the working class;

It invites the brave working men of the Mountain sections to rejoin the sections of the Romance Federation;

In case such an amalgamation should prove impracticable it decides that the dissident Mountain sections shall henceforth name themselves the "*Jurassian Federation*".

The Conference gives warning that henceforth the General Council will be bound to publicly denounce and disavow all organs^e of the International which, following the precedents of the *Progrès* and the *Solidarité*, should discuss in their columns, before

^a The French edition has "from the purpose common to the mass of militant proletariat united within the International Working Men's Association" instead of "from the common purposes of the Association".—*Ed.*

^b *Association Internationale des Travailleurs. Compte-rendu du IV^e Congrès International, tenu à Bâle, en septembre 1869*, Brussels, 1869.—*Ed.*

^c The German and French editions have "pending appeal to the next congress" instead of "etc.".—*Ed.*

^d See this volume, pp. 419-22.—*Ed.*

^e The German and French editions have "all would-be organs".—*Ed.*

the middle-class public, questions exclusively reserved for the local or Federal Committees and the General Council, or for the private and administrative sittings of the Federal or General Congresses.

NOTICE

The resolutions not intended for publicity will be communicated to the Federal Councils or Committees of the various countries by the corresponding secretaries of the General Council.

By order and in the name of the Conference,

The General Council:

R. Applegarth, M. J. Boon, Fred. Bradnick, G. H. Buttery, Delahaye, Eugène Dupont (on mission), W. Hales, G. Harris, Hurliman, Jules Johannard, Fred. Lessner, Lochner, Ch. Longuet, C. Martin, Z. Maurice, Henry Mayo, George Milner, Charles Murray, Pfänder, John Roach, Rühl, Sadler, Cowell Stepney, Alf. Taylor, W. Townshend, E. Vaillant, John Weston

Corresponding Secretaries:

<i>A. Serraillier</i> for France.	<i>Walery Wróblewski</i> for
<i>Karl Marx</i> Germany and	Poland.
Russia.	<i>Hermann Jung</i> for Switzer-
<i>F. Engels</i> Italy and Spain.	land.
<i>A. Herman</i> Belgium.	<i>T. Mottershead</i> Denmark.
<i>J. P. MacDonnell</i> Ireland.	<i>Ch. Rochat</i> Holland.
<i>Le Moussu</i> for the French	<i>J. G. Eccarius</i> United States.
branches of	<i>Leo Frankel</i> Austria and
the United States.	Hungary.

F. Engels, Chairman—*Hermann Jung*, Treasurer
John Hales, Gen. Secretary

256, High Holborn, W.C.,
October 17, 1871

Drafted, edited and prepared for the
press between October 8 and 23, 1871

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man and French editions

Published as a pamphlet in English,
German and French and in several press
organs of the International in November-
December 1871

Karl Marx

[TO THE EDITORS OF WOODHULL & CLAFLIN'S
WEEKLY]²⁸⁴

London, N. W., September 23, 1871

Mesdames:

I have the honor to send you, for insertion in your *Weekly*—if you judge the contribution sufficiently interesting for your readers—a short relation of my daughter Jenny on the persecutions she and her sisters, during their stay at Bagnères de Luchon (Pyrenees),^a had to undergo at the hands of the French Government. This tragico-comical episode seems to me characteristic of the Republic-Thiers.

The news of my death was concocted at Paris by the *Avenir libéral*,^b a Bonapartist paper.

Since Sunday last a private Conference of the delegates of the International Workingmen's Association is sitting at London. The proceedings will terminate to-day.

With my best thanks for the highly interesting papers you had the kindness to send me,

I have the honor, Mesdames, to remain,

Yours most sincerely,

Karl Marx

First published in the *Woodhull & Claflin's Weekly*, No. 23/75, October 21, 1871

Reproduced from the weekly

^a See this volume, pp. 622-32.—*Ed.*

^b "Paris, le 4 septembre 1871. Dernières Nouvelles", *L'Avenir libéral*, No. 376, September 5, 1871.—*Ed.*

FROM THE PREPARATORY MATERIALS

Karl Marx

DRAFTS OF *THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE*²⁸⁵

Written by K. Marx between the middle
of April and May 23, 1871

First published in full, in English and
Russian, in *Marx-Engels Archives*, Vol. III
(VIII), 1934

Reproduced from the manuscript

[FIRST DRAFT OF *THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE*]

THE GOVERNMENT OF DEFENCE

Four months after the commencement of the war, when the Government of Defence had thrown a sop to the Paris National Guard by allowing them to show their fighting capabilities at Buzenval,¹¹⁵ the Government considered the opportune moment come to prepare Paris for capitulation. To the assembly of the maires of Paris for capitulation, Trochu, in presence of a[nd] supported by Jules Favre and others of his colleagues, revealed at last his "*plan*". He said literally:

"The first question, addressed to me by my colleagues *on the evening of the 4th September*, was this: Paris can it stand, with any chance of success, a siege against the Prussian army? *I did not hesitate to answer in the negative*. Some of my colleagues here present will warrant the truth of these my words, and *the persistence of my opinion*. I told them in these very terms that, under the existing state of things, the attempt of Paris to maintain a siege against the Prussian army would be a *folly*. Without doubt, I added, this might be a *heroical folly*, but it would be nothing else... *The events have not given the lie to my prevision*."^a

Hence Trochu's plan, from the very day of the proclamation of the Republic, was *the capitulation of Paris and of France*. In point of fact he was the commander in chief of the Prussians. In a letter to Gambetta, Jules Favre himself confessed so much that the enemy to be put down, was not the Prussian soldier, but the Paris "demagogue revolutionist". The high-sounding promises to the people, by the Government of Defence, were therefore as many deliberate lies. Their "*plan*" they systematically carried out by entrusting the defence of Paris to Bonapartist generals, by

^a "Paris au jour le jour", *Le Figaro*, No. 74, March 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

disorganizing the National Guard and by organizing famine under the maladministration of Jules Ferry. The attempts of the Paris workmen on the 5th of October, the 31st of October etc, to supplant these traitors by the Commune, were put down as conspiracies with the Prussian!²⁸⁶ After the capitulation the mask was thrown off (cast aside). The *capitulards*¹⁶⁵ became a government by the grace of Bismarck.¹¹⁸ Being his prisoners, they stipulated with him a general armistice the conditions of which disarmed France and rendered all further resistance impossible. Resuscitated at Bordeaux as the Government of the Republic, these very same capitulards through Thiers, their ex-Ambassador, and Jules Favre, their Foreign minister, fervently implored Bismarck, in the name of the majority of the so-called National Assembly, and long before the rise of Paris, to disarm and occupy Paris and put down "its canaille", as Bismarck himself sneeringly told his admirers at Frankfurt on his return from France to *Berlin*.^a This occupation of Paris by the Prussians—such was the last word of the "plan" of the government of defence. The cynical effrontery with which, since their instalment at Versailles, the same men fawn upon and appeal to the armed intervention of Prussia, has dumbfounded even the venal press of Europe. The heroic exploits of the Paris National Guard, since they fight no longer *under* but *against* the capitulards, have forced even the most sceptical to brand the word "traitor" on the brazen fronts of the Trochu, Jules Favre et Co. The documents seized by the Commune, have at last furnished the juridical proofs of their high treason.^b Amongst these papers there are letters of the Bonapartist *sabreurs*^c to whom the execution of Trochu's "plan" had been confided, in which these infamous wretches crack jokes at and make fun of their own "defence of Paris". (cf. for instance the letter of *Alphonse Simon Guidod*, supreme commander of the artillery of the army of defence of Paris and Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, to *Suzanne*, General of division of artillery, published by the *Journal officiel* of the Commune.^d)

It is, therefore, evident, that the men who now form the

^a Report from Germany in the column "Révélation", *La Situation*, No. 156, March 21, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Le Gouvernement de la Défense nationale", *La Situation*, No. 189, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Stout soldiers.—*Ed.*

^d See *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 115, April 25, 1871. Marx refers to the item "Le Gouvernement de la Défense nationale", *La Situation*, No. 189, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

government of Versailles, can only be saved from the fate of convicted traitors by civil war, the death of the Republic and a monarchical restoration under the shelter of Prussian bayonets.

But—and this is most characteristic of the men of the Empire as well as of the men who but on its soil and within its atmosphere could grow into mock-tribunes of the people—the victorious republic would not only brand them as traitors, it would have to surrender them as common felons to the criminal court. Look only at *Jules Favre*, *Ernest Picard*, and *Jules Ferry*, the great men, under Thiers, of the government of defence!

A series of authenticated judiciary documents spreading over about 20 years, and published by M. Millière, a representative to the National Assembly,^a proves that *Jules Favre*, living in adulterous concubinage with the wife of a drunkard resident at Algiers,^b had, by a most complicated concatenation of daring forgeries, contrived to grasp in the name of his bastards, a large succession that made him a rich man and that the connivance only of the Bonapartist tribunals saved him from exposure in a law-suit undertaken by the legitimate claimants. *Jules Favre*, then, this unctuous mouthpiece of family, religion, property, and order, has long since been forfeited to the *Code Pénal*. Lifelong penal servitude would be his unavoidable lot under every honest government. *Ernest Picard*, the present Versailles home minister, appointed by himself on the 4th of September Home minister of the government of defence,^c after he had tried in vain to be appointed by L. Bonaparte, this Ernest Picard is the brother of one *Arthur Picard*. When, together with *Jules Favre* and Co., he had the impudence to propose this worthy brother of his as a candidate in the Seine et Oise for the *Corps législatif*, the Imperialist government published two documents, a report of the Prefecture of Police (31 July, 1867) stating that this *Arthur Picard* was excluded from the Bourse as an “escroc”,^d and another document of the 11 December 1868, according to which *Arthur* had confessed the theft of 300,000 fcs, committed by him as a director of one of the branches of the *Société Générale*,¹⁶⁷ rue Palestro, No. 5.^e Ernest made not only his worthy *Arthur* the *editor in chief* of a

^a See J.-B. É. Millière, “Le Faussaire”, *Le Vengeur*, No. 6, February 8, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Jeanne Charmont, who lived separate from her husband, Vernier.—*Ed.*

^c In the final version of *The Civil War in France* Marx corrected the inaccuracy: Ernest Picard was Minister of Finance in the Government of National Defence (see this volume, p. 314).—*Ed.*

^d Swindler.—*Ed.*

^e See “Le Sieur Picard”, *La Situation*, No. 168, April 4, 1871.—*Ed.*

paper of his own, the *Électeur libre*, founded under the Empire and continued to this day, a paper, in which the republicans are daily denounced as “robbers, bandits, and *partageux*”, but once become the home minister of the “Defence”, Ernest employed Arthur as his financial medium between the home office to the Stock Exchange, there to discount the State secrets entrusted to him. The whole “financial” correspondence between Ernest and Arthur has fallen into the hands of the Commune. Like the lachrymose Jules Favre, Ernest Picard, the Joe Miller of the Versailles Government, is a man forfeited to the *Code Pénal* and the galleys!

To make up this trio, Jules Ferry, a poor briefless barrister before 4 September, not content to organize the famine of Paris, had contrived to job a fortune out of this famine. The day on which he would have to give an account of his speculations during the Paris siege would be his day of judgment!

No wonder then that these men who can only hope to escape the hulks in a monarchy, protected by Prussian bayonets, who but in the turmoil of civil war can win their *ticket of leave*,^b that these desperadoes were at once *chosen* by Thiers and accepted by the Rurals as the safest tools of the Counterrevolution!

No wonder that when in the beginning of April captured National Guards were exposed at Versailles to the ferocious outrages of Piétri’s “lambs” and the Versailles mob, M. Ernest Picard, “with his hands in his trousers pockets, walked from group to group cracking jokes” while “on the balcony of the Prefecture Madame Thiers, Madame Jules Favre and a bevy of similar *Dames*, looking in excellent health and spirits”,^c exulted in that disgusting scene. No wonder then, that while one part of France winces under the heels of the conquerors, while Paris, the heart and head of France, daily sheds streams of its best blood in self-defence against the home traitors, ... the Thiers, Favres et Co. indulge in revelries at the Palace of Louis XIV, such f.i. as the grand *fête* given by Thiers in honour of Jules Favre on his return from Rouen (whither he had been sent to conspire with (fawn upon) the Prussians). It is the cynical orgy of evaded felons!

^a Supporters of the division of property.— *Ed.*

^b See this volume, p. 314.— *Ed.*

^c “The Advance of the Insurgents on Versailles”, *The Daily News*, No. 7781, April 7, 1871.— *Ed.*

If the Government of Defence first made Thiers their Foreign Ambassador, going a begging at all Courts of Europe there to barter a king for France for their intervention against Prussia, if, later on, they sent him on a travelling tour throughout the French provinces, there to conspire with the *châteaux*^a and secretly prepare the General elections which together with the Capitulation would take France by surprise—Thiers, on his side, made them his ministers and high functionaries. They were safe men.

There is one thing rather mysterious in the proceedings of Thiers, his recklessness in precipitating the revolution of Paris. Not content to goad Paris by the Antirepublican demonstrations of his rurals, by the threats to *decapitate* and *decapitalize* Paris,^b (by Dufaure's (Thiers' minister of justice) law of the 10th of March on the *échéances*^c of bills which impended bankruptcy on the Paris commerce¹⁸⁰), by appointing Orleanist ambassadors, by the transfer of the Assemblée to Versailles, by an imposition of a new tax on newspapers, by the confiscation of the Republican Paris journals, by the revival of the State of Siege, first proclaimed by Palikao and annulled with the downfall of the Imperialist government on the 4th of September, by appointing Vinoy, the *Décembriseur*¹⁸¹ and Exsenator governor of Paris, *Valentin*, the Imperialist Gendarme Prefect of Police, and Aurelle de Paladines, the jesuit General Commander in chief of the Paris National Guard—he opened the civil war with feeble forces, by Vinoy's attack on the Buttes Montmartre, by the attempt first to rob the National Guards of Cannons which belonged to them and which were only left to them by the Paris convention, because they were their property, and thus to disarm Paris.

Whence this feverish eagerness *d'en finir*^d? To disarm and put down Paris was of course the first condition of a monarchical counterrevolution, but an astute intriguer like Thiers could only risk the future of the difficult enterprise in undertaking it without due preparation, with ridiculously insufficient means, except under the sway of some overwhelmingly urgent move. The motive was this. By the agency of Pouyer-Quertier, his finance minister, Thiers had concluded a loan of two milliards to be paid immediately down and some more milliards to follow at certain terms. In this loan transaction a truly royal *pot-de-vin* (drink-

^a Manors (i.e. big landlords).—*Ed.*

^b See "The scanty news from the capital of Revolution...", *The Daily News*, No. 7774, March 30, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c The days of payment.—*Ed.*

^d To put an end to it.—*Ed.*

money) was reserved for those grand citizens Thiers, Jules Favre, Ernest Picard, Jules Simon, Pouyer-Quertier etc. But there was one hitch in the transaction. Before definitively sealing the treaty, the contractors wanted one guarantee—the *tranquillization of Paris*.¹⁸² Hence the reckless proceedings of Thiers. Hence the savage hatred against the Paris workmen perverse enough to interfere with this fine job.

As to the Jules Favres, Picards etc, we have said enough to prove them the worthy accomplices of such a jobbery. As to Thiers himself, it is notorious that during his two ministries under Louis Philippe he realized 2 millions, and that during his premiership (dating March 1840) he was taunted from the tribune of the Chambre of Deputies with his Bourse peculations, in answer to which he shed tears, a commodity he disposes of as freely as Jules Favre and the celebrated comedian Frédérick Lemaître. It is no less notorious that the first measure taken by M. Thiers to save France from the financial ruin, fastened upon her by the war, was—to endow himself with a yearly salary of 3 Millions of francs, exactly the sum L. Bonaparte got in 1850 as an equivalent from M. Thiers and his troop in the *Legislative Assembly* for allowing them to abolish the general suffrage.²⁸⁷ This endowment of M. Thiers with 3 millions was the first word of “the *economic republic*” the vista of which he had opened to his Paris electors in 1869. As to Pouyer-Quertier, he is a cottonspinner at Rouen. In 1869, he was the leader of the millowners’ conclave that proclaimed a general reduction of wages necessary for the “conquest” of the English market—an intrigue, then baffled by the *International*.²⁸⁸ Pouyer-Quertier, otherwise a fervent and even servile partisan of the Empire, found only one fault with it, its commercial treaty with England²¹⁶ damaging to his own shop interests. His first step as M. Thiers’ finance minister was to denounce that “hateful” treaty and to pronounce the necessity of reestablishing the old protective duties for his own shop. His second step was the *patriotic* attempt to strike Alsace by the reestablished old protective duties on the pretext that in this case no international treaty stood in the way of their re-introduction. By this masterstroke his own shop at Rouen would have got rid of the dangerous competition of the rival shops at Mulhausen.^a His last step was to make a present to his son-in-law, M. Roche Lambert, of the receveur-generalship of the Loiret, one of the rich booties falling into the lap of the governing bourgeois, and which Pouyer-Quertier had

^a Mulhouse.—Ed.

found so much fault with his Imperialist predecessor M. Magne, endowing his own son with that big jobbing place. This Pouyer-Quertier was then exactly the man for the perpetration of the above-said job.

30 March, *Rappel*. Jules Ferry, ex-mayor of Paris, issued a circular on March 28, ordering the town dues officials to stop forthwith all collections for the city of Paris.^a

Small state-rogueries,—a little character ... cankering conscience ... everlasting suggester of Parliamentary intrigue ... petty expedients and devices ... rehearsing his homilies of liberalism, of the "libertés nécessaires"¹⁷⁴ ... eagerly bent on ... strong reasons to weigh against the chances of failure ... cogent arguments which counterpoise ... kind of heroism in exaggerated baseness ... lucky parliamentary stratagems...

M. E. Picard is a swindler, who throughout the siege speculated on the Bourse over the defeats of our armies.

massacre, treason, arson, assassination, calumny, lies.^b

In his speech to the assembly of maires etc. (25th April) Thiers says himself that the

"assassins of Clément Thomas and Lecomte" are a handful of criminals^c "like those who may justly be regarded as having been accomplices in these crimes through abetting and assistance, that is, a *very small number of individuals*".^d

Dufaure

Dufaure wants to put down Paris by press prosecutions in the provinces. Monstrous to bring journals before a jury because preaching "*Conciliation*".

Dufaure plays a great part in the Thiers intrigue. By his law of the 10th of March, he roused all the indebted commerce of

^a Marx wrote this paragraph in French except for the words "for the city of Paris".—*Ed.*

^b Marx wrote this and the preceding paragraph in French.—*Ed.*

^c The following text in the paragraph is in French.—*Ed.*

^d "Méditation des municipalités de la Seine", *Le Rappel*, No. 684, April 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

Paris. By his law on Paris house-renters, he menaced all Paris.¹⁸⁰ Both laws were to punish Paris for having saved the honour of France and delayed the surrender to Bismarck for 6 months. Dufaure is an Orleanist, and a "Liberal", in the parliamentary sense of the word. Consequently, he has always been the minister of repression and of the State of Siege.

He accepted his first *portefeuille* on the 13 May, 1839, after the defeat of the *dernière prise d'armes*^a of the Republican party,²⁸⁹ was therefore the minister of the pitiless repression of the July government of that day.^b

Cavaignac, forced on the 29th October (1848) to raise the state of siege, called into his ministry two ministers of Louis Philippe (*Dufaure*, for the Interior, and *Vivien*). He appointed them on the demand of the *rue Poitiers* (Thiers),²⁹⁰ which demanded guarantees. He thus hoped to secure the support of the dynastics for the impending election of president. Dufaure employed the most illegal means to secure Cavaignac's candidature. Intimidation and electoral corruption had never been exercised on a larger scale. Dufaure inundated France with defamatory prints against the other candidates, and especially of Louis Bon., what did not prevent him to become later on Louis Bonaparte's minister. Dufaure became again the minister of the *state of siege of 13 June 1849* (against the demonstration of the National Guard against the bombardment of Rome etc by the French army). He is now again the minister of the state of siege, proclaimed at Versailles (for department of Seine et Oise). Power given to Thiers to declare any department whatever in a state of siege. Dufaure, as in 1839, as in 1849, wants new repressive laws, new press laws, a law to "abridge the formalities of the Courts Martial".¹⁸⁸ In a circular to the Procureurs-Généraux he denounces the cry of "*conciliation*" as a press crime to be severely prosecuted.^c It is characteristic of the French magistrature that only one single Procureur Général (that of Mayenne)^d wrote to Dufaure to

"resign... I cannot serve an Administration which orders me, in a moment of civil war, to rush into party struggles and prosecute citizens whom my conscience holds innocent, for uttering the word *conciliation*."^e

^a The latest armed uprising.— *Ed.*

^b The next sentence began with the words "On June 2, 1849", which were subsequently crossed out by Marx.— *Ed.*

^c J. Dufaure, [Circularaire aux procureurs généraux. Versailles, 23 avril 1871], *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 62, April 26, 1871.— *Ed.*

^d Louis Vacheron.— *Ed.*

^e "The French Assembly", *The Daily News*, No. 7800, April 29, 1871.— *Ed.*

He belonged to the "Union libérale" in 1847 which conspired against Guizot, as he belonged to the "Union libérale" of 1869 which conspired against Louis Bonaparte.²⁹¹

With respect to the law of 10 March and the law of houserents, it ought to be remarked that both Dufaure's and Picard's, both advocates, best clients are amongst the houseproprietors and the *big bourses* averse to losing anything by the siege of Paris.

Now as after the Revolution of February 1848, these men tell the Republic, as the executioner told Don Carlos, "*Je vais t'assassiner, mais c'est pour ton bien*". (I shall murder thee, but for thy own good.)

Lecomte and Clément Thomas

After Vinoy's attempt to carry the Buttes Montmartre (on the 18th March, they were shot in the gardens of the Château Rouge, 4 o'clock, 18th) General Lecomte and Clément Thomas were taken prisoners and shot by the same excited soldiers of the 81st of the line. It was a summary act of Lynch justice performed despite the instances of some delegates of the *Central Committee*. Lecomte, an epauletted cut-throat, had four times commanded his troop, on the place Pigalle, to charge an unarmed gathering of women and children. Instead of shooting the people, the soldiers shot him. Clément Thomas, an ex-quartermaster, a "general" extemporized at the eve of the June massacres (1848)¹³³ by the men of the *National*, whose *gérant*^a he had been, had never dipped his sword in the blood of any other enemy but that of the Paris working class. He was one of the sinister plotters who deliberately provoked the June insurrection and one of its most atrocious executioners. When on the 31 October 1870, the Paris Proletarian National Guards surprised the "Government of Defence" at the Hôtel de Ville and took them prisoners, these men, who had [been] appointed by themselves, these *gens de paroles*,^b as one of them, Picard, called them recently, gave their *word of honour* that they would make place to the *Commune*. Thus allowed to escape

^a Responsible editor.—*Ed*

^b Men of their word.—*Ed*

scot free, they launched Trochu's Bretons¹⁸⁵ on their too-confident captors. One of them, however, M. *Tamisier*, resigned his dignity as commander in chief of the National Guard. He refused to *break* his word of honour. Then the hour had again struck for Clément Thomas. He was appointed in Tamisier's place commander in chief of the National Guard. He was the true man for Trochu's "plan". He never made war upon the Prussians; he made war upon the National Guard, whom he disorganized, disunited, calumniated, weeding out all its officers hostile to Trochu's "plan", setting one set of National Guards against the other, and whom he sacrificed in "sorties" so planned as to cover them with ridicule. Haunted by the spectres of his June victims, this man, without any official charge, must needs again reappear on [the] theatre of war of the 18th of March, where he scented another massacre of the Paris people. He fell a victim of Lynch justice in the first moment of popular exasperation. The men who had surrendered Paris to the tender mercies of the *Décembreur* Vinoy, in order to kill the Republic and pocket the pots-de-Vin stipulated by the Pouyer-Quertier contract, shouted now: Assassins, Assassins! Their howl was re-echoed by the press of Europe so eager for the blood of the "Proletarians". A farce of hysterical "sensibility" was enacted in the rural Assemblée,¹⁷⁸ and, as now as before, the corpses of their friends were most welcome weapons against their enemies. Paris and the Central Committee were made responsible for an accident out of their control. It is known how in the days of June 1848 the "men of order" shook Europe with the cry of indignation against the Insurgents because of the assassination of the Archbishop of Paris.^a Even at that time they knew perfectly well from the evidence of M. Jacquemet, the vicaire général of the Archbishop, who had accompanied him to the barricades, that the Bishop had been shot by the troops of "Cavaignac", and not by the insurged,^b but his dead corpse served their turn. M. Darboy, the present Archbishop of Paris, one of the hostages taken by the *Commune* in self-defence against the savage atrocities of the Versailles government, however seems, as appears from his letter to Thiers,^c to have strange misgivings [that] *Papa Transnonain*¹⁶⁹ be eager to speculate in his dead body, as an object of holy indignation. There passed hardly a day, in which the

^a D. A. Affre.—Ed.

^b The reference is to Jacquemet's statement of June 26, 1848, published in *La Situation*, No. 185, April 25, 1871.—Ed.

^c G. Darboy, "Prison de Mazas, le 8 avril 1871", *Le Rappel*, No. 669, April 13, 1871.—Ed.

Versailles journals did not announce his execution, which the continued atrocities, and violation of the rules of war on the side of "order", would have sealed on the part of every government but that of the Commune. The Versailles government had hardly realized a first military success, when Captain Desmarets, who at the head of his gendarmes assassinated the chivalrous Flourens, has been decorated by Thiers. Flourens had saved the lives of the "defence men" on the 31st October.¹⁸⁴ Vinoy, the runaway (runagate), was appointed grand cross of the Legion of Honour, because he had our brave comrade Duval, when taken prisoner, shot inside the redoubts, because as a second instalment, he had shot some dozen captive troops of the line who had joined the Paris people and inaugurated this civil war by the "methods of December".²⁹² General Galliffet—"the husband of that charming Marchioness whose costumes at the masked balls were one of the wonders of the Empire", as a London penny a liner delicately puts it, "surprised" near Rueil a captain, lieutenant, and private of National Guards, had them at once shot, and immediately published a proclamation to glorify himself in the deed.^a These are a few of the murders *officially* narrated and gloried in by the Versailles government. 25 soldiers of the 80th Regiment of the line shot as "rebels" by the 75th.^b

"Every man wearing the uniform of the regular army who was captured in the ranks of the Communists was straightaway shot without the slightest mercy. The government troops were perfectly ferocious."^c

"M. Thiers communicated the *encouraging* particulars of Flourens' death to the Assembly."

Versailles 4 April. Thiers, that misshapen dwarf, reports on his prisoners brought to Versailles (in his proclamation):

"Never had more degraded countenances of a degraded democracy met the afflicted gaze of honest men."^d (Piétri's men!)

"Vinoy protests against any mercy to insurgent officers or line men."^e

On the 6th of April *decree of the Commune on reprisals* (and hostages):

^a Notice on the proclamation of General de Galliffet, April 3, 1871, *The Daily News*, No. 7783, April 10, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Paris, Monday, April 3, 1871", *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 4931, April 4, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c "Every man wearing...", *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 4932, April 5, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d L. A. Thiers' proclamation of April 4, 1871, *The Daily News*, No. 7779, April 5, 1871.—*Ed.*

^e "Versailles, April 5", *The Daily News*, No. 7781, April 7, 1871.—*Ed.*

"Considering that the Versailles government openly treads underfoot the laws of humanity and those of war, and that it has been guilty of horrors such as even the invaders of France have not dishonoured themselves by ... it is decreed etc." (*There follow the points.*)^a

April 5. Proclamation of the Commune:

"Every day the banditry of Versailles slaughter or shoot our prisoners, and every hour we learn that another murder has been committed... The people even in its anger, detests bloodshed, as it detests civil war, but it is its duty to protect itself against the savage attempts of its enemies, and whatever it may cost it shall be an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."^b

"The police who are fighting against Paris have 10 fcs a day."

Versailles, 11 April. Most horrible details of the coldblooded shooting of prisoners, not deserters, related with an evident gusto by general officers and other eyewitnesses.

In his letter to Thiers, Darboy protests

"against the atrocious excesses which add to the horror of our fratricidal war".^c

In the same strain writes Deguerry (curé de la Madeleine):

"These executions rouse^d great wrath in Paris and may well lead to terrible reprisals". "Thus, a decision has already been taken to execute two of the numerous hostages they hold for every new execution. Judge for yourself how pressing and absolutely necessary is that which, [I] as a priest, am asking you to do."^e

In midst of these horrors Thiers writes to the Prefects:
"L'assemblée siège paisiblement." (*Elle aussi a le cœur léger.*)^f

^a Decree of April 5, 1871 on reprisals and hostages, *The Daily News*, No. 7781, April 7, 1871. The phrase in parentheses is in German in the original. See also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 96, April 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b The Commune's Proclamation of April 5, 1871 is quoted according to "The Civil War in France" in *The Daily News*, No. 7781, April 7, 1871. See also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 96, April 6, 1871. Marx wrote the next sentence in French.—*Ed.*

^c G. Darboy, "Prison de Mazas, le 8 avril 1871", *Le Rappel*, No. 669, April 13, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d Beginning from here Marx quotes in French.—*Ed.*

^e C. Deguerry, "A Messieurs les membres du gouvernement à Versailles", *Le Rappel*, No. 669, April 13, 1871.—*Ed.*

^f "The Assembly's sitting proceeds peacefully." (It also takes everything light-heartedly.) A reference to Ollivier's statement that he will take the responsibility for the war "with a light heart", which he made on the eve of the declaration of war on Prussia and which was cited in Th. Astruc, "L'homme rouge", *La Situation*, No. 176, April 14, 1871.—*Ed.*

Thiers and la commission des quinze of his rurals²⁹³ had the cool impudence to “deny officially” the “pretended *summary executions and reprisals attributed to the troops of Versailles*”.^a

But Papa Transnonain, in his *circular of 16th April on the bombardment of Paris*:

“If some cannon-shots have been fired, it is not the deed of the army of Versailles, but of some insurgents wanting to make believe that they are fighting, while they do not dare show themselves.”

Thiers has proved that he surpasses his hero, Napoleon I, at least in one thing—lying bulletins. (Of course, Paris bombards itself, in order to be able to calumniate M. Thiers!)

To these atrocious provocations of the Bonapartist blacklegs, the Commune has contented itself to take hostages and to threaten reprisals, but its threats have remained a dead letter! Not even the Gendarmes maskered into officers, not even the captive sergents de ville, upon whom explosive bombs have been seized, were placed before a court martial. The Commune has refused to soil its hands with the blood of these bloodhounds!

A few days before the 18th March, Clément Thomas laid before the war minister Le Flô a plan for the disarmament of three quarters of the National Garde.

“The flower of the canaille,” he said, “has crowded round Montmartre and is working hand-in-glove with Belleville.”^b

The National Assembly

The assembly elected on February 8 under the pressure of the enemy, to whom the men of the Versailles government had surrendered all the forts and handed over defenceless Paris, this Assembly of Versailles has been called for the sole purpose, which is clearly stated in the Convention itself^c signed at Versailles on January 28, namely, to decide whether the war could be continued or a peace concluded, and in the latter case to arrange for peace terms and ensure the earliest possible evacuation of French territory.^d

^a “La commission des Quinze...”, *Le Rappel*, No. 673, April 17, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b “*La Sociale publie une curieuse lettre...*”, *Le Vengeur*, No. 21, April 19, 1871. Marx quotes in French in the original and gives the French phrase “three quarters” in the previous sentence.—*Ed.*

^c On the armistice and the capitulation of Paris.—*Ed.*

^d Marx wrote this paragraph in French.—*Ed.*

Chanzy. Archbishop of Paris etc.

Liberation of Chanzy took place almost simultaneously with the retreat of Saisset. The Royalist journalists were unanimous in decreeing the death of the General. They desired to fix that amiable proceeding on the Reds. Three times he had been ordered to execution, and now he was really going to be shot.

After the Vendôme affair^a: There was consternation at Versailles. An attack on Versailles was expected on 23 March, for the leaders of the Communal agitation had announced that they would march on Versailles, if the Assembly took any hostile action. The assembly did not. On the contrary, it voted as urgent a proposition to hold Communal Elections at Paris etc. By the concessions the Assembly admitted its powerlessness. At the same time *Royalist Intrigues at Versailles*. Bonapartist Generals and the Duc d'Aumale.²⁹⁴ Favre avowed he had received a letter from Bismarck, announcing that unless order were restored by the 26 March Paris would be occupied by the German troops. Reds saw plainly through his little artifice.^b The Vendôme affair was provoked by the forger, *that infamous jesuit J. Favre*, who on (21 March?) mounted the tribune of the Assembly of Versailles to insult the people who had rescued him from insignificance, and to rouse Paris against the departments.

30 March, Proclamation of the Commune:

"Today, the criminals, whom you did not even want to pursue, are abusing your magnanimity to organise a hotbed of monarchist conspiracy at the very gates of the city. They have been inciting to civil war. They have resorted to every means of corruption, they have acted as accomplices with everyone, and have gone to the extent of begging foreigners for aid."^c

Thiers

On the 25th April, in his reception of the maires, adjuncts, and municipal councillors of the suburban communes of the Seine, Thiers said:

"The republic is there. *The chief of the executive power is only a common citizen.*"^d

^a See this volume, pp. 511-12, 528-30.—*Ed.*

^b Beginning from here Marx writes in French to the end of the quotation.—*Ed.*

^c Quoted according to "Proclamation de la Commune" [March 29, 1871], *Le Rappel*, No. 655, March 30, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 1 (89), March 30, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d "Méditation des municipalités de la Seine", *Le Rappel*, No. 684, April 28, 1871. Marx quotes these two sentences in French.—*Ed.*

The progress of France from 1830 to 1871, according to M. Thiers, consists in this: In 1830 Louis Philippe was "the best of Republics". In 1871 the ministerial fossil of Louis Philippe's reign, little Thiers himself, is the *best of Republics*.

M. Thiers commenced his regime by an usurpation. By the National Assembly he was appointed chief of the ministry of the Assembly; he appointed himself chief of the executive of France.

The Assembly and the Paris Revolution

The Assembly, summoned at the dictate of the Foreign invader, was, as is clearly laid down in the Versailles convention of the 28th January, but elected for one single purpose: To decide the continuation of war or settle the conditions of peace. In their calling the French people to electoral urns, the Capitulars of Paris themselves plainly defined that specific mission of the Assembly and this accounts to a great part for its very constitution. The continuation of the war having become impossible through the very terms of the armistice humbly accepted by the capitulars, the Assembly had in fact but to register a disgraceful peace and for this specific performance the worst men of France were best.

The Republic was proclaimed on the 4th of September, not by the pettifoggers who installed themselves at the Hôtel de Ville as a government of defence, but by the Paris people. It was acclaimed throughout France without a single dissentient voice. It conquered its own existence by a five months' war whose cornerstone was the prolonged resistance of Paris. Without this war, carried on by the Republic and in the name of the Republic, the Empire would have been restored by Bismarck after the capitulation of Sedan, the pettifoggers with M. Thiers at their head would have had to capitulate not for Paris, but for personal guarantees against a voyage to Cayenne,¹⁸³ and the rural Assembly would never have been heard of. It met only by the grace of the Republican revolution, initiated at Paris. Being no constituent Assembly, as M. Thiers himself has repeated to nausea, it would, if not as a mere chronicler of the passed incidents of the Republican Revolution, not even have had the right to proclaim the destitution of the Bonapartist dynasty. The only legitimate power, therefore, in France is the *Revolution* itself, centring in Paris. That revolution was not made against Napoleon the little, but against the social and political conditions which

engendered the Second Empire, which received their last finish under its sway, and which, as the war with Prussia glaringly revealed, would leave France a cadaver, if they were not superseded by the regenerating powers of the French working class. The attempts of the Rural Assembly, holding only an Attorney's Power from the Revolution to sign the disastrous bond handed over by its present "executive" to the Foreign invader, its attempt to treat the Revolution as its own capitular, is, therefore, a monstrous usurpation. Its war against Paris is nothing but a cowardly Chouannerie²¹¹ under the shelter of Prussian bayonets. It is a base conspiracy to assassinate France, in order to save the privileges, the monopolies and the luxuries of the degenerate, effete, and putrefied classes that have dragged her to the abyss from which she can only be saved by the Herculean hand of a truly social Revolution.

Thiers' Finest Army

Even before he became a "statesman", M. Thiers had proved his lying powers as a historian. But the vanity, so characteristic of dwarfish men, has this time betrayed him into the sublime of the ridiculous. His army of order, the dregs of the Bonapartist *soldatesque*, freshly reimported, by the grace of Bismarck, from Prussian prisons,¹⁷⁵ the Pontifical Zouaves,¹⁰⁸ the Chouans²¹¹ of Charette, the Vendéans of Cathelineau; the "municipals"²⁹⁵ of Valentin, the exsergeants de ville of Piétri and the Corsican Gendarmes of Valentin who under L. Bonaparte were only the spies of the army but under M. Thiers form its warlike flower, the whole under the supervision of epauletted *mouchards*^a and under the command of the runaway Decembrist Marshals who had no honour to lose—this motley, ungainly, hangdog lot, M. Thiers dubs "*the finest army France ever possessed*"^b! If he allows the Prussians still to quarter at St. Denis, it is only to frighten them by the sight of the "finest army" of Versailles.

^a Spies.— *Ed.*

^b Quoted according to Th. Astruc, "L'homme rouge", *La Situation*, No. 176, April 14, 1871.— *Ed.*

Thiers

Small state rogueries. Everlasting suggester of Parliamentary intrigues, M. Thiers was never anything else but an "able" journalist and a clever "word fencer", a master of parliamentary roguery, a virtuoso in perjury, a craftsman in all the small stratagems, base perfidies, and subtle devices of Parliamentary party-warfare. This mischievous gnome charmed the French bourgeoisie during half a century because he is the truest intellectual expression of their own class-corruption. When in the ranks of the opposition he over and over rehearsed his stale homily of the "libertés nécessaires",¹⁷⁴ to stamp them out when in power. When out of office, he used to threaten Europe with the sword of France. And what were his diplomatic performances in reality? To pocket in 1841 the humiliation of the London treaty,²⁹⁶ to hurry on the war with Prussia by his declamations against German unity, to compromise France in 1870 by his begging tour at all the Courts of Europe, to sign in 1871 the Paris capitulation, to accept a "peace at any price" and implore from Prussia a concession: leave and means to get up a civil war in his own downtrodden country. To a man of his stamp the underground agencies of modern society remained of course always unknown, but even the palpable changes at its surface he failed to understand. F.i. any deviation from the old French protective system he denounced as a sacrilege and, as a minister of Louis Philippe, went the length of treating disdainfully the construction of railways as a foolish chimera and even under Louis Bonaparte he eagerly opposed every Reform of the rotten French army organization. A man without ideas, without convictions, and without courage.

A professional "Revolutionist" in that sense, that in his eagerness of display, of wielding power and putting his hands into the National Exchequer, he never scrupled, when banished to the banks of the opposition, to stir the popular passions and provoke a catastrophe to displace a rival; he is at the same time a most shallow man of routine, etc. The working class he reviled as "*the vile multitude*". One of his former colleagues in the legislative assemblies, a contemporary of his, a capitalist, and however a member of the Paris Commune, *M. Beslay* thus addresses him in a public address:

"The subjugation (*asservissement*) of labour to capital, such is the 'corner-stone' of your politics (policy), and the day you saw the *Republic of Labour* installed

at the Hôtel-de-Ville, you have never ceased to cry to France "They are criminals!"^a

No wonder that M. Thiers has given orders by his home minister Ernest Picard to prevent "the International Association" from communicating with Paris.^b (*Sitting of Assembly*. 28 March.) *Circular of Thiers, to prefects and sub-prefects*.

"The good workmen, so numerous as compared to the bad ones, ought to know, that if bread flies again from their mouths, they owe it to the adepts of the *International*, who are the tyrants of labour, of which they pretend themselves the liberators."^c

Without the *International*...^d

(Now for the story of money.) (He and Favre transferred their money to London.) It is a proverb that if rogues fall out truth comes out. We can therefore not better finish the picture of Thiers than by the words of the London *Moniteur* of the master of his Versailles generals. Says the *Situation* in its number of the 21 March:

"M. Thiers has never been minister without pushing the soldiers to the massacre of the people, he the parricide, the man of incest, the peculator, the plagiarist, the traitor, the ambitious, the impotent".

Shrewd in cunning devices, and artful dodges.

Banded with the republicans before the Revolution of July, he slipped into his first ministry under Louis Philippe by ousting Laffitte, his old protector. His first deed was to throw his old collaborator Armand Carrel into prison. He insinuated himself with Louis Philippe as a spy upon and the goal-accoucheur of the Duchesse of Berry,¹⁶⁸ but his activity centred in the massacre of the insurgent Paris Republicans in the Rue Transnonain and the September Laws against the press,¹⁶⁹ to be then cast aside as an instrument become blunted. Having intrigued himself again into power in 1840, he planned the Paris fortifications¹⁷⁰ opposed as an

^a Ch. Beslay, "Au citoyen Thiers...", *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 64, April 28, 1871. Marx gives the word "cornerstone" in French.—*Ed.*

^b "The French Assembly", *The Daily News*, No. 7774, March 30, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c L. A. Thiers, [Circularaire à préfets et sous-préfets. Versailles, 28 mars 1871], *Le Rappel*, No. 655, March 30, 1871. Marx gives the previous sentence in French.—*Ed.*

^d This sentence is incomplete in the manuscript. It is followed by two German sentences in parentheses.—*Ed.*

attempt on the liberty of Paris by the whole democratic party, except the Bourgeois Republicans of the *National*. M. Thiers replied to their outcry from the Tribune of the Chambre des Députés:

"What? To fancy that any works of fortification could endanger freedom?... This is to be completely out of touch with reality. And first of all, you calumniate *any government whatever* in assuming that it could one day try to maintain itself by bombarding the capital. Do you really think that after it had pierced with its bombs the dome of Les Invalides or the Pantheon, after it had swept the homes of your families with its fire, it could come before you and ask you to confirm it in office? *But it would be a hundred times more impossible after its victory than before.*"^a

Indeed, neither the government of Louis Philippe nor that of the Bonapartist Regency dared to withdraw from Paris and bombard it. This employment of the fortifications was reserved to M. Thiers, their original plotter.

When King Bomba of Naples¹⁷¹ bombarded Palermo in January 1848, M. Thiers again declared in the Chambre of Deputies:

"You know, gentlemen, what is happening in Palermo: you all shake with horror on hearing that during 48 hours a large town has been bombarded. By whom? Was it by a foreign enemy exercising the rights of war? No, gentlemen, it was by *its own government*. And why? *Because that unfortunate town demanded its rights*. Well then, for demanding its rights, it has had 48 hours of bombardment. [...] Allow me to appeal to the opinion of Europe. It will be a service to mankind to rise and, from what is perhaps the greatest tribune in Europe, voice *a few words of indignation against such acts*. Gentlemen, there was a cry of general indignation in all parts of the world when, 50 years ago, in order to avoid a long siege the Austrians, exercising the rights of war, wanted to bombard Lille, when later, exercising the same rights of war, the English bombarded Copenhagen, and *when, just recently, the Regent Espartero, who had rendered services to his country, wanted to bombard Barcelona in order to suppress an insurrection.*"^b

Little more than a year later, Thiers acted the most fiery apologist of the bombardment of Rome by the troops of the French republic,¹⁷² and exalted his friend, General Changarnier, for sabring down the Paris National Guards protesting against this breach of the French Constitution.

A few days before the Revolution of February 1848, fretting at the long exile from place to which Guizot had condemned him, scenting the growing commotion of the masses, which he hoped would enable him to oust his rival and impose himself upon Louis Philippe, Thiers exclaimed in the Chambre of Deputies:

^a L. A. Thiers' speech at the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies on January 13, 1841, *Le Vengeur*, No. 14, April 12, 1871. Marx quotes from it in French.—*Ed.*

^b L. A. Thiers' speech at the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies on January 31, 1848, *Le Rappel*, No. 673, April 17, 1871; *Le Vengeur*, No. 21, April 19, 1871. Marx quotes in French.—*Ed.*

"I am of the party of the Revolution not only in France, but in the whole of Europe. I wish the government of the Revolution to remain in the hands of moderate men... But when that government falls into the hands of ardent minds, even into those of Radicals, I shall, for all that, not desert my cause. I shall always be of the party of the Revolution."^a

To put down the February Revolution was his exclusive occupation from the day when the Republic was proclaimed to the Coup d'Etat.

The first days after the February explosion he anxiously hid himself, but the Paris workmen despised him too much to hate him. Still, with his notorious cowardice which made Armand Carrel answer to his boast "he would one day die on the banks of the Rhine", "Thou wilt die in a gutter"—he dared not play a part on the public stage before the popular forces were broken down through the massacre of the insurgents of June. He confined himself first to the secret direction of the Conspiracy of the Reunion of the Rue de Poitiers²⁹⁰ which resulted in the Restoration of the Empire, until the stage had become sufficiently clear to reappear publicly on it.

During the siege of Paris, on the question whether Paris was about to capitulate, Jules Favre answered that, to utter the word capitulation, the bombardment of Paris was wanted!^b This explains his melodramatic protests against the Prussian bombardment, and why the latter was a mock bombardment, while the Thiers bombardment is a stern reality.

Parliamentary mountebank.

He is for 40 years on the stage. He has never initiated a single useful measure in any department of state or life. Vain, sceptical, epicurean: He has never written or spoken for things. In his eyes the things themselves are only pretexts for the display of his pen or his tongue. Except his thirst for place and pelf and display there is nothing real about him, not even his chauvinism.

In the true vein of vulgar professional journalists he now sneers in his bulletins [at] the bad looks of his Versailles prisoners, now communicates that the rurals are "à leur aise",^c now covers

^a L. A. Thiers' speech at the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies on February 2, 1848, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 34, February 3, 1848. Marx quotes from it in French.—*Ed.*

^b See "If the contest between M. Thiers and the Commune...", *The Standard*, No. 14572, April 15, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c At ease.—*Ed.*

himself with ridicule by his bulletin on the taking of "Moulin-Saquet" (4 of May), where 300 prisoners were taken.

"The rest of the insurgents has fled in a wild flight, leaving 150 dead and wounded on the field of battle", and snappishly adds: "Such is the victory the Commune can celebrate in its bulletins tomorrow. ... *Paris* will soon be delivered from the terrible tyrants oppressing it."^a

Paris—the "Paris" of the mass of the Paris people fighting against him is not "Paris". "Paris—that is the rich, the capitalist, the idle"^b (why not the cosmopolitan stew?). This is the Paris of M. Thiers. The real Paris, working, thinking, fighting Paris, the Paris of the people, the Paris of the Commune is a "vile multitude". There is the whole case of M. Thiers, not only for Paris, but for France. The Paris that shews its courage in the "pacific procession" and Saisset's "escapade", that throngs now at Versailles, at Rueil, at St. Denis, at St. Germain-en-Laye, followed by the cocottes sticking to the "men of religion, family, order, and property" (the Paris of the really "dangerous", of the exploiting and lounging classes) ("the francs-fileurs"²⁰⁸) and amusing itself by looking by the telescope at the battle going on, for whom "the civil war is but an agreeable diversion"—that is the Paris of M. Thiers, as the emigration of Coblenz²¹⁰ was the France of M. de Calonne. In his vulgar journalist vein he knows not even to observe sham dignity, but he murders the wives and girls, and children found under the ruins of Neuilly not to swerve from the etiquette of "legitimacy". He must needs illuminate the municipal elections he has ordered in France by the conflagration of Clamart burnt by petroleum bombs. The Roman historians finish off Nero's character by telling us that the monster gloried in being a rhymester and a comedian. But lift a professional mere journalist and parliamentary mountebank like Thiers to power, and he will outnero Nero.

He acts only his part as the blind tool of class interests in allowing the Bonapartist "generals" to revenge themselves on Paris; but he acts his personal part in the little byplay of bulletins, speeches, addresses, in which the vanity, vulgarity, and lowest taste of the journalist creep out.

^a "Voici, sur le même fait, le bulletin...", *Le Rappel*, No. 692, May 6, 1871. Marx gives a French quotation.—*Ed.*

^b "The Commune of Paris...", *The Times*, No. 27028, April 4, 1871.—*Ed.*

He compares himself with Lincoln and the Parisians with the rebellious slaveholders of the South. The Southerners fought for the slavery of labour and the territorial secession from the United States. Paris fought for the emancipation of labour and the secession from power of Thiers state parasites, of the would-be slaveholders of France!

In his speech to the maires:

"You may rely upon my word, which I have never broken!"
 "The Assembly is one of the most liberal ever elected by France."

He will save the Republic

"provided order and labour are not continuously threatened by those who claim to be the special guardians of the Republic's weal".^a

At the April 27 sitting of the Assembly, he said:

"The Assembly is more liberal than he is."^b

He whose rhetorical trumpcard was always the denunciation of the Vienna treaties, he signs the Paris treaty,²⁹⁷ not only the dismemberment of one part of France, not only the occupation of almost $\frac{1}{2}$ of it, but the milliards of indemnity, without even asking Bismarck to specify and prove his war expenses! He does not even allow the Assembly at Bordeaux to discuss the paragraphs of his capitulation!

He who upbraided throughout his life the Bourbons because they came back in the rear of Foreign armies and because of their undignified behaviour to the allies occupying France after the conclusion of peace,⁹⁹ he asks nothing from Bismarck in the treaty but one concession: 40,000 troops to subdue Paris¹⁷⁵ (as Bismarck stated in the Diet). Paris was for all purposes of internal defence and Foreign aggression fully secured by his armed National Guard, but Thiers superadded at once to the capitulation of Paris

^a "Méditation des municipalités de la Seine", *Le Rappel*, No. 684, April 28, 1871. Marx quotes from it in French; the phrase "He will save the Republic" is in German.— *Ed.*

^b Marx gives the first part of the sentence in German and quotes from the speech in French.— *Ed.*

to the Foreigner the character of the capitulation of Paris to himself and Co. This stipulation was a stipulation for civil war. That war itself he opens not only with the passive permission of Prussia, but by the facilities she lends him, by the captive French troops she magnanimously despatches him from German dungeons! In his bulletins, in his and Favre's speeches in the Assembly, he crawls in the dust before Prussia and threatens Paris every eight days with her intervention, after having failed to get it, as stated by Bismarck himself.^a The Bourbons were dignity itself compared to this mountebank, this grand apostle of Chauvinism!

After the downbreak of Prussia (Tilsit peace 1807), its government felt that it could only save itself and the country by a great social regeneration. It naturalized in Prussia—on a small scale, within the limits of a feudal monarchy—the results of the French revolution. It liberated the peasant etc.²⁹⁸ After the Crimean defeat, which, however Russia might have saved her honour by the defence of Sebastopol and dazzled the Foreigner by her diplomatic triumphs at Paris, laid open at home the rottenness of her social and administrative system, her government emancipated the serf and her whole administrative and judicial system.²⁹⁹ In both countries the daring social reform was fettered and limited in its character because it was octroyed from the throne and not conquered by the people. Still there were great social changes doing away with the worst privileges of the ruling classes and changing the economical basis of the old society. They felt that the great malady could only be cured by heroic measures. They felt that they could only answer to the victors by social reforms, by calling into life elements of popular regeneration. The French catastrophe of 1870 stands unparalleled in the history of the modern world! It shewed official France, the France of Louis Bonaparte, the France of the ruling classes and their state parasites—a putrescent cadaver. And what is the first attempt of the infamous men, who had got at her government by a surprise of the people and who continue to hold it by a conspiracy with the Foreign invader, what is their first attempt? To assassinate, under Prussian patronage, by L. Bonaparte's *soldatesque* and Piétri's police, the glorious work of popular regeneration commenced at Paris, to summon all the old legitimist spectres, beaten by the July

^a See report from Germany under the general heading "Révélations", *La Situation*, No. 156, March 21, 1871.—*Ed.*

Revolution, the fossil swindlers of Louis Philippe, beaten by the revolution of February, and celebrate an orgy of counterrevolution! Such heroism in exaggerated self-debasement is unheard of in the annals of history! But, what is most characteristic, instead of arousing a general shout of indignation on the part of official Europe, and America, it evokes a current of sympathy and of fierce denunciation of Paris! (*fossiles, vilains, hommes tarés*^a) This proves that Paris, true to its historical antecedents, seeks the regeneration of the French people in making it the champion of the regeneration of old society, making the social regeneration of mankind the national business of France! It is the emancipation of the producing class from the exploiting classes, their retainers and their state parasites who prove the truth of the French adage, that "les valets du diable sont pire que le diable himself."^b Paris has hoisted the flag of mankind!

18 March. Government laid

"stamp of 2 centimes on each copy of every periodical, whatever its nature".
 "forbidden to found new journals until the raising of the state of siege".

The different fractions of the French bourgeoisie had successively *their reigns*, the great landed proprietors under the *Restoration* (the old Bourbons), the capitalists under the parliamentary monarchy of July (Louis Philippe), while its Bonapartist and republican elements kept rankling in the background. Their party feuds and intrigues were of course carried on on pretexts of *public welfare*, and a popular revolution having got rid of these monarchies, the other set in. All this changed with the Republic (February). All the fractions of the Bourgeoisie combined together in the *Party of Order*, that is the party of [landed] Proprietors and Capitalists, bound together to maintain the economic subjugation of labour and the repressive state machinery supporting it. Instead of a monarchy, whose very name signified the prevalence of one bourgeois fraction over the other, a victory on one side and a defeat on the other (the triumph of one side and the humiliation of the other), the *Republic* was the anonymous joint-stock-company of the combined bourgeois fractions, of all the *exploiters* of the people clubbed together, and indeed, Legitimists, Bonapartists, Orleanists, Bourgeois Republicans, Jesuits, and Voltaireans, embraced each other. No longer hidden by the shelter of the crown,

^a Fossils, villains, ill-famed men.—*Ed*

^b "The Devil's valets are worse than the Devil himself".—*Ed*

no longer able to interest the people in their party feuds by maskading them into struggles for popular interest, no longer subordinate the one to the other. Direct and confessed antagonism of their class rule to the emancipation of the producing masses,—*order* the name for the economical and political conditions of their class rule and the servitude of labour, this anonymous or republican form of the bourgeois regime—this Bourgeois Republic, this Republic of the *Party of Order* is the most *odious* of all political regimes. Its direct business, its only *raison d'être*^a is to crush down the people. It is the *terrorism* of class rule. The thing is done in this way. The people having fought and made the Revolution, proclaimed the Republic, and made room for a National Assembly, the Bourgeois whose known Republican professions are a guarantee for their “Republic”, are pushed on the foreground of the stage by the majority of the Assembly, composed of the vanquished and professed enemies of the Republic. The Republicans are entrusted with the task to goad the people into the trap of an insurrection to be crushed by fire and sword. This part was performed by the party of the *National* with Cavaignac at their head³⁰⁰ after the Revolution of February (by the June Insurrection). By their crime against the masses, these Republicans lose then their sway. They have done their work and, if yet allowed to support the *party of order* in its general struggle against the Proletariate, they are at the same time displaced from the government, forced to fall back in the last ranks, and only allowed “on sufferance”. The combined royalist bourgeois then become the fathers of the Republic, the true rule of the “Party of Order” sets in. The material forces of the people being broken for the time being, the work of reaction—the breaking down of all the concessions conquered in four revolutions—begins piece by piece. The people is stung to madness not only by the deeds of the *party of order*, but by the cynical effrontery with which it is treated as the vanquished, with which in its own name, in the name of the Republic, that low lot rules it supreme. Of course, that spasmodic form of *anonymous* class despotism cannot last long, can only be a transitory phase. It knows that it is seated on a revolutionary volcano. On the other hand, if the party of order is united in its war against the working class, in its capacity of the *party of order*, the play of intrigue of its different fractions the one against the other, each for the prevalence of its peculiar interest in the old order of society, each for the Restoration of its own pretender and

^a Meaning of existence.—*Ed.*

personal ambitions, sets in in full force as soon as its rule seems secured (guaranteed) by the destruction of the material revolutionary forces. This combination of a common war against the people and a common conspiracy against the Republic, combined with the internal feuds of its rulers, and their play of intrigues, paralyses society, disgusts and bewilders the masses of the middle class and "troubles" business, keeps them in a chronic state of disquietude. All the conditions of despotism are created (have been engendered) under this regime, but despotism without quietude, despotism with parliamentary anarchy at its head. Then the hour has struck for a *Coup d'Etat*, and the incapable lot has to make room for any lucky pretender, making [an] end of the *anonymous* form of class rule. In this way Louis Bonaparte made an end of the Bourgeois Republic after its 4 years of existence. During all that time Thiers was the "âme damnée"^a of the party of order, that in the name of the Republic made war upon the Republic, a class war upon the people, and, in reality, created the Empire. He played exactly the same part now as he played then, only then but as a parliamentary intriguer, now as the Chief of the Executive. Should he not be conquered by the Revolution, he will now as then be a baffled tool. Whatever countervailing government will set in, its first act will be to cast aside the man who surrendered France to Prussia and bombarded Paris.

Thiers had many grievances against L. Bonaparte. The latter had used him as a tool and a dupe. He had frightened him by his arrest after the Coup d'Etat. He had annulled him by putting down the parliamentary regime, the only one under which a mere state-parasite, like Thiers, a mere talker can play a political part. Last not least, Thiers having been the historic shoeblack of Napoleon^b had so long described his deeds as to fancy he had enacted them himself. The legitimate caricature of Nap. I was in his eyes not Nap. the little, but little Thiers. With all that there was no infamy committed by L. B. which had not been backed by Thiers, from the occupation of Rome by the French troops to the war with Prussia.

Only a man of his shallow head can fancy for one moment, that a Republic with his head on its shoulders, with a National

^a The tool.—Ed.

^b The reference is to Thiers' *Histoire de la Révolution française* and *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*.—Ed.

Assembly half-Legitimist, half-Orleanist, with an army under Bonapartist leaders, will, if victorious, not push him aside.

There is nothing more grotesquely horrid than a Tom Pouce affecting to play the Timur Tamerlane. With him the deeds of cruelty are not only a matter of business, but a thing of theatrical display, of phantastical vanity. To write his "bulletins", to show his "severity", to have "his" troops, "his" strategy, "his" bombardments, "his" petroleum-bombs, to hide "his" cowardice under the coldbloodedness with which he allows the Decembrist blacklegs to take their revenge on Paris! This kind of heroism in exaggerated baseness! He exults in the important part he plays and the noise he makes in the world! He quite fancies to be a great man! and how gigantic (titanic) he, the dwarf, the parliamentary dribbler, must look in the eyes of the world! In midst the horrid scenes of this war, one cannot help smiling at the ridiculous capers Thiers Vanity cuts! M. Thiers is a man of lively imagination, there runs an artist's vein through his blood, and an artist's vanity able to gull him into a belief of his own lies, and a belief in his own grandeur.

Through all the speeches, bulletins etc. of Thiers, runs a vein of elated vanity.

that affreux^a Triboulet.

Splendid Bombardment (with petroleum bombs) from Mont Valérien on one part of the houses in the Ternes within the rampart, with a grandiose conflagration and a fearful thunder of cannon shaking all Paris. Bombs purposely thrown into Ternes and the Champs Elysées quarters.

Explosive bombs, petroleum bombs.

The Commune

The glorious British penny a liner has made the splendid discovery that this is not what *we* use to understand by

^a Atrocious.—*Ed.*

self-government. Of course, it is not. It is not the self-administration of the towns by turtle-soup guttling aldermen, jobbing vestries, and ferocious workhouse guardians. It is not the self-administration of the counties by the holders of broad acres, long purses and empty heads. It is not the judicial abomination of "the Great Unpaid".³⁰¹ It is not political self-government of the country through the means of an oligarchic club and the reading of *The Times* newspaper. It is the people acting for itself by itself.

Within this war of cannibals the most disgusting, the "literary" shrieks of the hideous gnome seated at the head of the government!

The ferocious treatment of the Versailles prisoners was not interrupted one moment, and their coldblooded assassination was resumed so soon as Versailles had convinced itself that the Commune was too humane to execute its decree of reprisals!

The *Paris Journal* (at Versailles) says that 13 line soldiers made prisoners at the railway station of Clamart were shot offhand, and all prisoners wearing the line uniforms who arrive in Versailles will be executed whenever doubts about their identity are cleared up!

M. Alexander Dumas, fils, tells that a young man exercising the functions, if not bearing the title, of a general, was shot after having marched (in custody) a few hundred yards along a road.

5 May, *Mot d'Ordre*: According to the *Liberté*, which is published in Versailles, "all regular army soldiers found at Clamart among the insurgents were shot on the spot" (by Lincoln Thiers!) (Lincoln acknowledged the belligerent rights). "These are the men denouncing on the walls of all French communes the Parisians as assassins!" The banditti!^a

Desmarets.

A deputation of the Commune went to Bicêtre (April 27) to investigate the case of four National Guards of the 185th field battalion and there saw one survivor (badly wounded) *Scheffer*.

"The wounded man said that on April 25 he and three of his comrades were overtaken at Belle Epine, near Villejuif, by a detachment of mounted Chasseurs, who told them to surrender. As it was quite impossible to put up any resistance against the forces that surrounded them, they laid down their arms and gave up.

^a The first half of the paragraph, to the parenthesis, is in French in the original.—Ed

The soldiers surrounded them and took them prisoner without resorting to violence or threats against them. They had been prisoners for a few minutes, when a captain of the mounted Chasseurs appeared and threw himself upon them revolver in hand. Without saying a word he fired at one of them and killed him outright; then he also fired at Guardsman Scheffer, who was shot in the chest and fell by his comrade. The other two guardsmen, terrified at this sneaking attack, tried to escape but the wild captain ran after the two prisoners and killed them both with revolver shots. After these savage and outrageous acts the Chasseurs retired with their chief, leaving their victims lying on the ground.”^a

New York Tribune outdoes the London papers.

M. Thiers’ “most liberal and most freely elected National assembly that ever existed in France” is quite of a piece with his “finest army that France ever possessed”.^b The municipal elections, carried on under Thiers himself on the 30th of April, show their relations to the French people! Of 700,000 councillors (in round numbers) returned by the 35,000 communes still left in mutilated France, 200 are Legitimists, 600 Orleanists, 7,000 avowed Bonapartists, and all the rest Republicans or Communists. (*Versailles Cor. Daily News*, 5 May.) Is any other proof wanted that this Assembly with the Orleanist mummy Thiers at its head represent only an usurpatory minority?

Paris

M. Thiers represented again and again the Commune as the instrument of a handful of “convicts” and “ticket of leave men”, of the scum of Paris. And this “handful” of desperadoes holds in check since more than 6 weeks the “finest army that France ever possessed” led by the invincible Mac Mahon and inspired by the genius of Thiers himself!

The exploits of the Parisians have not only refuted him. All elements of Paris have spoken.

“You must not confuse the movement of Paris with the seizure of Montmartre, which was only its opportunity and starting point; this movement is general and profound in the conscience of Paris; the greatest number even of those who, for

^a [Rapport de la Commission d'enquête de la Commune], *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 65, April 29, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 118, April 28, 1871. These two paragraphs are in French in the original.—*Ed.*

^b The following text is crossed out in the manuscript: “This senile *chambre introuvable*,¹⁷⁷ chosen on a false pretext, consists almost exclusively of Legitimists¹⁷⁶ and Orleanists.—*Ed.*

one reason or another, hold aloof from it, do not deny that it is socially legitimate.”^a

Who says this? The *delegates of the Syndical chambres*, men who speak in the name of 7-8,000 merchants and industrials. They have gone to tell it at Versailles... The *Ligue de la réunion républicaine ... the manifestation of the Franks Maçons*³⁰² etc.

The Province

Les provinciaux espiègles.^b

If Thiers fancied one moment that the provinces were really antagonistic to the Paris movement, he would do all in his power to give the provinces the greatest possible facilities to become acquainted with that movement and all “its horrors”. He would solicit them to look at it in its naked reality, to convince themselves with their own eyes and ears of what it is. Not he! He and his “defence men” try to keep the provinces down, to prevent their general rising for Paris, by a *wall of lies* as they kept out the news from the provinces in Paris during the Prussian siege. The Provinces are only allowed to look at Paris through the Versailles *camera obscura*. (Nothing but the lies and slanders of the Versailles journals reach the departments and reign there unrivalled.)^c Pillages and murders of 20,000 ticket of leave men dishonour the capital.

“The League considers it to be its primary duty to shed light on the facts and restore normal relations between the province and Paris.”^d

As they were, when besieged in Paris, thus they are now in besieging it in their turn.

“As in the past, the lie is their favourite weapon. They suppress and confiscate the journals of the capital, intercept reports, and sift the letters, in such a way that the province is reduced to having the news that it pleases Jules Favre, Picard and Company to let it have, without it being possible to verify its truth.”^e

^a “Rapport des délégués des chambres syndicales. Au syndicat de l’Union nationale”, quoted according to A. Vacquerie, “Une poignée de factieux”, *Le Rappel*, No. 669, April 13, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 102, April 12, 1871. Marx gives a French quotation.—*Ed.*

^b Provincial wags. Quoted from “Ceci est vraiment merveilleux...”, *Le Rappel*, No. 669, April 13, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c The sentence in parentheses is in French.—*Ed.*

^d “Le comité de l’Union républicaine pour les droits de Paris...”, *Le Rappel*, No. 673, April 17, 1871. Marx gives a French quotation.—*Ed.*

^e “La circulaire de M. Thiers”, *Le Vengeur*, No. 21, April 19, 1871. Marx gives a French quotation in the original and uses the English phrase “sift the letters”.—*Ed.*

Thiers' bulletins, Picard's circulars, Dufaure's... The placards in the Communes. The felon press of Versailles and the Germans. The *petit Moniteur*.^a The reintroduction of passports for travelling from one place to another. An army of *mouchards*^b spread in every direction. Arrests (in Rouen etc under Prussian authority) etc. Thousands of commissioners of police scattered in the environs of Paris have been ordered by the prefect of the gendarmerie, Valentin, to confiscate journals of any trend published in the insurgent city, and to burn them publicly, as used to be done in the heyday of the Holy Inquisition.^c

Thiers' government first appealed to the provinces^d to form battalions of National Guards and send them to Versailles against Paris.

"The Province," as the *Journal de Limoges* says, "showed its discontent by refusing the battalions of *volontaires* which were asked from it by Thiers and his *ruraux*."^e

The few Breton idiots, fighting under a white flag, every one of them wearing on his breast a Jesus heart in white cloth and shouting "vive le roi!"^f are the only "provincial" army gathered round Thiers.

The elections. Vengeur 6 May.

M. Dufaure's *presslaw* (8 April)²¹⁴ confessedly directed against the "excesses" of the Provincial press.

Then the numerous *arrestations* in the Province. It is placed under the *laws of suspects*.³⁰³ *Intellectual and police blockade of province*.^g

April 23 Havre: The municipal council has despatched three of its members to Paris and Versailles with instructions to offer mediation, with the view of terminating the civil war on the basis of the maintenance of the Republic, and the granting of municipal franchises to the whole of France... *23 April delegates from Lyon received by Picard and Thiers*—"war at any price" is their reply.

^a The reference is to the *Moniteur des Communes*.—Ed.

^b Spies.—Ed.

^c Marx gives the French sentence in the original.—Ed.

^d The manuscript contains the following text written above this sentence: "made an anxious appeal ... before having got a prisoner army from Bismarck."—Ed.

^e Communication from the Limoges paper *La Défense républicaine* in *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 65, April 29, 1871.—Ed.

^f "Long live the King!"—Ed.

^g Quoted in French from "Qui, c'en est fait...", *Le Vengeur*, No. 38, May 6, 1871.—Ed.

The address of the Lyons delegates^a is handed to the Assembly by Greppo on April 24.³⁰⁴

The municipalities of the provincial towns committed the great impudence to send their deputations to Versailles in order to call upon them to grant what demanded by Paris; not one Commune of France has sent an address approving of the acts of Thiers and the rurals; the provincial papers, like these municipal councils, as Dufaure complains in his *circular against Conciliation to the Procureur Général*,

"put on the same footing the Assembly elected by universal suffrage, and the self-styled Paris Commune; reproach the former for having failed to recognise the municipal rights of Paris etc"^b

and what is worse, these municipal councils, f. i. *that of Auch*,

"have unanimously demanded that it *should at once propose an armistice with Paris*,^c and that the Assembly chosen on the 8-th of February, dissolves itself because its mandate had expired". (*Dufaure, l'assemblée de Versailles, April 26*)

It ought to be remembered that these were the old municipal councils,³⁰⁵ not those elected on 30th April. Their delegations so numerous, that Thiers decided no longer to receive them personally, but address them to a ministerial subaltern.

Lastly the elections of 30 April the final judgment of the Assembly and the electoral surprise from which it had sprung. If then, the provinces have till now only made a passive resistance against Versailles without rising for Paris, to be explained by the strongholds the old authorities hold here still, the trance in which the Empire merged and the war maintained the Province. It is evident that it is only the Versailles army, government, and Chinese wall of lies, that stand between Paris and the provinces. If that wall falls, they will unite with it.

It is most characteristic, that the same men (Thiers et Co.) who in May 1850 abolished by a parliamentary conspiracy (Bonaparte aided them, to get them into a snare, to have them at his mercy, and to proclaim himself after the coup d'état as the restorator of

^a "Adresse des Délégués de Lyon à l'Assemblée nationale et à la Commune de Paris", *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 63, April 27, 1871. Marx gives this sentence and the end of the previous one in French and the words "is their reply" in German.—*Ed.*

^b J. Dufaure, [Circulaire aux procureurs généraux. Versailles, 23 avril 1871], *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 62, April 26, 1871. Marx gives a French quotation.—*Ed.*

^c Marx gives this part of the quotation in French.—*Ed.*

the universal suffrage against the party of order and its Assembly) the *universal suffrage*, because under the Republic it might still play them freaks, are now its fanatical adepts, make it their "legitimate" title against Paris, after it had received under Bonaparte such an organization as to be the mere plaything in the hand of the Executive, a mere machine of cheat, surprise, and forgery on the part of the Executive. *Congrès de la Ligue des Villes*³⁰⁶ (*Rappel 6 May!*)

Trochu, Jules Favre, and Thiers'
Provincials

It may be asked how these superannuated parliamentary mountebanks and intriguers like Thiers, Favre, Dufaure, Garnier-Pagès (only strengthened by a few rascals of the same stamp) continue to reappear, after every revolution, on the surface, and usurp the executive power? these men that always exploit and betray the Revolution, shoot down the people that made it, and sequester the few liberal concessions conquered from former governments? (which they opposed themselves?)

The thing is very simple. In the first instance, if very unpopular, like Thiers after the February Revolution, popular magnanimity spares them. After every successful rising of the people the cry of conciliation, raised by the implacable enemies of the people, is reechoed by the people in the first moments of the enthusiasm at its own victory. After this first moment men like Thiers and Dufaure eclipse themselves as long as the people hold material power and work in the dark. They reappear as soon as it is disarmed and are acclaimed by the bourgeoisie as their *chefs de file*.^a

Or, like Favre, Garnier Pagès, Jules Simon etc (recruited by a few younger ones of similar stamp) and Thiers himself after the 4th of September, were the "respectable" republican opposition under Louis Philippe: afterwards the parliamentary opposition under L. Bonaparte. The reactionary regimes they have themselves initiated when raised to power by the Revolution, secure for them the ranks of the opposition, deporting, killing, exiling the true Revolutionists. The people forget their past, the middle class look upon them as their men, their infamous past is forgotten,

^a File-leaders.— *Ed.*

and thus they reappear to recommence their treason and their work of infamy.

Night of 1 to 2 May: the village of Clamart had been in the hands of the military, the railway station in those of the insurgents. (this station dominates the Fort of Issy.) By a surprise (their *patrouilles* being let in by a soldier on guard, the *watchword having been betrayed* to them) the 23 Battalion of Chasseurs got in, surprised the garrison most of them sleeping in their bed, made only 60 prisoners, *bayoneted 300 of the insurgents*. *Dazu*^a line soldiers afterwards shot offhand. *Thiers in his circular to the Prefects, civil and military authorities of 2 May* has the impudence to say:

"It (the Commune) arrests generals (Cluseret!) only to shoot them, and institutes a committee of public safety which is utterly unworthy!"^b

Troops under General Lacretelle took the *redoubt of Moulin Saquet* situated betwixt Fort Issy and Montrouge, by a *coup de main*.^c The garrison was surprised by treachery on the part of the commandant *Gallien*, who had sold the password to the Versaillese troops. 150 of the Federals bayoneted and over 300 of them made prisoners.

M. Thiers, says the *Times* correspondent, was weak when he ought to have been firm (the coward is always weak as long as *he has to apprehend danger for himself*) and firm, when everything was to be gained by some concessions.^d (the rascal is always firm, when the employment of material force bleeds France, gives great airs to himself, but when he, personally, is safe. This is his whole cleverness. Like Anthony, Thiers is an "honest man".^e)

Thiers' bulletin on Moulin-Saquet (4 May)^f

^a Moreover.—*Ed.*

^b L. A. Thiers, [Circulaire à toutes les autorités civiles et militaires. Versailles, 2 mai 1871], *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 123, May 3, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Sudden attack.—*Ed.*

^d "The Commune of Paris...", *The Times*, No. 27055, May 5, 1871.—*Ed.*

^e W. Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, Act III, Scene II.—*Ed.*

^f Then follows the French text to the end of the section.—*Ed.*

"*Deliverance of Paris from the hideous tyrants who oppress it*" ("the Versaillese were disguised as National Guards") ("most of the Federals were asleep and were killed or taken in their sleep").^a

"Blanqui thrown into jail dying, Flourens cut to pieces by the gendarmes, Duval shot by Vinoy, they had them in their hands on the 31st of October, and did nothing to them."

^a "Voici, sur le même fait, le bulletin...", *Le Rappel*, No. 692, May 6, 1871. The following passage, written by Marx in French, is crossed out in the manuscript: "*Picard 'our artillery does not bombard; true, it cannonades'*" (*Moniteur des communes, journal de Picard*).—*Ed.*

THE COMMUNE

A) MEASURES FOR THE WORKING CLASS

nightwork of journeymen bakers suppressed. (20 April).^a
the private jurisdiction, usurped by the Seigneurs of mills etc (manufacturers) (employers, great and small) being at the same time judges, executors, gainers and parties in the disputes, that right of a penal code of their own, enabling them to rob the labourers' wages by fines and deductions, as punishment etc, abolished in public and private workshops; penalties impended upon the employers in case they infringe upon this law; fines and deductions extorted since the 18th of March to be paid back to the workmen; (27 April).^b

Sale of pawned articles at Pawn Shops suspended; (29 March).^c

A great lot of workshops and manufactures have been closed in Paris; their owners having run away. This is the old method of the industrial capitalists, who consider themselves entitled "by the spontaneous action of the laws of political economy" not only to make a profit out of labour, as the condition of labour, but to stop it altogether and throw the workmen on the pavement—to produce an artificial crisis whenever a victorious revolution threatens the "order" of their "system". The Commune, very wisely, has appointed a Communal commission which in cooperation with delegates chosen by the different trades will inquire into the ways of handing over the deserted workshops and manufactures to cooperative workmen societies with some indemnity for

^a [Arrêté sur la suppression du travail de nuit dans les boulangeries. Paris, 20 avril 1871], *L'Avant-Garde*, No. 451, April 22, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 111, April 21, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b [Arrêté sur l'abolition des amendes ou retenues sur les salaires. Paris, 27 avril 1871], *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 119, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Decree of March 29, 1871 suspending the sale of pawned articles, *The Daily News*, No. 7776, April 1, 1871.—*Ed.*

the capitalist deserters; (16 April)^a (this commission has also to make statistics of the abandoned workshops);

Commune has given order to the mairies to make no distinction between the *femmes* called illegitimate, the mothers and widows of national guards, as to the indemnity of 75 centimes^b;

the public prostitutes till now kept for the “men of order” at Paris but for their “safety” kept in penal servitude under the arbitrary rule of the police; the Commune has liberated the prostitutes from this degrading slavery, but swept away the soil upon which, and the men by whom, prostitution flourishes. The higher prostitutes—the *cocottes*—were, of course, under the rule of order, not the slaves, but the masters of the police and the governors.

There was, of course, no time to reorganize public instruction (education); but by removing the religious and clerical element from it, the Commune has taken the initiative in the mental emancipation of the people. It has appointed a Commission for the organization of education (primary and professional) (28 April). It has ordered that all tools of instruction like books, maps, paper etc be given gratuitously by the schoolmasters who receive them in their turn from the respective mairies to which they belong. No schoolmaster is allowed on any pretext to ask payment from his pupils for these instruments of instruction. (28 April)^c

Pawnshops^d: under all receipts issued by Mont de Piété before April 25, 1871, the pawned clothes, furniture, linen, books, bedding and implements of labour, valued at not more than 20 francs, may be reclaimed free of charge, beginning from May 12. (May 7)^e

2) MEASURES FOR THE WORKING CLASS,
BUT MOSTLY FOR THE MIDDLE CLASSES

House-rent for the last 3 quarters up to April wholly remitted: Whoever had paid any of these 3 quarters shall have right of

^a Decree of April 16, 1871 on handing over the workshops and manufacturies to cooperative workmen societies, *The Daily News*, No. 7790, April 18, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 107, April 17, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b See “Un groupe de citoyennes nous écrit...”, *Le Vengeur*, No. 21, April 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c The source from which Marx cites it has not been established. See [Arrêté sur la commission d'organisation de l'enseignement. Paris, 28 avril 1871], *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 119, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d Then follows the French text except for “not more”, written in German.—*Ed.*

^e [Décret sur le mont-de-piété. Paris, 6 mai 1871], *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 127, May 7, 1871.—*Ed.*

setting that sum against future payments. The same law to prevail in the case of furnished apartments. No notice to quit coming from landlords to be valid for 3 months to come. (29 March)^a

échéances (*Payment of bills of exchange due*): (*expiration of bills*): all prosecutions for bills of exchange fallen due suspended. (12 April)^b

All commercial papers of that sort to be repaid in repayment spread over two years, to begin next July 15, the debts being not chargeable with interest. The total amount of the sums due divided in 8 *equal coupures*, payable by *trimestre* (first trimester to be dated from July 15). Only on these partial payments when fallen due judicial prosecutions permitted. (16 April)¹⁹⁴ The Dufaure laws on leases and bills of exchange entailed the bankruptcy of the majority of the respectable shopkeepers of Paris.¹⁸⁰

The notaries, *huissiers*,^c auctioneers, bum-bailiffs and other judicial officers making till now a fortune of their functions transformed into agents of the Commune receiving from it fixed salaries like other workmen^d;

As the Professors of the Ecole de Médecine have run away, the Commune appointed a Commission for the foundation of *free universities*, no longer state parasites; given to the students that had passed their examination means to practise independent of Doctor titles; (titles to be conferred by the faculty).

Since the judges of the *Civil tribunal of the Seine*, like the other magistrates always ready to function under any class government, had run away, Commune appointed an advocate to do the most urgent business until the reorganization of tribunals on the basis of general suffrage; (26 April)

3) GENERAL MEASURES

Conscription abolished.^e In the present war every able man (National Guard) must serve. This measure excellent to get rid of all traitors and cowards hiding in Paris (29 March).

^a Decree of March 29, 1871 on the remission of rents, *The Daily News*, No. 7775, March 31, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b [Décret sur la suspension des poursuites pour échéances. Paris, 12 avril 1871], *Le Rappel*, No. 670, April 14, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Bailiffs.—*Ed.*

^d The source from which Marx cites it has not been established. See [Décret sur les traitements publics. Paris, 2 avril 1871], *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 92, April 2, 1871.—*Ed.*

^e Decree of March 29, 1871 on abolishing conscription, *The Daily News*, No. 7776, April 1, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 1 (89), March 30, 1871.—*Ed.*

Games of hazard suppressed. (2 April)^a

Church separated from State; the religious budget suppressed; all clerical estates declared national properties, (3 April).^b

The Commune, having made inquiries consequent upon private informations, found that beside the old Guillotine the “government of order” had commanded the construction of a new guillotine (more expeditive and portable), and paid in *avance*. The Commune ordered both the old and the new guillotine to be burned publicly on the 6th of April.^c The Versailles journals, reechoed by the press of order all over the world, narrated the Paris people, as a demonstration against the bloodthirstiness of the Communals, had burnt these guillotines! (6 April) All political prisoners were set free at once after the Revolution of the 18th of March.^d But the Commune knew that under the *régime* of L. Bonaparte and his worthy successor of the Government of Defence many people were simply incarcerated on no charge whatever as political suspects. Consequently it charged one of its members—Protot—to make inquiries.^e By him 150 people set free who being arrested since six months, had not yet undergone any judicial examination; many of them, already arrested under Bonaparte, had been for a year in prison without any charge or judicial examination. (9 April) This fact, so characteristic of the Government of Defence, enraged them. They asserted the Commune had liberated all felons. But who liberated convicted felons? The forger Jules Favre. Hardly got into power, he hastened to liberate Pic and Taillefer, condemned for theft and forgery in the affaire of the *Etendard*.¹⁶⁶ One of these men, Taillefer, daring to return to Paris, has been reinstated into his convenient abode. But this is not all. The Versailles government has delivered in the *Maisons Centrales*^f all over France convicted thieves on the condition of entering M. Thiers’ army!

*Decree on the demolition of the column of the place Vendôme*²⁰² as

^a See “Le jeux de hasard”, *Le Petit Journal*, No. 3014, April 3, 1871.—Ed.

^b Decree of April 2, 1871 separating the church from the state, *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 4931, April 4, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 93, April 3, 1871.—Ed.

^c “La Guillotine”, *La Situation*, No. 176, April 14, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 100, April 10, 1871.—Ed.

^d “Amnistie pleine et entière...”, *La Cloche*, No. 385, March 21, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 79, March 20, 1871.—Ed.

^e [Arrêté de la commission de justice. Paris, 31 mars 1871], *Le Rappel*, No. 666, April 10, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 91, April 1, 1871.—Ed.

^f Central prisons.—Ed.

"a monument of barbarism, symbol of brute force and false glory, an affirmation of militarism, a negation of international right". (12 April)^a

Election of Frankel (German member of the International) to the Commune declared valid: "considering that the flag of the Commune is that of the Universal Republic and that foreigners can have a seat in it"; (4 April)^b Frankel afterwards chosen a member of the executive of the Commune; (21 April)

The *Journal officiel* has inaugurated the publicity of the sittings of the Commune. (15 April)

Decree of Pascal Grousset for the protection of Foreigners against requisitions. Never a government in Paris so courteous to Foreigners. (27 April)^c

The Commune has abolished political and professional oaths. (May 4)^d

Destruction of the monument called "*Chapelle expiatoire de Louis XVI*" rue d'Anjou St. Honoré (erected by the Chambre introuvable¹⁷⁷ of 1816) (7 May).^e

4) MEASURES OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Disarmament of the "loyal" National Guards; (30 March)^f

Commune declares incompatibility between seats in its ranks and at Versailles; (29 March)^g

Decree of Reprisals.^h Never executed. Only the fellows arrested, *Archbishop of Paris* and *Curé of the Madeleine*ⁱ; whole staff of the

^a [Décret sur la démolition de la colonne Vendôme. Paris, 12 avril 1871], *Le Rappel*, No. 670, April 14, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 103, April 13, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Rapport de la Commission des élections", *La Situation*, No. 169, April 5, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 90, March 31, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Decree of April 26, 1871 on the protection of foreigners, *The Daily News*, No. 7799, April 28, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 117, April 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d The source used by Marx has not been established. See [Décret sur l'abolition du serment politique et du serment professionnel. Paris, 4 mai 1871], *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 125, May 5, 1871.—*Ed.*

^e The source used by Marx has not been established. See [Arrêté sur la destruction de la chapelle dite expiatoire de Louis XVI. Paris, 5 mai 1871], *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 126, May 6, 1871. This paragraph, except for the first four words, is in French in the original.—*Ed.*

^f "Progress of the revolution in Paris", *The Daily News*, No. 7775, March 31, 1871.—*Ed.*

^g "The Central Committee still continues...", *The Daily News*, No. 7776, April 1, 1871.—*Ed.*

^h Decree of April 5, 1871 on reprisals and hostages, *The Daily News*, No. 7781, April 7, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 96, April 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

ⁱ G. Darboy and G. Deguerry.—*Ed.*

college of Jesuits; Incumbents of all the principal churches; *Part of these fellows arrested* as hostages, part as conspirators with Versailles, part because they tried to save church property from the clutches of the Commune. (6 April)

"The Monarchists wage war like savages; they shoot prisoners, they murder the wounded, they fire on ambulances, troops raise the butt-end of their rifles in the air and then fire traitorously." (*Proclamation of Commune*)^a

In regard to these decrees of Reprisals to be remarked:

In the first instance men of all layers of the Paris society—after the exodus of the capitalists, the idlers, and the parasites—have interposed at Versailles to stop the Civil war—*except the Paris clergy*. The Archbishop and the curé de [la] Madeleine have only written to Thiers because averse to "*the effusion of their own blood*"^b in their quality as hostages.

Secondly: After the publication by the Commune of the Decree of reprisals, the taking of hostages etc, the atrocious treatment of the Versailles prisoners by Piétri's lambs and Valentin's Gendarmes did not cease, but the assassination of the captive Paris soldiers and National Guard was stopped to set in with renewed fury so soon as the Versailles Government had convinced itself that the Commune was too humane to execute its decree of the 6th of April. Then the assassination set again in wholesale. The Commune did not execute one hostage, not one prisoner, not even some Gendarme officers who under the disguise of National Guards had entered Paris as spies and were simply arrested.

Surprise of the Redoute of Clamart (2 May). *Railway Station in the hands of the Parisians*, massacre, bayonetting, the 22nd Battalion of Chasseurs (*Galliffet?*) shoots line soldiers offhand without any formality. (2 May)

Redoubt of Moulin Saquet, situated between Fort Issy and Montrouge, surprised in the night by treachery on the part of the commandant *Gallien* who had sold the password to the Versaillese troops. Federals surprised in their beds asleep—massacred great part of them. (4 May?)

25 April 4 National guards (this constated by Commissaries

^a Proclamation of the Commune of April 5, 1871 to the inhabitants of Paris, *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 4933, April 6, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 95, April 5, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b G. Darboy, "Prison de Mazas, le 8 avril 1871", *Le Rappel*, No. 669, April 13, 1871; G. Deguerry, "A Messieurs les membres du gouvernement à Versailles", the same issue.—*Ed.*

sent to Bicêtre where the only survivor of the 4 men, à Belle Epine, près^a Villejuif. His name Scheffer.) These men being surrounded by horse Chasseurs, on their order, unable to resist, surrendered, disarmed, nothing done to them by the soldiers. But then arrives the captain of the Chasseurs, and shoots them down one after the other with his revolver. Left them on the soil. Scheffer fearfully wounded survived.^b

13 soldiers of the line made prisoners at the railway Station of Clamart were shot offhand, and all prisoners wearing the line uniforms who arrive in Versailles will be executed whenever doubts about their identity are cleared up. (*Liberté* at Versailles.) Alexander Dumas fils, now at Versailles, tells that a young man exercising the functions, if not bearing the title, of a general, was shot, by order of a Bonapartist general, after having marched in custody a few 100 yards along a road... Parisian troops and National Guards surrounded in houses by Gendarmes, [who] inundate the house with Petroleum and then fire it. Some cadavers of National Guards (*calcinés*^c) have been transported by the ambulance of the press of the Ternes. (*Mot d'ordre* 20 April^d) "They have no right to ambulances."^e 190

Thiers. Blanqui. Archbishop. General Chanzy. (Thiers said his Bonapartists should have liked to be shot.)

Visitation in Houses, etc. Casimir Bouis, appointed chairman of a commission of inquiry^e in the doings of the dictators of 4 September. (14 April) Private houses invaded and papers seized, but no furniture has been carried away and sold by auction.^f (Papers of the fellows of 4 September, of Thiers etc and Bonapartist policemen), f. i. in Hôtel of Lafont, inspecteur-général des prisons. (11 April) The houses (properties) of Thiers et Co. as traitors sealed but *only the papers* confiscated.

Arrests among themselves: This shocks the bourgeois who wants political idols and "great men" immensely.

"It is provoking" (*Daily News*, 6 May. *Paris Correspondence*), "however, and discouraging, that whatever be the authority possessed by the Commune, it is continually changing hands, and we know not to-day with whom the power may

^a Near.—Ed.

^b [Rapport de la Commission d'enquête de la Commune], *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 65, April 29, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 118, April 28, 1871.—Ed.

^c Charred.—Ed.

^d "Les gendarmes usent...", *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 56, April 20, 1871.—Ed.

^e Marx gives this part of the sentence in French.—Ed.

^f "Considérant qu'il est important...", *Le Rappel*, No. 672, April 16, 1871. Marx then gives the German sentence in parentheses.—Ed.

rest to-morrow... In all these eternal changes one sees more than ever the want of a presiding mind. The Commune is a concourse of equivalent atoms, each one jealous of another and *none endowed with supreme control over the others.*"^a

*Journal suppression!*²¹⁴

5) FINANCIAL MEASURES

(*See Daily News. 6 May*)^b

Principal outlay for war!

Only 8,928 fcs. from confiscations^c—all taken from ecclesiastics
etc

Vengeur 6 May.^d

^a "The Balance-sheet of the Commune", *The Daily News*, No. 7807, May 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b *Ibid.* See also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 124, May 4, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Marx gives the French word.—*Ed.*

^d Concerning the financial account of the Commune see "Et maintenant...", *Le Vengeur*, No. 38, May 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

THE COMMUNE

THE RISE OF THE COMMUNE AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The Commune had been proclaimed at Lyons, then Marseilles, Toulouse etc after Sedan. Gambetta tried his best to break it down.³⁰⁷

The different movements at Paris in the beginning of October aimed at the establishment of the Commune, as a measure of defence against the Foreign invasion, as the realisation of the rise of the 4th of September. Its establishment by the movement of the 31 October failed only because Blanqui, Flourens and the other then leaders of the movement believed in the *gens de paroles*^a who had given their *parole d'honneur*^b to abdicate and make room to a Commune freely elected by all the arrondissements of Paris. It failed because they saved the lives of those men so eager for the assassination of their saviours. Having allowed Trochu and Ferry to escape, they [were] surprised then by Trochu's Bretons. It ought to be remembered that on the 31st of October the selfimposed "government of defence" existed only on sufferance. It had not yet gone even through the farce of a plebiscite.³⁰⁸ Under the circumstances, there was of course nothing easier than to misrepresent the character of the movement, to decry it as a treasonable conspiracy with the Prussians, to improve the dismissal of the only man amongst them who would not break his word,^c for strengthening Trochu's Bretons who were for the Government of the Defence what the Corsican *spadassins*^d had been for

^a Men as good as their word.— *Ed.*

^b Word of honour.— *Ed.*

^c F.A.L. Tamisier.— *Ed.*

^d Bravos.— *Ed.*

L. Bonaparte¹⁸⁵ by the appointment of Clément Thomas as Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard; there was nothing easier for these old panic-mongers than—appealing to the cowardly fears of the middle class [before] working *bataillons* who had taken the initiative, throwing distrust and dissension amongst the working *bataillons* themselves, by an appeal to patriotism—to create one of those days of blind reaction and disastrous misunderstandings by which they have always contrived to maintain their usurped power. As they had slipped into power the 4th of September by a surprise, they were now enabled to give it a mock sanction by a plebiscite of the true Bonapartist pattern during days of reactionary terror.

The victorious establishment at Paris of the Commune in the beginning of November 1870 (then already initiated in the great cities of the country and sure to be imitated all over France) would not only have taken the defence out of the hands of traitors and imprinted its enthusiasm as the present heroic war of Paris shows, it would have altogether changed the character of the war. It would have become the war of republican France, hoisting the flag of the social Revolution of the 19th century, against Prussia, the banner bearer of the conquest and counterrevolution. Instead of sending the hackneyed old intriguer^a a begging at all courts of Europe, it would have electrified the producing masses in the old and the new world. By the *escamotage* of the Commune on October 31, the Jules Favre and Co secured the capitulation of France to Prussia and initiated the present civil war.

But this much is shown: The revolution of the 4th September was not only the reinstalment of the Republic because the place of the usurper^b had become vacant by his capitulation at Sedan,—it not only conquered that republic from the Foreign invader by the prolonged resistance of Paris although fighting under the leadership of its enemies—that revolution was working its way in the heart of the working classes. The republic had ceased to be a name for a thing of the past. It was impregnated with a new world. Its real tendency veiled from the eye of the world through the deceptions, the lies and the vulgarizing of a pack of intriguing lawyers and word fencers, came again and again to the surface in the spasmodic movements of the Paris working classes (and the South of France) whose watchword was always the same: the *Commune*!

^a Thiers.—*Ed.*

^b Napoleon III.—*Ed.*

The Commune—the positive form of the Revolution against the Empire and the conditions of its existence—first essayed in the cities of Southern France, again and again proclaimed in the spasmodic movements during the siege of Paris and *escamotés* by the sleights of hand of the Government of Defence and the Bretons of Trochu, the “plan of capitulation” hero—was at last victoriously installed on the 26th March, but it had not suddenly sprung into life on that day. It was the unchangeable goal of the workmen’s revolution. The capitulation of Paris, the open conspiracy against the Republic at Bordeaux, the Coup d’Etat initiated by the nocturnal attack on Montmartre, rallied around it all the living elements of Paris, no longer allowing the defence men to limit it to the insulated efforts of the most conscious and revolutionary portions of the Paris working class.

The government of defence was only undergone as a *pis aller*^a of the first surprise, a necessity of the war. The true answer of the Paris People to the Second Empire, the Empire of Lies—was the Commune.

Thus also the rising of all living Paris—with the exception of the pillars of Bonapartism and its official opposition, the great capitalists, the financial jobbers, the sharpers, the loungers, and the old state parasites—against the government of Defence does not date from the 18th of March, although it conquered on that day its first victory against the conspirators, it dates from the 28 January, from the very day of the capitulation. The National Guard—that is all the armed manhood of Paris—organized itself and really ruled Paris from that day, independently of the usurpatory government of the capitulards¹⁶⁵ installed by the grace of Bismarck. It refused to deliver its arms and artillery, which was its property and only left them in the capitulation because its property. It was not the magnanimity of Jules Favre that saved these arms from Bismarck, but the readiness of armed Paris to fight for its arms against Jules Favre and Bismarck. In view of the Foreign invader and the peace negotiations Paris would not complicate the situation. It was afraid of civil war. It observed a mere attitude of defence and [was] content with the de facto self-rule of Paris. But it organized itself quietly and steadfastly for resistance. (Even in the terms of the capitulation itself the capitulards had unmistakably shown their tendency to make the surrender to Prussia at the same time the means of their domination over Paris. The only concession of Prussia, they insisted upon,

^a A makeshift.—Ed.

a concession, which Bismarck would have imposed upon them as a condition, if they had not begged it as a concession—was 40,000 soldiers for subduing Paris. In the face of its 300,000 national guards,—more than sufficient for securing Paris from an attempt by the Foreign enemy, and for the defence of its internal order—the demand of these 40,000 men—a thing which was besides avowed—could have no other purpose.¹⁷⁵) On its existing military organization it grafted a political federation according to a very simple plan. It was the alliance of all the National Guards put in connection the one with the other *by the delegates* of each company, appointing in their turn the delegates of the battalions, who in their turn appointed general delegates, generals of legions, who were to represent an arrondissement and to cooperate with the delegates of the 19 other arrondissements. Those 20 delegates, chosen by the majority of the battalions of the National Guard, composed the *Central Committee*, which on the 18th of March initiated the greatest revolution of this century and still holds its post in the present glorious struggle of Paris. Never were elections more sifted, never delegates fuller representing the masses from which they had sprung. To the objection of the outsiders that they were unknown—in point of fact, that they only were known to the working classes, but no old stagers, no men illustrated by the infamies of their past, by their chase after pelf and place—they proudly answered: “So were the 12 Apostles”^a and they answered by their deeds.

THE CHARACTER OF THE COMMUNE

The centralized state machinery which, with its ubiquitous and complicated military, bureaucratic, clerical and judiciary organs, entoids (inmeshes) the living civil society like a boa constrictor, was first forged in the days of absolute monarchy as a weapon of nascent modern society in its struggle of emancipation from feudalism. The seignorial privileges of the medieval lords and cities and clergy were transformed into the attribute of a unitary state power, displacing the feudal dignitaries by salaried state functionaries, transferring the arms from medieval retainers of the landlords and the corporations of townish citizens to a standing army, substituting for the checkered (party coloured) anarchy of conflicting medieval powers the regulated plan of a state power, with a systematic and hierarchic division of labour. The first

^a “To the objection...”, *The Daily News*, No. 7776, April 1, 1871.—Ed.

French Revolution with its task to found national unity (to create a nation) had to break down all local, territorial, townish and provincial independences. It was, therefore, forced to develop, what absolute monarchy had commenced, the centralization and organization of state power, and to expand the circumference and the attributes of the state power, the number of its tools, its independence of, and its supernaturalist sway of real society which in fact took the place of the medieval supernaturalist heaven with its saints. Every minor solitary interest engendered by the relations of social groups was separated from society itself, fixed and made independent of it and opposed to it in the form of state interest, administered by state priests with exactly determined hierarchical functions.

This parasitical [excrement upon] civil society, pretending to be its ideal counterpart, grew to its full development under the sway of the first Bonaparte. The restoration and the monarchy of July added nothing to it but a greater division of labour, growing at the same measure in which the division of labour within civil society created new groups of interest, and, therefore, new material for state action. In their struggle against the Revolution of 1848, the parliamentary republic of France and the governments of all continental Europe, were forced to strengthen, with their measures of repression against the popular movement, the means of action and the centralization of that governmental power. All revolutions thus only perfected the state machinery instead of throwing off this deadening incubus. The fractions and parties of the ruling classes which alternately struggled for supremacy, considered the occupancy (Control) (seizure) and the direction of this immense machinery of government as the main booty of the victor. It centred in the creation of immense standing armies, a host of state vermin, and huge national debts. During the time of the absolute monarchy it was a means of the struggle of modern society against feudalism, crowned by the French revolution, and under the first Bonaparte it served not only to subjugate the Revolution and annihilate all popular liberties, it was an instrument of the French revolution to strike abroad, to create for France on the Continent instead of feudal monarchies more or less states after the image of France. Under the Restoration and the Monarchy of July it became not only a means of the forcible class domination of the middle class, and a means of adding to the direct economic exploitation a second exploitation of the people by assuring to their families all the rich places of the State household. During the time of the Revolutionary struggle of 1848 at last it

served as a means of annihilating that Revolution and all aspirations at the emancipation of the popular masses. But the state parasite received only its last development during the second Empire. The governmental power with its standing army, its all directing bureaucracy, its stultifying clergy and its servile tribunal hierarchy, had grown so independent of society itself, that a grotesquely mediocre adventurer with a hungry band of desperadoes behind him sufficed to wield it. It did no longer want the pretext of an armed Coalition of old Europe against the modern world founded by the Revolution of 1789. It appeared no longer as a means of class domination, subordinate to its parliamentary ministry or legislature. Humbling under its sway even the interests of the ruling classes, whose parliamentary show-work it supplanted by self-elected Corps Législatifs and self-paid senates, sanctioned in its absolute sway by universal suffrage, the acknowledged necessity for keeping up "order", that is the rule of the landowner and the capitalist over the producer, cloaking under the tatters of a maskerade of the past, the orgies of the corruption of the present and the victory of the most parasite fraction, the financial swindler, the *debauchery* of all the reactionary influences of the past let loose—a pandemonium of infamies—the state power had received its last and supreme expression in the Second Empire. Apparently the final victory of this governmental power over society, it was in fact the orgy of all the corrupt elements of that society. To the eye of the uninitiated it appeared only as the victory of the Executive over the legislative, as the final defeat of the form of class rule pretending to be the autocracy of society under its form pretending to be a superior power to society. But in fact it was only the last degraded and the only possible form of that class rule, as humiliating to those classes themselves as to the working classes which they kept fettered by it.

The 4th of September was only the revindication of the Republic against the grotesque adventurer that had assassinated it. The true antithesis to the *Empire itself*—that is to the state power, the centralized executive, of which the Second Empire was only the exhausting formula—was *the Commune*. This state power forms in fact the creation of the middle class, first a means to break down feudalism, then a means to crush the emancipatory aspirations of the producers, of the working class. All reactions and all revolutions had only served to transfer that organized power—that organized force of the slavery of labour—from one hand to the other, from one fraction of the ruling classes to the other. It had served the ruling classes as a means of subjugation and of

pelf. It had sucked new forces from every new change. It had served as the instrument of breaking down every popular rise and served it to crush the working classes after they had fought and been ordered to secure its transfer from one part of its oppressors to the others. This was, therefore, a Revolution not against this or that, legitimate, constitutional, republican or Imperialist form of State Power. It was a Revolution against the *State* itself, this supernaturalist abortion of society, a resumption by the people for the people, of its own social life. It was not a revolution to transfer it from one fraction of the ruling classes to the other, but a Revolution to break down this horrid machinery of Class domination itself. It was not one of those dwarfish struggles between the executive and the parliamentary forms of class domination, but a revolt against both these forms, integrating each other, and of which the parliamentary form was only the deceitful bywork of the Executive. The Second Empire was the final form of this State usurpation. The Commune was its definite negation, and, therefore the initiation of the social Revolution of the 19th century. Whatever therefore its fate at Paris, it will make *le tour du monde*.^a It was at once acclaimed by the working class of Europe and the United States as the magic word of delivery. The glories and the antediluvian deeds of the Prussian conqueror seemed only hallucinations of a bygone past.

It was only the working class that could formulate by the word "Commune" and initiate by the fighting Commune of Paris—this new aspiration. Even the last expression of that state power in the Second Empire although humbling for the pride of the ruling classes and casting to the winds their parliamentary pretensions of self-government, had been only the last possible form of their class rule. While politically dispossessing them, it was the orgy under which all the economic and social infamies of their régime got full sway. The middling bourgeoisie and the petty middle class were by their economical conditions of life excluded from initiating a new revolution and induced to follow in the tracks of the ruling classes or [be] the followers of the working class. The peasants were the passive economical basis of the Second Empire, of that last triumph of a *State* separate of and independent from society. Only the Proletarians, fired by a new social task to accomplish by them for all society, to do away with all classes and class rule, were the men to break the instrument of that class rule—the State, the centralized and organized governmental power usurping to be the

^a It will go round the world.— *Ed.*

master instead of the servant of society. In the active struggle against them by the ruling classes, supported by the passive adherence of the peasantry, the Second Empire, the last crowning at the same time as the most signal prostitution of the State—which had taken the place of the medieval church—had been engendered. It had sprung into life against them. By them it was broken, not as a peculiar form of centralized governmental power, but as its most powerful, elaborated into seeming independence from society expression, and, therefore, also its most prostitute reality, covered by infamy from top to bottom, having centred in absolute corruption at home and absolute powerlessness abroad.^a

Parliamentarism in France had come to an end. Its last term and fullest sway was the parliamentary Republic from May 1848 to the Coup d'Etat. The Empire that killed it, was its own creation. Under the Empire with its Corps Législatif and its Senate—and in this form it has been reproduced in the military monarchies of Prussia and Austria—it had been a mere farce, a mere bywork of Despotism in its crudest form. Parliamentarism then was dead in France and the workmen's Revolution certainly was not to awaken it from the death.

But this one form of class rule had only broken down to make the Executive, the governmental state machinery the great and single object of attack to the Revolution.

The *Commune*—the reabsorption of the State power by society, as its own living forces instead of as forces controlling and subduing it, by the popular masses themselves, forming their own force instead of the organized force of their suppression—the political form of their social emancipation, instead of the artificial force (appropriated by their oppressors) (their own force opposed to and organized against them) of society wielded for their oppression by their enemies. The form was simple like all great things. The reaction of former Revolutions—the time wanted for all historical developments, and in the past always lost in all Revolutions in the very days of popular triumph, whenever it had rendered its victorious arms, to

^a Marx added the following two paragraphs on the upper margin of the manuscript.—*Ed.*

be turned against itself—[the Commune] first displaced the army by the National guard.

"For the first time since the 4th September the republic is liberated from the *government of its enemies...* to the city a national militia that defends the citizens against the power (*the government*) instead of a permanent army that defends the *government* against the citizens" (*Proclamation of Central Committee of 22 March*).^a

(the people had only to organize this militia on a national scale, to have done away with the Standing armies; the first economical *conditio sine qua non*^b for all social improvements, discarding at once this source of taxes and state debt, and this constant danger to government usurpation of class rule—of the regular class rule or an adventurer pretending to save all classes); at the same time the safest guarantee against Foreign aggression and making in fact the costly military apparatus impossible in all other states; the emancipation of the peasant from the bloodtax and the most fertile source of all state taxation and state debts. Here already the point in which the Commune is a *bail for the peasant*, the first word of his emancipation. With the "independent police" abolished, and its ruffians supplanted by servants of the Commune. The general suffrage, till now abused either for the parliamentary sanction of the Holy State Power, or a play in the hands of the ruling classes, only employed by the people to choose the instruments of parliamentary class rule once in many years, adapted to its real purposes, to choose by the communes their own functionaries of administration and initiation. [Gone is] the Delusion as if administration and political governing were mysteries, transcendent functions only to be trusted to the hands of a trained caste, state parasites, richly paid sycophants and sinecurists, in the higher posts, absorbing the intelligences of the masses and turning them against themselves in the lower places of the hierarchy. Doing away with the state hierarchy altogether and replacing the haughteous masters of the people by its always removable servants, a mock responsibility by a real responsibility, as they act continuously under public supervision. Paid like skilled workmen, 12 pounds a month, the highest salary not exceeding 240 £ a year, a salary somewhat more than $\frac{1}{5}$, according to a great scientific authority, Professor Huxley, to satisfy a clerk for the Metropolitan School Board.¹⁹³ The whole sham of state mysteries and state pretensions

^a [Proclamation du Comité central de la Garde nationale. Paris, 22 mars 1871]. *Le Rappel*, No. 650, March 25, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 84, March 25, 1871.—Ed.

^b The necessary condition.—Ed.

[illegible]

was done away by a Commune, mostly consisting of simple working men, organizing the defence of Paris, carrying war against the Pretorians of Bonaparte, securing the *approvisionnement* of that immense town, filling all the posts hitherto divided between Government, police, and Prefecture, doing their work publicly, simply, under the most difficult and complicated circumstances, and doing it, as Milton did his *Paradise Lost*, for a few pounds, acting in bright daylight, with no pretensions to infallibility, not hiding itself behind circumlocution office, not ashamed to confess blunders by correcting them. Making in one order the public functions,—military, administrative, political—*real workmen's functions*, instead of the hidden attributes of a trained caste; (keeping order in the turbulence of civil war and revolution) (initiating measures of general regeneration). Whatever the merits of the single measures of the Commune, its greatest measure was its own organisation, extemporized with the Foreign Enemy at one door, and the class enemy at the other, proving by its life its vitality, confirming its thesis by its action. Its appearance was a victory over the victors of France. Captive Paris resumed by one bold spring the leadership of Europe, not depending on brute force, but by taking the lead of the Social Movement, by giving body to the aspirations of the working class of all countries.

With all the great towns organized into Communes after the model of Paris no government could repress the movement by the surprise of sudden reaction. Even by this preparatory step the time of incubation, the guarantee of the movement, won. All France organized into self-working and self-governing communes, the standing army replaced by the popular militias, the army of state parasites removed, the clerical hierarchy displaced by the schoolmaster, the state judges transformed into Communal organs, the suffrage for the National representation not a matter of sleight of hand for an allpowerful government, but the deliberate expression of organized communes, the state functions reduced to a few functions for general national purposes.

Such is the *Commune—the political form of the social emancipation*, of the liberation of labour from the usurpation of the (slaveholding) monopolists of the means of labour, created by the labourers themselves or forming the gift of nature. As the state machinery and parliamentarism are not the real life of the ruling classes, but only the organized general organs of their dominion, the political guarantees and forms and expressions of the old order of things, so the Commune is not the social movement of the working class and therefore of a general regeneration of mankind but the

organized means of action. The Commune does not [do] away with the class struggles, through which the working classes strive to the abolition of all classes and, therefore, of all class rule (because it does not represent a peculiar interest. It represents the liberation of "labour", that is the fundamental and natural condition of individual and social life which only by usurpation, fraud, and artificial contrivances can be shifted from the few upon the many), but it affords the rational medium in which that class struggle can run through its different phases in the most rational and human way. It could start violent reactions and as violent revolutions. It begins the *emancipation of labour*—its great goal—by doing away with the unproductive and mischievous work of the state parasites, by cutting away the springs which sacrifice an immense portion of the national produce to the feeding of the state-monster, on the one side, by doing, on the other, the real work of administration, local and national, for workingmen's wages. It begins therefore with an immense saving, with economical reform as well as political transformation.

The communal organization once firmly established on a national scale, the catastrophes it might still have to undergo, would be sporadic slaveholders' insurrections, which, while for a moment interrupting the work of peaceful progress, would only accelerate the movement, by putting the sword into the hand of the Social Revolution.

The working class know that they have to pass through different phases of class struggle. They know that the superseding of the economical conditions of the slavery of labour by the conditions of free and associated labour can only be the progressive work of time, (that economical transformation) that they require not only a change of distribution, but a new organization of production, or rather the delivery (setting free) of the social forms of production in present organized labour (engendered by present industry) of the trammels of slavery, of their present class character, and their harmonious national and international coordination. They know that this work of regeneration will be again and again relented and impeded by the resistances of vested interests and class egotisms. They know that the present "spontaneous action of the natural laws of capital and landed property"—can only be superseded by "the spontaneous action of the laws of the social economy of free and associated labour", by a long process of development of new conditions, as was the "spontaneous action of the economic laws of slavery" and the "spontaneous action of the economical laws of serfdom". But they know at the same time that

great strides may be taken at once through the Communal form of political organization and that the time has come to begin that movement for themselves and mankind.

PEASANTRY

(*War indemnity.*) Even before the instalment of the Commune, the Central Committee had declared through its *Journal officiel*: "*The greater part of the war indemnity should be paid by the authors of war.*"^a This is the great "conspiracy against Civilization"^b the men of order are most afraid of. It is the most practical question. With the Commune victorious, the authors of the war will have to pay its indemnity; with Versailles victorious, the producing masses who have already paid in blood, ruin, and contributions, will have again to pay, and the financial dignitaries will even contrive to make a profit out of the transaction. The liquidation of the war costs is to be decided by the civil war. The Commune represents on this vital point not only the interests of the working class, the petty middle class, in fact, all the middle class with the exception of the *bourgeoisie* (the wealthy capitalists) (the rich landowners, and their state parasites). It represents above all the interests of the *French peasantry*. On them the greater part of the war taxes will be shifted, if Thiers and his "Rurals"¹⁷⁸ are victorious. And people are silly enough to repeat the cry of the "Rurals" that they—the great landed proprietors—represent the peasant, who is, of course, in the naivety of his soul exceedingly anxious to pay for these good "landowners" the milliards of the war indemnity who made him already pay the milliard of the Revolution indemnity!¹⁹⁹

The same men deliberately compromised the Republic of February by the additional 45 Centimes tax on the peasant,²⁰⁰ but this they did in the name of the Revolution, in the name of the "provisional government", created by it. It is now in their own name that they wage a civil war against the Communal Republic to shift the war indemnity from their own shoulders upon those of the peasant! He will of course be delighted by it!

The Commune will abolish Conscription, the party of order will fasten the bloodtax on the peasant. The party of order will fasten upon him the tax-collector for the payment of a parasitical and

^a [V.] Grélier, "Le comité central de la garde nationale est décidé...", *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 80, March 21, 1871.—Ed.

^b Quoted from "The Commune of Paris...", *The Times*, No. 27028, April 4, 1871.—Ed.

costly state machinery, the Commune will give him a cheap government. The party of order will continue [to] grind him down by the townish usurer, the Commune will free him of the incubus of the mortgages lasting upon his plot of land. The Commune will replace the parasitical judiciary body eating the heart of his income—the notary, the *huissier*^a etc—by Communal agents doing their work at workmen's salaries, instead of enriching themselves out of the peasants' work. It will break down this whole judiciary cobweb which entangles the French peasant and gives abodes to the judiciary bench and maires of the bourgeois spiders that suck its blood! The party of order will keep him under the rule of the gendarme, the Commune will restore him to independent social and political life! The Commune will enlighten him by the rule of the schoolmaster, the party of order force upon him the stultification by the rule of the priest! But the French peasant is above all a man of reckoning! He will find it exceedingly reasonable that the payment of the clergy will no longer [be] exacted from him by the tax-collector, but will be left to the "spontaneous action" of his religious instincts!

The French peasant had elected L. Bonaparte President of the Republic, but the party of Order (during the anonymous Regime of the Republic under the assembly constituante, and législative) was the creator of the Empire! What the French peasant really wants, he commenced to show in 1849 and 1850 by opposing his maire to the Government's prefect, his schoolmaster to the government's parson, himself to the government's gendarme! The nucleus of the reactionary laws of the Party of Order in 1849—and peculiarly in January and February 1850²⁰¹—were specifically directed against the French Peasantry! If the French peasant had made L. Bonaparte president of the Republic because in his tradition all the benefits he had derived from the first Revolution were phantastically transferred on the first Napoleon, the armed risings of Peasants in some departments of France and the gendarme hunting upon them after the Coup d'Etat proved that that delusion was rapidly breaking down! The Empire was founded on the delusions artificially nourished and traditional prejudices, the Commune would be founded on his living interests and his real wants!

The hatred of the French peasant centres on the "rural", the men of the Château, the men of the Milliard of indemnity and the townish capitalist, masked into a landed proprietor, whose

^a Bailiff.—Ed.

encroachment upon him marched never more rapidly than under the Second Empire, partly fostered by artificial state means, partly naturally growing out of the very development of modern agriculture. The "rurals" know that three months rule of the Republican Commune in France would be the signal of the rising of the peasantry and the agricultural Proletariat against them. Hence their ferocious hatred of the Commune! What they fear even more than the emancipation of the townish proletariat is the emancipation of the peasants! The peasants would soon acclaim the townish proletariat as their own leaders and seniors! There exists of course in France as in most continental Countries a deep antagonism between the townish and rural producers, between the industrial Proletariat and the peasantry. The aspirations of the Proletariat, the material basis of its movement is labour organized on a large scale, although now despotically organized, and the means of production centralized, although now centralized in the hands of the monopolist, not only as a means of production, but as a means of the exploitation and enslavement of the producer. What the proletariat has [to] do is to transform the present capitalist character of that organized labour and those centralized means of labour, transform them from the means of class rule and class exploitation into forms of free associated labour and social means of production. On the other hand, the labour of the peasant is insulated, and the means of production are parcelled, dispersed. On these economical differences rests superconstructed a whole world of different social and political views. But this peasantry proprietorship has long since outgrown its normal phase, that is the phase in which it was a reality, a mode of production and a form of property which responded to the economical wants of society and placed the rural producers themselves into normal conditions of life. It has entered its period of decay. On the one side a large *prolétariat foncier* (rural proletariat) has grown out of it whose interests are identical with those of the townish wages labourer. The mode of production itself has become superannuated by the modern progress of agronomy. Lastly—the peasant proprietorship itself has become nominal, leaving to the peasant the delusion of proprietorship, and expropriating him from the fruit of his own labour. The competition of the great farm producers, the bloodtax, the statetax, the usury of the townish mortgagee and the multitudinous pilfering of the judiciary system thrown around him, have degraded him to the position of a Hindoo Ryot,³⁰⁹ while expropriation—even expropriation from his nominal proprietorship—and, his degradation into a rural proletarian is an every

day's fact. What separates the peasant from the proletarian is, therefore, no longer his real interest, but his delusive prejudice. If the Commune, as we have shown, is the only power that can give him immediate great boons even in its present economical conditions, it is the only form of government that can secure to him the transformation of his present economical conditions, rescue him from expropriation by the landlord on the one hand, from grinding, trudging and misery on the pretext of proprietorship on the other, that can convert his nominal proprietorship of the land in the real proprietorship of the fruits of his labour, that can combine for him the profits of modern agronomy, dictated by social wants, and every day now encroaching upon him as a hostile agency, without annihilating his position as a really independent producer. Being immediately benefited by the communal Republic, he would soon confide in it.

UNION (LIGUE) RÉPUBLICAINE

The party of disorder, whose régime topped under the corruption of the Second Empire, has left Paris (Exodus from Paris), followed by its appurtenances, its retainers, its menials, its state parasites, its *mouchards*,^a its "cocottes", and the whole band of low *bohème* (the common criminals) that form the complement of that *bohème of quality*. But the true vital elements of the middle classes, delivered by the workmen's revolution from their sham representatives, have, for the first time in the history of French Revolution, separated from it and come out in its true colours. It is the "Ligue of Republican Liberty"¹⁹⁷ acting the intermediary between Paris and the Provinces, disavowing Versailles and marching under the banners of the Commune.

THE COMMUNAL REVOLUTION AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL CLASSES OF SOCIETY NOT LIVING UPON FOREIGN LABOUR

We have seen that the Paris Proletarian fights for the French Peasant, and Versailles fights against him; that the greatest anxiety of the "Rurals" is that Paris be heard by the Peasants and no longer separated by him through the blockade; that at the bottom of its war upon Paris is the attempt to keep the peasantry as its

^a Spies.—*Ed.*

bondman and treat him as before as its matière "taillable à merci et miséricorde".^a

For the first time in history the petty and *moyenne* middle class has openly rallied round the workmen's Revolution, and proclaimed it as the only means of their own salvation and that of France! It forms with them the bulk of the National guard, it sits with them in the Commune, it mediates for them in the Union Républicaine!

The principal measures taken by the Commune are taken for the salvation of the middle class—the debtor class of Paris against the creditor class! That middle class had rallied in the June insurrection (1848) against the Proletariat under the banners of the capitalist class, their generals, and their state parasites. It was punished at once on the 19th September 1848 by the rejection of the "concordats à l'amiable".¹⁹⁵ The victory over the June insurrection showed itself at once also as the victory of the creditor, the wealthy capitalist, over the debtor, the middle class. It insisted mercilessly on its pound of flesh.^b On the 13th June 1849 the national guard of that middle class was disarmed and sabred down by the army of the bourgeoisie! During the Empire the dilapidation of the State Resources, upon which the wealthy capitalist fed, this middle class was delivered to the plunder of the stockjobber, the Railway kings, the swindling associations of the Crédit Mobilier¹⁶⁷ etc and expropriated by Capitalist Association (Joint-Stock Company). If lowered in its political position, attacked in its economical interests, it was morally revolted by the orgies of that regime. The infamies of the war gave the last shock and roused its feelings as Frenchmen. The disasters bestowed upon France by that war, its crisis of national downbreak and its financial ruin, this middle class feels that not the corrupt class of the would-be slaveholders of France, but only the manly aspirations and the herculean power of the working class can come to the rescue!

They feel that only the working class can emancipate them from priest rule, convert science from an instrument of class rule into a popular force, convert the men of science themselves from the panderers to class prejudice, place hunting state parasites, and allies of capital into free agents of thought! Science can only play its genuine part in the Republic of Labour.

^a As its subject "in its power and at its mercy".—Ed.

^b W. Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice*, Act IV, Scene I.—Ed.

REPUBLIC ONLY POSSIBLE AS AVOWEDLY
SOCIAL REPUBLIC

This civil war has destroyed the last delusions about "Republic" as the Empire the delusion of unorganized "universal suffrage" in the hands of the State Gendarme and the parson. All vital elements of France acknowledge that a Republic is only in France and Europe possible as a "Social Republic", that is a Republic which disowns the capital and landowner class of the State machinery to supersede it by the Commune, that frankly avows "social emancipation" as the great goal of the Republic and guarantees thus that social transformation by the Communal organisation. The other Republic can be nothing but the *anonymous* terrorism of all monarchical fractions, of the combined Legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists to land in an Empire *quelconque*^a as its final goal, the *anonymous* terror of class rule which having done its dirty work will always burst into an Empire!

The professional republicans of the rural assembly¹⁷⁸ are men who really believe, despite the experiments of 1848-51, despite the civil war against Paris—the *republican form* of class despotism a possible, lasting form, while the "party of order"¹⁷³ demands it only as a form of conspiracy for fighting the Republic and reintroducing its only adequate form, monarchy or rather Imperialism, as the form of class despotism. In 1848 these voluntary dupes were pushed in the foreground till, by the insurrection of June, they had paved the way for the *anonymous* rule of all fractions of the would-be slaveholders in France. In 1871, at Versailles, they are from beginning pushed in the background, there to figure as the "Republican" decoration of Thiers' rule and sanction by their presence the war of the Bonapartist generals upon Paris! In unconscious self-irony these wretches hold their party meeting in the *Salle des Paumes* (Tennis-Court) to show how they have degenerated from their predecessors in 1789!³¹⁰ By their Schoelchers, etc., they tried to coax Paris in tendering its arms to Thiers and to force it into disarmament by the National Guard of "Order" under Saisset! We do not speak of the so-called Socialist Paris deputies like Louis Blanc. They undergo meekly the insults of a Dufaure and the rurals, dote upon Thiers' "legal" rights, and whining in presence of the banditti cover themselves with infamy!

^a Of some sort.—Ed.

Workmen and Comte

If the workmen have outgrown the time of Socialist Sectarianism, it ought not be forgotten that they have never been in the leading strings of Comtism. This sect has never afforded the *International* but a *branch* of about half a dozen of men, and whose programme was rejected by the General Council.³¹¹ Comte is known to the Parisian workmen as the prophet in politics of Imperialism (of personal *Dictatorship*), of capitalist rule in political economy, of hierarchy in all spheres of human action, even in the sphere of science, and as the author of a new catechism with a new pope and new saints in place of the old ones.^a

If his followers in England play a more popular part than those in France, it is not by preaching their Sectarian doctrines, but by their personal valour, and by the acceptance on their part of the forms of workingmen class struggle created without them, as f. i. the trade unions and strikes in England which by the by are denounced as a heresy by their Paris coreligionists.

THE COMMUNE (SOCIAL MEASURES)

That the workmen of Paris have taken the initiative of the present Revolution and in heroic self-sacrifice bear the brunt of his battle, is nothing new. It is the striking fact of all French revolutions! It is only a repetition of the past! That the revolution is made in *the name* and confessedly *for* the popular masses, that is the producing masses, is a feature this Revolution has in common with all its predecessors. The new feature is that the people, after the first rise, have not disarmed themselves and surrendered their power into the hands of the Republican mountebanks of the ruling classes, that, by the constitution of the *Commune*, they have taken the actual management of their Revolution into their own hands and found at the same time, in the case of success, the means to hold it in the hands of the People itself, displacing the State machinery, the governmental machinery of the ruling classes by a governmental machinery of their own. This is their ineffable crime! Workmen infringing upon the governmental privilege of the upper 10,000 and proclaiming their will to break the economical basis of that class despotism, which for its own sake wielded the organized State force of society! This is it that has thrown the respectable classes in Europe as in the United States

^a A. Comte, *Cours de philosophie positive*, T. 1-6, Paris, 1830-1842.—Ed.

into the paroxysm of convulsions and accounts for their shrieks of abomination, it is blasphemy, their fierce appeals to assassination of the people, and this Billingsgate³¹² of abuse and calumny from their parliamentary tribunes and their journalistic servants' hall!

The greatest measure of the Commune is its own existence, working, acting under circumstances of unheard-of difficulty! The red flag, hoisted by the Paris Commune, crowns in reality only the government of workmen for Paris! They have clearly, consciously proclaimed the Emancipation of Labour, and the transformation of Society, as their goal! But the actual "social" character of their Republic consists only in this, that workmen govern the Paris Commune! As to their measures, they must, by the nature of things, be principally confined to the military defence of Paris and its *approvisionnement*.

Some patronizing friends of the working class, while hardly dissembling their disgust even at the few measures they consider as "socialist" although there is nothing socialist in them except their tendency—express their satisfaction and try to coax genteel sympathies for the Paris Commune by the great discovery that after all workmen are rational men and whenever in power always resolutely turn their back upon Socialist enterprises! They do in fact neither try to establish in Paris a *phalanstère* nor an *Icarie*.³¹³ Wise men of their generation! These benevolent patronizers, profoundly ignorant of the real aspirations and the real movement of the working classes, forget one thing. All the Socialist founders of Sects belong to a period in which the working class themselves were neither sufficiently trained and organized by the march of capitalist society itself to enter as historical agents upon the world's stage, nor were the material conditions of their emancipation sufficiently matured in the old world itself. Their misery existed, but the conditions of their own movement did not yet exist. The utopian founders of sects, while in their criticism of present society clearly describing the goal of the social movement, the supersession of the wages system with all its economical conditions of class rule, found neither in society itself the material conditions of its transformation nor in the working class the organized power and the conscience of the movement. They tried to compensate for the historical conditions of the movement by phantastic pictures and plans of a new society in whose propaganda they saw the true means of salvation. From the moment the workingmen class movement became real, the phantastic utopias evanesced, not because the working class had given up the end aimed at by these Uto-

pists, but because they had found the real means to realize them, but in their place came a real insight into the historic conditions of the movement and a more and more gathering force of the military organization of the working class. But the last 2 ends of the movement proclaimed by the Utopians are the last ends proclaimed by the Paris Revolution and by the International. Only the means are different and the real conditions of the movement are no longer clouded in utopian fables. These patronizing friends of the Proletariat in glossing over the loudly proclaimed Socialist tendencies of this Revolution, are therefore but the dupes of their own ignorance. It is not the fault of the Paris proletariat, if for them the Utopian creations of the prophets of the workingmen movement are still the "Social Revolution", that is to say, if the Social Revolution is for them still "utopian".

Journal officiel of the Central Committee, 20 March:

"The proletarians of the capital, in midst the *défaillances*^a and the treasons of the governing (ruling) classes, have understood (compris) that the hour was arrived for them *to save the situation in taking into their own hands the direction (management) of public affairs* (the state business)."

They denounce "the political incapacity and the moral decrepitude of the bourgeoisie" as the source of "the misfortunes of France".

"The workmen, who produce everything and enjoy nothing, who suffer from misery in the midst of their accumulated products, the fruit of their work and their sweat, ... shall *they never be allowed to work for their emancipation?*... The proletariat, in face of the permanent menace against its rights, of the absolute negation of all its legitimate aspirations, of the ruin of the country and all its hopes, has understood that it was its imperious duty and its absolute right to take into its hands its own destinies and to assure their triumph in seizing the state power (*en s'emparant du pouvoir*)."^b

It is here plainly stated that the government of the working class is, in the first instance, necessary to save France from the ruins and the corruption impended upon it by the ruling classes, that the dislodgment of these classes from Power (of these classes who have lost the capacity of ruling France) is a *necessity of national safety*.

But it is no less clearly stated that the government by the

^a Impotence.— *Ed.*

^b "La Révolution du 18 mars", *Le Petit Journal*, No. 3002, March 22, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 80, March 21, 1871.— *Ed.*

working class can only save France and do the national business, by working for its *own emancipation*, the conditions of that emancipation being at the same time the conditions of the regeneration of France.

It is proclaimed as a war of labour upon the monopolists of the means of labour, upon capital.

The *chauvinism* of the bourgeoisie is only the supreme vanity, giving a national cloak to all their own pretensions. It is a means, by permanent armies, to perpetuate international struggles, to subjugate in each country the producers by pitching them against their brothers in each other country, a means to prevent the international cooperation of the working classes, the first condition of their emancipation. The true character of that chauvinism (long since become a mere phrase) has come out during the war of defence after Sedan, everywhere paralysed by the Chauvinist bourgeoisie, in the capitulation of France, in the civil war carried on under that high Priest of Chauvinism, Thiers, on Bismarck's sufferance! It came out in the petty police intrigue of the Anti-German league,^a Foreigners-hunting in Paris after the capitulation. It was hoped that the Paris people (and the French people) could be stultified into the passion of National hatred and by factitious outrages to the Foreigner forget its real aspiration and its home betrayers!

How has this factitious movement disappeared (vanished) before the breath of Revolutionary Paris! Loudly proclaiming its international tendencies—because the cause of the producer is every[where] the same and its enemy everywhere the same, whatever its nationality (in whatever national garb)—it proclaimed as a principle the admission of Foreigners into the Commune, it chose even a Foreign workman^b (a member of the International) into its Executive, it decreed [the destruction of] the symbol of French chauvinism—the Vendôme column²⁰²!

And, while their bourgeois *chauvins* have dismembered France, and act under the dictatorship of the Foreign invasion, the Paris workmen have beaten the Foreign enemy by striking at their own class rulers, have abolished frontiers, in conquering the post as the vanguard of the workmen of all nations!

The genuine patriotism of the bourgeoisie—so natural for the real proprietors of the different “national” estates³¹⁴—has faded into a mere sham consequent upon the cosmopolitan character imprinted upon their financial, commercial, and industrial enter-

^a See this volume, pp. 286-87.—*Ed.*

^b Leo Frankel.—*Ed.*

prise. Under similar circumstances it would be exploded in all countries as it did in France.

DECENTRALIZATION BY THE RURALS AND THE COMMUNE

It has been said that Paris, and with it the other French towns, were oppressed by the rule of the peasants, and that its present struggle is for its emancipation from the rule of the peasantry! Never was a more foolish lie uttered!

Paris as the central seat and the stronghold of the centralized government machinery subjected the peasantry to the rule of the gendarmes, the tax collector, the Prefect, and the priest, and the rural magnates, that is to the despotism of its enemies, and deprived it of all life (took the life out of it). It repressed all organs of independent life in the rural districts. On the other hand, the government, the rural magnates, the gendarme and the priest, into whose hands the whole influence of the provinces was thus thrown by the centralized state machinery centring at Paris, brought this influence to bear for the government and the classes whose government it was, not against Paris [of] the government, the parasite, the capitalist, the idle, the cosmopolitan stew, but against the Paris of the workmen and the thinker. In this way, by the government centralization with Paris as its base, the peasants were suppressed by the Paris of the government and the capitalist, and the Paris of the workmen was suppressed by the provincial power handed over into the hands of the enemies of the peasants.

The *Versailles Moniteur*^a (29 March) declares

"that Paris cannot be a *free city*, because it is the *capital*".^b

This is the true thing. Paris, the capital of the ruling classes and its government, cannot be a "free city", and the provinces cannot be "free", because such a Paris is the capital. The provinces can only be free with the *Commune at Paris*. The *party of order* is still less infuriated against Paris because it has proclaimed its own emancipation from them and their government, than because, by doing so, it has sounded the alarm signal for the emancipation of the peasant and the provinces from their sway.

Journal officiel de the Commune, 1 April:

"The revolution of the 18th March had not for its only object the securing to Paris of communal representation elected, but subject to the *despotic tutelage of a*

^a *Moniteur des Communes*.—Ed.

^b Quoted from "The *Moniteur* which is...", *The Daily News*, No. 7776, April 1, 1871.—Ed.

national power strongly centralized. It is to conquer, and secure independence for all the communes of France, and also of all superior groups, departments, and provinces, united amongst themselves for their common interest by a really national pact; it is to guarantee and perpetuate the Republic.... Paris has renounced her apparent omnipotence which is identical with her forfeiture, she has not renounced that moral power, that intellectual influence, which so often has made her victorious in France and Europe in her propaganda."^a

"This time again Paris works and suffers for all France, of which it prepares by its combats and its sacrifices the intellectual, moral, administrative and economic regeneration, the glory and the prosperity" (*Programme of the Commune de Paris sent out by balloon*).^b

Mr. Thiers, in his tour through the provinces, managed the elections, and above all, his own manifold elections. But there was one difficulty. The Bonapartist provincials had for the moment become impossible. (Besides, he did not want them, nor did they want him.) Many of the old Orleanist stagers had merged into the Bonapartist lot. It was, therefore, necessary, to appeal to the rusticated legitimist landowners, who had kept quite aloof from politics and were just the men to be duped. They have given the apparent character to the Versailles assembly, its character of the "chambre introuvable"¹⁷⁷ of Louis XVIII, its "rural" character. In their vanity, they believed, of course, that their time had at last come with the downfall of the Second Bonapartist Empire and under the shelter of Foreign invasion, as it had come in 1814 and 1815. Still they are mere dupes. So far as they act, they can only act as elements of the "party of order",¹⁷³ and its "anonymous" terrorism as in 1848-1851. Their own party effusions lend only the comical character to that association. They are, therefore, forced to suffer as president the jail-*accoucheur* of the Duchess of Berry¹⁶⁸ and as their ministers the pseudo republicans of the government of defence. They will be pushed aside as soon as they have done their service. But—a freak of history—by this curious combination of circumstances they are forced to attack Paris because of revolting against "the République une et indivisible" (Louis Blanc expresses it so,^c Thiers calls it unity of France), while their very first exploit was to revolt against unity by declaring for the "decapitation and decapitalization"^d of Paris, by wanting the

^a Quoted from "An article in the *Journal officiel*...", *The Evening Standard*, No. 14561, April 3, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Déclaration au peuple français. [Paris, 19 avril 1871]", *The Daily News*, No. 7793, April 21, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 110, April 20, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c "United and indivisible republic", quoted from L. Blanc's letter to the editor of *Le Siècle* in *The Daily News*, No. 7797, April 26, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d "The scanty news from the capital of Revolution...", *The Daily News*, No. 7774, March 30, 1871.—*Ed.*

Assembly to throne in a provincial town. What they really want is to go back to what preceded the centralized state machinery, become more or less independent of its prefects and its ministers, and put into its place the provincial and local domanial influence of the *Châteaux*. They want a reactionary *decentralization* of France. What Paris wants is to supplant that centralization which has done its service against feodality, but has become the mere unity of an artificial body, resting on gendarmes, red and black armies, repressing the life of real society, lasting as an incubus upon it, giving Paris an "apparent omnipotence" by enclosing it and leaving the provinces outdoor—to supplant this unitarian France which exists besides the French society—by the political union of French society itself through the Communal organization.

The true partisans of breaking up the unity of France are therefore the rurals, opposite to the united state machinery so far as it interferes with their own local importance (seignorial rights), so far as it is the antagonist of feudalism.

What Paris wants is to break up that factitious unitarian system, so far as it is the antagonist of the real living union of France and a mere means of class rule.

Comtist view

Men completely ignorant of the existing economical system are of course still less able to comprehend the workmen's negation of that system. They can of course not comprehend that the social transformation the working class aim at is the necessary, historical, unavoidable birth of the present system itself. They talk in deprecatory tones of the threatened abolition of "property" because in their eyes their present class form of property—a transitory historical form—is property itself, and the abolition of that form would therefore be the abolition of property. As they now defend the "eternity" of capital rule and the wages system, if they had lived in feudal times or in times of slavery, they would have defended the feudal system and the slave system as founded on the nature of things, as springing from nature, fiercely declaimed against their "abuses", but at the same time from the height of their ignorance answering to the prophecies of the abolition by the dogma of their "eternity" righted by "moral checks" (constraints).

They are as right in their appreciation of the aims of the Paris working classes, as is M. Bismarck in declaring that what the Commune wants is the Prussian municipal order.^a

Poor men! They do not even know that every *social form* of property has "morals" of its own, and that the form of social property which makes property the attribute of labour, far from creating individual "moral constraints" will emancipate the "morals" of the individual from its class constraints.

How the breath of the popular revolution has changed Paris! The revolution of February was called the Revolution of moral contempt! It was proclaimed by the cries of the people: "*à bas les grands voleurs! à bas les assassins!*"^b Such was the sentiment of the people. But as to the bourgeoisie, they wanted broader sway for corruption! They got it under Louis Bonaparte's (Napoleon the little) reign. Paris, the gigantic town, the town of historic initiative, was transformed in the *Maison dorée* of all the idlers and swindlers of the world, into a cosmopolitan stew! After the exodus of the "better class of people", the Paris of the working class reappeared, heroic, self-sacrificing, enthusiastic in the sentiment of its herculean task! No cadavers in the Morgue, no insecurity of the streets. Paris was never more quiet within. Instead of the Cocottes, the heroic women of Paris! Manly, stern, fighting, working, thinking Paris! Magnanimous Paris! In view of the cannibalism of their enemies, making their prisoners only dangerless!...

"What Paris will no longer stand is yet the existence of the Cocottes and Cocodès. What it is resolved to drive away or transform is this useless, sceptical and egotistical race which has taken possession of the gigantic town, to use it as its own. No celebrity of the Empire shall have the right to say, Paris is very pleasant in the best quarters, but there are too many paupers in the others."^c

(*Vérité*: 23 April)

"Private crime wonderfully diminished^d at Paris. The absence of thieves and cocottes, of assassins and street attacks: all the *conservateurs* have fled to Versailles!"

"There has not been signalized one single nocturnal attack even in the most distant and less frequented quarters since the citizens do their police business themselves."^e

^a O. von Bismarck's speech in the Reichstag, May 2, 1871, *Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages*. 1. Legislatur-Periode. 1. Session 1871. Bd. 1, Berlin, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Down with big robbers! Down with the assassins!"—*Ed.*

^c "The really dangerous classes...", *The Observer*, No. 4170, April 23, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d "Life in Paris", *The Daily News*, No. 7791, April 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

^e "Manifeste", *Le Vengeur*, No. 30, April 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

[FRAGMENTS]

Thiers on the Rurals

"This party knows only to employ three means: Foreign invasion, civil war and anarchy ... such a government will never be that of France." (*Chambre des Députés of 5th Janvier 1833.*)^a

Government of Defence

And this same Trochu said in his famous programme: "the governor of Paris will never capitulate"^b and Jules Favre in his circular: "Not a stone of our fortresses, nor a foot of our territories"^c; same as Ducrot: "I shall never return to Paris save dead or victorious."^d He found afterwards at Bordeaux that his life was necessary for keeping down the "rebels" of Paris. (These wretches know that in their flight to Versailles they have left behind the proofs of their crimes, and to destroy these proofs, they would not recoil from making of Paris a mountain of ruins bathed in a sea of blood) (*Manifeste à la Province, by balloon*)^e.

"The unity which has been imposed upon us to the present, by the Empire, the Monarchy, and Parliamentary Government is nothing but centralization, despotic,

^a Quoted in *La Tribune de Bordeaux*, April 25, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b L. J. Trochu, [Proclamation aux habitants de Paris. Paris. 6 janvier 1871], *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 7, January 7, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c J. Favre, "Circulaire adressée aux agents diplomatiques de France.... Le 6 septembre 1870", *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 246, September 7, 1870.—*Ed.*

^d A. Ducrot, "Soldat de la 2^e armée de Paris!" [Order of November 28, 1870], *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 329, November 29, 1870.—*Ed.*

^e "Manifeste", *Le Vengeur*, No. 30, April 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

unintelligent, arbitrary and onerous. The political unity as desired by Paris, is a voluntary association of all local initiatives..." a central delegation from the Federal Communes... "End of the old governmental and clerical world, of military supremacy and bureaucracy and jobbing in monopolies and privileges to which the *proletariat* owed its slavery and the country its misfortunes and disasters." (Proclamation of Commune 19 April.)^a

The Gendarmes and Policemen

20,000 Gendarmes drawn to Versailles from all France (a total of 30,000 under the Empire)^b and 12,000 Paris police agents,—basis of the finest army France ever had.

Republican Deputies of Paris

The Republican deputies of Paris "have not protested either against the bombardment of Paris, nor the summary executions of the prisoners, nor the calumnies against the People of Paris. They have on the contrary by their presence at the assembly and their *mutisme* given a consecration to all these acts supported by the notoriety the republican party has given those men. "Have become the allies and conscious accomplices of the monarchical party. Declares them traitors to their mandate and the Republic". (*Association générale des défenseurs de la République*³¹⁵) (9 May)

"Centralization leads to apoplexy in Paris and to absence of life everywhere else" (*Lamennais*).

"Everything now gravitates to one centre, and this centre is, so to say, the state itself" (*Montesquieu*).^c

Vendôme affair etc.

The Central Committee of the National Guard, constituted by the nomination of a delegate of each company, on the entrance of the Prussians into Paris, transported to Montmartre, Belleville and La Villette the cannon and mitrailleuses founded by the subscription of the National guards themselves, which cannon and mitrailleuses were abandoned by the government of the National defence, even in those quarters which were to be occupied by the Prussians.

^a "Déclaration au peuple français. [Paris, 19 avril 1871]", *The Daily News*, No. 7793, April 21, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 110, April 20, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Marx gives a German phrase in parentheses.—*Ed.*

^c Ch.-L. de Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des Loix*, London, 1769, Liv. 23, Ch. 24. Marx gives a French quotation.—*Ed.*

On the morning of the 18th March the government made an energetic appeal to the National Guard, but out of 400,000 National Guard only 300 men answered.

On the 18th March, at 3 o'clock in the morning, the agents of police, and some *bataillons* of the line were at Montmartre, Belleville, and La Villette to surprise the guardians of artillery and to take it away by force.

The National Guard resisted, the soldiers of the line raised their rifle-butts in the air,^a *despite the menaces and the orders of General Lecomte*, shot the same day by his soldiers at the same time as Clément Thomas.

("troops of the line threw the butts of their muskets in the air, and fraternized with the insurgents.")^b

The bulletin of victory by Aurelle de Paladines was already printed, also papers found on the Decembrisation of Paris.^c

On the 19 March the Central Committee declared the state of siege of Paris raised,^d on the 20 Picard proclaimed it for the department of the *Seine-et-Oise*.

18 March (Morning: still believing in his victory) *proclamation of Thiers*, placarded on the walls:

"The Government has resolved to act. The Criminals who affect to institute a government must be delivered to regular justice, and the cannon taken away must be restored to the Arsenals."

Late in the afternoon, the nocturnal surprise having failed he appeals to the *National Guards*:

"The Government is not preparing a coup d'état. The Government of the Republic has not and cannot have any other aim than the safety of the Republic."

He will only

"do away with the insurgent committee ... *almost all unknown to the population*".^e

Late in the evening a third proclamation to the *National Guard*, signed by Picard and d'Aurelle:

^a Marx gives "raised their rifle-butts in the air" in French.—Ed.

^b "Paris, March 18, 1871", *The Daily News*, No. 7765, March 20, 1871.—Ed.

^c I. e. a coup d'état like that of December 2, 1851. See "Paris in Insurrection", *The Daily News*, No. 7765, March 20, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 78, March 19, 1871.—Ed.

^d "Au Peuple", *The Standard*, No. 14550, March 21, 1871 (published in French).—Ed.

^e L. A. Theirs' proclamation of March 17, 1871 to the inhabitants of Paris and proclamation of March 18, 1871 to the National Guards, *The Daily News*, No. 7765, March 20, 1871.—Ed.

"Some misguided men ... resist forcibly the National Guard and the army.... The Government has chosen *that your arms should be left to you. Seize them with resolution to establish the reign of law and to save the Republic from anarchy.*"^a

(On the 17th Schoelcher tries to wheedle them into disarming.)
Proclamation of the Central Committee of the 19 March:

"the state of siege is raised. The people of Paris is convoked for its communal elections."

Id. to the National Guards:

"You have charged us to organize the defence of Paris and of your rights.... At this moment our mandate has expired; we give it back to you, we will not take the place of those whom the popular breath has just swept away."^b

They allowed the members of the Government to withdraw quietly to Versailles (even such as they had in their hands like Ferry).

The communal elections convoked for the 22 March through the demonstration of the party of order removed to the 26th March.

21 March. The Assembly's frantic roars of dissent against the words "*Vive la République*" at the end of a Proclamation "*To Citizens and Army (soldiers)*"^c. Thiers: "It might be a very legitimate proposal etc." (Dissent of the rurals.) Jules Favre made a harangue against the doctrine of the Republic being superior to universal suffrage, flattered the rural majority, threatened the Parisians with Prussian intervention and provoked—the *demonstration of the Paris of Order*. Thiers: "*come what may he would not send an armed force to attack Paris.*"^d (had no troops yet to do it.)

The Central Committee was so unsure of its victory that it hastened to accept the mediation of the mayors and the deputies of Paris.... The stubbornness of Thiers allowed it (the Committee) to survive for a day or two, and by then it had come to realise its strength. Countless mistakes by the revolutionaries. Instead of rendering the police harmless, the doors were flung open to them; they went to Versailles, where they were welcomed as saviours; they let the 43rd of the line go; all the soldiers who had

^a E. Picard, L. J.-B. d'Aurelle de Paladines, "To the National Guards of the Seine", *The Daily News*, No. 7765, March 20, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Au Peuple"; "Aux Gardes nationaux de Paris", *The Standard*, No. 14550, March 21, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 79, March 20, 1871. Marx gives the last four words in French.—*Ed.*

^c Proclamation of March 21, 1871 "To the Citizens and Soldiers", *The Daily News*, No. 7768, March 23, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d See L. A. Thiers' and J. Favre's speeches in the National Assembly on March 21, 1871, *The Daily News*, No. 7768, March 23, 1871.—*Ed.*

fraternised with the people were allowed to go home; they let the reactionaries organise themselves in the very heart of Paris; they left Versailles alone. Tridon, Jaclard, Varlin and Vaillant wanted them to go and drive the royalists out right away.... Favre and Thiers took urgent steps with the Prussian authorities to secure their assistance ... in putting down the insurgent movement in Paris.

Trochu and Clément Thomas concentrated on frustrating every attempt to arm and organise the National Guard. The march on Versailles was decided upon, prepared and undertaken by the Central Committee without the knowledge of the Commune and even directly contrary to its clearly expressed will....

Bergeret ... instead of blowing up the bridge at Neuilly, which the Federals were unable to hold because of Mont Valérien and the batteries installed at Courbevoie, allowed the royalists to take it, and there to entrench themselves strongly, thereby assuring themselves of a route of communication with Paris...^a

As M. *Litré* said in a letter (*Daily News*, 20 April):

"Paris disarmed; Paris manacled by the Vinoys, the Valentins, the Paladines, the Republic was lost. This the Parisians understood. With the alternative of succumbing without fighting, and risking a terrible contest of uncertain issue, they chose to fight; and I cannot but praise them for it."^b

The expedition to Rome,¹⁷² the work of Cavaignac, Jules Favre, and Thiers.

"A government which has all the internal advantages of a republican government and the external strength of a monarchist government. I mean a *federal republic*.... It is a society of societies, a new society, which grows through the addition of numerous new *associated members* until it becomes strong enough to assure the security of those who have banded together. This kind of republic ... can maintain its size *without succumbing to internal corruption*. The form of this society averts all difficulties" (*Montesquieu. L'Esprit des Loix*, 1.IX, Ch. I).^c

*The Constitution of 1793*³¹⁶

§ 78. Every *commune* of the Republic shall have a municipal administration.

Every *district* shall have an intermediate administration and every *department* a central administration. § 79. Municipal officers shall be elected by assemblies of the commune. § 80. The administrators shall be appointed by assemblies of electors in the departments and districts. § 81. One-half of the membership of the municipalities and the administrations shall be renewed every year.

Executive Council, § 62. Shall consist of 24 members. § 63. The electoral assembly of each department shall nominate one candidate. The Legislative Corps

^a Marx wrote the last three paragraphs in French.—*Ed.*

^b "A French View of the Presence and Future of France", *The Daily News*, No. 7792, April 20, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Marx gives a French quotation in the original.—*Ed.*

shall elect the members of the Council by general roll. § 64. One-half of it shall be renewed in the last month of the legislative session. § 65. The Council shall be charged with directing and supervising the general administration. § 66. It shall appoint not from its members the chief officers of the general administration of the Republic. § 68. These officers shall not constitute a council but shall act separately and shall have no direct connection with one another; they shall not exercise any personal authority. § 73. The Council shall recall and replace the officers it appoints.^a

Roused on the one hand by J. Favre's call to civil war in the Assembly—he told that the Prussians had threatened to interfere, if the Parisians did not give in at once,—encouraged by the forbearance of the people and the passive attitude towards them of the Central Committee, the “Party of Order” at Paris resolved on a *coup de main*^b which came off on the 22 March under the *etiquette* of a *Peaceful Procession*, a peaceable demonstration against the Revolutionary Government. And it was a peaceful demonstration of a very peculiar character.

“The whole movement seemed a surprise. There were no preparations to meet it.”^c

A riotous mob of “gentlemen”, in their first rank the familiars of the Empire, the Heeckeren, Coëtlogon, and H. de Pène etc, illtreating and disarming national guards detached from advanced sentinels (sentries) who fled to the Place Vendôme whence the National Guards march at once to the Rue Neuve des Petits Champs. Meeting the rioters, they received order not to fire, but the rioters advance under the cry: “down with the Assassins! down with the Committee!”, insult the guards, grasp at their muskets, shoot with a revolver citizen *Maljournal* (lieutenant of the General Staff on the Place)^d (*membre du Comité central*). General Bergeret calls upon them to withdraw (disband) (retire). During about 5 minutes the drums are beaten and the *sommations*^e (replacing the English reading of the riot acts)¹⁸⁷ made. They reply by cries of insult. Two national guards fall severely wounded. Meanwhile their comrades hesitate and fire into the air. The rioters try to forcibly break through the lines and to disarm them. Bergeret commands fire and the cowards fly. The *émeute*^f is at once dispersed and the fire ceases. Shots were fired from houses on the national guard. Two of them, Wahlin and François were

^a These two paragraphs are in French in the original.—*Ed.*

^b Sudden attack.—*Ed.*

^c “The Rule of Sedition”, *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 4921, March 23, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d Marx gives the phrase in parentheses in French.—*Ed.*

^e Summons.—*Ed.*

^f Rebellion.—*Ed.*

killed, eight are wounded. The streets through which the "pacific" disband are strewn with revolvers and sword-canes (many of them picked up in the Rue de la Paix). Vicomte de Molinet, killed from behind (by his own people) found with a *dagger* fixed by a chain.^a

Rappel^b was beaten. A number of cane swords, revolvers, and daggers lay on the streets by which the "unarmed" demonstration had passed. Pistol shots were fired before the insurgents received orders to fire on the crowd. The manifesters were the aggressors (witnessed by General Sheridan from a window).

This was then simply an attempt to do by the reactionists of Paris, armed with revolvers, caneswords, and daggers, what Vinoy had failed to do with his sergents-de-ville, soldiers, cannon and mitrailleuse. That the "lower orders" of Paris allowed themselves not even to be disarmed by the "gentlemen" of Paris, was really too bad!

When on the 13th June 1849 the National Guards of Paris made a really "unarmed" and "pacific" procession to protest against a crime, the attack on Rome by the French troops, General Changarnier was praised by his intimate Thiers for sabring and shooting them down. The state of siege was declared, new laws of repression,¹⁸⁸ new proscriptions, a new reign of terror!^c Instead of all that, the Central Committee and the workmen of Paris strictly kept on the defensive during the encounter itself, allowed the assailers, the gentlemen of the dagger, to return quietly home, and, by their indulgence, by not calling them to account for this daring enterprise, encouraged them so much, that two days later, under the leadership of admiral Saisset, sent from Versailles, [they] rallied again and tried again their hands at civil war.

And this Vendôme affair evoked at Versailles a cry of "Assassination of unarmed citizens" reverberating throughout the world. Be it remarked that even Thiers, while eternally reiterating the assassination of the two generals, has not once dared to remind the world of this "Assassination of unarmed citizens".

As in the medieval times the knight may use any weapon whatever against the plebeian, but the latter must not dare even to defend himself.

(27 March. *Versailles. Thiers:*

^a "Le *Journal officiel* de Paris raconte...", *Le Rappel*, No. 650, March 25, 1871.—Ed.

^b Retreat.—Ed.

^c Marx gives a detailed analysis of the events of June 13, 1849 in his *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850*, Ch. 2 (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 71-100).—Ed.

"I give a formal contradiction to those who accuse me of leading the way for a monarchical settlement. *I found the Republic an accomplished fact.* Before God and men I declare I will not betray it".]

After the second rising of the party of Order, the Paris people took no reprisals whatever. The Central Committee even committed the great blunder, against the advice of its most energetic members, not to march at once at Versailles, where, after the flight of Adm. Saisset and the ridiculous collapse of the National Guard of Order, Consternation ruled supreme, there being not yet any forces of resistance organized.

After the election of the Commune, the party of order tried again their forces at the ballot-box, and, when again beaten, effected their Exodus from Paris. During the election, handshaking and fraternization of the Bourgeois (in the courts of the Mayoralties) with the insurgent National Guards, while among themselves they talk of nothing but "*decimation en masse*",^a "mitrailleuses", "frying at Cayenne", "wholesale fusillades".

"The runaways of yesterday think to-day by flattering the men of the Hôtel de Ville to keep them quiet until the Rurals and Bonapartist generals, who are gathering at Versailles will be in a position to fire on them."^b

Thiers commenced the armed attack on the National Guard for the second time in Affair of *April 2*. Fighting between Courbevoie and Neuilly, close to Paris. National Guards beaten, bridge of Neuilly occupied by Thiers' soldiers. Several thousands of National Guards, having come out of Paris and occupied Courbevoie and Puteaux and the bridge of Neuilly, routed. Many prisoners taken. Many of the insurgents immediately shot as rebels. Versailles troops began the firing.

Commune:

"The Government of Versailles has attacked us. Not being able to count upon the army, it has sent Pontifical Zouaves¹⁰⁸ of Charette, Bretons¹⁸⁵ of Trochu, and Gendarmes of Valentin, in order to bombard Neuilly."^c

On 2nd April the Versailles Government had sent forward a division chiefly consisting of *Gendarmes, Marines, Forest Guard, and Police*. Vinoy with two brigades of infantry, and Galliffet at the

^a Mass decimation.—*Ed.*

^b "Paris, March 26, 1871", *The Daily News*, No. 7772, March 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Proclamation of the Commune of April 2, 1871 to the National Guards, *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 4931, April 4, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 93, April 3, 1871.—*Ed.*

head of a brigade of cavalry and a battery of artillery advanced upon Courbevoie.

Paris. April 4. Millière (Declaration)

"the people of Paris was not making any aggressive attempt ... when the government ordered it to be attacked by the ex-soldiers of the Empire, organized as pretorian troops,²²⁰ under the Command of ex-Senators."^a

^a J.-B. E. Millière's declaration of April 4, 1871, *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 4933, April 6, 1871.— *Ed.*

[SECOND DRAFT OF *THE CIVIL WAR IN FRANCE*]

1) GOVERNMENT OF DEFENCE.
TROCHU, FAVRE, PICARD, FERRY

The republic proclaimed on the 4th September by the Paris workmen was acclaimed through all France without a single voice of dissent. Its right of life was fought for in a 5 months' defensive war (centring in) based upon the resistance of Paris. Without that war of defence waged in the name of the Republic, William the "Conqueror" would have restored the Empire of his "good brother" Louis Bonaparte. The cabal of barristers, with Thiers for their statesman, and Trochu for their general, installed themselves at the Hôtel-de-Ville at a moment of surprise, when the real leaders of the Paris working class were still shut up in Bonapartist prisons and the Prussian army was already marching upon Paris. So deeply were the Thiers, the Jules Favre, the Picard then imbued with the belief in the historical leadership of Paris, that to legitimate their title as the government of national defence they founded their claim exclusively upon their having been chosen in the elections to the Corps Législatif, in 1869, as the *Deputies of Paris*.

In our Second address on the late war, five days after the advent of those men, we told you what they were.^a If they had seized the government without consulting Paris, Paris had proclaimed the republic in the teeth of their resistance. And their first step was to send Thiers begging about at all courts of Europe there to buy if possible Foreign mediation, bartering the Republic for a king. Paris did bear with their assumption of power, because they highly professed on their solemn vow to wield that power for the single purpose of *national defence*. Paris, however, was not to be

^a See this volume, pp. 268-69.— *Ed.*

seriously defended without arming the working class, organizing them into a National Guard, and training their ranks through the war itself. But Paris armed was the social Revolution armed. The victory of Paris over its Prussian besieger would have been a victory of the Republic over French class rule. In this conflict between national duty and class interest, the Government of national Defence did not hesitate one moment to turn into a government of national defection. In a letter to Gambetta, Jules Favre confessed that what Trochu stood in defence of, was not the Prussian soldier, but the Paris workman. Four months after the commencement of the siege, when they thought the opportune moment come for breaking the first word of capitulation, Trochu, in the presence of Jules Favre and others of his colleagues, addresses the reunion of the maires of Paris in these terms:

"The first question, addressed to me by my colleagues, *on the very evening of the 4th September*, was this: Paris, can it, with any chance of success, stand a siege against the Prussian army? *I did not hesitate to answer in the negative.* Some of my colleagues here present will warrant the truth of my words, and *the persistence of my opinion.* I told them, in these very terms, that under the existing state of things, the attempt of Paris to maintain a siege against the Prussian army would be *a folly.* Without doubt, I added, it might be *a heroic folly*, but it would be nothing more.... *The events (managed by himself) have not given the lie to my prevision."*

(This little speech of Trochu's was after the armistice published by M. Corbon, one of the maires present.)^a Thus, on the very evening of the proclamation of the Republic, Trochu's "plan", known to his colleagues, was nothing else but the *capitulation of Paris and France*. To cure Paris of its "heroic folly", it had to undergo a treatment of decimation and famine, long enough to screen the usurpers of the 4th of September from the vengeance of the December men.³¹⁷ If the "national defence" had been more than a false pretence for "government", its self-appointed members would have abdicated on the 5th of September, publicly revealed Trochu's "plan", and called upon the Paris people to at once surrender to the conqueror or take the work of defence in its own hands. Instead of this the imposters published high-sounding manifestoes wherein Trochu "the governor will never capitulate"^b and Jules Favre the Foreign minister "not cede a stone of our fortresses, nor a foot of our territory".^c Through the whole time

^a "Paris au jour le jour", *Le Figaro*, No. 74, March 19, 1871.—Ed.

^b L. J. Trochu, [Proclamation aux habitants de Paris. Paris, 6 janvier 1871], *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 7, January 7, 1871.—Ed.

^c J. Favre, "Circulaire adressée aux agents diplomatiques de France ... Le 6 septembre 1870", *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 246, September 7, 1870.—Ed.

of the siege Trochu's plan was systematically carried out. In fact, the vile Bonapartist cut-throats, to whose trust they gave the generalship of Paris, cracked in their intimate correspondence ribald jokes at the well-understood farce of the defence. (See f.i. the correspondence of *Alphonse Simon Guiod*, supreme commander of the artillery of the army of defence of Paris and Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour, to *Suzanne*, General of Division of Artillery,^a published by the *Journal officiel* of the Commune.) The mask of imposture was dropped at the capitulation of Paris. The "government of national defence" unmasked itself as the "government of France by Bismarck's prisoners"—a part which Louis Bonaparte himself at Sedan had considered too infamous even for a man of his stamp. On their wild flight to Versailles, after the events of the 18th March, the capitulars¹⁶⁵ have left in the hands of Paris the documentary evidence of their treason, to destroy which, as the Commune says in its *Manifesto to the Provinces*,

"they would not recoil from battering Paris into a heap of ruins washed in a sea of blood".^b

Some of the most influential members of the government of defence had moreover urgent private reasons of their own to be passionately bent upon such a consummation. Look only at Jules Favre, Ernest Picard, and Jules Ferry!

Shortly after the conclusion of the armistice, *M. Millière*, one of the representatives of Paris to the National Assembly, published a series of authentic legal documents^c in proof that *Jules Favre*, living in concubinage with the wife of a drunkard, resident at Algiers,^d had, by a most daring concoction of forgeries, spread over many years, contrived to grasp, in the name of the children of his adultery, a large succession which made him a rich man, and that, in a law-suit undertaken by the legitimate heirs, he only escaped exposure through the connivance of the Bonapartist tribunals. Since those dry legal documents were not to be got rid of by any horsepower of rhetorics, Jules Favre, in the same heroism of self-abasement, remained for once tongue-tied until the turmoil of the civil war allowed him to brand the Paris people in the Versailles assembly as a band of "escaped convicts" in utter revolt against family, religion, order and property!

^a See *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 115, April 25, 1871. Marx cites from the item "Le Gouvernement de la Défense nationale", *La Situation*, No. 189, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Manifeste", *Le Vengeur*, No. 30, April 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c J.-B. E. Millière, "Le Faussaire", *Le Vengeur*, No. 6, February 8, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d Jeanne Charmont, who lived separately from her husband Vernier.—*Ed.*

(*Pic affaire*.) This very forger had hardly got into power when he sympathetically hastened to liberate two brother-forgers, Pic and Taillefer, under the Empire itself convicted to the hulks for theft and forgery.¹⁶⁶ One of these men, Taillefer, daring to return to Paris after the instalment of the Commune, was at once returned to a convenient abode; and then Jules Favre told all Europe that Paris was setting free all the felonious inhabitants of her prisons!

Ernest Picard, appointed by himself the home minister of the French Republic on the 4th of September, after having striven in vain to become the home minister of Louis Bonaparte, is the brother of one *Arthur Picard*, an individual expelled from the Paris bourse as a blackleg (Report of the Prefecture of Police d.d. 31 July 1867) and convicted on his own confession of a theft of 300,000 fcs while a director of one of the branches of the *Société Générale*,¹⁶⁷ (see Report of the Prefecture of Police, 11 December 1868).^a Both these reports were still published at the time of the Empire. This Arthur Picard was made by Ernest Picard the *rédacteur en chef* of his "*Electeur libre*" to act, during the whole siege, as his financial go-between, discounting at the Bourse the state secrets in the trust of Ernest and safely speculating on the disasters of the French army, while the common jobbers were misled by the false news, and official lies, published in the "*Electeur libre*";^b the organ of the home minister. The whole financial correspondence between that worthy pair of brethren has fallen into the hands of the Commune. No wonder that Ernest Picard, the Joe Miller of the Versailles government, "with his hands in his trousers' pockets, walked from group to group cracking jokes", at the first batch of Paris National Guards made prisoners and exposed to the ferocious outrages of Piétri's lambs.^c

Jules Ferry, a pennyless barrister before the 4th of September, contrived, as the Maire of Paris, to job during the siege a fortune out of the famine which was to a great part the work of his maladministration. The day on which he would have to give an account of his maladministration would be his day of judgement. The documentary proofs are in the hands of the Commune.

These men, therefore, are the deadly foes of the workingmen's

^a See "Le Sieur Picard", *La Situation*, No. 168, April 4, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Marx corrected the inaccuracy in the final version of *The Civil War in France*: Ernest Picard was Minister of Finance in the Government of National Defence and the newspaper *Electeur libre* was the organ of the Ministry of Finance (see this volume, p. 314).—*Ed.*

^c "The Advance of the Insurgents on Versailles", *The Daily News*, No. 7781, April 7, 1871.—*Ed.*

Paris, not only as parasites of the ruling classes, not only as the betrayers of Paris during the siege, but above all as common felons who but in the ruins of Paris, this stronghold of the French Revolution, can hope to find their *tickets-of-leave*.^a These desperadoes were exactly the men to become the ministers of Thiers.

2) THIERS. DUFAURE. POUYER-QUERTIER

In the "parliamentary sense" things are only a pretext for words serving as a snare for the adversary, an ambushade for the people, or a matter of artistic display for the speaker himself.

Their master, M. Thiers, the mischievous gnome, has charmed the French bourgeoisie for almost half a century because he is the most consummate intellectual expression of their own class corruption. Even before he became a statesman, he had shown his lying powers as a historian. Eager of display, like all dwarfish men, greedy of place and pelf, with a barren intellect but lively fancy, epicurean, sceptical, of an encyclopedic facility for mastering the surface of things, and turning things into a mere pretext for talk, a wordfencer of rare conversational power, a writer of lucid shallowness, a master of small state roguery, a virtuoso in perjury, a craftsman in all the petty stratagems, cunning devices and base perfidies of parliamentary party warfare, national and class prejudices standing him in the place of ideas, and vanity in the place of conscience, in order to displace a rival, and to shoot the people, in order to stifle the Revolution, mischievous when in opposition, odious when in power, never scrupling to provoke revolutions, the history of his public life is the chronicle of the miseries of his country. Fond of brandishing with his dwarfish arms in the face of Europe the sword of the first Napoleon, whose historical shoeblack he had become,^b his Foreign policy always culminated in the utter humiliation of France, from the London Convention of 1841²⁹⁶ to the Paris capitulation of 1871¹¹⁸ and the present civil war he wages under the shelter of Prussian invasion. It need not be said that to such a man the deeper undercurrents of modern society remained a closed book, but even the most palpable changes on its surface were abhorrent to a brain all whose vitality had fled to the tongue. F.i. he never fatigued to denounce any deviation from the old French protective system as

^a See this volume, p. 314.—Ed.

^b The reference is to Thiers' *Histoire de la Révolution française* and *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*.—Ed.

a sacrilege, railways he sneeringly derided, when a minister of Louis Philippe, as a wild chimera, and every reform of the rotten French army system he branded under Louis Bonaparte as a profanation. With all his versatility of talent and shiftiness of purpose, he was steadily wedded to the traditions of a fossilized routine, and never, during his long official career, became guilty of one single, even the smallest measure of practical use. Only the old world's edifice may be proud of being crowned by two such men as Napoleon the little and little Thiers. The so-called accomplishments of culture appear in such a man only as the refinement of debauchery and the...^a of selfishness.

Banded with the Republicans under the restoration, Thiers insinuated himself with Louis Philippe as a spy upon and the jail-*accoucheur* of the Duchess of Berry,¹⁶⁸ but his activity when he had first slipped into a ministry (1834-35) centred in the massacre of the insurgent Republicans at the rue Transnonain and the incubation of the atrocious September laws against the press.¹⁶⁹

Reappearing as the chief of the cabinet in March 1840, he came out with the plot of the Paris fortifications.¹⁷⁰ To the [outcry] of the Republican party, against the sinister attempt on the liberty of Paris, he replied:

"What! To fancy that any works of fortification could endanger liberty! And first of all, you calumniate *every Government whatever* in supposing that it could one day try to maintain itself by bombarding the capital.... But it would be hundred times more impossible after its victory than before."^b

Indeed no French government whatever save that of M. Thiers himself with his ticket-of-leave^c ministers and his rural assembly¹⁷⁸ ruminants could have dared upon such a deed! And this too in the most classic form; one part of his fortifications in the hands of his Prussian conquerors and protectors.

When King Bomba^d tried his hands at Palermo¹⁷¹ in January 1848, Thiers rose in the Chamber of Deputies:

"You know, gentlemen, what passes at Palermo: you all shook with horror" (in the "parliamentary" sense) "when hearing that *during 48 hours a great town has been bombarded*. By whom? was it by a Foreign enemy, exercising the rights of war? No, gentlemen, by *its own government*."

^a A blank space in the manuscript.—Ed.

^b L. A. Thiers' speech at the session of the Chamber of Deputies, January 13, 1841, *Le Venguer*, No. 14, April 12, 1871.—Ed.

^c See this volume, p. 314.—Ed.

^d Ferdinand II.—Ed.

(If it had been by its own government, under the eyes and on the sufferance of the Foreign enemy, all would, of course, have been right.)

"And why? *Because that unfortunate town (city) demanded its rights.* Well, then. For the demand of its rights, it has *had 48 hours of bombardment.*"

(If the bombardment had lasted 4 weeks and more all would have been right.)

"...Allow me to appeal to the opinion of Europe. It is doing a service to mankind to come and make reverberate from the greatest tribune perhaps of Europe some *words of indignation*" (indeed! words!) "against such acts.... When the regent Espartero, who had rendered services to his country" (what Thiers never did), "*in order to suppress an insurrection, wanted to bombard Barcelona, there was from all parts of the world a general shriek of indignation.*"^a

Well, about a year later this fine-souled man became the sinister suggester and the most fierce defender (apologist) of the bombardment of Rome by the troops of the French republic, under the command of the legitimist Oudinot.¹⁷²

A few days before the Revolution of February, fretting at the long exile from power to which Guizot had condemned him, smelling in the air the commotion, Thiers exclaimed again in the Chambre of Deputies:

"*I am of the party of Revolution not only in France, but in Europe. I wish the government of the Revolution to remain in the hands of moderate men.... But if that government should pass into the hands of ardent men, even of the Radicals, I should not for all that desert (abandon) my cause. I shall always be of the party of the Revolution.*"^b

The Revolution of February came. Instead of displacing the Guizot cabinet by the Thiers cabinet as the little man had dreamt, it displaced Louis Philippe by the Republic. To put down that Revolution was M. Thiers' exclusive business from the proclamation of the Republic to the *Coup d'Etat*. On the first day of the popular victory, he anxiously hid himself, forgetting that the contempt of the people rescued him from its hatred. Still, with his legendary courage, he continued to shy the public stage until after the bloody disruption of the material forces of the Paris proletariat by Cavaignac, the bourgeois republican.¹³³ Then the scene was cleared for his sort of action. His hour had again struck. He became the leading mind of the "*Party of Order*"¹⁷³ and its "*Parliamentary Republic*", that anonymous reign in which all the

^a L. A. Thiers' speech at the session of the Chamber of Deputies, January 31, 1848, *Le Rappel*, No. 673, April 17, 1871; *Le Vengeur*, No. 21, April 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b L. A. Thiers' speech at the session of the Chamber of Deputies, February 2, 1848, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 34, February 3, 1848.—*Ed.*

rival factions of the ruling classes conspired together to crush the working class and conspired against each other, each for the restoration of its own monarchy.

(The Restoration had been the reign of the aristocratic landed proprietors, the July monarchy the reign of the capitalist, Cavaignac's republic the reign of the "Republican" fraction of the bourgeoisie, while during all these reigns the band of hungry adventurers forming the Bonapartist party had panted in vain for the plunder of France, that was to qualify them as the saviours of "order and property, family and religion".

That Republic was the anonymous reign of coalesced Legitimists, Orleanists, and Bonapartists, with the bourgeois Republicans for their tail.)

3) THE RURAL ASSEMBLY

If this rural assembly, meeting at Bordeaux, made this government, the "government of defence men" had beforehand taken good care to make that assembly. For that purpose they had dispatched Thiers on a travelling tour through the provinces, there to foreshadow coming events and make ready for the surprise of the general elections. Thiers had to overcome one difficulty. Quite apart from having become an abomination to the French people, the Bonapartists, if numerously elected, would at once have restored the Empire and embalmed M. Thiers and Co. for a voyage to Cayenne.¹⁸³ The Orleanists were too sparsely scattered to fill their own places and those vacated by the Bonapartists. To galvanize the Legitimist party, had therefore become unavoidable. Thiers was not afraid of his task. Impossible as a government of modern France, and therefore contemptible as rivals for place and pelf, who could be fitter to be handled as the blind tool of Counter-revolution, than the party whose action, in the words of Thiers, had always been confined to the three resources of "Foreign invasion, civil war, and anarchy". (*Speech of Thiers at the Chambre of Deputies of January 5, 1833.*^a) A select set of the Legitimists, expropriated by the Revolution of 1789, had regained their estates by enlisting in the servant hall of the first Napoleon, the bulk of them by the milliard of indemnity and the private donations of the Restoration. Even their seclusion from participation in active politics under the successive reigns of Louis Philippe and Napoleon the little, served as a lever to the reestablishment of their wealth as landed proprietors. Freed from

^a See *La Tribune de Bordeaux*, April 25, 1871.—Ed.

court dissipation and representation costs at Paris, they had, out of the very corners of provincial France, only to gather the golden apples falling into their *châteaux*^a from the tree of modern industry, railways enhancing the price of their land, agronomy applied to it by capitalist farmers, increasing its produce, and the inexhaustible demand of a rapidly swollen town population securing the growth of markets for that produce. The very same social agencies which reconstituted their material wealth and remade their importance as partners of that jointstock company of modern slaveholders, screened them from the infection of the modern ideas and allowed them, in rustic innocence, nothing to forget and nothing to learn. Such people furnished the mere passive material to be worked upon by a man like Thiers. While executing the mission, entrusted to him by the government of Defence, the mischievous imp overreached his mandataries in securing to himself that multitude of elections which was to convert the defence men from his opponent masters into his avowed servants.

The electoral traps being thus laid, the French people was suddenly summoned by the capitulars of Paris¹⁶⁵ to choose within 8 days a national assembly with the exclusive task by virtue of the terms of the convention of the 31st January, dictated by Bismarck,³¹⁸ to decide on war or peace. Quite apart from the extraordinary circumstances, under which that election occurred, with no time for deliberation, with one half of France under the sway of Prussian bayonets, with its other half secretly worked upon by the government intrigue, with Paris secluded from the provinces, the French people felt instinctively that the very terms of the armistice, undergone by the capitulars, left France no alternative (choice) but that of a peace *à outrance*^b and that for its sanction the worst men of France would be the best. Hence the rural assembly emerging at Bordeaux.

Still we must distinguish between the old regime orgies and the real historical business of the rurals. Astonished to find themselves the strongest fraction of an immense majority, composed of themselves and the Orleanists, with a contingent of Bourgeois republicans and a mere sprinkling of Bonapartists, they verily believed in the long-expected advent of their retrospective millennium. There were the heels of the Foreign invasion trampling upon France, there was the downfall of the Empire and

^a Manors.— *Ed.*

^b At any price.— *Ed.*

the captivity of a Bonaparte, and there they were themselves. The wheel of history had evidently turned round to stop at the *Chambre introuvable*¹⁷⁷ of 1816, with its deep and impassionate curses against the Revolutionary deluge and its abominations, with its "decapitation and decapitalization of Paris",^a its "decentralization" breaking through the network of state rule by the local influences of the *Châteaux* and its religious homilies and its tenets of antediluvian politics, with its *gentilhommerie*, flippancy, its genealogic spite against the drudging masses, and its *Oeil de Boeuf*³¹⁹ views of the world. Still in point of fact they had only to act their part as joint-stock holders of the "party of order", as monopolists of the means of production. From 1848 to 1851, they had only to form a fraction of the interregnum of the "parliamentary republic", with this difference that then they were represented by their educated and trained parliamentary champions, the Berryer, the Falloux, the Larochejaquelein, while now they had to ask in their rustic rank and file, imparting thus a different tone and tune to the assembly, maskering its bourgeois reality under feudal colours. Their grotesque exaggerations (homilies) serve only to set off the liberalism of their banditti government. Ensnared into an usurpation of powers beyond their electoral mandates, they live only on the sufferance of their selfmade rulers. The Foreign invasion of 1814 and 1815³²⁰ having been the deadly weapon wielded against them by the bourgeois parvenus, they have in injudicial blindness bestowed upon themselves the responsibility for this unprecedented surrender of France to the Foreigner by their bourgeois foes. And the French people astonished and insulted by the reappearance of all the noble Pourceaugnacs it believed buried long since, has become aware that beside making the Revolution of the 19th century it has to finish off the Revolution of 1789 by driving the ruminants to the last goal of all rustic animals—the shambles.

5) OPENING OF THE CIVIL WAR. 18 MARCH REVOLUTION.
CLÉMENT THOMAS. LECOMTE. THE VENDÔME AFFAIR

The disarmament of Paris, as a mere necessity of the counter-revolutionary plot, might have been undertaken in a more temporizing, circumspect manner, but as a clause of the urgent financial treaty with its irresistible fascinations, it brooked no delay.¹⁸² Thiers had therefore to try his hand at a *coup d'état*. He

^a See "The scanty news from the capital of Revolution...", *The Daily News*, No. 7774, March 30, 1871.—Ed.

opened the civil war by sending Vinoy, the *Décembriseur*,¹⁸¹ at the head of a multitude of sergents-de-ville and a few regiments of the line, upon the nocturnal expedition against the Montmartre Buttes. Thiers' felonious attempt having broken down on the resistance of the National Guards and their fraternization with the soldiers, on the following day, in a manifesto, stuck to the walls of Paris, Thiers told the National Guards of his magnanimous resolve to leave them their arms^a with which, he felt sure, they would be eager to rally round the government against "the rebels". Out of 300,000 national guards only 300 responded to his summons. The glorious workmen's Revolution of the 18th March had taken undisputed possession (sway) of Paris.

The Central Committee, which directed the defence of Montmartre and emerged on the dawn of the 18th March as the leader of the Revolution, was neither an expedient of the moment nor the offspring of secret conspiracy. From the very day of the capitulation, by which the government of the national defence had disarmed France but reserved to itself a bodyguard of 40,000 troops for the purpose of cowing Paris, Paris stood on the watch. The national guard reformed its organization and entrusted its supreme control to a Central Committee, consisting of the delegates of the single companies, mostly workmen, with their main strength in the workmen's suburbs, but soon accepted by the whole body save its old Bonapartist formations. On the eve of the entrance of the Prussians into Paris, the Central committee took measures for the removal to Montmartre, Belleville, and La Villette, of the cannon and mitrailleuses treacherously abandoned by the capitulars, even in those quarters which the Prussians were about to occupy. It thus made safe the artillery, furnished by the subscriptions of the National Guard, officially recognized as their private property in the convention of the 28th of January,³¹⁸ and on that very title exempted from the general surrender of arms. During the whole interval from the meeting of the National Assembly at Bordeaux to the 18th of March, the Central Committee had been the people's government of the capital, strong enough to persist in its firm attitude of defence despite the provocations of the Assembly, the violent measures of the Executive, and the menacing concentration of troops.^b

The defeat of Vinoy by the National Guard was but a check

^a E. Picard, L. J.-B. d'Aurelle de Paladines, "To the National Guards of the Seine", *The Daily News*, No. 7765, March 20, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Then follows a paragraph beginning with the words "The revolution of the 4th September" to "of a long bygone past", which was crossed out by Marx since it occurs on the next page.—*Ed.*

given to the Counterrevolution plotted by ruling classes, but the Paris people turned at once that incident of their selfdefence into the first act of a social Revolution. The revolution of the 4th September had restored the Republic after the throne of the usurper had become vacant. The tenacious resistance of Paris during its siege, serving as the basis for the defensive war in the provinces, had wrung from the Foreign invader the recognition of that Republic, but its true meaning and purpose were only revealed on the 18th of March. It was to supersede the social and political conditions of class rule, upon which the old world's system rests, which had engendered the Second Empire and under its tutelage, ripened into rottenness. Europe thrilled as under an electric shock. It seemed for a moment to doubt whether its late sensational performances of state and war had any reality in them and were not the mere sanguinary dreams of a long bygone past. The traces of the long endured famine still upon their figures, and under the very eye of Prussian bayonets, the Paris working class conquered in one bound the championship of progress etc.

In the sublime enthusiasm of historic initiative, the Paris workmen's Revolution made it a point of honour to keep the proletarian clean of the crimes in which the revolutions and still more the counterrevolutions of their betters (natural superiors) abound.

Clément Thomas. Lecomte etc.

But the horrid "atrocities" that have sullied this Revolution?

So far as these atrocities imputed to it by its enemies are not the deliberate calumny of Versailles or the horrid spawn of the penny a liner's brain, they relate only to two facts—the execution of the Generals Lecomte and Clément Thomas and the Vendôme Affaire, of which we shall dispose in a few words.

One of the paid cut-throats selected for the (felonious handy work) execution of the nocturnal *coup de main*^a on Montmartre, General Lecomte had on the place Pigalle four times ordered his troops of the 81st of the line to charge an unarmed gathering, and on their refusal fiercely insulted them. Instead of shooting women and children, some of his own men shot him, when taken prisoner in the afternoon of the 18th March, in the gardens of the Château rouge. The inveterate habits acquired by the French *soldatesque* under the training of the enemies of the working class, are of

^a Sudden attack.— *Ed.*

course not likely to change the very moment they change sides. The same soldiers executed Clément Thomas.

"General" Clément Thomas, a discontent ex-quarter-master-sergeant had, in the latter times of Louis Philippe's reign, enlisted in the "republican" *National* newspaper, there to serve in the double quality of strawman (responsible *Gérant*^a) and bully. The men of the *National* having abused the February Revolution,^b to cheat themselves into power, metamorphosed their old quartermaster-sergeant into a "General" on the eve of the butchery of June, of which he, like Jules Favre, was one of the sinister plotters and became one of the most merciless executors. Then his generalship came to a sudden end. He disappears only to rise again to the surface on the 1st November 1870. The day before the government of defence, caught at the Hôtel de Ville, had, upon their word of honour, solemnly bound themselves to Blanqui, Flourens and the other representatives of the working class to abdicate their usurped power into the hands of a Commune to be freely chosen by Paris.¹⁸⁴ They broke, of course, their word of honour, to let loose the Bretons of Trochu, who had taken the place of the Corsicans of L. Bonaparte,¹⁸⁵ upon the people guilty of believing in their honour. M. Tamisier alone refusing to brand himself by such a breach of faith, tendering at once his resignation of the commandership-in-chief of the National Guard, "General" Clément Thomas was shuffled into his place. During his whole tenure of office he made war not upon the Prussians, but upon the Paris National Guard, proving inexhaustible in pretexts to prevent its general armament, in devices of disorganization by pitching its bourgeois element against its working men's elements, of weeding out the officers hostile to Trochu's "plan" and disbanding, under the stigma of cowardice, the very proletarian battalions whose heroism is now astonishing their most inveterate enemies. Clément Thomas felt proud of having reconquered his June preeminence as the personal enemy of the Paris working class. Only a few days before the 18th of March he laid before the war minister Le Flô a new plan of his own for finishing off "*la fine fleur* (the cream) of the Paris *canaille*".^c As if haunted by the June spectres, he must needs appear, in the quality of an *amateur* detective, on the scene of action after Vinoy's rout!

^a Editor.—*Ed.*

^b Of 1848.—*Ed.*

^c "*La Sociale* publie une curieuse lettre...", *Le Venguer*, No. 21, April 19, 1871. *Canaille*—mob.—*Ed.*

The Central Committee tried in vain to rescue these two criminals, Lecomte and Clément Thomas, from the soldiers' wild lynch justice, of which they themselves and the Paris workmen were as guilty as the Princess Alexandra of the people crushed to death on the day of her entrance in London. Jules Favre, with his forged Pathos, flung his curses upon Paris, the den of assassins. The Rural Assembly mimicked hysterical contortions of "sensible-rie".^a These men never shed their crocodile tears but as a pretext for shedding the blood of the people. To handle respectable cadavers as weapons of civil war has always been a favourite trick with the party of order. How did Europe ring in 1848 with their shouts of horror at the assassination of the Archbishop of Paris^b by the insurgents of June, and while they were fully aware from the evidence of an eyewitness: M. Jacquemet, the Archbishop's vicar, that the Bishop had been shot by Cavaignac's own soldiers!^c Through the letters to Thiers of the present Archbishop of Paris,^d a man with no martyr's vein in him, there runs the shrewd suspicion that his Versailles friends were quite the men to console themselves of his prospective execution in the violent desire to fix that amiable proceeding on the Commune! However, when the cry of "assassins" had served its turn, Thiers coolly disposed of it by declaring from the tribune of the National Assembly, that the "assassination" was the private deed of a few, "very few" obscure individuals.^e

The "men of order", the reactionists of Paris, trembling at the people's victory as the signal of retribution, were quite astonished by proceedings strangely at variance with their own traditional methods of celebrating a defeat of the people. Even the sergents-de-ville, instead of being disarmed and locked up, had the doors of Paris flung wide open for their safe retreat to Versailles, while the "men of order", left not only unhurt, were allowed to rally quietly and lay hold of the strongholds in the very centre of Paris. They interpreted, of course, the indulgence of the Central Committee and the magnanimity of the armed workmen as mere symptoms of conscious weakness. Hence their plan to try under the mask of an "unarmed" demonstration the work which four

^a Sentimentality.— *Ed.*

^b D. A. Affre.— *Ed.*

^c The reference is to Jacquemet's statement of June 26, 1848, published in *La Situation*, No. 185, April 25, 1871.— *Ed.*

^d G. Darboy, "Prison de Mazas, le 8 avril 1871", *Le Rappel*, No. 669, April 13, 1871.— *Ed.*

^e See "Méditation des municipalités de la Seine", *Le Rappel*, No. 684, April 28, 1871.— *Ed.*

days before Vinoy's cannon and mitrailleuses had failed in. Starting from their quarters of luxury, this riotous mob of "gentlemen", with all the "*petits crevés*"^a in their ranks and the familiars of the Empire, the Heeckeren, Coëtlogon, H. de Pène etc. at their head, fell in marching order under the cries of "down with the Assassins! down with the Central Committee! Vive l'Assemblée Nationale!" illtreating and disarming the detached posts of National Guards they met with on their progress. When then at last debouching in the place Vendôme, they tried, under shouts of ribald insults, to dislodge the National Guards from their headquarters and forcibly break through the lines. In answer to their pistol shots the regular *sommations* (the French equivalent of the English reading of the Riot acts)¹⁸⁷ were made, but proved ineffective to stop the aggressors. Then fire was commanded by the general of the National Guard^b and these rioters dispersed in wild flight. Two national guards killed, eight dangerously wounded, and the streets, through which they disbanded (runaways fled), strewn with revolvers, daggers and cane-swords, gave clear evidence of the "unarmed" character of their "pacific" demonstration.^c When, on the 13th June 1849, the National guards of Paris made a really "unarmed" demonstration of protest against the felonious assault on Rome by French troops, Changarnier, the general of the "party of order", had their ranks sabred, trampled down by cavalry and shot down, the state of siege was at once proclaimed, new arrests, new proscriptions, a new reign of terror set in.^d But the "lower orders" manage these things otherwise. The runaways of the 22nd March being neither followed up on their flight nor afterwards called to account by the judge of instruction (*juge d'instruction*), were able two days later to muster again an "armed" demonstration under Admiral Saisset. Even after the grotesque failure of this their second rising, they were, like all other Paris citizens, allowed to try their hands at the ballot-box for the election of the Commune, and when succumbing in this bloodless battle, they at last purged Paris from their presence by an unmolested Exodus, dragging along with them the cocottes, the lazzaroni and the other dangerous class of the capital.

^a Fops.— *Ed.*

^b J. Bergeret.— *Ed.*

^c See "Le Journal officiel de Paris raconte...", *Le Rappel*, No. 650, March 25, 1871.— *Ed.*

^d Marx gives a detailed analysis of the events of June 13, 1849 in his work *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850*, Ch. II (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 71-100).— *Ed.*

The "assassination of the unarmed citizens" on the 22nd of March is a myth which even Thiers and his rurals¹⁷⁸ have never dared to harp upon, entrusting it exclusively to the servant hall of European journalism.

If there is to be found fault with in the conduct of the Central Committee and the Paris workmen towards these "men of order" from 18th March to the time of their Exodus, it is an excess of moderation bordering upon weakness.

Look now to the other side of the medal!

After the failure of their nocturnal surprise of Montmartre, the party of order began their regular Campaign against Paris in the commencement of April. For inaugurating the civil war by the methods of December, the massacre in cold blood of the captured soldiers of the line and infamous murder of our brave friend Duval, Vinoy, the runaway, is appointed by Thiers Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour! Galliffet, the fancy-man of that woman so notorious for her shameless maskarades at the orgies of the Second Empire,^a boasts in an official manifesto of his cowardly assassination of Paris National Guards, their lieutenant and their captain, made by surprise and treason.^b Desmarêts, the gendarme, is decorated for his butchery-like chopping of the highsouled and chivalrous Flourens, the "encouraging" particulars of whose death are triumphantly communicated to the Assembly by Thiers.^c In the horribly grotesque exultation of a Tom Pouce playing the part of Timur Tamerlane, Thiers denies the "rebels" against his littleness all the rights and customs of civilized warfare, even the rights of "ambulances".¹⁹⁰

When the Commune had published on the 7 April its decree of reprisals, declaring it its duty to protect itself against the cannibal exploits of the Versailles banditti and to demand an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,^d the atrocious treatment of the Versailles prisoners, of whom Thiers says in one of his bulletins:

^a "The wild tumults of...", *The Daily News*, No. 7779, April 5, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Notice on Proclamation of General de Galliffet, April 3, 1871, *The Daily News*, No. 7783, April 10, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Marx sets forth Thiers' speech in the National Assembly on April 3, 1871 according to *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 4932, April 5, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d The Proclamation of the Commune of April 5, 1871 is cited from *The Civil War in France* published in *The Daily News*, No. 7781, April 7, 1871; see also *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 96, April 6, 1871.—*Ed.*

"never had more degraded countenances of a degraded democracy met the afflicted gazes of honest men",^a

did not cease, but the fusillades of the captives were stopped. Hardly however had he and his Decembrist generals become aware, that the Commune's decree was but an empty threat, that even their spying gendarmes caught in Paris under the disguise of National Guards, that even their sergents-de-ville captured with explosive bombs upon them were spared, when at once the old regime set in wholesale and has continued to this day. The National Guards who had surrendered at Belle Epine to an overwhelming force of Chasseurs were then shot down one after the other by the captain of the *peloton*^b on horseback; houses, to which Parisian troops and National guards had fled, surrounded by Gendarmes, inundated with petroleum, and then set on fire, the calcinated corpses being afterward transported by Paris ambulance; the bayoneting of the national guards surprised (Federalists surprised in their beds asleep) by treason in their beds at the Redoubt of Moulin Saquet, the massacre (fusillades) of Clamart, prisoners wearing the line uniform shot offhand, all these high deeds flippantly told in Thiers bulletin,^c are only a few incidents of this slaveholders' rebellion! But would it not be ludicrous to quote single facts of ferocity in view of this civil war, fomented amidst the ruins of France, by the conspirators of Versailles from the meanest motives of class interest, and the bombardment of Paris under the patronage of Bismarck, in the sight of his soldiers! The flippant manner in which Thiers reports on these things in the bulletin, has even shocked the not oversensitive nerves of *The Times*.^d All this is however "regular" as the Spaniards say. All the fights of the ruling classes against the producing classes menacing their privileges are full of the same horrors, although none exhibits such an excess of humanity on the part of the oppressed and few such an abasement.... Theirs has always been the old axiom of knight-errantry that every weapon is fair if used against the plebeian.

"*L'assemblée siège paisiblement*", writes Thiers to the Prefects.^e

^a L. A. Thiers' proclamation of April 4, 1871, *The Daily News*, No. 7779, April 5, 1871.—Ed.

^b A company.—Ed.

^c See "Voici, sur le même fait, le bulletin...", *Le Rappel*, No. 692, May 6, 1871.—Ed.

^d See "The Massacre at Clamart", *The Times*, No. 27056, May 6, 1871.—Ed.

^e "Assembly meets peacefully", quoted in: Th. Astrie, "L'homme rouge", *La Situation*, No. 176, April 14, 1871.—Ed.

The Affaire at Belle-Epine

The affair at Belle-Epine, near Villejuif this: On the 25th April four national guards, being surrounded by a troop of mounted Chasseurs, who bid them to surrender and lay down their arms. Unable to resist, they obeyed and were left unhurt by the Chasseurs. Some time later then their captain, a worthy officer of Galliffet's, arrives in full gallop and shoots the prisoners down with his revolver, one after the other, and then trots off with his troop. Three of the guards were dead, one, named Scheffer, grievously wounded, survives, and is afterwards brought to the Hospital of Bicêtre. Thither the Commune sent a commission to take up the evidence of the dying man which it published in its report.^a When one of the Paris members of the *Assemblée* interpellated the war minister upon that report, the *rurals* drowned the voice of the deputy and forbid the minister to answer.^b It would be an insult to their "glorious" army—not to commit murder, but to speak of it.

The tranquillity of mind with which that Assembly bears with the horrors of civil war is told in one of Thiers' bulletins to his prefects: "*L'assemblée siège paisiblement*" (has the *cœur léger*^c like Ollivier) and the executive with its ticket-of-leave men shows by its gastronomical feats, given by Thiers and at the table of German princes, that their digestion is not troubled even by the ghosts of Lecomte and Clément Thomas.

6) THE COMMUNE

The Commune had, after Sedan, been proclaimed by the workmen of Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulouse.³⁰⁷ Gambetta did his best to destroy it. During the siege of Paris the ever recurrent workmen's commotions again and again crushed on false pretences by Trochu's Bretons, those worthy substitutes of L. Bonaparte's Corsicans,¹⁸⁵ were as many attempts to dislodge the government of impostors by the Commune. The Commune then silently elaborated, was the true secret of the Revolution of the 4th of September. Hence on the very dawn of the 18th March, after the rout of the Counterrevolution, drowsy Europe started up from

^a [Rapport de la Commission d'enquête de la Commune], *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 65, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Report of the National Assembly's Sitting of May 6, 1871, *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 127, May 7, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c Carefree mind.—*Ed.*

its dreams of the Prussian Empire under the Paris thunderbursts of *Vive la Commune!*^a

What is the Commune, this sphinx so tantalizing to the Bourgeois mind?

In its most simple conception, the form under which the working class assume the political power in their social strongholds, Paris and the other centres of industry.

"The proletarians of the capital," said the Central Committee in its proclamation of the 20 March, "have, in the midst of the failures and treasons of the ruling classes, understood that for them the hour had struck to save the situation by taking into their own hands the direction of public affairs.... They have understood that it was their imperious duty and their absolute right to take into their own hands their own destiny by seizing upon the political power" (state power).^b

But the proletariat cannot, as the ruling classes and their different rival fractions have done in the successive hours of their triumph, simply lay hold of the existent state body and wield this ready-made agency for their own purpose. The first condition for the holding of political power, is to transform the traditional working machinery and destroy it as an instrument of class rule. That huge governmental machinery, entailing like a boa constrictor the real social body in the ubiquitous meshes of a standing army, a hierarchical bureaucracy, an obedient police, clergy and a servile magistrature, was first forged in the days of absolute monarchy as a weapon of nascent middleclass society in its struggles of emancipation from feudalism. The first French Revolution, with its task to give full scope to the free development of modern middleclass society, had to sweep away all the local, territorial, townish and provincial strongholds of feudalism, prepared the social soil for the superstructure of a centralized state power, with omnipresent organs ramified after the plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labour.

But the working class cannot simply lay hold on the ready-made state machinery and wield it for their own purpose. The political instrument of their enslavement cannot serve as the political instrument of their emancipation.

The modern bourgeois state is embodied in two great organs, parliament and government. Parliamentary omnipotence had, during the period of the party of order republic, from 1848 to 1851, engendered its own negative—the Second Empire, and

^a "Long live the Commune!"—*Ed.*

^b "La Révolution du 18 mars", *Le Petit Journal*, No. 3002, March 22, 1871.—*Ed.*

Imperialism, with its mere mockery of parliament, is the regime now flourishing in most of the great military states of the continent. At first view apparently the usurpatory dictatorship of the governmental body over society itself, rising alike above and humbling alike all classes, it has in fact, on the European continent at least, become the only possible state form in which the appropriating class can continue to sway it over the producing class. The assembly of the ghosts of all the defunct French parliaments which still haunts Versailles, wields no real force save the governmental machinery as shaped by the Second Empire.

The huge governmental parasite, entailing the social body like a boa constrictor in the ubiquitous meshes of its bureaucracy, police, standing army, clergy and magistrature—dates its birth from the days of absolute monarchy. The centralized state power had at that time to serve nascent middleclass society as a mighty weapon in its struggles of emancipation from feudalism. The French Revolution of the 18th century, with its task to sweep away the medieval rubbish of seigniorial, local, townish, and provincial privileges, could not but simultaneously clear the social soil of the last obstacles hampering the full development of a centralized state power, with omnipresent organs wrought after the plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labour. Such it burst into life under the first Empire, itself the offspring of the coalition wars of old semifeudal Europe against modern France. During the subsequent parliamentary regimes of the Restoration, the July Monarchy, and the party of order Republic, the supreme management of that state machinery with its irresistible allurements of place, pelf and patronage, became not only the butt of contest between the rival fractions of the ruling class, but at the same degree that the economic progress of modern society swelled the ranks of the working class, accumulated its miseries, organized its resistance and developed its tendencies at emancipation, that, in one word, the struggle of classes, the struggle between labour and capital assumed shape and form, the physiognomy and the character of the state power underwent a striking change. It had always been the power for the maintenance of order, i.e., the existing order of society, and, therefore, of the subordination and exploitation of the producing class by the appropriating class. But as long as this order was accepted as the uncontrovertible and uncontested necessity, the state power could assume an aspect of impartiality. It kept up the existing subordination of the masses which was the unalterable order of things and a social fact undergone without contest on the part of the masses, exercised by

their "natural superiors" without solicitude. With the entrance of society itself into a new phase, the phase of class struggle, the character of its organized public force, the state power, could not but change also (but also undergo a marked change) and more and more develop its character as the instrument of class despotism, the political engine for forcibly perpetuating the social enslavement of the producers of wealth by its appropriators, of the economic rule of capital over labour. After each new popular revolution, resulting in the transfer of the direction of the state machinery from one set of the ruling classes to another, the repressive character of the state power was more fully developed and more mercilessly used, because the promises made, and seemingly assured by the Revolution, could only be broken by the employment of force. Besides, the change worked by the successive revolutions, sanctioned only politically the social fact, the growing power of capital, and, therefore, transferred the state power itself more and more directly into the hands of the direct antagonists of the working class. Thus the Revolution of July transferred the power from the hands of the landowners into those of the great manufacturers (the great capitalists) and the Revolution of February into those of the united fractions of the ruling class, united in their antagonism to the working class, united as "the party of order", the order of their own class rule. During the period of the parliamentary republic the state power became at last the avowed instrument of war wielded by the appropriating class against the productive mass of the people. But as an avowed instrument of civil war it could only be wielded during a time of civil war and the condition of life for the parliamentary republic was, therefore, the continuance of openly declared civil war, the negative of that very "order" in the name of which the civil war was waged. This could only be a spasmodic, exceptional state of things. It was impossible as the normal political form of society, unbearable even to the mass of the middle class. When therefore all elements of popular resistance were broken down, the parliamentary republic had to disappear (give way to) before the Second Empire.

The Empire, professing to rest upon the producing majority of the nation, the peasants, apparently out of the range of the class struggle between capital and labour (indifferent and hostile to both the contesting social powers), wielding the state power as a force superior to the ruling and ruled classes, imposing upon both an armistice, (silencing the political, and, therefore, revolutionary form of the class struggle), divesting the state power of its direct

form of class despotism by braking the parliamentary and, therefore, directly political power of the appropriating classes, was the only possible state form to secure the old social order a respite of life. It was, therefore, acclaimed throughout the world as the "saviour of order" and the object of admiration during 20 years on the part of the would-be slaveholders all over the world. Under its sway, coincident with the change brought upon the market of the world by California, Australia,³²¹ and the wonderful development of the United States, an unsurpassed period of industrial activity set [in], an orgy of stockjobbery, finance swindling, Joint-Stock Company adventure—leading all to rapid centralization of capital by the expropriation of the middle class and widening the gulf between the capitalist class and the working class. The whole turpitude of the capitalist regime, gave full scope to its innate tendency, broke loose unfettered. At the same time an orgy of luxurious debauch, meretricious splendour, a pandemonium of all the low passions of the higher classes. This ultimate form of the governmental power was at the same time its most prostitute, shameless plunder of the state resources by a band of adventurers, hotbed of huge state debts, the glory of prostitution, a factitious life of false pretences. The governmental power with all its tinsel covering from top to bottom immersed in mud. The maturity of rottenness of the state machinery itself, and the putrescence of the whole social body, flourishing under it, were laid bare by the bayonets of Prussia, herself only eager to transfer the European seat of that regime of gold, blood, and mud from Paris to Berlin.

This was the state power in its ultimate and most prostitute shape, in its supreme and basest reality, which the Paris working class had to overcome, and of which this class alone could rid society. As to parliamentarism, it had been killed by its own triumph and by the Empire. All the working class had to do was not to revive it.

What the workmen had to break down was not a more or less incomplete form of the governmental power of old society, it was that power itself in its ultimate and exhausting shape—the *Empire*. The direct opposite to the *Empire* was the *Commune*.

In its most simple conception the Commune meant the preliminary destruction of the old governmental machinery at its central seats, Paris and the other great cities of France, and its superseding by real self-government which, in Paris and the great cities, the social strongholds of the working class, was the government of the working class. Through the siege Paris had got

rid of the army which was replaced by a National Guard, with its bulk formed by the workmen of Paris. It was only due to this state of things, that the rising of the 18th of March had become possible. This fact was to become an institution, and the national guard of the great cities, the people armed against governmental usurpation, to supplant the standing army, defending the government against the people. The commune to consist of the municipal councillors of the different arrondissements, (as Paris was the initiator and the model, we have to refer to it) chosen by the suffrage of all citizens, responsible, and revocable in short terms. The majority of that body would naturally consist of workmen or acknowledged representatives of the working class. It was to be a working, not a parliamentary body, executive and legislative at the same time. The police agents, instead of being the agents of a central government, were to be the servants of the Commune, having, like the functionaries in all the other departments of administration, to be appointed and always revocable by the Commune; all the functionaries, like the members of the Commune itself, having to do their work at workmen's wages. The judges were also to be elected, revocable, and responsible. The initiative in all matters of social life to be reserved to the Commune. In one word, all public functions, even the few ones that would belong to the Central Government, were to be executed by communal agents, and, therefore, under the control of the Commune. It is one of the absurdities to say, that the Central functions, not of governmental authority over the people, but necessitated by the general and common wants of the country, would become impossible. These functions would exist, but the functionaries themselves could not, as in the old governmental machinery, raise themselves over real society, because the functions were to be executed by *communal agents*, and, therefore, always under real control. The public functions would cease to be a private property bestowed by a central government upon its tools. With the standing army and the governmental police the physical force of repression was to be broken. By the disestablishment of all churches as proprietary bodies and the banishment of religious instruction from all public schools (together with gratuitous instruction) into the recesses of private life, there to live upon the alms of the faithful, the divestment of all educational institutes from governmental patronage and servitude, the mental force of repression was to be broken, science made not only accessible to all, but freed from the fetters of government pressure and class prejudice. The municipal taxation to be determined and

levied by the Commune, the taxation for general state purposes to be levied by communal functionaries, and disbursed by the Commune itself for the general purposes. (its disbursement for the general purposes to be supervised by the Commune itself.)

The governmental force of repression and authority over society was thus to be broken in its merely repressive organs, and where it had legitimate functions to fulfil, these functions were not to be exercised by a body superior to the society, but by the responsible agents of society itself.

7) SCHLUSS*

To fighting, working, thinking Paris, electrified by the enthusiasm of historic initiative, full of heroic reality, the new society in its throes, there is opposed at Versailles the old society, a world of antiquated shams and accumulated lies. Its true representation is that rural Assembly,¹⁷⁸ peopled with the gibberish ghouls of all the defunct regimes into which class rule had successively embodied itself in France, at their head a senile mountebank of parliamentarism, and their sword in the hands of the Imperialist capitulars,¹⁶⁵ bombarding Paris under the eyes of their Prussian conquerors.

The immense ruins which the second Empire, in its fall, has heaped upon France, is for them only an opportunity to dig out and throw to the surface the rubbish of former ruins, of Legitimism or Orleanism.

The flame of life is to burn in an atmosphere of the sepulchral exhalations of all the bygone emigration. (The very air they breathe is the sepulchral exhalation of all bygone emigrations.)

There is nothing real about them but their common conspiracy against life, their egotism of class interest, their wish to feed upon the carcass of French society, their common slaveholders' interests, their hatred of the present, and their war upon Paris.

Everything about them is a caricature, from that old fossil of Louis Philippe's regime, Count Jaubert exclaiming in the National assembly, in the palace of Louis XIV: "we are the state" ("The state, that is ourselves")³²² (they are in fact the State spectre in its secession from society) to the Republican fawners upon Thiers holding their reunions in the *Jeu de Paumes* (Tennis Court) to show their degeneracy from their predecessors in 1789.³¹⁰

Thiers at the head, the bulk of the majority split into these two groups of Legitimists and Orleanists, in the tail the Republicans of

* Conclusion.—Ed.

"old style". Each of these fractions intrigues for a restoration of its own, the Republicans for that of the parliamentary Republic—building their hopes upon the senile vanity of Thiers, forming in the meantime the Republican decoration of his rule and sanctioning by their presence the war of the Bonapartist generals upon Paris, after having tried to coax it into the arms of Thiers and to disarm it under Saisset! Knights of the sad figure, the humiliations they voluntarily bear with, show what Republicanism, as a special form of class rule, has come down to. It was in view of them that Thiers said to the assembled maires of the Seine and Oise: What could they more want? "Was not he, a simple citizen, at the head of the State."^a Progress from 1830 to 1870 that then Louis Philippe was the best of Republics, and that now Louis Philippe's Minister, little Thiers himself, is the best of Republics.

Being forced to do their real work—the war against Paris, through the Imperialist soldiers, Gendarmes, and police, under the sway of the retired Bonapartist generals, they tremble in their shoes at the suspicion that—as during their regime of 1848-51—they are only forging the instrument for a second Restoration of the Empire. The Pontifical Zouaves¹⁰⁸ and the Vendéans of Cathelineau and the Bretons of Charette¹⁸⁵ are in fact their "parliamentary" army, the mere phantasms of an army compared with the Imperialist reality. While fuming with rage at the very name of the Republic, they accept Bismarck's dictates in its name, waste in its name the rest of French wealth upon the civil war, denounce Paris in its name, forge laws of prospective proscription against the rebels in its name, usurp dictation over France in its name.

Their title [is] the general suffrage, which they had always opposed during their own régimes from 1815 to 1848, abolished in May 1850, after it had been established against them by the Republic, and which they now accept as the prostitute of the Empire, forgetting that with it they accept the Empire of the Plebiscites! They themselves are impossible even with the general suffrage.

They reproach Paris for revolting against national unity, and their first word was the *decapitation* of that Unity by the decapitalization of Paris. Paris has done the thing they pretended to want, but it has done it, not as they wanted it, as a reactionary dream of the past, but as the revolutionary vindication of the future. Thiers, the

^a "Méditation des municipalités de la Seine", *Le Rappel*, No. 684, April 28, 1871.—Ed.

Chauvin,^a threatens since the 18th March Paris with the "intervention of Prussia", asked at Bordeaux for the "intervention of Prussia", acts against Paris in fact only by the means accorded to him by Prussia. The Bourbons were dignity itself, compared to this mountebank of Chauvinism.

Whatever may be the name—in case they are victorious—of their Restoration, with whatever successful pretender at its head, its reality can only be the Empire, the ultimate and indispensable political form of the rule of their rotten classes. If they succeed to restore it, and they must restore it with any of their plans of restoration successful—they succeed only to accelerate the putrefaction of the old society they represent and the maturity of the new one they combat. Their dim eyes see only the political outwork of the defunct regimes and they dream of reviving them by placing a Henry the 5th or the Count of Paris at their head. They do not see that the social bodies which bore these political superstructures have withered away, that these regimes were only possible under now outgrown conditions and past phases of French society, and that it can only yet bear with Imperialism, in its putrescent state, and the Republic of Labour in its state of regeneration. They do not see that the cycles of political forms were only the political expression of the real changes society underwent.

The Prussians who in coarse war exultation of triumph look at the agonies of French society and exploit them with the sordid calculation of a Shylock, and the flippant coarseness of the *Krautjunker*,^b are themselves already punished by the transplantation of the Empire to the German soil. They themselves are doomed to set free in France the subterranean agencies which will engulf them with the old order of things. The Paris Commune may fall, but the Social Revolution it has initiated, will triumph. Its birthstead is everywhere.

[FRAGMENTS]

The Lies in Thiers' Bulletins

The immense sham of that Versailles, its lying character could not better be embodied and resumed than in Thiers, the professional liar, for whom the "reality of things" exists only in their "parliamentary sense", that is as a lie.

^a Jingo.—*Ed.*

^b The country squire.—*Ed.*

In his answer to the Archbishop's letter he coolly denies "the pretended executions and *reprisals* (!) attributed to the troops of Versailles",^a and has this impudent lie confirmed by a commission appointed for this very purpose by his rurals.²⁹³ He knows of course their triumphant proclamations by the Bonapartist generals themselves. But in "the parliamentary sense" of the word they do not exist.

In his circular of the 16th April on the bombardment of Paris:

"If some cannon-shots have been fired, it is not the deed of the army of Versailles, but of some insurgents *wanting to make believe that they are fighting*, while they do not dare show themselves."^b

Of course, Paris bombards itself, in order to make the world believe that it fights!

Later: "*Our artillery does not bombard—but it cannonades, it is true.*"

Thiers' bulletin on Moulin-Saquet (4 May): "*Deliverance of Paris from the hideous tyrants who oppress it*"^c (by killing the Paris National Guards asleep).

The motley lot of an army—the dregs of the Bonapartist *soldatesque* released from prison by the grace of Bismarck,¹⁷⁵ with the gendarmes of Valentin and the sergents-de-ville of Piétri for their nucleus, set off by the Pontifical Zouaves, the Chouans of Charette and the Vendéans of Cathelineau, the whole placed under the runaway Decembrist generals of capitulation, he dubs "*the finest army France ever possessed*".^d Of course, if the Prussians quarter still at St. Denis, it is because Thiers wants to frighten them by the sight of that "finest of fine armies".

If such is the "finest army"—the Versailles anachronism is "the most liberal and most freely elected assembly that ever existed in France".^e Thiers caps his eccentricity by telling the maires etc that "he is a man, who has never broken his word", of course in the parliamentary sense of word-keeping.

^a "La commission des Quinze...", *Le Rappel*, No. 673, April 17, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b Cited in: "La Circulaire de M. Thiers", *Le Vengeur*, No. 21, April 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c "Voici, sur le même fait, le bulletin...", *Le Rappel*, No. 692, May 6, 1871. Marx gives the quotations in this and the previous paragraph in French.—*Ed.*

^d Quoted according to: Th. Astrie, "L'homme rouge", *La Situation*, No. 176, April 14, 1871.—*Ed.*

^e "Méditation des municipalités de la Seine", *Le Rappel*, No. 684, April 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

He is the truest of Republicans and (*Séance* of 27 April): "The Assembly is more liberal than he himself."^a

To the Maires: "You can rely on my word which I have never broken", in an unparliamentary sense, which I have never kept.

"This Assembly is one of the most liberal ever elected by France."^b

He compares himself with Lincoln and the Parisians with the rebellious slaveholders of the South. The Southerners wanted territorial Secession from the United States for the slavery of labour.³²³ Paris wants the secession of M. Thiers himself and the interests he represents from power for the emancipation of labour.

The revenge which the Bonapartist Generals, the Gendarmes and the Chouans wreak upon Paris is a necessity of the class war against labour, but in the little byplay of his bulletins Thiers turns it into a pretext of caricaturing his idol, the first Nap., and makes himself the laughing-stock of Europe by boldly affirming, that the French army through its war upon the Parisian has regained the renown it had lost in the war against the Prussian. The whole war thus appears as mere childplay to give vent to the childish vanity of a dwarf, elated at having to describe *his* own battles, fought by *his* own army, under *his* own secret commandship-in-chief.

And his lies culminate in regard to Paris and the province.

Paris which in reality holds in check for two months the finest army France ever possessed, despite the secret help of the Prussian, is in fact only anxious to be delivered from its "atrocious tyrants", by Thiers, and therefore it fights against him, although a mere handful of criminals.

He does not tire of representing the Commune as a handful of convicts, ticket-of-leave men, scum. Paris fights against him because it wants to be delivered by him from "the *affreux*^c tyrants that oppress it". And this "handful" of desperadoes holds in check for two months "the finest army that France ever possessed" led by the invincible MacMahon and inspired by the Napoleonic genius of Thiers himself!

The resistance of Paris is no reality, but Thiers' lies about Paris are.

Not content to refute him by its exploits, all the living elements

^a L. A. Thiers' speech in the National Assembly on April 27, 1871, *Le Rappel*, No. 685, April 29, 1871. Marx cites the French text of the speech here and in the next paragraph.—*Ed.*

^b Marx gives this quotation in French.—*Ed.*

^c Atrocious.—*Ed.*

of Paris have spoken to him, but in vain, to dislodge him out of his lying world.

"You must not confound the movement of Paris with the surprise of Montmartre, which was only its opportunity and starting point; this movement is general and profound in the conscience of Paris; the greatest number even of those who by one reason or another keep back (stand aside), do for all that not disavow its social legitimacy."^a

By whom he was told this? By the delegates of the syndical chambers, speaking in the name of 7-8,000 merchants and Industrials. They went to tell it him personally at Versailles. Thus the *League of the Republican Union*, thus the *Masons' lodges*³⁰² by their delegates and their demonstrations. But he sticks to it.

In his bulletin of Moulin-Saquet (4 May):

"300 prisoners taken ... the rest of the insurgents has fled like the wind, leaving 150 dead and wounded on the field of battle.... Such is the victory the Commune can celebrate in its bulletins. Paris will soon be delivered from the terrible tyrants oppressing it."^b

But the fighting Paris, the real Paris is not *his* Paris. His Paris is itself a parliamentary lie. "The rich, the idle, the capitalist Paris",^c the cosmopolitan stew, this is his Paris. That is the Paris which wants to be restored to him, the real Paris is the Paris of the "vile multitude". The Paris that shewed its courage in the "pacific procession" and Saisset's stampede, that throngs now at Versailles, at Rueil, at St. Denis, at St. Germain-en-Laye, followed by the cocottes, sticking to the "man of family, religion, order" and above all "of property", the Paris of the lounging classes, the Paris of the francs-fileurs,²⁰⁸ amusing itself by looking through telescopes at the battles going on, treating the civil war but as an agreeable diversion,^d that is the Paris of M. Thiers, as the emigration of Coblenz²¹⁰ was the France of M. de Calonne and as the emigration at Versailles is the France of M. Thiers.

If the Paris, that wants to be delivered of the Commune by Thiers, his rurals,¹⁷⁸ *Décembriseurs*¹⁸¹ and Gendarmes, is a lie, so is his "province" which through him and his rurals wants to be delivered from Paris.

^a Quoted according to: A. Vacqueries, "Une Poignée de Factieux", *La Rappel*, No. 669, April 13, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Voici, sur le même fait, le bulletin...", *Le Rappel*, No. 692, May 6, 1871. Marx quotes from it in French beginning with the words "like the wind".—*Ed.*

^c "The Commune of Paris...", *The Times*, No. 27028, April 4, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d "The really dangerous classes...", *The Observer*, No. 4170, April 23, 1871.—*Ed.*

Before the definitive conclusion at Frankfort of the peace treaty,³²⁴ he appealed to the provinces to send their battalions of national guards and volunteers to Versailles to fight against Paris. The Province refused point blank.^a Only Bretagne sent a handful of Chouans "fighting under a white flag, every one of them wearing on his breast a Jesus heart in white cloth and shouting: "Vive le roi!"^b Thus is the provincial France listening to his summons so that he was forced to lend captive French troops from Bismarck, lay hold of the Pontifical Zouaves (the real armed representatives of *his* provincial France) and make 20,000 Gendarmes and 12,000 sergents-de-ville the nucleus of his army.

Despite the wall of lies, the intellectual and police blockade, by which he tried to (debar) fence off Paris from the provinces, the provinces, instead of sending him battalions to wage war upon Paris, inundated him with so many delegations insisting upon peace with Paris, that he refused to receive them any longer in person. The tone of the addresses sent up from the Provinces, proposing most of them the immediate conclusion of an armistice with Paris, the dissolution of the Assembly, "because its mandate had expired",^c and the grant of the municipal rights demanded by Paris, was so offensive that Dufaure denounces them in his "circular against conciliation" to the prefects.^d On the other hand, the rural assembly and Thiers received not one single address of approval on the part of the provinces.

But the grand *défi*^e the Provinces gave to Thiers' "lie" about the provinces were the municipal elections of the 30th April, carried on under his government, on the basis of a law of his Assembly. Out of 700,000 councillors (in round numbers) returned by the 35,000 communes still left in mutilated France, the united Legitimists, Orleanists and Bonapartists did not carry 8,000! The supplementary elections still more hostile! This showed plainly how far the *National Assembly*, chosen by surprise, and on false pretences, represents France, provincial France, France minus Paris!

^a Report from *La Défense républicaine* of Limoges, *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 65, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "Long live the King!" "The Communal Delegation...", *The Daily News*, No. 7779, April 5, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c J. Dufaure's speech in the National Assembly on April 26, 1871, *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 65, April 29, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d J. Dufaure, [Circularaire aux procureurs généraux. Versailles, 23 avril 1871], *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 62, April 26, 1871.—*Ed.*

^e Challenge.—*Ed.*

But the plan of an assembly of the municipal delegates of the great provincial towns at Bordeaux, forbidden by Thiers on the ground of his law of 1834 and an Imperialist one of 1855,³²⁵ forced him to avow that his "Provinces" are a lie, as "his" Paris is. He accuses them of resembling the "false" Paris, of being eagerly bent upon "laying the fundamentals of Communism and Rebellion". Again he has been answered by the late resolutions of the municipal councils of Nantes, Vienne, Chambéry, Limoux, Carcassonne, Angers, Carpentras, Montpellier, Privas, Grenoble etc. insisting upon peace with Paris,

"the absolute affirmation of the Republic, the recognition of the communal right which", as the municipal *council of Vienne* says,^a "those elected on February 8 promised in their circulars when they were candidates. To stop the external war, it (the National Assembly) ceded two provinces and promised Prussia five milliards. What ought it not to do to put an end to the civil war?"

(Just the contrary. The two provinces are not their "private" property, and as to the promissory note of 5 milliards, the thing is exactly that it shall be paid by the French people and not by them.)

If, therefore, Paris may justly complain of the Provinces that they limit themselves to pacific demonstrations, leaving it unaided against all the State forces ... the Province has in most unequivocal tones given the lie to Thiers and the Assembly to be represented there, has declared their Province a lie as is their whole existence, a sham, a false pretence.

The General Council feels proud of the prominent part the Paris branches of the *International* have taken in the glorious revolution of Paris. Not, as the imbeciles fancy, as if the Paris, or any other branch of the *International* received its *mot d'ordre*^b from a centre. But the flower of the working class in all civilized countries belonging to the *International*, and being imbued with its ideas, they are sure everywhere in the working-class movements to take the lead.

From^c the very day of the capitulation by which the government of Bismarck prisoners had signed the surrender of France, but in

^a Beginning from here Marx quotes in French.—*Ed.*

^b Orders.—*Ed.*

^c The following text was written on three pages without any pagination; the second paragraph is marked "to p. 9".—*Ed.*

return, got leave to retain a bodyguard for the express purpose of cowing Paris, Paris stood on its watch. The National guard reorganized itself and entrusted its supreme control to a central committee elected by all the companies, battalions, and batteries of the capital, save some fragments of the old Bonapartist formations. On the eve of the entrance of the Prussians into Paris, the central committee took measures for the removal to Montmartre, Belleville, and La Villette, of the cannon and mitrailleuses treacherously abandoned by the capitulars¹⁶⁵ in the very quarters the Prussians were about to occupy.

Armed Paris was the only serious obstacle in the way of the counter-revolutionary conspiracy. Paris was, therefore, to be disarmed. On this point the Bordeaux assembly was sincerity itself. If the roaring rant of its rurals had not been audible enough, the surrender of Paris handed over by Thiers to the tender mercies of the *triumvirat* of Vinoy, the *Décembreur*, Valentin, the Bonapartist Gendarme, and Aurelle de Paladines, the Jesuit General, would have cut off even the last subterfuge of doubt as to the ultimate aim of the disarmament of Paris. But if their purpose was frankly avowed, the pretext on which these atrocious felons initiated the civil war was the most shameless, the most barefaced (glaring) of lies. The artillery of the Paris National Guard, said Thiers, belonged to the State and to the State it must be returned.^a The fact was this. From the very day of the capitulation by which Bismarck's prisoners had signed the surrender of France but reserved to themselves a numerous bodyguard for the express purpose of cowing Paris, Paris stood on its watch. The national guard reorganized themselves and entrusted their supreme control to a central committee elected by their whole body, save some fragments of the old Bonapartist formations. On the eve of the entrance of the Prussians into Paris, their central committee took measures for the removal to Montmartre, Belleville, and La Villette of the cannon and mitrailleuses treacherously abandoned by the capitulars in the very quarters the Prussians were about to occupy. That artillery had been furnished by the subscriptions of the National Guard. As their private property it was officially recognized in the convention of the 28th January,¹¹⁸ and on that

^a L. A. Thiers' proclamation of March 17, 1871 to the inhabitants of Paris, *The Daily News*, No. 7765, March 20, 1871.—Ed.

very title exempted from the general surrender of arms, belonging to the government, into the hands of the conqueror. And Thiers dared initiate the civil war on the mendacious pretext that the artillery of the National Guard was state property!

The seizure of this artillery was evidently but to serve as the preparatory measure for the general disarmament of the Paris National Guard, and therefore of the Revolution of the 4th of September. But that revolution had become the legal status of France. Its republic was recognized in the terms of the capitulation itself by the conqueror, it was after the capitulation acknowledged by the Foreign powers, in its name the National Assembly had been summoned. The Revolution of the Paris workmen of the 4th of September was the only legal title of the National Assembly seated at Bordeaux and its Executive. Without it, the National Assembly had at once to give room to the Corps Législatif, elected by general suffrage and dispersed by the arm of the Revolution. Thiers and his ticket-of-leave men would have had to capitulate for safe conducts and securities against a voyage to Cayenne. The National Assembly, with its Attorney's Power to settle the terms of peace with Prussia, was only an incident of the Revolution. Its true embodiment was armed Paris, that had initiated the Revolution, undergone for it a five months siege with its horrors of famine, that had made its prolonged resistance, despite Trochu's "plan", the basis of a tremendous war of defence in the provinces, and Paris was now summoned with coarse insult by the rebellious slaveholders at Bordeaux to lay down its arms and acknowledge that the popular revolution of the 4th September had had no other purpose but the simple transfer of power from the hands of Louis Bonaparte and his minions into those of his monarchical rivals, or to stand forward as the selfsacrificing champion of France to be saved from her ruin and to be regenerated only through the revolutionary overthrow of the political and social conditions that had engendered the Empire and under its fostering care, matured into utter rottenness. Paris, Paris emaciated by a five months' famine, did not hesitate one moment. It heroically resolved to run all the hazards of a resistance against the French conspirators under the very eye of the Prussian army quartered before its gates. But in its utter abhorrence of civil war, the popular government of Paris, the Central Committee of the National Guard, continued to persist in its merely defensive attitude, despite the provocations of the Assembly, the usurpations of the Executive, and the menacing concentration of troops in and around Paris.

On the dawn of the 18th March Paris arose under thunderbursts of *Vive la Commune!* What is the Commune, that sphinx so tantalizing to the bourgeois mind?

"The proletarians of the capital," said the Central Committee in its manifesto of the 18th March, "have, in the midst of the failures and treasons of the ruling classes, understood that for them the hour has struck to save the situation by taking into their own hands the direction of public affairs.... They have understood that it is their imperious duty and their absolute right to take into their own hands their own destinies by seizing the political power."^a

But the working class cannot, as the rival factions of the appropriating class have done in their hours of triumph, simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.

The centralized state power, with its ubiquitous organs of standing army, police, bureaucracy, clergy and magistrature, organs wrought after the plan of a systematic and hierarchic division of labour, dates from the days of absolute monarchy when it served nascent middleclass society as a mighty weapon in its struggles for emancipation from feudalism. The French Revolution of the 18th century swept away the rubbish of seigniorial, local, townish and provincial privileges, thus clearing the social soil of its last medieval obstacles to the final superstructure of the state. It received its final shape under the First Empire, the offspring of the Coalition wars of old, semifeudal Europe against modern France. Under the following parliamentary regimes, the hold of the governmental power, with its irresistible allurements of place, pelf, and patronage, became not only the bone of contention between the rival factions of the ruling classes. Its political character changed simultaneously with the economic changes of society. At the same pace that the progress of industry developed, widened and intensified the class antagonism between capital and labour, the governmental power assumed more and more the character of the national power of capital over labour, of a political force organized to enforce social enslavement, of a mere engine of class despotism. On the heels of every popular revolution, marking a new progressive phase in the march (development) (course) of the struggle of classes, (class struggle), the repressive character of the state power comes out more pitiless and more divested of disguise. The Revolution of July, by transferring the management of the state machinery from the

^a "La Révolution du 18 mars", *Le Petit Journal*, No. 3002, March 22, 1871.—Ed.

landlord to the capitalist, transfers it from the distant to the immediate antagonist of the working men. Hence the state power assumes a more clearly defined attitude of hostility and repression in regard of the working class. The Revolution of February hoists the colours of the "social Republic", thus proving at its outset that the true meaning of state power is revealed, that its pretence of being the armed force of public welfare, the embodiment of the general interests of societies rising above and keeping in their respective spheres the warring private interests, is exploded, that its secret as an instrument of class despotism is laid open, that the workmen do want the republic, no longer as a political modification of the old system of class rule, but as the revolutionary means of breaking down class rule itself. In view of the menaces of "the Social Republic" the ruling class feels instinctively that the anonymous reign of the parliamentary republic can be turned into a jointstock company of their conflicting factions, while the past monarchies by their very title signify the victory of one faction and the defeat of the other, the prevalence of one section's interests of that class over that of the other, land over capital or capital over land. In opposition to the working class the hitherto ruling class, in whatever specific forms it may appropriate the labour of the masses, has one and the same *economic* interest, to maintain the enslavement of labour and reap its fruits directly as landlord and capitalist, indirectly as the state parasites of the landlord and the capitalist, to enforce that "order" of things which makes the producing multitude, "a vile multitude" serving as a mere source of wealth and dominion to their betters. Hence Legitimists, Orleanists, Bourgeois Republicans and the Bonapartist adventurers, eager to qualify themselves as defenders of property by first pilfering it, club together and merge into the "*Party of Order*", the practical upshot of that revolution made by the proletariat under enthusiastic shouts of the "*Social Republic*". The parliamentary republic of the Party of Order is not only the reign of terror of the ruling class. The state power becomes in their hand the *avowed instrument of the civil war* in the hand of the capitalist and the landlord, not their state parasites, against revolutionary aspirations of the producer.

Under the monarchical regimes the repressive measures and the confessed principles of the day's government are denounced to the people by the fractions of the ruling classes that are out of power, the opposition's ranks of the ruling class interest the people in their party feuds, by appealing to its own interests, by their attitudes of tribunes of the people, by the revindication of popular

liberties. But in the anonymous reign of the republic, while amalgamating the modes of repression of old past regimes (taking out of the arsenals of all past regimes the arms of repression), and wielding them pitilessly, the different fractions of the ruling class celebrate an orgy of renegation. With cynical effrontery they deny the professions of their past, trample under foot their "socalled" principles, curse the revolutions they have provoked in their name, and curse the name of the republic itself, although only its anonymous reign is wide enough to admit them into a common crusade against the people.

Thus this most cruel is at the same time the most odious and revolting form of class rule. Wielding the state power only as an instrument of civil war, it can only hold it by perpetuating civil war. With parliamentary anarchy at its head, crowned by the uninterrupted intrigues of each of the fractions of the "order" party for the restoration of each own pet regime, in open war against the whole body of society out of its own narrow circle, the party of order rule becomes the most intolerable rule of disorder. Having in its war against the mass of the people broken all its means of resistance and laid it helplessly under the sword of the Executive, the party of order itself and its parliamentary regime are warned off the stage by the sword of the Executive. That parliamentary party of order republic can therefore only be an interreign. Its natural upshot is *Imperialism*, whatever the number of the Empire. Under the form of imperialism, the state power with the sword for its scepter, professes to rest upon the peasantry, that large mass of producers apparently outside the class struggle of labour and capital, professes to save the working class by breaking down parliamentarism and therefore the direct subserviency of the state power to the ruling classes, professes to save the ruling classes themselves by subduing the working classes without insulting them, professes, if not public welfare, at least national glory. It is therefore proclaimed as the "saviour of order". However galling to the political pride of the ruling class and its state parasites, it proves itself to be the really adequate regime of the bourgeois "order" by giving full scope to all the orgies of its industry, turpitudes of its speculation, and all the meretricious splendours of its life. The state thus seemingly lifted above civil society, becomes at the same time itself the hotbed of all the corruptions of that society. Its own utter rottenness, and the rottenness of the society to be saved of it, was laid bare by the bayonet of Prussia, but so much is this Imperialism the unavoidable political form of "order", that is, the "order" of bourgeois

society, that Prussia herself seemed only to reverse its central seat at Paris in order to transfer it to Berlin.

The Empire is not, like its predecessors, the legitimate monarchy, the constitutional monarchy and the parliamentary republic, one of the political forms of bourgeois society, it is at the same time its most prostitute, its most complete, and its ultimate political form. It is *the* state power of modern class rule, at least on the European continent.

Frederick Engels

ROBERT REID, EX-CORRESPONDENT
OF *THE DAILY TELEGRAPH*³²⁶

July 1, 1871

Just after the arrest at Peter's restaurant, Bower, the correspondent of *The Morning Advertiser*, and the other, the *Times* correspondent Dallas, and a Russian attaché were released, but Bower went back inside to fetch his (English) lady friend, who had already taken up with another gentleman, so THAT HE PITCHED INTO HIM, ASSAULTED HIM, WAS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY, AND LOCKED UP FOR THAT.

These 3 published a letter,^a which was in reality a fake. 1) that it was the members of the Commune who had been in the café with red and gold sashes and also whores, who showed their cards in the café, and 2) that Bower was arrested without reason (it was only the police commissars who were wearing red sashes but without gold fringes).

IN *THE TELEGRAPH* REID'S REPORTS OFTEN ALTERED. A VERY IMPORTANT LETTER WAS SUPPRESSED BY THEM.

ON 20TH MAY, Reid had the newspaper. In *The Telegraph* of the 17 OR 18TH MAY VERSAILLES CORRESPONDENT STATED THAT COURBET HAD WITH A HAMMER DESTROYED OBJECTS OF ART IN LOUVRE.^b On the 20th, Reid showed this telegram to Courbet. Below follows Courbet's letter to the editor of *The Telegraph*:

* "Sir,

"Not only have I not destroyed any works of art in the Louvre, but on the contrary it was under my care that all those which had been dispersed by various ministers in different buildings throughout the capital were collected, and restored to their proper

^a E. Bower, "A monsieur le rédacteur de *La Vérité*", *La Vérité*, No. 225, May 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

^b "The Civil War around Paris", *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 4971, May 20, 1871.—*Ed.*

places in the [Louvre] Museum. In like manner the Luxemburg was benefitted.^a It was I who preserved and arranged all the works of art removed from the house of M. Thiers. I am accused of having destroyed the Column Vendôme when the fact is on record that the decree for its destruction was passed 14th April and I was elected to the Commune on the 20, six days afterwards. I warmly urged the preservation of the bas-reliefs and proposed to form a Museum of them in the Court of the Invalides. Knowing the purity of the motives by which I have been actuated, I also know the difficulties one inherits in coming after a régime such as the Empire.*

"Greetings and fraternity

"G. Courbet

"Hôtel de Ville 20 MAY 71."

This letter was sent to *The Telegraph* by Reid but was not printed.^b

See PAPERS for about April 10.12.

Tolain. The *Times* correspondent wished to know what the General Council would say to it—*The Times* suppressed our resolution.³²⁷

Reid was engaged by *The Telegraph* to send telegrams and is ready to swear that they were amended in printing to show the Commune in a bad light.

Adolphus Smith, Ex-correspondent of *The Daily News* to lecture on the Commune, Charing Cross Theatre, 3.7.71.³²⁸

Present at the demonstration on Rue de la Paix.^c In the Place Vendôme the rifles of the National Guard were stacked together in piles, and one Englishman, whom he referred to as (Leatham?) and who was in the front row of the procession, rushed out to seize a pile of rifles.

Jourde was in the burning Ministry of Finance until the very last and saved books and money. And he is alleged to have set it afire! An Englishman, who lives opposite, whom he can name, saw 2 bombs strike the roof, explode, and soon thereafter smoke, then flame, then gradually the whole building in flames.

Written down by Engels on July 1, 1871

Printed according to the manuscript

First published, in Russian, in the magazine *Kommunist*, No. 2, Moscow, 1971

^a The museum in the Luxemburg Palace in Paris.—*Ed.*

^b Reid sent the letter to *The Times*, where it was printed under the title "M. Courbet, the painter" in its issue No. 27100 on June 27, 1871.—*Ed.*

^c On March 22, 1871 (see this volume, pp. 324-25, 511-12, 528-30).—*Ed.*

Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

[NOTES FROM THE MINUTES
OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL, 1869-1871]³²⁹

1869

(SINCE BASLE CONGRESS)

September 28, 1869. Jung stated the receipt of a letter from General Cluseret of New York. It was addressed to the Congress but had arrived too late.³³⁰

Printing of Basle Congress Report.^a

A letter from the Paper-stainers New York requesting the Council to use its influence to prevent an importation of men to defeat the men now on strike. Action taken thereupon.^b (later letter from Manchester, Edinburgh etc Trades Councils received, which had got letters from the General Council.)

5 *October 1869.* Letter from Varlin of Paris stating that a meeting of the Congress delegates had been held and that they had agreed to urge the affiliation of their societies.³³¹

Latham and Lambord *proposed* in one of the former sittings by Odger. *Postponed.*

Hales (seconded by Lucraft). "That the Council proceed to establish an English Section of the International Working Men Association, with a platform based upon the Congressional Resolutions, to be called '*The National Labour League and British Section of I.W.A.*'."

Weston announces that a conference would be held on October 13, at Bell Inn, to establish an Association for the agitation of the *land-question* and other workingmen's measures.

^a Report of the Fourth Annual Congress of the International Working Men's Association, held at Basle, in Switzerland. From the 6th to the 11th September, 1869. London [1869].—Ed.

^b See the appeal "A toutes les sections de l'Association Internationale des Travailleurs", *L'Internationale*, No. 38, October 3, 1869.—Ed.

12 October, 1869. Proposition to establish an English section of the International carried.

19 October, 1869.

26 October, 1869. Mottershead elected.

Resolved "that a resolution be drawn up asking for the release of the (Irish) political prisoners and stating the opinion of the Council".

2 November.

Hales: "On the previous Wednesday (27 Oct.) the *Land and Labour League* had been established, many Council members were on the executive of that league, it was not necessary to go any farther (with English Section) at present.

9 November.

16 November. Article against the Council in *Egalité*.^a (*Opening of Irish question by Marx.*) *Resolutions proposed by Marx on Irish Political prisoners.*

23 November. (Irish Debate.)

30 November. (*The Resolutions on the Irish prisoners passed.*)^b

7 December.

14 December. Jung reads strictures from the *Egalité* against the Irish Resolutions of the Council (*Schweitzer, Liebknecht* etc.) [*Monthly Reports.*]^c

1870

[1 January. *Private Circular on Egalité* etc. *Irish Question* etc. *Reports* etc.]^d

4 January. Robert Hume appointed Correspondent (*of Long Island United States*) (3000 Cards sent to the German Committee. (*Brunswick*)).

Complaints of *Progrès* (Locle) and *Egalité* (Genève) against Zürich movement (*Tagwacht*) as *too political*.³³²

11 January. A letter from the Geneva Committee stated that the section did not approve of the proceedings of the *Egalité*. [The Editorial Committee resigned, their resignation accepted.]³³³

^a See "L'Organisation de l'Internationale", *L'Egalité*, No. 43, November 13, 1869.—*Ed.*

^b See "Draft Resolution of the General Council on the Policy of the British Government Towards the Irish Prisoners" (present edition, Vol. 21, p. 83).—*Ed.*

^c "Réflexions", *L'Egalité*, No. 47, December 11, 1869.—*Ed.*

^d K. Marx, "The General Council to the Federal Council of Romance Switzerland" (present edition, Vol. 21, p. 84).—*Ed.*

18 January.

25 January. Dupont's motion: "that any society in France nominating a corresponding secretary with General Council should be held as de facto affiliation." (*Carried.*)

1 February. The Central Council of Switzerland had appointed a new staff for "*Egalité*"!

Serrailhier received letter from Brussels, the Belgian General Council approved the answer of the General Council to the attack in the *Egalité*.^a

8 February. Application of *Prolétaires Positivistes Society*.³¹¹

15 February. Dupont communicates on difference between the elder and younger branches at Lyons.³³⁴ (handed over to Sub-Committee.)²³⁸

22 February. At Naples search made at the meeting place of the *International* for papers, without a search-warrant being produced by the police officer. President, secretary and a lawyer who had protested against it as illegal, had been arrested.

Le Réveil contained paragraph from a Spanish paper according to which the governments of Austria, Italy, and France are going to take rigorous measures against the *International*.

8 March. Report of the Sub-Committee on the *Lyons Affair*.^b (*Richard* etc.)

15 March. Letter of the *Prolétaires Positivistes* at Paris. [They had been asked by Dupont for their rules and by-laws.]

Admitted but not as "sect" and the discrepancy between *their own* programme and that of the *International* pointed out to them.

22 March. Russian Section in Geneva founded. Desired Marx to become their representative.

29 March.

4, 5, 6 April. Congress at La Chaux-de-fonds.^{c 256}

5 April.

12 April. Jung letter from *La Chaux-de-fonds*. Split at the Congress.

In consequence of a majority having voted for the admission of the Geneva Alliance the Geneva and La Chaux-de-fonds delegates had withdrawn and continued the Congress by

^a K. Marx, "The General Council to the Federal Council of Romance Switzerland" (present edition, Vol. 21, p. 84).—*Ed.*

^b K. Marx, "Concerning the Conflict in the Lyons Section" (present edition, Vol. 21, p. 108).—*Ed.*

^c This line is written in pencil.—*Ed.*

themselves. Jung instructed to write to both parties for full particulars.

19 April. Discrepancies (says Jung) between the statements of the two Swiss parties. The new committee numbered about 600, the old 2000 members.

26 April. (Letter from Guillaume to Jung.)³³⁵

3 May. Resolution on pretended *Conspiracy against Badinguet* (plebiscite) [arrest of many members of Paris and Lyons sections].^a

10 May. Resolution against the *London French branch*.^b (10 May)—Jung proposed that in future all the names of the Council members should be signed to official documents whether the members were present or not.

17 May.

Resolution: "Considering: That by the Basle Congress Paris was appointed as the meeting place of this year's Congress of the I.W.A.; that the present French regime continuing the Congress will not be able to meet at Paris; that nevertheless the preparations for the meeting render an immediate resolution necessary; that art. 3 of the Statutes obliges the Council to change, in case of need, the place of meeting appointed by the Congress; that the Central Committee of the German Social Democratic Workingmen's Party has invited the General Council to transfer this year's Congress to Germany; the General Council has in its sitting of the 17 of May unanimously resolved that this year's Congress of the I.W.A. be opened on the 5th September next and meet at Mayence."

De Paepe, in letter to Serrailier, asked the opinion of the Council on the affairs of Switzerland.

Jung letter from Perret (Geneva) who wished the Council to decide upon the Swiss question.

24 May. (Row over the Beehive Resolutions.)^c

31 May. Parisians against the transfer to Mayence. Question Cluseret.—Osborne Ward introduced by Jung.—Jung introduced *Duval* as delegate from the Paris iron-founders on strike.

^a K. Marx, "Concerning the Persecution of the Members of the French Sections. Declaration of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association" (present edition, Vol. 21, p. 127).—*Ed.*

^b K. Marx, "Draft Resolution of the General Council on the French Federal Section in London" (present edition, Vol. 21, p. 131).—*Ed.*

^c K. Marx, "Resolution of the General Council on *The Bee-Hive*" (present edition, Vol. 21, p. 126).—*Ed.*

Council appoints deputation (Jung and Hales) to introduce him to the trade societies.—Credentials voted to Hume at New York.

7 June.

14 June. New lockout at Geneva (building trades).

21 June. Address to the Trades Societies etc. on the Geneva affair.^a

28 June. Regional Congress at Rouen suppressed.

Letter from Geneva asked the Council to come to a decision as soon as possible. (*Discussion over this affaire.*)

(*On the Alliance.* See Weston's Statement.)³³⁶ (*Proposition adopted* that Geneva Committee remains in its old faction; the new committee may choose a local name.)^b

Marx proposed that the General Council be transferred from London to Brussels. (this to be proposed to next Congress) (and that this proposition, to consider the removal of Council, be communicated to all Sections). *Carried.* Hales gave notice of motion to reconsider the question.

5 July. Parisians want refutation of the false statements of Aulois,³³⁷ the public prosecutor, but they had sent no papers etc. to the Council. Dupont complains of receiving no reply.

12 July. French branch. Lemaître.³³⁸—Positivist branch send their contribution.—Money (voted by the Amalgamated Engineers to the Paris iron-moulders).—The proposition (Marx stated) was: "to write to the sections to ask them to consider the advisability of removing the Council from London. If they were favourable to a removal, then Brussels should be proposed etc."^c

Programme for Mayence Congress.^d

19 July. Geneva Committee thanks for the resolution of the Council. Jung written to La-Chaux-de-Fonds against their political abstentionism.—Anti-War Address of Paris Section.—Marx to draw up *Anti-War Address.*^e

26 July. Bebel and Liebknecht on German War Loan.

(*North German Reichstag. Berlin*)—(In their written declaration

^a K. Marx, "The Lock-out of the Building Trades in Geneva" (present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 137-39).—*Ed.*

^b K. Marx, "General Council Resolution on the Federal Committee of Romance Switzerland. The General Council to the Romance Federal Committee" (present edition, Vol. 21, p. 136).—*Ed.*

^c K. Marx, "Confidential Communication to All Sections" (present edition, Vol. 21, p. 142).—*Ed.*

^d K. Marx, "Programme for the Mainz Congress of the International" (present edition, Vol. 21, p. 143).—*Ed.*

^e See this volume, pp. 3-8.—*Ed.*

(why they abstain from voting) declare themselves members of the International.)^a *First War Address of July 23* read.^b

2 August. Serrailier reads letter from Belgium: Council to be left at London; but gives notice that Belgium Congress Delegates will ask why Council interfered in the Swiss affair. Marx states that protest against War has been issued in Barmen, Munich, Breslau etc.—Jung on Swiss affair. Article in *Solidarité*^c. Guillaume's party has not sent a proper reply. The Parisians asked for a prompt settlement of this affair. Referred to Sub-Committee. Marx proposes to ask sections to agree to postponement of Congress. Carried.

9 August. Jung [received] letter from Naples about Caporusso having betrayed them.

16 August. Third 1,000 of War Address printed. Letters from Switzerland and Germany (Central Committee) to leave Council at London and to empower it to postpone Congress to any time and place.

23 August. 15,000 German and 15,000 French copies of Address ordered to be printed at Geneva. Belgian Council's letter withdrawing observations on Swiss affair (see 2 August) and agreeing to postponement of Congress. Romance Council of Geneva also for postponement and Council to remain in London.

Resolution passed to postpone Congress.

August 30th. French Section formed at New York. Osborne Ward attended and spoke.

September 6. Marx had correspondence with German Social Democratic Party^d who say they will do their duty. *Second War Address* resolved upon.^e

September 9. Address carried.

September 13. Serrailier off to Paris.

September 20. Arrest of Braunschweigers. Expulsion from Mayence.³³⁹ Protests against annexation in Berlin, München, Augsburg, Nürnberg etc. Deputation of 5 to act with the Arundel Hall Committee in fitting up a demonstration for the French Republic and against annexation.

^a See "Motiviertes Votum der Reichstagsabgeordneten Liebknecht und Bebel in Sachen der 120 Millionen Kriegsanleihe", *Der Volksstaat*, No. 59, July 29, 1870.—*Ed.*

^b Beginning from here the notes are in Engels' hand.—*Ed.*

^c "Le Conseil général de Londres...", *La Solidarité*, No. 16, July 23, 1870.—*Ed.*

^d See this volume, pp. 260-62.—*Ed.*

^e *Ibid.*, pp. 263-70.—*Ed.*

September 27. Stated that a deputation to Gladstone had been agreed upon for recognition of French Republic (by the joint Committee).³⁴⁰

October 4.

October 11. Meetings at Berlin and Munich against the Prussian war policy. Letter about Bakounin at Lyons 28 Sept.³⁴¹ Report of Finance Committee.

October 18. Birmingham Trades Council joins. Objection taken to Belgian International papers not having published 2nd War Address. Financial Secretary appointed.

October 25. The Belgian *Internationale* at last prints the beginning of the 2-d War Address.^a—Heinemann's Meeting. Protest of the [German] Workers' Educational Society.³⁴² Resolved that *when questions of an internal administration are discussed* none but members of Council be allowed to be present.

November 1. Letters from Patterson N. J. and New York that French and Germans there had issued a joint address against the war.³⁴³ Letter from Aubrey (Rouen) about the Bonapartists still in power there and their doings.

November 8.—Meeting of Intervention Committee attended by Secretary.³⁴⁴

November 15.—Mass Meeting in New York on the War announced as impending.³⁴⁵

November 22. Letter from Brest, that all the 12 members of the Committee there had been arrested 2/10 October, and tried 27 October for conspiring against safety of State, 2 got 2 years, one 1 year (merely for holding a Defence meeting).—From the Bonaparte papers published it appeared that on the eve of the plebiscite the hunting down of the International was purposely organised.

November 29. The Trades Council of Manchester promises its *moral support*. Dupont appointed Representative for Lancashire.^b

6 December. Marx proposed that the secretary should make out a list of the attendance of the members for the last 3 months. Carried.

13 December. Secretary read a list of the members and the number

^a [K. Marx,] "Deuxième adresse du Conseil général de l'Association internationale des Travailleurs au sujet de la guerre", *L'Internationale*, No. 93, October 23, 1870.—Ed.

^b Then follows Marx's note in pencil: "The Romance Federal Committee in Geneva during the 1869-70 refused [the Alliance] affiliation to the Romance Federation of the International Association. The section was recognized by the General Council." Beginning from here the notes are written by Marx.—Ed.

of times they had been absent since September. To be entered into the minutes, and in future the absent members to be noted down as well as those present.

- 20 December. Announcement of formation of Central Committee at New York.³⁴⁶ (*See list of attendance*) (after the last sitting of December). (From Sept.-December 1870 and from January-end of March, 1871.)

1871

3 January.

- 17 January. Birmingham Trades' Council joins. *Felleisen* to be asked in what position towards the International (These fellows for annexation).³⁴⁷ Marx speaks against Odger's rant at St. James's Hall. (*Favre et Co.*)³⁴⁸ (against our *Second Address*).

- 24 January. Formation of Central Committee for the United States at New York.

- 31 January. Swiss (Geneva Romance Confédération) write that they had received letter from Spain to enter into close communication, but before doing so they desired to know whether the Spanish section was in relation with the Council; otherwise they would not communicate with them.

Engels appointed Spanish Secretary.

Engels resolution on the war (Franco-German) (and attitude of English Government).^a

- 7 February. Discussion of Franco-German War. Attitude of English government.

14 February. (*Continuation of that discussion.*)

- 21 February. Land Tenure Reform Association³⁴⁹ meeting the workingmen's party half ways in regard to the *nationalisation of land*. (*Mill*) Harris thought it was a move to break up the Land and Labour League.³⁵⁰

- 28 February. Discussion of Land Tenure Reform Association. (Resolution to discuss their programme.)

Report of Citizen Serraillier. (*Federal Paris Council during the siege.*)

- 7 March. (*Discussion on New York Central Committee*) (*Marx on Paris declaration of 1856*).³⁵¹

- 14 March: Robin (Conference of delegates from all the sections to be convoked to London). (*Rejected.*) (*Debate on declaration of 1856*) (*Irish Question*).

^a See this volume, pp. 263-70.—Ed.

21 March. Marx stated: when the war broke out letters sent to all the continental Sections that the congress could not be held at Mayence or Paris; all the sections that had answered had left it to the Council to choose time and place when and where the Council should meet. Robin said that letter had never been received at Paris. *Declaration to be sent to the English papers* against the false resolution (of excluding the Germans) *attributed to the Paris Federal Council*.^a

(*Revolution of March 18.*)

Section in the East of London.

28 March. Serrailier sent to Paris. 5£ voted for his wife.

Our German friends only prosecuted as *Internationals* (all other charges dropped).

Central Republican Meeting at Wellington Music Hall (to establish a Republican Club).³⁵²—Wade moved the addition of "social and democratic" (26 for, 50 against). *Resolutions for founding branches in the East End of London.*

4 April. *San Francisco (line) branch. Bethnal Green branch.*

11 April. (*Antwerp, etc. Cigarmakers (strike) lockout*) (*Action taken by Council*).^b

18 April. (Tolain affair first brought before the Council.)

25 April. Expulsion of Tolain. Confirmed.^c

2 May. Applegarth and Odger (Eccarius moved that the rule of appending all names to Addresses should be suspended with regard to them. Mottershead against. Jung to speak about it with Applegarth, Eccarius with Odger).

9 May. Eccarius *resigns General Secretaryship* (Applegarth left to the Council the appending of his name. Odger should like to see the address beforehand).

*New Zealand correspondence.*³⁵³

16 May. *Hales elected General Secretary.*

23 May. The English shall convoke meeting to urge the English Government not to act against the French Refugees. This was done and different meetings took place on that point.

30 May. Marx read Address "*On Civil War*" (*Accepted*).^d

6 June. Commune. English press. Mazzini. (Attempts of *International Democratic Association*³⁵⁴ to play a role.) (Citizen Cadiot appears on the scene.)

^a See this volume, pp. 286-87.—*Ed.*

^b *Ibid.*, p. 294.—*Ed.*

^c *Ibid.*, p. 297.—*Ed.*

^d *Ibid.*, pp. 307-59.—*Ed.*

13 June. (12 June. Reply to Favre's circular sent to *Times*.^a) Address on Civil War issued. (Citizen Baudry turns up.)

20 June. Odger and Lucraft leave (Scandal-sitting) (Holyoake-scandal).^b

Declarations against the false Paris (*International*) manifestoes.^c

27th June. Refugee Committee on Saturdays formed. Declarations about Odger, Lucraft, Holyoake etc.^d Letter of Marx in *Daily News* about Address.

First Edition^e exhausted.

4 July. Mc Donnell elected.

Correspondence of Cafiero.³⁵⁵ Robert Reid sent with Address as lecturer on the Commune to the Provinces.

Major Wolff (Tibaldi etc.) Marx and "Pall Mall".^f

11 July. Assi-Bigot affair, (Lumley, barrister, present) Address on Washburne.^g

Rutson (Bruce) applies for the published documents of the International.

18 July. Richard Affair (not admitted as member) Elliot (rejected).

Herman elected as Belgian secretary. Refugee—money question.

25 July. New Orleans branch. ("La Commune", their organ.) Pope^h and Mazzini against the *International*.ⁱ

Robin brings Swiss affair forward. Referred to a Conference.

Private Conference Resolved upon (for 17 September).^j

1 August. Bishop of Malines,^k Catholic Workingmen's International Association. Washington section.

Rochat's Proposition as to formation of Enquiry (through and from the Refugees) on the History of the Commune (Cohn.)

8 August. Deputation of Newcastle and London Engineers on the Newcastle Lockout. Deputation sent by General Council to

^a See this volume, p. 361.—Ed.

^b Ibid., pp. 367-68.—Ed.

^c Ibid., p. 369.—Ed.

^d Ibid., pp. 372-73.—Ed.

^e Of *The Civil War in France*.—Ed.

^f See this volume, p. 378.—Ed.

^g Ibid., pp. 379-82.—Ed.

^h Pius IX.—Ed.

ⁱ See this volume, pp. 607-08.—Ed.

^j Ibid., p. 609.—Ed.

^k V. A. Dechamps.—Ed.

Belgium etc. Warning to all international branches against importation of men into *Newcastle-on-Tyne*.

Applegarth's letter. Visitors to be excluded in future.

15 August. Branches at *Liverpool* and *Loughborough* in *Leicestershire*.

Conference to be confined to questions of organisation and policy.

22 August. (*Canada Communard Exportation Scheme*.)

29 August. Deputation from Refugees' Society. Quarrel.³⁵⁶

5 September. Marx, Engels, Hales, Jung resign as members of Refugees' Committee. Propositions as to Conference.

Written presumably in September 1871

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Frederick Engels

MEETING OF SUB-COMMITTEE ³⁵⁷

9th September, 8 o'clock

Longuet in the Chair.

Marx proposes that as to *Landeck* the General Council has nothing to do with the question [whether] he still belongs to the International or not, and that he be referred to the French Internationals in London to settle this.—L. has, on the trial of the Internationals in Paris, eaten humble pie and promised not to belay to the International in future; but such questions cannot be settled by the Council.

Mottershead seconds.

Carried unanimously.

*The Conference.*²⁵³ Marx: a Conference is not composed of delegates of branches but of delegates of *countries* which come to confer *with* the Council under extraordinary circumstances and therefore very different from a Congress and has quite different powers. This has not to be forgotten. The first question will be

1) the *money* questions, the contributions have not come in as they ought to do. The Conference has no power to change the Statutes but it can enforce them. Therefore proposal No. 1 branches to pay before admittance.

Jung seconds. Adopted unanimously.

Marx: 2) (Countries where the International is suppressed to propose their own plans, and to be allowed other names but *not secret*.)

Eccarius seconds. Adopted unanimously.

Marx: 3) That some members be appointed to draw up the Report of Council to be submitted to Conference for last 2 years. Adopted as a matter of course.

Jung proposes, Eccarius seconds Marx to draw up the Report.

Marx: 4) To enforce the resolution of Congress of Basel, that the Central Council to be called *Federal Council*, etc., etc.²⁵⁴

Serrailhier seconds. Adopted unanimously.

Marx: 5) Reply to be issued to different governments to be drawn up afterwards.

Engels seconds. Adopted unanimously.

[Marx:] 6) In regularly organized countries regular reports of local and district taxation to be sent in.

This is withdrawn by Marx himself.

Marx: 7) All delegates of General Council to have the right to attend and be heard at meetings of district councils and local branches.

Serrailhier seconds. Adopted unanimously.

Marx: 8) General Council to issue fresh edition of Statutes and authentic French and German version, printed side by side; and all other countries to have their translations approved by General Council before publishing.

Jung seconds. Adopted unanimously.

Mottershead: That the Conference be asked to charge the General Council with enforcing Art. V. of the Statutes relative to a general statistics of the Working Classes and the resolution of the Congress of Geneva on the same subject.^a To carry this out it might be resolved that trades unions etc who refuse to give the information required, shall not be supported by the General Council in case of strike.

McDonnell seconds. Adopted unanimously!

Marx: That the Sub-Committee meets at 8 at Marx's on Monday evening.

Adopted.

First published in part, in Russian, in the book *The London Conference of the First International*, Moscow, 1936, and in full in *The General Council of the First International, 1870-1871*, Moscow, 1965

Reproduced from the manuscript

^a K. Marx, *Rules and Administrative Regulations of the International Working Men's Association* (present edition, Vol. 20, Appendices); *Resolutions of the Congress of Geneva, 1866, and the Congress of Brussels, 1868. The International Working Men's Association. Office of General Council*, London [1869].—Ed.

Frederick Engels

MEETING OF SUB-COMMITTEE³⁵⁸

Monday 11th September 1871 at 1 Maitland Park

Serrailier in the Chair. Engels appointed Secretary.

Proposed by Engels, seconded by Hales that the Bill of Mr. Truelove³⁵⁹ £25 11.6 be passed, reserving the question of the price of the handbills and the 5th Thousand copies.^a Adopted unanimously.

Proposed by Engels, seconded by Eccarius: that Mr. Truelove be paid £10.—on account and the payment of the rest be delayed until he shall have handed in an account of copies sold. Adopted unanimously.

Proposed by Marx, seconded by Longuet: that the General Council be requested, to avoid all misunderstandings, to declare at the opening of the Conference: that a Conference is nothing but a meeting of delegates from various countries called to consult and decide together with the General Council, on administrative measures rendered necessary by extraordinary circumstances.^b

Hales proposed, Longuet seconded: that the General Council recommend the formation of an English Federal Council. Withdrawn to be submitted to General Council tomorrow.

Marx proposes, Jung seconds: that the formation of working women's sections be recommended.^c

First published, in Russian, in the book
The London Conference of the First International, Moscow, 1936

Reproduced from the manuscript

^a Of the third edition of *The Civil War in France*.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, p. 613.—*Ed.*

^c *Ibid.*, p. 424.—*Ed.*

APPENDICES

[RECORD OF MARX'S SPEECH ON THE GOVERNMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENCE]³⁶⁰

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING
OF JANUARY 17, 1871]

Cit. Marx said as there were several English members present he had a very important statement to make. At the last meeting at St. James's Hall Odger spoke of the French Government contrary to truth. In our second address we said the brand of infamy attaches to some of the members of the provisional government from the Revolution of 1848.^a Odger said there was not a blame attached to them. Favre can only be received as the representative of the Republic, not as the spotless patriot Jules Favre. The way that is now talked about him put Favre in the foreground and the Republic almost out of sight. One example of Favre's doings. After the Revolution of 1848 Favre became Secretary of the Interior; on account of Flocon being ill, Ledru-Rollin chose Favre. One of the first things he did was to bring back the army to Paris, which afterwards enabled the bourgeoisie to shoot the work-people down. Later, when the people became convinced that the Assembly consisted of middle-class men, the people made a demonstration in favour of Poland on which occasion the people ran into the assembly.³⁶¹ The president entreated Louis Blanc to speak to them and pacify them, which he did. A war with Russia would have saved the Republic. The first thing Jules Favre did a few days after was to ask for authority to prosecute Louis Blanc as an accomplice of the invaders. The Assembly thought he was instructed by the Government to do but all the other members of the Government denounced [this measure] as the private affair of Favre. The provisional government conspired to provoke the insurrection of June. After the people were shot down Favre

^a See this volume, p. 269.—*Ed.*

proposed that the Executive Committee should be abolished.³⁶² On the 27th he drew up the decree to transport the prisoners without trial; 15,000 were transported. In November the Assembly was compelled to examine some not yet transported. In Brest alone 1,000 had to be liberated. Of the most dangerous who were tried by a military commission many had to be liberated, others were only sentenced to short terms of imprisonment. Afterwards motions were made for an amnesty, Favre always opposed. He was one of the men who insisted for a commission of inquiry of the whole revolution except February. He was instrumental in the passing of the most infamous press laws³⁶³ that ever existed and of which Napoleon made good use. Favre had certain relations with the Bonapartists under the July monarchy and he used all his influence to get Napoleon into the National Assembly. He interested himself to bring about the expedition to Rome,¹⁷² which was the first step for the establishment of the Empire.

The account of the speech (without any mention of the author) was published in *The Eastern Post* No. 121, January 21, 1871.

Reproduced from the General Council's Minute Book

This variant of the record was first published in: K. Marx and F. Engels, *Works*, Second Russian Edition, Vol. 17, Moscow, 1960

[RECORDS OF MARX'S AND ENGELS' SPEECHES
ON THE POSITION OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS
IN THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR]³⁶⁴

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL MEETINGS]

January 24, 1871

Cit. Engels inquired whether any of the members had been at the meeting of the previous evening³⁶⁵ but there was no reply. He then stated as there was a difference of opinion amongst the members it would be advisable to discuss the question as to the attitude of the English working class^a on the present phase of the war at the meeting. He moved that the question be put on the order of the day.

Cit. Marx seconded the proposition, which was agreed to.

January 31, 1871

Cit. Engels said: following the advice of the Chairman of the last meeting^b and complying with an English custom, I have drawn up some resolutions principally as a basis for the debate. I am not particular as regards carrying them exactly as they are. These are the resolutions I have drawn up:

1. That the working-class movement in support of the French Republic ought to have concentrated its efforts, at the beginning, upon the enforcement of the recognition of the Republic by the British Government.

2. That the military intervention of England in favour of France, as understood by those proposing it, could have been of any use whatever at a certain moment only, which has long since passed away.

3. That England remains incapable, not only of interfering with effect in Continental affairs, but also of defending herself against

^a The record has "Council", which was subsequently crossed out.—*Ed.*

^b B. Lucraft.—*Ed.*

the Continental military despotism so long as she does not recover the liberty of using her real war power—that is to say, her naval power, which she can only recover by the renunciation of the Declaration of Paris.³⁵¹

The policy adopted by the Council was laid in the second address.^a On the 4th of September the Republic was declared, on the 9th of September our address was issued in which it was said: "The English workmen have already taken measures to overcome, by a wholesome pressure from without, the reluctance of their Government to recognise the French Republic." Had the movement been confined to that it might have succeeded, other countries would have followed and it would have given France a standing which Prussia could [not] have ignored. But there were others who were not satisfied with this. I mean the Comtists, Professor Beesly and his friends. Professor Beesly has on several occasions stood up bravely, for the working class, he braved the hostility of the middle classes in the Broadhead affair,³⁶⁶ but the Comtists are not properly a working-class party. They advocate a compromise to make wages-labour tolerable to perpetuate it; they belong to a political sect who believe that France ought to rule the world. In their last declaration, which was signed by several members of the Council,³⁶⁷ they demanded that France should be restored to the position it occupied before the war.^b Before the war France was a military power. The Comtists asked for intervention and as soon as it was done the working-class movement split up. The opposition said that hitherto war had postponed everything in the shape of social and political progress and every war had given the aristocracy a new lease of life. There is a great deal of truth in that. But on the other hand how could people, who were not able to compel the Government to recognise the Republic, force the same Government to go [to] war for the Republic? Supposing England had gone to war. By withdrawing all armed forces from Scotland, by depriving every other place of soldiers and leaving only 10,000 in Ireland, some 30,000 men could have been started and they would have been useful at a certain moment. At one time the French and German forces were about equal and Moltke was going to raise the siege, and at that moment an English army might have turned the scales against the Germans. But that moment had long since passed away; it was

^a See this volume, p. 269.—*Ed.*

^b See J. M. Ludlow and others, [Remonstrance forwarded to Mr. Gladstone], *The Times*, No. 26947, December 30, 1870.—*Ed.*

when there was a sort of revival before Orléans, when Aurelle de Paladines gained his successes. An English force then would have had a good effect upon the French soldiers, it would have improved [their spirit]; then the Germans have been largely reinforced, and the Prussians have such a bad opinion of the army of this country that the English, had they gone over, would have been laughed at; all they could have done would have been to make Chanzy's retreat³⁶⁸ a little more orderly.

An English army on land can only act in alliance with other armies. This was done in the Peninsular War and it was done in the Crimea.³⁶⁹ England can best carry on war by supplying her allies with the materials of war. In the Crimea they had [to] borrow French soldiers to fill their trenches. It has always been found impossible to carry on a war far from home with a large army. Owing to the military system—the absence of conscription, the slow process of voluntary recruiting, the system of drill, the length of time it takes to make an English soldier efficient—the English army is based on long service, it is impossible to maintain a large army by the necessary reinforcements. If an army had been sent to France it could not have been kept up if it had met with any losses. The only thing England could have done to assist France would have been to declare war at the moment when Russia repudiated the Treaty of Paris. That point too was alluded to in our addresses. In the first the following is said: "In the background of this suicidal strife looms the dark figure of Russia. It is an ominous sign that the signal for the present war should have been given at the moment when the Moscovite Government had just finished its strategical lines of railway and was already massing troops in the direction of the Pruth."^a In the second: "As in 1865 promises were exchanged between Louis Bonaparte and Bismarck, so in 1870 promises have been exchanged between Gorchakov and Bismarck."^b But nobody has taken any notice of that. No sooner had Russia declared against the Treaty of Paris than Bismarck repudiated the Luxembourg Treaty.¹³⁹ This proved the secret understanding. Prussia has never been anything else but the tool of Russia. That was the opportunity for England to step in. The French were not quite so low down as they have been since, and if England had declared war Prussia and Russia would have gone together and the rest of Europe would have gone together and France would have been relieved. Austria, Italy and

^a See this volume, p. 7.—*Ed.*

^b *Ibid.*, p. 267.—*Ed.*

Turkey were ready, and if the Turks had not been interfered with as in the war,^a if they had been allowed to defend themselves in their own way, they would have been able to hold their own while the others helped the French to drive out the Prussians. But, when this opportunity arose, the gentlemen who were going to help France had nothing to say.

Now, the way in which Jules Favre has thrown up the sponge for the whole of France, a thing he had no business to do, there is no doubt, with the help of the French middle class, France will have to submit and peace will be made. Then we shall see what Russia will do. Russia and Prussia require war as much [as] Napoleon to stem the popular movement at home, to preserve their prestige and keep their positions.

The navy is the main power of England but by the Declaration of 1856 a new naval code was established; it was laid down that privateering should be done away with. The right of search was abandoned, enemy's goods were made safe in neutral bottoms and neutral goods in enemy's bottoms. There was a similar attempt made once before by the Empress Catherine of Russia but England refused till after the Crimean war.³⁵¹ At the Conference of Paris, by one stroke of the pen, Clarendon signed away England's power to hurt Russia at sea. By whose instructions or authority [he] did so has never come out. When it was brought before the House of Commons Disraeli blinked at it, the question was shirked. To cripple Russia it is necessary to stop her export, her export trade. If the Russian aristocracy could not sell their corn, their flax, in one word, their agricultural produce, to foreign countries, Russia could not hold out for a year, and the bulk of her trade is carried on in foreign bottoms. To make war on Russia England must regain her hold of this power. It was abandoned on the pretence of making private property as safe at sea as it was on land. We have seen how the Prussians have respected private property in France. The working class has no private property to lose, it has therefore no interest in making [it] safe. But the working class has interest in resuming the hold of this power and to keep [it] intact till the Russian Empire is dissolved. The English Empire like all other empires based upon ...^b will have to be dissolved in due time but with that we have nothing to do at present and that will proceed more peaceably perhaps. No other country can oppose Russia the same as England can and she must

^a Apparently the words "in the Crimea" are omitted.—*Ed.*

^b A blank space in the record.—*Ed.*

keep this power at least till Poland is restored. Had war been declared against Russia it would have been the salvation of France, and Poland could have been restored. Now Russia will enter on a war of conquest, perhaps before a year is over, and Europe will have to fight minus France.

February 7, 1871

Cit. Engels. When I mentioned Ireland I only supposed that 10,000 would be the smallest force the Government would leave in Ireland. I did not take the sentiments of the Irish into account at all.

February 14, 1871

Cit. Marx. The recognition of the Republic was the first condition for all the rest; if that did not succeed all the rest must fail. France was internationally paralysed and at home, too, while Prussia had Russia at her back. The moment the Republic was proclaimed everybody in France became enthusiastically republican. Had the Republic been recognised then it would have had a chance to succeed. But when no recognition came they turned back. The propertied class had an interest rather to see Prussia victorious than the Republic. They are well aware that sooner or later the Republic must have become socialistic and therefore they intrigued against it, and these intrigues have done more for Prussia than Moltke and his generals. Well, no one has shown in this discussion that the recognition of the Republic was not the first point. Next, the Cannon Street meeting³⁷⁰ was not a meeting of the wealthy citizens of London, it was the small middle class who never had any influence. They may either support the great capitalists against the people or join the working class; they cannot do anything by themselves, but when they join the working class they must not be permitted to lead, because they are dangerous leaders. They hate the Republic and would not recognise it, but they were afraid of Prussia, therefore they were for war. Cit. Eccarius talked about protesting against the dismemberment of France; without threatening war [it] would have been useless; that had nothing to do with it. We protested in our address^a and the Germans protested but that was only a moral protest; the British Government could not protest until Prussia had been victorious and formally demanded those provinces, and it was impossible to believe that this Government would seriously oppose the dismemberment.

^a See this volume, pp. 263-70.—*Ed.*

Then Cit. Cohn seems to entertain strange notions about the working men's agitation. When the workmen go to Gladstone to hear his opinion they must take that as an ultimate decision and give up. He also thinks that more could have been done if Parliament had been sitting. That was the best thing that Parliament was not sitting. The recognition of the Republic was a simple executive act. Had Parliament been sitting Gladstone would have shoved [it] off his own shoulders onto those of the majority and there would have been a thousand reasons to support him to one against it. A change of government might have necessitated an election and the Liberals don't care about buying the free electors too often. I am quite sure, if the working men had persevered and not allowed doctrinary middle-class speakers to meddle, they might have succeeded. There was not half the energy thrown into this movement that there was some time since in a beer row.³⁷¹ All things in England are carried by pressure from without. Cit. Milner spoke as if the Germans would be offended if the English insisted on the recognition of the French Republic. Quite the contrary: they believe the English have not gone far enough. Hundreds have been imprisoned and the only people they could look to for moral support were the English work-people but they did not get in the way they ought to have done. As to monarchy against republic, there was one monarchical army against another in the beginning; there was nothing about republic, and the French army was supposed to be the stronger. When all the French standing army disappeared everybody thought the French would have to give in, in a few days no monarchy could have assisted [against] the Prussians. It was the absence of a monarch alone, the Republic, that has done it for five months, and if there [had] been no treason and no intriguing they would have kept up longer.

The third point that has come out is that middle-class republics have become impossible in Europe. A middle-class government dare not interfere so far as to take the proper revolutionary measures for defence. It is only a political form to develop the power of the working class. The last elections in France and the proceedings of the middle class in Germany prove that they rather have a military despotism than a republic. In England there is the same fear. Republicanism and middle-class government can no longer go together.

I now come to the war itself. After the capitulation of Sedan ^a

^a On September 2, 1870.—*Ed.*

Bismarck was in a difficulty. The king^a had told the German Parliament and the French people that he only made war against Napoleon in self-defence. But after Sedan it was no [longer] more for defence than the French had been. I know that Bismarck worked as hard to bring about the war as Napoleon, the defence was only a pretext. But after Sedan he wanted a new pretext. The German middle class was doubtful whether it was not time to stop but Bismarck found that there was no recognised government to make peace with, therefore he must go to Paris to make peace. It was the height of impudence for him [to] say what government the French would recognise and what they would not but it answered his purpose. Money-makers are always worshippers of success, and the German middle class being afraid of the Republic, [he] secured their support, that of the aristocracy he was sure of beforehand. It was Bismarck's interest that England should not recognise the Republic because England was the only power that could oppose him, but he reckoned on Gladstone and the Court relations. To be mother-in-law of the Emperor of Germany^b was no small thing, so England followed in the footsteps of the Holy Alliance. When Gladstone was taxed by the working men's deputation about the haste with which Napoleon had been recognised, he baffled them by mixing up dates and confounding the recognition after the coup d'état by Palmerston with that of Derby after the plebiscite. He told the working men he had gone as far as he could, and he made a merit of not having broken off diplomatic relations. He could have gone as far as America. His colleagues, Bruce, Lowe and Cardwell, made hostile demonstrations against the Republic³⁷² by stating that England could only employ moral force without. The only place where England can employ physical force is Ireland. Then the German press was ordered to insult England about selling stores to the French. When Bernstorff called Granville to account he equivocated and said he would inquire and then found it was all right and legal.³⁷³ He knew that before, only he had not the pluck to say so. Then the British Government, at the instance of Bernstorff, confiscated the French cable, which an English judge afterwards pronounced to be illegal.³⁷⁴ After the capitulation of Metz Russia thought it was time to show her partnership which was shown in the renunciation of the Treaty of Paris. Immediately after [this] came the repudiation of the Treaty of Luxembourg and the settlement of

^a William I.—*Ed.*

^b A hint at the Queen Victoria.—*Ed.*

Rumania in the principalities,^a which were all insults to England. And what did Gladstone do? He sent a plenipotentiary extraordinary^b to Bismarck to ask his advice. Bismarck advised a conference in London and even Gladstone felt that it would be no use without France because without France the treaty breakers would be in the majority. But France could not be admitted without recognising the Republic, and therefore Bismarck had to prevent it. When Auberon Herbert asked Gladstone in the House he again shuffled out and falsified the facts and ignored the most important part.^c Pious people always do a deal of sinning. From the Blue Book it appears [that] when the English Government asked for a pass for Favre, Bismarck answered that France was internationally incapable of acting, before that was removed it would be useless to take any steps to admit her to Conference. Non-recognition was the means of isolating the English Government.

February 21, 1871

Cit. Marx then called the attention of the Council to the report of his speech in *The Eastern Post*^d and the slovenly way in which it was put together. If his name had not been misprinted he should have considered it his duty to write to the editor. The report stated "the moment the Republic was proclaimed everybody in France was enthusiastically republican, but no recognition came and a reaction set in". There was no sense whatever in it. He had on the contrary stated that the Republic had been recognised by Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Belgium and other countries and that the enthusiasm of the people had been so great that the opponents had been obliged to pretend to be in favour of it; and he had particularly mentioned that the judge of the High Court of Blois had played the Republican. The report went on: "the bourgeoisie had no interest in making the Republic succeed, they are well aware that sooner or later the social question must be dealt with." This was altogether different from what he had said, which was that the Republic must become socialistic. Then the report went

^a The entry is not exact. *The Eastern Post* report of this meeting, February 19, 1871, gives this passage as follows: "In quick succession followed the renunciation of the Treaty of Luxembourg and the stipulations about the principalities by Bismarck and the Prince of Rumania."—*Ed.*

^b Lord Odo Russell.—*Ed.*

^c See the speeches of A. Herbert and W. Gladstone in the House of Commons on February 10, 1871, *The Times*, No. 26984, February 11, 1871.—*Ed.*

^d See "The International Working Men's Association", *The Eastern Post*, No. 125, February 19, 1871.—*Ed.*

on: "none of the advocates of^a war have shown that the recognition of the Republic was the first condition to all the rest", which ought [to be] "*not* the first condition".

About his remarks upon what other speakers had said the reporter had not taken the trouble to say who spoke, so that it was difficult to distinguish who had spoken. The remark attributed to him about Cit. Cohn was tantamount to an insult. Further the report said that it was "the absence of a monarch that inspired the people"; he had distinctly stated "the absence of monarchy", which was quite a different affair. The devil should understand such reports. Then that England use "more force" without, which might be a misprint of "moral force".

Again it was reported that Bismarck had said, "the French had not recognised that Government and it was the height of impudence for him to say what Government should be recognised by the French". No mention was made that he [Marx] had said that everybody in France had recognised and obeyed the Government and that it was the height of impudence for Bismarck to say they had not.

Then it is reported that the admission of France to the Conference would be tantamount to recognition. This was a penny-a-liner's remark, not his [Marx's]; the conclusion was altogether falsified. It was because the Government was not recognised that it was internationally incapable. The report differs also from the Minutes. Such reports could only do injury, and if any more of that sort were published he should move that no more be printed.

March 7, 1871

Cit. Marx then recurred to the question of the Declaration of Paris.³⁵¹ He said if the English working people did not speak out, that Declaration might be made an article of a treaty and the people of England must not be disarmed in their foreign policy, and there was no time to be lost: an English committee ought to be formed at once. For a maritime power the only way to make war was to make war against the foreign commerce of the enemy. America had not consented to that Declaration but the French had observed it and that was the reason the French fleet had done so little. Holland was now put forward to ask that that what was formerly only a declaration be made a part of the treaty. On the sea only goods could be destroyed but in a war in the interior an amount of fixed capital, such [as] bridges, buildings, etc., were

^a The following words, "the intervention", are crossed out in the MS.—*Ed.*

destroyed which it took years to replace. Letters of mark were another affair; they were the *francs tireurs*³⁴ of the sea. The ruling class of this country had lost the power of national defence without, and at the moment when France was powerless England represented the West of Europe, and the working class of England must regain the power.

March 14, 1871

Cit. Marx then resumed the adjourned debate. He said it was of the greatest possible consequence to find an antagonist for the military powers of the Continent. They were again in the position of the Holy Alliance,³⁷⁵ and England was the only power that could oppose them and she could only do it by regaining her maritime rights. Confiscating their goods in neutral ships would ruin their foreign commerce in a few weeks and then the German middle class would not be quite so warlike, as it had lately been. This kind of warfare was more humane than war in its general aspects. By the Paris Declaration the military powers said virtually to England: you must make war in our way, not in yours. There had [been] much said against privateers but they were as good as *francs tireurs* and required less government power. When Butler had advocated war with England people had said America could not go to war without a navy, to which Butler had replied: we want no navy, we only require privateers. It was a matter of indifference with the present rulers of England whether they had that power or not but they would not always rule and [it] was necessary for a power of the English people to be employed for the benefit of the people of the Continent. Stuart Mill had been for the Declaration of Paris but some papers had been sent to him and he had now turned against it. The whole Black Sea Conference³⁷⁶ had turned upon getting this Declaration sanctioned. Before, it had only been privately agreed to by Palmerston and Clarendon but the protocol signed on the previous day as to stipulations seemed to include it.

Cit. Engels said it was hardly worthwhile to go on as Cit. Weston to whose remarks he wanted to reply was not present. As to the Paris Declaration, Cit. Marx had already pointed out that it had only been a private agreement. It had never been acknowledged by any statesman or Parliament, nobody had said that it was binding. In 1862 Cornwall Lewis had declared that it was not binding. In 1867 the present Lord Derby had declared in answer to Stuart Mill that it was only binding in a way but that self-defence overawed all compacts. It had never been ratified and

only rested on the authority of a private letter of a minister; no one was bound by it. This was clear from the fact that at every war the belligerent powers themselves had, by special agreements, bound themselves. But the Conference had signed a protocol that henceforth treaties and stipulations should be binding until they were relinquished by common consent.^a The war between France and Germany had proved that the present fortresses were insufficiently protected against bombardment and that by detached forts the fortresses themselves could be saved, and there were to be some forts erected in Poland. The Russian armaments were continued with unabated zeal and were on the last step from a peace to a war footing. The telegraph and sanitary companies were being organised. There was a Russian loan in the English market for £12,000,000, which was already oversubscribed and was probably the last English money Russia would get. We might have war before the summer was over—it did not look very peaceful. Referring to what had been said during the discussion, he said the only point that had been disputed was that an English army would not have been sufficient for intervention. The strong language of which Cit. Weston had spoken had not been used by him. He then showed again that England could only bring out a force of 30,000; only at the battle of the Alma the English had numbered 33,000 and that figure they had never reached again during the Crimean war. This was only equal to Prussian army corps, and [to] suppose that such a force could have turned the scales was absurd. The English were as brave as any and there was individual bravery in every country but the men had different qualifications and the mode they exercised them was different. Some were best for attack, others best for defence. The Irish were the best men for light infantry, the English for ...^b but the military authorities here treated the English like the Irish and the Irish like the English. The English system of training was so incomplete and antiquated that never until the present war had men been trained in outpost duty at Aldershot. It had been said that 100,000 Englishmen would not have put up with being locked up in Paris. What could soldiers like our volunteers have done to prevent it? The French had had enough of such soldiers, and if 400,000 Englishmen of the same class had been locked up as the French

^a *Protocoles des Conférences tenue à Londres ... pour la révision des stipulations du Traité du 30 mars 1856 relatives à la neutralisation de la Mer Noire, séance du 17 janvier 1871, Annexe.—Ed.*

^b A gap in the MS. The newspaper report further has "heavy infantry".—*Ed.*

were in Paris and led by the same jackasses and traitors they would have done the same as the French had done.

In conclusion he said England could not wage war on equal terms with the Continental powers, nor was it desirable that she should. An English soldier costs £100 a year, a Prussian only £30, therefore Prussia could keep three soldiers where England could only keep one; hence she could never compete with the military powers and he hoped she never would try to do it.

The first and the second point of the proposition with which the discussion commenced were withdrawn and the third:—"That England remains incapable, not only of interfering with effect in Continental affairs, but also of defending herself against the Continental military despotism, so long as she does not recover the liberty of using her real war power, that is to say, her naval power, which she can recover only by the renunciation of the Declaration of Paris"—was carried unanimously.

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Council's Minute Book

[RECORD OF ENGELS' SPEECH ON THE REVOLUTION OF MARCH 18 IN PARIS]³⁷⁷

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING
OF MARCH 21, 1871]

Cit. Engels then gave a description of the state of things in Paris. He said the letters received during the week from Paris, which Serrailhier had already mentioned, had cleared up what had been incomprehensible before. It had appeared as if a few men had suddenly seized a number of cannon and kept them. The whole of the press and every one of the correspondents had written that these men must be [put] down but the French Government had temporised. The information received from our Paris Committee was [that] the National Guards paid for the making of these guns and liked to keep them. After the election they had found that the Republic was anything but safe under such an Assembly as had been elected.³⁷⁸ When the Prussians had entered Paris the guns had been taken away to another part of the town to keep them out of their reach. Then the Government had laid claim to them and endeavoured to take them away from the National Guards. Aurelle de Paladines had been appointed Commander in Chief of the National Guards and prefect of the police.^a Under Napoleon he had been Commander in Chief of the Gendarmerie and he was a partisan of the priests. At the bidding of Dupanloup, the bishop of Orleans, he had done five hours' penance at Church while his army had been defeated in an action with the Germans. This had left no doubt as to the intentions of the Government.

^a At the next meeting on March 28, 1871, Engels pointed out to the mistake made in the record of his speech on March 21: "Two Generals, Aurelle de Paladines and Valentin, were made into one. It was the latter who had been appointed Prefect of the Police".— *Ed.*

The National Guard had then prepared for resistance. Out of 260 battalions 215 had organised a Central Committee, men and officers combined. A delegate had been elected by each Company out of whom the local Committees of the arrondissements, or wards, had been formed, and they had elected the Central Committee. Out of twenty arrondissements only five had not elected any delegates. When the Assembly had removed to Versailles the Government had tried to clear Paris of the revolutionists and take the guns from them. The troops only just arrived in Paris had been meant to be employed under the command of Vinoy who had commanded the soldiers that shot down the people on the boulevards during the *coup d'état* in 1851. They had partly succeeded early in the morning but when the National Guards had discovered what had been done they had set to work to retake the guns and the soldiers had fraternised with the people. The town was now in the hands of the people, the troops that had not gone over had been withdrawn to Marseilles and the Assembly did not know what to do. None of the men of the Central Committee were known to fame, there were no Felix Pyats and men of that stamp in it, but they were well known among the working class. There were four members of the International in the Committee.^a

The Commune was to be elected the next day. They had announced that the liberty of the press should be respected but not the rotten Bonapartist press. The most important resolution passed was that the preliminaries of peace should be respected. The Prussians were still near and if they could be kept out of the quarrel the chances of success were increased.

The account of the speech was printed, without the author's name, in *The Eastern Post*, No. 130, March 25, 1871

Reproduced from the General Council's Minute Book

This variant of the record was first published, in Russian, in the newspaper *Pravda*, No. 77, March 18, 1932

^a A. Alavoine, J.-L. Durand, L.-E. Varlin, J.-L. Pindy.—*Ed.*

[RECORD OF MARX'S AND ENGELS' SPEECHES
ON THE REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND]³⁷⁹

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING
OF MARCH 28, 1871]

Cit. Engels said the question was not whether we support a republican movement but whether under present circumstances it would drive into our path. There were men like Peter Taylor and others who were simply for the Republic but it must be considered that the abolition of monarchy would involve the abolition of the State Church, the House of Lords and many other things. No republican movement could go on here without expanding into a working class movement and if such a movement was to take place it would be as well to know how it went on. Before our ideas could be carried into practice we must have the Republic. We must watch it and [it] was right for our members to take part in it and try to shape it. If it turned into a middle class affair it would become a clique. The working [class] could not but break with all established forms.

Cit. Engels said there was as much oppression in America as here, but the republic gave a fair field for the working classes to agitate. In the densely populated states the labor movement was organised but the extent of unoccupied land prevented [it from] getting stronger than it was.

Cit. Marx was convinced that no Republican movement could become serious without becoming social. The wire pullers of the present move of course intended no such thing.

First published, in Russian, in the book
*The First International during the Paris
Commune*, 1941

Reproduced from the General
Council's Minute Book

[RECORD OF ENGELS' SPEECH ON THE PARIS
COMMUNE]³⁸⁰

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING
OF APRIL 11, 1871]

Cit. Engels said he had another fact to communicate. The press had lately been full of the wonders done by the Association, but the last stated in a Paris paper was that Marx had been private secretary to Bismarck in 1857.^a

He further said it would not be well to allow the Paris affair to go on without saying something about it. As long as the Central Committee of the National Guards had managed the affair it had gone on well but after the election³⁸¹ there had been talk and no action. The time for action against Versailles had been when it was weak but that opportunity had been lost and now it seemed that Versailles was getting the upper hand and driving the Parisians back. People would not put up long with being led into defeat. They lost ground, their ammunition was spent to little purpose and they were eating up their provisions. They could not be starved into submission as long as one side of Paris was open. Favre declined to take Prussian help.³⁸² In June 1848 the fight had been over in four days but then the workpeople had had no cannon. It would not be over so quick now. Louis Napoleon had made the streets wide that they might be swept with cannon against the workpeople but now it was in their favor; they would sweep the streets with cannon against the other party. The workpeople 200,000 men far better organised than at any former insurrection. Their case was a bad one but the chances were not so good as a fortnight ago.

First published, in Russian, in the newspaper *Pravda*, No. 77, March 18, 1932

Reproduced from the General Council's Minute Book

^a See "Nouvelles d'hier. Paris, 2 avril", *La Province*, No. 428, April 5, 1871. See also Marx's letter to Karl Liebknecht, about April 10, 1871, present edition, Vol. 44.—*Ed.*

[RECORD OF MARX'S SPEECH ON THE PARIS
COMMUNE]³⁸³

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING
OF APRIL 25, 1871]

Cit. Marx read a letter from the Secretary of the New York Committee^a giving the following list of Sections represented by delegates in the Committee.³⁸⁴

1. General German Workingmen's Society (Labor Union No. 5).
2. French Section of the I.W.A. New York.
3. Czechian Workingmen's Society New York.
4. Social Political Workingmen's Society 1 Chicago
5. Ditto " " " 2 Chicago
6. Social Democratic Workingmen's Society New York
7. Irish section of the I.W.A. New York.
8. Social Democratic Society Williamsburgh N.Y. (German).

} German

The Sections were reported as doing good work, the Irish is rapidly increasing and trying to enter into combination with the Irish Confederation of the United States. Progress has been made to establish a weekly German newspaper. The Workingmen's Union had decided that only delegates representing Labor,^b not capital should be admitted. The National Labor Union was losing ground among the New York Societies; several had refused to send delegates to the next Congress.

The Workingmen's Assembly of the State of New York had held its annual session at Albany and passed a resolution approving and endorsing the principles of the I.W.A. concluding "Workingmen of all Countries, unite!"

An address to the workingmen's Societies and Trades Union was in course of preparation and correspondence had been established with the Miners' Benevolent Association of Pennsylvania. The

^a F. A. Sorge.—*Ed.*

^b Then follows the text of the missing page from the Minute Book.—*Ed.*

organised political labor party had overthrown the Republican ascendancy in New Hampshire in the recent election. A native American Section had been founded and sent a delegate [to the New York Committee]. A bill of exchange for two pounds sterling was remitted as contribution for 293 members and payment for Congress Reports.

Cit. Marx announced that letters had been received from Paris, one of the 12th and one of 15th^a but they had only arrived on Saturday. A Frenchman from the Commune who had come to London to transact business with the Stock Exchange had paid him [Marx] a visit to obtain his assistance. The expulsion of Tolain was authentic,^b in consequence of which he proposed the following resolution:—

“Considering the Resolution of the Federal Council of the Paris Sections expelling Citizen Tolain from the Association because, after having been elected to the National Assembly as a representative of the Working Classes, he has deserted their cause in the most cowardly manner, which resolution the General Council is called upon to confirm;

Considering that the place of every French member of the International Workingmen's Association is undoubtedly on the side of the Commune of Paris and not in the usurpatory and counter-revolutionary Assembly of Versailles;

The General Council of the International Workingmen's Association confirms the resolution of the Paris Federal Council and declares that Citizen Tolain is expelled from the International Workingmen's Association.”

Eccarius seconded the resolution, it was carried unanimously.

Cit. Marx continued. He said he had pointed out to the delegate of the Commune that it was a great blunder to leave us without either letters^c or papers. This would be rectified in future as the commercial communications between the Commune and London would be kept up by a travelling agent who would also take charge of our communications.

Serraillier and Dupont had been elected to fill up vacancies in the 17th arrondissement, Serraillier had written that Dupont^d was sure to be elected but he had not written since the election; he might have written to Manchester.³⁸⁵ It appeared that more letters had been written than had arrived.

^a A. Serraillier's letters were received on April 23.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, p. 297.—*Ed.*

^c The end of the missing page from the Minute Book.—*Ed.*

^d J. M. A. Dupont.—*Ed.*

Felix Pyat and Vésinier were calumniating Serraillier and Dupont^a in Paris and when Serraillier had threatened to prosecute they had denied it. It was urgent to write at once to Paris to state the reasons why Pyat calumniated Serraillier and Dupont, and upon the motion of Citizen Mottershead Citizen Marx was instructed to write.³⁸⁶

The letters had been posted outside the line by Lafargue,³⁸⁷ they had therefore been delayed by rail, both the French and the Prussian Governments sifted the letters. Most of the information they contained was old but there were a few facts which the papers had not given. It was stated that the provinces knew as little what was going on in Paris as during the Siège. Except where the fighting was going on it had never been so quiet. A great part of the middle class had joined the National Guards of Belleville. The great Capitalists had run away and the small trades people went with the working class.^b No one could have an idea of the enthusiasm of the people, and the National Guards and the people at Versailles must be fools if they believed that they could enter Paris. Paris did not believe in a rising in the provinces and knew that superior forces were brought against it but there was no fear on that account, but there was fear of Prussian intervention and want of provisions. The decrees about rent and commercial bills were two master strokes: without them 3/4 of the trades people would have become bankrupt. The murder of Duval and Flourens had excited a sentiment of vengeance. The family of Flourens and the Commune had sent a legal officer to have the cause of their death certain, but in vain.^c Flourens had been killed in a house.^d

About the fabrication of telegrams there was some information. When Protot had gone through the accounts of the Government of National Defence he had discovered that money had been paid for the construction of an improved portable guillotine.^e The

^a Eugène Dupont.—*Ed.*

^b In the report published in *The Eastern Post* this sentence ends as follows: "and the shopkeepers have little love for the Versailles government".—*Ed.*

^c *The Eastern Post* has: "for an authenticated statement of the cause of death, which would have involved an inquest, but the Versaillese flatly refused".—*Ed.*

^d *The Eastern Post* has: "Flourens did not fall in any encounter, he was literally assassinated in a home."—*Ed.*

^e *The Eastern Post* has: "One of the first things the officers of the Commune did was to examine the papers and books of their predecessors. In the accounts of the Home Department of the Government of National Defence, there was an entry found of money having been paid for the construction of an improved portable guillotine. This new instrument for the slaughter of the Paris workmen was constructed while the patriots now conspiring at Versailles, pretended to defend Paris from Prussians."—*Ed.*

guillotine had been found and publicly burned by order of the Commune.^a The Gas Company had owed the municipality more than a mill, but had not shown any willingness to refund till their goods had been seized; then a bill to the amount had been given on the Bank of France. The telegrams and correspondents gave altogether different versions of these things.^b The greatest eyesore was that the Commune governed so cheap. The highest officials only received at the rate of 6000 fr.[per] year, the others only workman's wages.^c

The Address^d was to be ready at the next meeting.

First published in part in *The Eastern Post*,
No. 135, April 29, 1871

First published in full in: Marx and
Engels, *Works*, Second Russian Edition,
Vol. 44, Moscow, 1977

Reproduced from the General
Council's Minute Book, verified
with *The Eastern Post*

^a *The Eastern Post* has further: "The telegrams and the correspondents had it that the people burned them to save their heads against the Commune."—*Ed.*

^b *The Eastern Post* describes this as follows: "The Gas Company being robbed is another little bit. The municipal account showed that the Gas Company had received upwards of a million out of the rates levied on the inhabitants of Paris, which was registered as owing; while the same Gas Company had a large balance in the Bank of France. When no response was made to refund, the Commune sent the brokers, and when the Company found that matters had become serious, that their cash-box and goods were seized, they gave a cheque in the Bank of France for the amounts, and their cash-box and goods were restored. These two cases may serve as samples."—*Ed.*

^c *The Eastern Post* has: "The pay of ordinary functionaries is only equal to skilled workmen's wages, the salary of the highest officials is only at the rate of £240 a year. Surely they must be people, they cannot have any gentlemen among them—fancy a gentleman giving ministerial parties and Lord Mayor's dinner on £240 a year."—*Ed.*

^d K. Marx, *The Civil War in France* (this volume, pp. 307-59).—*Ed.*

[RECORD OF ENGELS' SPEECHES
ON THE PARIS COMMUNE AND
IN CONNECTION WITH THE CENTENNIAL
ANNIVERSARY OF ROBERT OWEN'S BIRTH]³⁸⁸

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING
OF MAY 9, 1871]

Cit. Engels then stated that the address^a was not ready yet. Cit. Marx had been seriously unwell and drawing up the address had made him worse. But it would be ready on Saturday and the Subcommittee²³⁸ could meet at Marx's any time after five o'clock in the afternoon. A delegate from the Commune had been here, the reports were good. Strictness had to be employed not to let people pass without passports. It had been discovered that spies from Versailles had lounged about at their leisure. The main attack had failed. The Versailles army had tried to get in between the National Guards and the ramparts but now they could only attack in one place and that was where they had failed before. The defence was getting stronger. The Commune had lost a little ground [but] had regained Clamart. Even if the army succeeded at the ramparts there were the barricades afterwards and there had never been such a struggle before as the one impending. For the first time barricades would be defended by cannon, by military guns, and by regularly organised forces. The contending armies were nearly equal now. Versailles could get no troops from the country, they had to send some away to keep the towns in order. Thiers could not even allow the Town Councils to meet at Bordeaux and talk politics,³⁰⁶ he had to use Napoleon's Law to prevent it.³²⁵

Cit. Engels seconded the proposition.³⁸⁹ He said he knew too little of the promoters of the affair but there was no doubt about

^a K. Marx, *The Civil War in France* (pp. 307-59).—Ed.

Robert Owen. There were things to be found in his writings that had not been superseded yet. He had started from his own ideas, had been originally a manufacturer himself and the first that had stood up against his class to put a stop to the shameful system in which women and children had been employed in factories. He thought the International ought to be represented.

Cit. Engels objected to Mottershead³⁹⁰ that Locke had been a deist but Owen a materialist. Locke's philosophy had led the French to materialism. He doubted that Owen had been acquainted with the older French writers. He differed entirely from Mottershead. Owen's movement had commenced as early as 1809 and had been independent of anything previously written. In 1812 he had published his book on marriage^a and 1818 he had gone to the King's Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle to induce them to proclaim Communism. That later the movement had been more in the direction of religion was true to a certain extent but much had been said about social reform. Most of the Owenites had gone over to the middle classes. They had been Chartists but forced into the position of professional agitators and then they had become less reliable and not stuck [to] their principles. He should regret if the festival came off in such a way that we could not take part in it.

Cit. Engels said he had not meant that all the socialists were Chartists but some he had known had been.

First published, in Russian, in the book *The First International during the Paris Commune*, Moscow, 1941 and in the book *The General Council of the First International, 1870-1871*, Moscow, 1965

Reproduced from the General Council's Minute Book

^a Evidently a mistake in the date. The reference is to Owen's book *The Marriage System of the New Moral World...*, Leeds, 1838.—Ed.

[RECORD OF MARX'S SPEECH ON THE PARIS
COMMUNE]³⁹¹

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING
OF MAY 23, 1871]

Citizen Marx explained that he had been ill, and had not been able to finish the address^a upon which he was engaged, but he hoped to have it ready by Tuesday next. In reference to the struggle in Paris he said. "He was afraid the end was near, but if the Commune was beaten, the struggle would only be deferred. The principles of the Commune were eternal and could not be crushed; they would assert themselves again and again until the working classes were emancipated. The Commune of Paris was being crushed by the aid of the Prussians, they were acting as gendarmes for Thiers. The plot for its destruction was concocted between Bismarck, Thiers and Favre; Bismarck stated at Frankfort that Thiers and Favre had asked him to interfere.^b The result showed that he was willing to do anything he could to assist them, short of risking the lives of German soldiers—not that he valued life when there was anything to be got—but he wished to see France sink still lower so that he might be able to exact the more. He had allowed Thiers to have more soldiers than was stipulated in the Convention,¹¹⁸ and had only allowed food to go into Paris in limited quantities. It was only the old story. The upper classes always united to keep down the working class. In the 11th century there was a war between some French Knights and Norman Knights, and the Peasants rose in insurrection; the Knights immediately forgot their differences and coalesced to crush the movement of the Peasants. To show how the Prussians have been

^a K. Marx, *The Civil War in France* (pp. 307-59).—Ed.

^b Report from Germany in the column "Révélations", *La Situation*, No. 156, March 21, 1871.—Ed.

doing Police work, it might be mentioned that 500 were arrested at Rouen which is occupied by the Prussians—upon the plea that they belonged to the International. The International was feared. In the French Assembly the other day, Count Jaubert—a dried up mummy—a minister of '34—a man noted for supporting measures against the Press¹⁶⁹—made a speech in which he said that after order was restored, the first duty of the Government must be to enquire into the working of the International, and put it down.”^a

First published in *The Eastern Post*,
No. 139, May 27, 1871

Reproduced from the General
Council's Minute Book, verified
with *The Eastern Post*

^a See H. F. Jaubert's speech in the National Assembly, May 12, 1871, *Journal officiel* (Versailles), No. 133, May 13, 1871.—*Ed.*

[RECORD OF MARX'S SPEECH AGAINST
THE CALUMNY INVENTED BY THE BOURGEOIS PRESS
TO SLANDER THE INTERNATIONAL AND THE PARIS
COMMUNE]

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING
OF JUNE 6, 1871]

Citizen Marx said the Council must disclaim all connection with the so-called International Democratic Association³⁵⁴ as it was started in opposition to the International Workingmen's Association which had to bear the responsibilities of acts absurd as they sometimes were.^a Another thing to which he wished to call the attention of the Council was the infamous lies circulated about the Commune by the English Press. They were lies fabricated by the French and Prussian police. They were afraid lest the truth should be known. It was asserted that Millière was one of the most furious members of the Commune. Now it was a fact that he never was a member of the Commune, but as he had been a deputy for Paris it was necessary to have an excuse for shooting him. The English press acted as police and bloodhounds for Thiers. Slanders against the Commune and against the International were invented to serve his bloody policy. The press knew full well the objects and principles of the International. It had given reports of the prosecutions against it in Paris under the Empire. It had had representatives at the various Congresses held by the Association, and had reported their proceedings, and yet it circulated reports to the effect that the Association included the Fenian Brotherhood, the Carbonari, ceased to exist 1830, the Marianne, Ditto 1854³⁹² and other secret Societies, and asked if Colonel Henderson knew of the whereabouts of the General Council which was said to sit in London. These things were simply

^a The first sentence is omitted in the report published in *The Eastern Post*.—Ed.

invented to justify any action taken against the International. The upper classes were afraid of the principles of the International.

He wished also to call attention to the fact that Mazzini had written in *The Contemporary Review* denouncing the Commune.^a It was not so well known as it ought to be, but Mazzini had always been opposed to the Workmen's movements. He denounced the insurgents of June 1848 when Louis Blanc, who then had more courage than he has now—answered him.^b

When Pierre Leroux—who had a large family—obtained employment in London Mazzini was the man to denounce him. The fact was, Mazzini, with his old-fashioned Republicanism knew nothing and accomplished nothing. In Italy he had created a military despotism by his cry for Nationality. With him the State—which was an imaginary thing, was everything, and Society—which was a reality—was nothing. The sooner the People repudiated such men the better.

First published in *The Eastern Post*,
No. 141, June 10, 1871

Reproduced from the General
Council's Minute Book, verified
with *The Eastern Post*

^a G. Mazzini, "The Commune in Paris", *The Contemporary Review*, June 1871.—*Ed.*

^b L. Blanc, *Des socialistes français à M. Mazzini*, Brussels, 1852.—*Ed.*

[RECORD OF MARX'S SPEECH ON THE PARIS
COMMUNE]³⁹³

[FROM THE NEWSPAPER REPORT ON THE GENERAL COUNCIL
MEETING OF JUNE 20, 1871]

Citizen Marx said that he was glad to observe that the workmen on the continent were thoroughly outspoken upon the subject of the Commune. Meetings had been held in Geneva, Brussels, Munich, Vienna, and Berlin, denouncing the Thiers-Favre massacres. He also called attention to the fact that a number of so-called manifestoes had appeared in the French papers, purporting to be issued by the Paris section of the International. They were all forgeries issued by the French police for the purpose of entrapping the unwary, it shewed the dirty actions to which a despicable government could descend.^a

First published in *The Eastern Post*,
No. 143, June 24, 1871

Reproduced from the newspaper

^a See this volume, pp. 364-66.—*Ed.*

[RECORD OF MARX'S INTERVIEW WITH
THE WORLD CORRESPONDENT]

London, July 3 [1871]

I^a went straight to my business. The world, I said, seemed to be in the dark about the International, hating it very much, but not able to say clearly what thing it hated. Some, who professed to have peered further into the gloom than their neighbors, declared that they had made out a sort of Janus figure with a fair, honest workman's smile on one of its faces, and on the other a murderous, conspirator's scowl. Would he [Marx] light up the case of mystery in which the theory dwelt? The professor laughed, chuckled a little I fancied, at the thought that we were so frightened of him.

"There is no mystery to clear up, dear sir," he began, in a very polished form of the Hans Breitmann dialect,³⁹⁴ "except perhaps the mystery of human stupidity in those who perpetually ignore the fact that our association is a public one and that the fullest reports of its proceedings are published for all who care to read them. You may buy our rules^b for a penny, and a shilling laid out in pamphlets will teach you almost as much about us as we know ourselves.

R.—Almost—yes, perhaps so; but will not the something I shall not know constitute the all-important reservation? To be quite frank with you, and to put the case as it strikes an outside observer, this general claim of depreciation of you must mean something more than the ignorant ill-will of the multitude. And it is still pertinent to ask even after what you have told me, what is the International Society?

Dr. M.—You have only to look at the individuals of which it is composed—workmen.

R.—Yes, but the soldier need be no exponent of the statecraft that sets him in motion. I know some of your members, and I can believe that they are not of the

^a R. Lander.—*Ed.*

^b See K. Marx, *Rules and Administrative Regulations of the International Working Men's Association* (present edition, Vol. 20, Appendices).—*Ed.*

stuff of which conspirators are made. Besides, a secret shared by a million men would be no secret at all. But what if these were only the instruments in the hands of a bold, and I hope you will forgive me for adding, not over-scrupulous conclave.

Dr. M.—There is nothing to prove it.

R.—The last Paris insurrection?

Dr. M.—I demand firstly the proof that there was any plot at all—that anything happened that was not the legitimate effect of the circumstances of the moment; or the plot granted, I demand the proofs of the participation in it of the International Association.

R.—The presence in the communal body of so many members of the association.

Dr. M.—Then it was a plot of the Freemasons, too, for their share in the work as individuals was by no means a slight one. I should not be surprised, indeed, to find the Pope^a setting down the whole insurrection to their account. But try another explanation. The insurrection in Paris was made by the workmen of Paris. The ablest of the workmen must necessarily have been its leaders and administrators; but the ablest of the workmen happen also to be members of the International Association. Yet the association as such may be in no way responsible for their action.

R.—It will still seem otherwise to the world. People talk of secret instructions from London, and even grants of money. Can it be affirmed that the alleged openness of the association's proceedings precludes all secrecy of communication?

Dr. M.—What association ever formed carried on its work without private as well as public agencies? But to talk of secret instruction from London, as of decrees in the matter of faith and morals from some centre of Papal domination and intrigue is wholly to misconceive the nature of the International. This would imply a centralized form of government for the International, whereas the real form is designedly that which gives the greatest play to local energy and independence. In fact the International is not properly a government for the working class at all. It is a bond of union rather than a controlling force.

R.—And of union to what end?

Dr. M.—The economical emancipation of the working class by the conquest of political power. The use of that political power to the attainment of social ends. It is necessary that our aims should be thus comprehensive to include every form of working class activity. To have made them of a special character would have been to adapt them to the needs of one section—one nation of

^a Pius IX.—*Ed.*

workmen alone. But how could all men be asked to unite to further the objects of a few. To have done that the association must have forfeited its title of International. The association does not dictate the form of political movements; it only requires a pledge as to their end. It is a network of affiliated societies spreading all over the world of labor. In each part of the world some special aspect of the problem presents itself, and the workmen there address themselves to its consideration in their own way. Combinations among workmen cannot be absolutely identical in detail in Newcastle and in Barcelona, in London and in Berlin. In England, for instance, the way to show political power lies open to the working class. Insurrection would be madness where peaceful agitation would more swiftly and surely do the work. In France a hundred laws of repression and a mortal antagonism between classes seem to necessitate the violent solution of social war. The choice of that solution is the affair of the working classes of that country. The International does not presume to dictate in the matter and hardly to advise. But to every movement it accords its sympathy and its aid within the limits assigned by its own laws.

R.—And what is the nature of that aid?

Dr. M.—To give an example, one of the commonest forms of the movement for emancipation is that of strikes. Formerly, when a strike took place in one country, it was defeated by the importation of workmen from another. The International has nearly stopped all that. It receives information of the intended strike, it spreads that information among its members, who at once see that for them the seat of the struggle must be forbidden ground. The masters are thus left alone to reckon with their men. In most cases the men require no other aid than that. Their own subscriptions or those of the societies to which they are more immediately affiliated supply them with funds, but should the pressure upon them become too heavy and the strike be one of which the association approves, their necessities are supplied out of the common purse. By these means a strike of the cigar-makers of Barcelona was brought to a victorious issue the other day.³⁹⁵ But the society has no interest in strikes, though it supports them under certain conditions. It cannot possibly gain by them in a pecuniary point of view, but it may easily lose. Let us sum it all up in a word. The working classes remain poor amid the increase of wealth, wretched amid the increase of luxury. Their material privation dwarfs their moral as well as their physical stature. They

cannot rely on others for a remedy. It has become then with them an imperative necessity to take their own case in hand. They must revise the relations between themselves and the capitalists and landlords, and that means they must transform society. This is the general end of every known workmen's organization; land and labor leagues,³⁵⁰ trade and friendly societies, co-operative stores and co-operative production are but means towards it. To establish a perfect solidarity between these organizations is the business of the International Association. Its influence is beginning to be felt everywhere. Two papers spread its views in Spain, three in Germany, the same number in Austria and in Holland, six in Belgium, and six in Switzerland. And now that I have told you what the International is you may, perhaps, be in a position to form your own opinion as to its pretended plots.

R.—I do not quite understand you.

Dr. M.—Do you not see that the old society, wanting the strength to meet it with its own weapons of discussion and combination, is obliged to resort to the fraud of fixing upon it the imputation of conspiracy?

R.—But the French police declare that they are in a position to prove its complicity in the late affair, to say nothing of preceding attempts.

Dr. M.—But we will say something of those attempts, if you please, because they best serve to test the gravity of all the charges of conspiracy brought against the International. You remember the last “plot” but one. A plebiscite had been announced.³⁹⁶ Many of the electors were known to be wavering. They had no longer a keen sense of the value of the imperial rule, having come to disbelieve in those threatened dangers of society from which it was supposed to have saved them. A new bugbear was wanted. The police undertook to find one. All combinations of workmen being hateful to them, they naturally owed the International an ill-turn. A happy thought inspired them. What if they should select the International for their bugbear, and thus at one stroke discredit that society and curry favor for the imperial cause? Out of that happy thought came the ridiculous “plot” against the Emperor's life—as if we wanted to kill the wretched old fellow. They seized the leading members of the International. They manufactured evidence. They prepared their case for trial, and in the meantime they had their plebiscite. But the intended comedy was too obviously but a broad, coarse farce. Intelligent Europe, which witnessed the spectacle, was not deceived for a moment as to its character, and only the French peasant elector was befooled. Your

English papers reported the beginnings of the miserable affair; they forgot to notice the end. The French judges admitting the existence of the plot by official courtesy were obliged to declare that there was nothing to show the complicity of the International. Believe me, the second plot is like the first. The French functionary is again in business. He is called in to account for the biggest civil movement the world has ever seen. A hundred signs of the times ought to suggest the right explanation—the growth of intelligence among the workmen, of luxury and incompetence among their rulers, the historical process now going on of that final transfer of power from a class to the people, the apparent fitness of time, place, and circumstance for the great movement of emancipation. But to have seen these the functionary must have been a philosopher, and he is only a *mouchard*.^a By the law of his being, therefore, he has fallen back upon the *mouchard*'s explanation—a “conspiracy”. His old portfolio of forged documents will supply him with the proofs, and this time Europe in its scare will believe the tale.

R.—Europe can scarcely help itself, seeing that every French newspaper spreads the report.

Dr. M.—Every French newspaper! See, here is one of them (taking up *La Situation*), and judge for yourself of the value of its evidence as to a matter of fact. (Reads:) “Dr. Karl Marx, of the International, has been arrested in Belgium, trying to make his way to France. The police of London have long had their eye on the society with which he is connected, and are now taking active measures for its suppression.”^b

Two sentences and two lies. You can test the truth of one story by the evidence of your own senses. You see that instead of being in prison in Belgium I am at home in England. You must also know that the police in England are as powerless to interfere with the International Society as the society with them. Yet what is most regular in all this is that the report will go the round of the continental press without a contradiction, and could continue to do so if I were to circularize every journal in Europe from this place.

R.—Have you attempted to contradict many of these false reports?

Dr. M.—I have done so till I have grown weary of the labor. To show the gross carelessness with which they are concocted I may

^a Police agent.—*Ed.*

^b Report in the column “*Dépêches Télégraphiques*”, *La Situation*, No. 240, June 28, 1871.—*Ed.*

mention that in one of them I saw Felix Pyat set down as a member of the International.

R.—And he is not so?

Dr. Marx—The association could hardly have found room for such a wild man. He was once presumptuous enough to issue a rash proclamation in our name, but it was instantly disavowed,³⁹⁷ though, to do them justice, the press of course ignored the disavowal.

R.—And Mazzini, is he a member of your body?

Dr. Marx (laughing)—Ah, no. We should have made but little progress if we had not got beyond the range of his ideas.

R.—You surprise me. I should certainly have thought that he represented the most advanced views.

Dr. M.—He represents nothing better than the old idea of a middle-class republic. We seek no part with the middle class. He has fallen as far to the rear of the modern movement as the German professors, who, nevertheless, are still considered in Europe as the apostles of the cultured democratism of the future. They were so at one time—before '48, perhaps, when the German middle class, in the English sense, had scarcely attained its proper development. But now they have gone over bodily to the reaction, and the proletariat knows them no more.

R.—Some people have thought they saw signs of a positivist element in your organization.

Dr. M.—No such thing. We have positivists among us, and others not of our body who work as well. But this is not by virtue of their philosophy, which will have nothing to do with popular government, as we understand it, and which seeks only to put a new hierarchy in place of the old one.^a

R.—It seems to me, then, that the leaders of the new international movement have had to form a philosophy as well as an association for themselves.

Dr. M.—Precisely. It is hardly likely, for instance, that we could hope to prosper in our war against capital if we derive our tactics, say from the political economy of Mill. He has traced one kind of relationship between labor and capital. We hope to show that it is possible to establish another.

R.—And as to religion?

Dr. M.—On that point I cannot speak in the name of the society. I myself am an atheist. It is startling, no doubt, to hear such an avowal in England, but there is some comfort in the

^a See this volume, pp. 498, 504-05.—*Ed.*

thought that it need not be made in a whisper in either Germany or France?

R.—And yet you make your headquarters in this country?

Dr. M.—For obvious reasons; the right of association is here an established thing. It exists, indeed, in Germany, but it is beset with innumerable difficulties; in France for many years it has not existed at all.

R.—And the United States?

Dr. M.—The chief centres of our activity are for the present among the old societies of Europe. Many circumstances have hitherto tended to prevent the labor problem from assuming an all-absorbing importance in the United States. But they are rapidly disappearing, and it is rapidly coming to the front there with the growth as in Europe of a laboring class distinct from the rest of the community and divorced from capital.

R.—It would seem that in this country the hoped for solution, whatever it may be, will be attained without the violent means of revolution. The English system of agitating by platform and press until minorities become converted into majorities is a hopeful sign.

Dr. M.—I am not so sanguine on that point as you. The English middle class has always shown itself willing enough to accept the verdict of the majority so long as it enjoyed the monopoly of the voting power. But mark me, as soon as it finds itself outvoted on what it considers vital questions we shall see here a new slave-owner's war."³⁹⁸

First published in *The World*, July 18,
1871

Reproduced from the newspaper

[ACCOUNT OF ENGELS' SPEECH ON MAZZINI'S ATTITUDE
TOWARDS THE INTERNATIONAL]

[FROM THE NEWSPAPER REPORT ON THE GENERAL COUNCIL
MEETING OF JULY 25, 1871]

Citizen Engels said after the Pope^a should come the Anti-Pope,³⁹⁹ he had to report that Joseph Mazzini had been attacking the International^b in the columns of his Journal. After stating that he knew the Italian people loved him and he loved them, he proceeded:—

"An association has arisen which threatens to subvert all order (the same words as used by the Pope) started many years ago, I refused from the first to belong [to] it. It is controlled by a Council sitting in London, the soul of which is Karl Marx, a man of acute intellect, but like that of Proudhon of a dissolving character, and of domineering temper, who is jealous of other people's influence. The Council itself, composed of men of different nationalities, can have no unity of purpose either to discuss the evils which afflict society, nor the unity of sentiment necessary to amend them. These are the reasons why I retired from the Association, and why the Italian branch of the Democratic Alliance (London) retired from it also. The three fundamental principles of the International are:—1st Negation of God, that is of all morality. 2nd Negation of Country, which it dissolves into a Conglomeration of Communes, whose inevitable fate it must be to quarrel among themselves, 3rd Negation of Property, thereby depriving every working-man of the fruits of his labour for the right to individual property is nothing but the right of every man to that which he has produced."

After descanting at length upon these points, he concluded by advising the Italian Working Class to organise themselves strongly under his banner in a counter-league against the Internationals, to have faith in the future of Italy, and to work for its future and glory, and to form among themselves Co-operative Stores (not

^a Pius IX.—*Ed.*

^b G. Mazzini, "Agli operai italiani", *La Roma del popolo*, No. 20, July 13, 1871; see also this volume, pp. 385-87.—*Ed.*

Co-operative Workshops) so that all may get as much profit as possible.

It will be seen that upon one important point Mazzini contradicts himself, in one place he says "he refused to belong to the International from the first," and afterwards says he retired. How a man can retire from that to which he never belonged, the public must imagine. The fact is Mazzini never was a member of the International but he tried to turn it into a tool of his own. He drew up a programme which was submitted to the provisional Council but it was rejected, and after some further attempts made through Major Wolff, since discovered to be a police spy, towards the same end had failed,²³⁸ Mazzini refrained from all interference with the International until lately.

As to the charges against the International, they are either untrue or absurd, with regard to the first that it wants to make atheism compulsory, that is untrue, and was refuted in the Secretary's^a letter in reply to Jules Favre's circular.^b The second is absurd, for while the International recognises no country, it desires to unite, not dissolve. It is opposed to the cry for Nationality, because it tends to separate people from people, and is used by tyrants to create prejudices and antagonism,⁴⁰⁰ the jealousy existing between the Latin and Teuton races led to the late disastrous war, and was equally used by Napoleon and Bismarck. The third charge only betrays Mazzini's ignorance of the very elements of political economy. That individual property which assures to everyone the fruits of his own labour, the International does not intend to abolish, but on the contrary to establish. At present the fruits of the labour of the masses goes into the pockets of the few, and this system of capitalist production is what Mazzini proposes to leave unaltered, but which the International would destroy. It desires everyone to have the produce of his or her labour. The letters received from Italy prove that the Italian Workmen are with the International, and are not to be misguided by Mazzini's shallow sophistry.

First published in *The Eastern Post*,
No. 148, July 29, 1871

Reproduced from the newspaper,
verified with the General Council's
Minute Book

^a J. Hales.—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, pp. 361-63.—*Ed.*

[RECORD OF ENGELS' SPEECH ON THE CONVOCA-
TION OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF 1871]⁴⁰¹

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING
OF JULY 25, 1871]

Citizen Engels proposed "That a private Conference of the Association be called in London to meet on the third Sunday in September". He said that last year the Sections gave the General Council power to postpone the Annual Congress—because of the circumstances created by the war—and things were not much better now. It was impossible to hold a Congress in France. In Germany the Association was subject to prosecution and any member that had the courage to attend a Congress would do so at the risk of imprisonment. In Spain the Association was being persecuted, and in Belgium there was no freedom. So taking things altogether there were only two places where it would be possible to meet, England and Switzerland, and Citizen Robin had told them how in the latter country the members were divided among themselves. The position too was such, that if a Congress was summoned scarcely any of the sections could send delegates, at the same time it was necessary for the General Council to take counsel with the sections, as to the future policy, and to get its powers ratified, and such could only be done by holding a private Conference as he proposed.

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*The London Conference of the First Interna-
tional*, 1936

Reproduced from the General
Council's Minute Book

[ACCOUNT OF MARX'S SPEECH AGAINST ODGER]⁴⁰²[FROM THE NEWSPAPER REPORT ON THE
GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING OF AUGUST 1, 1871]

Citizen Marx said there was one other subject to which he wished to allude. It appeared that at a meeting of the Land and Labour League³⁵⁰ a Mr. Shipton—whom he did not know but who had the reputation of being Mr. Odger's Lieutenant—had been criticising the address on the "Civil War in France" and had said that he (Dr Marx) had repudiated the Council. Such a remark only shewed Mr. Shipton's ignorance and didn't speak much for his perception even though he might be a dummy in the hands of Odger.—"Because he had avowed himself the author of the charges contained in the address, he had repudiated the Council"!—Why, that avowal was made by the sanction of the Council, so that men like Mr. Odger who were apologists for M. Thiers and Favre—should no longer have the power to say they did not know whether the charges were true or not that were made in the address. In the letter of avowal the men charged were distinctly challenged to indict him for libel so that the matter might be tested in a court of law,^a but it did not serve their purpose to do so, as they knew well what the result would be. Of course it was to be easily understood why Mr. Odger was not satisfied. He had exhibited an amount of ignorance in dealing with foreign politics that would not have been creditable to any ordinary reader of newspapers. He had said "The character of Jules Favre was irreproachable": Why, it was well known that he had been all his life the bitter opponent of the French Working Class, and of all Labour movements, he was the principal instigator of the massacres of June—'48;—he was the author of the expedition to

^a See this volume, p. 370.—*Ed.*

Rome in '49; he was the man who obtained the expulsion of Louis Blanc from France, and was one of the men who brought back Bonaparte; and yet Mr. Odger unblushingly stood up and said "Nothing could be said against the character of Jules Favre". Why, if Mr. Odger, who claimed to have been one of the foremost men of the International, had attended to his duties as a member, he must have known, such a statement had no ground whatever to rest upon. It was either made with a knowledge that it was false, or it betrayed an inexcusable ignorance. Mr. Odger knew nothing of the International for the last five years, as he had never attended to the duties, the Office of President was abolished by the Congress,⁴⁰³ because it was found to be a sham. Mr. Odger was the first—and only President of the International: he never attended to his duties—the Council got on quite as well without—therefore the office was abolished.

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No. 149, August 5, 1871

Reproduced from the newspaper,
verified with the General Council's
Minute Book

[RECORD OF ENGELS' SPEECH ON
THE SITUATION IN SPAIN]

[FROM THE NEWSPAPER REPORT ON THE
GENERAL COUNCIL MEETING OF AUGUST 22, 1871]

Citizen Engels reported that the members of the Spanish Federal Council had great hopes from the change of Ministry which had just taken place in Spain. It was expected that the prosecutions against the International would cease, and then the Association would soon extend its ramifications throughout the length and breadth of the peninsula. A great change had taken place in the ranks of the Republican party. On the establishment of the Commune in Paris, the leaders of the Republican party in Spain—not knowing the social principles involved—went in for it. But as soon as they found out that it meant a struggle for more than municipal government they turned round and denounced it. This shocked the Spanish working-class, which formed the bulk of the Republican party. Having had their eyes opened, the people not wishing to be used as tools, had turned to the International. Citizen Engels also reported that Citizen Paul Lafargue, son-in-law to Dr. Marx, and formerly a member of the General Council, had been arrested in Spain and sent under an escort of gendarmes to Madrid. The government, however, finding nothing against him, had since liberated him.

First published in *The Eastern Post*,
No. 152, August 26, 1871

Reproduced from the newspaper

[RECORD OF MARX'S SPEECH IN THE OPENING
OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE]⁴⁰⁴

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE SESSION
OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION ON SEPTEMBER 17, 1871]

Marx: The General Council has called a conference to consult the delegates of the various countries about the measures to be taken to guard against the risks which the Association is running in a large number of countries, and to set up a new organisation to meet the needs of the situation.

Secondly, to draw up a response to the various governments that are working unceasingly to destroy the Association by every means at their disposal.

And finally to reach a definitive solution to the Swiss conflict.

Other secondary questions will certainly be raised during the course of the conference and should be resolved.

Citizen Marx adds that it will be necessary to make a public declaration to the Russian government, which is trying to implicate the Association in a certain affair relating to a secret society whose main leaders are completely unconnected with or hostile to the Association.⁴⁰⁵

This conference is private, but when all the delegates have returned to their countries, the General Council will publish those resolutions which the Conference deems it necessary to publish.

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time

[RECORDS OF MARX'S SPEECHES ON TRADE UNIONS]⁴⁰⁶

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE SESSION OF THE
LONDON CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING
MEN'S ASSOCIATION ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1871]

I

Marx believes that these resolutions were not taken at the Congress of Basle—after verification he recognises that some decisions were taken in this sense⁴⁰⁷—it was a pious wish—he also thought at that time—the thing possible—now he is persuaded that the TRADES UNIONS will not accept this federation—The TRADES UNIONS, he says, are an aristocratic minority—the poor workers cannot belong to them: the great mass of workers whom economic development is driving from the countryside into the towns every day—has long been outside the TRADES UNIONS—and the most wretched mass has never belonged; the same goes for the workers born in the East End of London; one in 10 belongs to TRADES UNIONS—peasants, day labourers never belong to these societies.

The TRADES UNIONS can do nothing by themselves—they will remain a minority—they have no power over the mass of proletarians—whereas the International works directly on these men—it does not need their organisation in order to carry along the workers—the international idea appeals to them immediately—It is the only society to inspire complete confidence in the workers.

Language also stands in the way of an international association with the TRADES UNIONS.

II

Marx does not share Steens' fears—with regard to the TRADES UNIONS.⁴⁰⁸ They have never been able to do anything without turning to us—even the best organised—those with branches in

the United States—they have remained outside the largest revolutionary movement in England⁴⁰⁹—Since the International has been in existence—it has been different—if they wish to employ their strength—with our aid—they can achieve everything—they had a clause in their Rules prohibiting them from getting involved in politics—the only political moves they have made were under the influence of the International—The General Council has for several years been in contact with the TRADES UNIONS—there existed a committee⁴¹⁰—at present it is still in contact with three big cities—Manchester—Birmingham—Sheffield.

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[RECORD OF MARX'S SPEECH ON THE POLITICAL
ACTION OF THE WORKING CLASS]⁴¹¹

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE SESSION OF THE
LONDON CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING
MEN'S ASSOCIATION ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1871]

Citizen Lorenzo has called on us to observe the Regulations, and Citizen Bastelica has followed him in this course.—I take the original Rules and the Inaugural Address, and I read in the two that the General Council will be responsible for presenting a programme for discussion at the congresses.^a

The programme which the General Council is presenting to the conference for discussion comprises^b—the organisation of the Association; and the Vaillant motion relates to this point—the claim of Lorenzo and Bastelica is therefore unfounded—

In almost all countries some members of the International, basing themselves on the mutilated formulation of the Rules passed by the Congress of Geneva,⁴¹² have indulged in propaganda in favour of abstention from politics, which the governments have taken great care not to interrupt. Even in Germany, Schweitzer and others in the pay of Bismarck tried to rally the sections round the policies of the government. In France this culpable abstention had allowed Favre, Picard and others to seize power on 4 September—this abstention enabled a dictatorial committee to set itself up in Paris on 18 March, composed largely of Bonapartists and intriguers who knowingly wasted the first days of the Revolution in inaction, when they should have spent them consolidating it.⁴¹³

In America a congress held recently⁴¹⁴ and composed of workers has resolved to deal seriously with the political question

^a K. Marx, *Rules and Administrative Regulations of the International Working Men's Association*, London, 1867 (present edition, Vol. 20, Appendices); K. Marx, *Inaugural Address of the Working Men's International Association*, London, 1864 (present edition, Vol. 20).—Ed.

^b See this volume, p. 613.—Ed.

and to substitute workers like themselves to represent them, entrusted with defending the interests of their class, for these personalities who make a career out of being politicians.

In England it is less easy for a worker to enter Parliament. The Members receiving no subsidy, and the worker having nothing but the proceeds of his labour to live on, Parliament is closed to him, and the Bourgeoisie, stubbornly refusing to pay an allowance to Members, knows full well that this is the way to prevent the working class from being represented.

But it must not be thought that it is of minor importance to have workers in parliament. If their voices are stifled, like those of De Potter and Castiau, if they are ejected like Manuel—the effect of this severity and intolerance on the people is profound—Whereas if, like Bebel and Liebknecht, they are able to speak from this platform, the entire world can hear them—in one way or the other it means considerable publicity for our principles—To mention only one example—When, during the war taking place in France, Bebel and Liebknecht embarked on the struggle against it, and to disclaim all responsibility on behalf of the working class with regard to what was happening—the whole of Germany was shaken, and even Munich, this city where no-one would contemplate revolution unless it involved the price of beer, was the scene of great demonstrations demanding an end to the war.

The governments are hostile to us.^a We must answer them by using every possible means at our disposal, getting workers into parliament is so much gaining over them, but we must choose the right men and watch out for the Tolains.^b

He supports Citizen Vaillant's motion with the Frankel amendment, which consists in prefacing it with a preamble explaining the reason for this declaration, that is stating that it is not just today that the Association asks the workers to engage in politics, but all the time.

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^a The paragraph in the draft notes by Martin begins as follows: "Since the July Revolution the bourgeoisie has always made every effort to unnoticeably create obstacles, in the workers' way. Our newspapers are not reaching the masses—the speaker's platform is the best means of publicity."—*Ed.*

^b See this volume, p. 297.—*Ed.*

[RECORD OF MARX'S SPEECH ON THE POLITICAL ACTION
OF THE WORKING CLASS]

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE SESSION OF THE
LONDON CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION ON SEPTEMBER 21, 1871]

Marx will not speak against Vaillant's motion because yesterday he spoke for it—he replies to Bastelica that from the beginning of the conference it had been decided that this question was entirely one of organisation and not of principle—as for the regulation invoked—he recalls [that it is necessary] to read the Rules and the Inaugural Address together—which he reads once again.^a

He outlines the history of abstention—we must not get annoyed, he says, over the issue—the people who propagated this doctrine were sincere utopians—but those who are resuming the same path today are not—by adjourning politics until after the violent struggle they are hurling the people into the formalist, bourgeois opposition—which it is our duty to combat, as well as the powers-that-be—We must expose Gambetta, so that the people are not deceived all over again. He is of the same opinion as Vaillant—we must throw down a challenge to all the governments in response to their persecution of the International—which (...)

Reaction exists throughout the Continent, it is general and permanent—and even in the United States and in England in another form—

We must tell them—we know that you are the armed force opposing the proletariat—we shall act against you peacefully wherever possible—and take up arms when that is necessary—he believes that changes must be made in the framing of Vaillant's motion—which is why he is supporting Utin's motion.⁴¹⁵

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utes, verified with his rough notes

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^a One of the drafts continues as follows: "He combats the abstentionists, saying that they are sectarians."—*Ed.*

[RECORD OF MARX'S SPEECH ON THE POSITION
OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S
ASSOCIATION IN GERMANY AND ENGLAND]⁴¹⁶

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE SESSION OF THE
LONDON CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1871]

You know that in Germany the organisation of the Association is unable to exist under its own name, the laws not permitting any local society to affiliate with a foreign society, but the Association exists nevertheless and has experienced tremendous development under the name of the Socialist Democratic Party, whose membership of the Association already dates back a long way. But this membership was reaffirmed with great éclat at the Congress of Dresden.⁴¹⁷ So there is no need to propose any measure or declaration for this country comparable to those approved for countries where the Association is persecuted.

If he [Marx] has spoken badly of the German students, he has no criticism to make of the workers; during the last war, which had become a matter of contention between the classes, the attitude of the German workers was quite beyond praise, moreover, the *Socialist Democratic Party* fully realised that this war had been undertaken by Bonaparte and Wilhelm more to stifle modern ideas than for ideas of conquest—the Committee of Brunswick had all been arrested^a and taken to a fortress on the Russian border, and most of its members are still prisoners today, charged with the crime of high treason. In the Reichstag itself, Bebel and Liebknecht, the representatives of the German working class, were not afraid to declare that they were members of the International Association and that they were protesting against the war, for which they refused to vote any subsidy—the government did not dare to have them arrested while the House was sitting, only when

^a See this volume, p. 271.—*Ed.*

they emerged did the police seize them and carry them off to prison.^a

During the Commune the German workers did not cease, at meetings and through the newspapers that belong to them, to affirm their solidarity with the Revolutionaries of Paris. And when the Commune was crushed they held a meeting at Breslau which the Prussian police tried in vain to prevent; at this meeting, and at others in various towns in Germany, they acclaimed the Paris Commune—Eventually, when Kaiser Wilhelm and his army staged their triumphal entry into Berlin, these conquering heroes were greeted by the populace with cries of “Long Live the Commune!”^b

When speaking about England Citizen Marx had forgotten to make the following statement.

You will know that between the English workers and the Irish workers there has existed of old very considerable antagonism the causes of which are actually very easy to enumerate. This antagonism has its origin in the differences of language and religion^c; and in the competition between Irish workers and English workers over wages.—In England this antagonism is the dam that holds back the flood of Revolution, hence it is skilfully exploited by the government and the upper classes, who are convinced that no bond would be able to unite the English and Irish workers.—It is true that in the political field no union would be possible; but it is not the same in the economic field, and on either side sections of the International are being formed which in this capacity ought to march simultaneously towards the same goal.—Before long the Irish sections will be very numerous.

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^a See this volume, pp. 274-75.—*Ed.*

^b The rough notes by Martin continue as follows: “The workers have shown that they are the only party with socialist aspirations in Germany.”—*Ed.*

^c The rough notes by Martin have “long oppression of Ireland” after the word “religion”.—*Ed.*

[RECORD OF MARX'S SPEECH ON SECRET SOCIETIES]

[FROM THE MINUTES OF THE SESSION OF THE
LONDON CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1871]

Marx reads out the following motion.

In countries where the regular organisation of the International Association has become temporarily impracticable in consequence of government intervention, the Association and its local groups may reconstitute themselves under various designations, but any secret society in the strict sense is formally prohibited.^a

By secret organisation we do not mean secret societies in the strict sense, which, *on the contrary*, must be fought against. In France and Italy, where the political situation is such that the right of assembly is an offence, there will be strong tendencies for men to become involved in secret societies, the results of which are always negative. Moreover, this type of organisation is opposed to the development of the proletarian movement because, instead of instructing the workers, these societies subject them to authoritarian, mystical laws which cramp their independence and distort their powers of reason^b—He seeks acceptance of the motion.

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^a See this volume, pp. 427-28.—*Ed.*

^b The rough notes by Martin continue as follows: "Secret societies would annihilate the spirit of the International Association. This is good for the carbonari. They cannot suit the proletarian movement."—*Ed.*

[JENNY MARX'S LETTER TO THE EDITOR
OF WOODHULL & CLAFLIN'S WEEKLY]⁴¹⁸

Madame:

The following private letter (originally written to a friend) may serve the public interest, if by means of it some light is thrown upon the arbitrary proceedings of the present French Government, who, with supreme contempt for personal security and liberty, do not scruple to arrest foreigners, as well as natives, on altogether false pretenses:

*** Monsieur Lafargue, my brother-in-law, his wife^a and children, my youngest sister^b and myself, had spent the months of June and July at Bagnères de Luchon, where we intended remaining until the end of September. I hoped, by a prolonged stay in the Pyrenees, and by a daily use of the mineral waters for which Luchon is famous, to recover from the effects of a severe attack of pleurisy. *Mais dans la République-Thiers l'homme propose et la police dispose.*^c On the first or second day in August, M. Lafargue was informed by a friend that he might daily expect a domiciliary visit of the police, when, if found, he would surely be arrested, on the pretext that he had paid a short visit to Paris during the time of the Commune, had acted as emissary of the International in the Pyrenees, and last, but not least, because he is the husband of his wife, consequently the son-in-law of Karl Marx. Knowing that under the present government of lawyers the law is a dead letter, that persons are continually locked up, no reason whatever being assigned for their arrest, Mr. Lafargue follows the advice given him, crosses the frontier, and settles down

^a Laura Lafargue.—*Ed.*

^b Eleanor Marx.—*Ed.*

^c But in 'Thiers' Republic man proposes and the police dispose.—*Ed.*

at Bosost, a small Spanish town. Several days after his departure, on the 6th of August, Mad. Lafargue, her sister Eleanor and I visit M. Lafargue at Bosost. Mad. Lafargue, finding that her little boy^a is not well enough to leave Bosost on the same day (she was very anxious on the child's account, having lost his brother a few days before), resolved to remain with her husband for a day or two. My sister Eleanor and I therefore returned alone to Luchon.

Without accident we succeeded in getting along the rugged Spanish roads, and safely reached Fos. There the French custom house officials ask us the usual questions and look into our carriage to see whether there are any contraband goods. As we have nothing but our cloaks with us, I tell the coachman to drive on, when an individual no other than the Procureur de la République^b M. le Baron Desagarre—steps forward saying “in the name of the Republic, follow me.” We leave our carriage and enter a small room, where we find a forbidding-looking creature—a most unwomanly woman—waiting to search us. Not wishing to let this coarse-looking person touch us, we offer to take off our dresses ourselves. Of this the woman will not hear. She rushes out of the room, whither she soon returns, followed by the Procureur de la République, who in the most ungentlemanly manner thus apostrophizes my sister: “If you will not allow this woman to search you, I shall do so.” My sister replies: “You have no right to come near a British subject. I have an English passport.” Seeing, however, that an English passport does not count for much, that the bearer of such a passport does not inspire M. le Baron Desagarre with much respect, for he looks as though he were in good earnest, ready to suit his actions to his words, we allow the woman to have her way. She unpicks the very seams of our dresses, makes us take off even our stockings. I fancy I can still feel her spider-like fingers running through my hair. Having only found a newspaper on me and a torn letter on my sister, she runs with these to her friend and ally, M. le Baron Desagarre. We are reconducted to our carriage—our own coachman, who had acted as our “guide” during our whole stay in the Pyrenees, and had grown much attached to us, is forced away, replaced by another coachman, two officers are installed in the carriage opposite us, and thus we are driven off, a cart-full of custom-house officers and police agents following us. After a time, finding, no doubt, that after all we are not such very dangerous characters, that we

^a Charles Étienne Lafargue.—*Ed.*

^b Attorney of the Republic (of the local court).—*Ed.*

do not make any attempts to murder our sentinels, our escort is left behind and we remain in the charge of the two officers in the carriage. Thus guarded, we are driven through village after village, through St. Béat, the inhabitants of which comparatively large town collect in crowds, evidently taking us to be thieves, or, at least, smugglers. At 8 o'clock, thoroughly tired out, we arrive at Luchon, cross the *Quinconces*,^a where hundreds of people are assembled to listen to the band, it being Sunday and the height of the season. Our carriage stops before the hotel of the Prefect, M. le Comte de Kératry. That personage not being at home, still guarded, we are kept waiting before his door for at least half an hour. At length orders are given for us to be taken back to our house, which we find surrounded by gendarmes. We at once go upstairs, wishing to refresh ourselves by washing our faces (we had been out since five o'clock in the morning), but as a gendarme and an agent in plain clothes follow us even into our bedroom, we return to the drawing-room, unrefreshed, to await the arrival of the Prefect. The clock strikes nine, ten; M. de Kératry has not come—he is listening to the band on the *Quinconces*, and, we hear, is determined to stay until the last chord of the music has died away. Meanwhile, quantities of *mouchards*^b drop in; they walk into the room as if it were their own and make themselves quite at home, settling down on our chairs and sofa. Soon we are surrounded by a motley crowd of police agents, which devoted servants of the Republic, it is easy to see, have served their term of apprenticeship under the Empire—they are masters of their honorable calling. They have recourse to impossible tricks and dodges to inveigle us into a conversation, but, finding all their efforts to do so are vain, they stare at us as only “professionals” can stare, until, at half-past ten, the Prefect puts in an appearance, flanked by the Procureur Général, M. Delpech, the Juge d’Instruction, Juge de Paix, the Commissaires of Toulouse and Luchon, etc. My sister is told to step into an adjoining room; the Commissaire of Toulouse and a gendarme accompany her. My interrogatory commences. I refuse to give any information concerning my brother-in-law and other relatives and friends. With regard to myself, I declare I am under medical treatment, and have come to Luchon to take the waters. For more than two hours M. de Kératry by turns exhorts, persuades and at length

^a A park with trees planted in clumps of five according to a certain scheme.—*Ed.*

^b Spies.—*Ed.*

threatens me, that if I choose to persist in my refusal to act as a witness, I shall be looked upon as an accomplice. "To-morrow," he says, "the law will *compel* you to give your deposition on oath; for, let me tell you, M. Lafargue and his wife have been arrested." At this I felt alarmed, because of my sister's sick child.

At length my sister Eleanor's turn comes. I am ordered to turn my back while she speaks. An officer is placed in front of me lest I should attempt to make some sign. To my annoyance I hear my sister is being led by degrees to say yes or no to the numberless questions put to her. Afterward I found out by what means she had been made to speak. Pointing to my written declaration, M. de Kératry (I could not see his gestures, my back being turned,) affirmed the contrary of what I had really said. Therefore, anxious not to contradict me, my sister had not refuted the statements said to have been made by me. It was half-past two before her examination was ended. A young girl of 16, who had been up since five A.M., had traveled nine hours on an intensely hot day in August, and only taken food quite early at Bosost, cross-examined until half-past two in the morning!

For the rest of that night the Commissaire of Toulouse and several gendarmes remained in our house. We went to bed, but not to sleep, for we puzzled our heads as how to get a messenger to go to Bosost to warn M. Lafargue, in case he had not yet been arrested. We looked out of the window. Gendarmes were walking about in the garden. It was impossible to get out of the house. We were close prisoners—not even allowed to see our maid and landlady. On the following day, landlady and servants were examined on oath. I was again questioned for more than an hour by the Procureur Général, M. Delpech, and the Procureur de la République. That tongue-valiant hero, M. le Baron Desagarre, read long extracts to me, pointing out the penalties I am liable to incur by persisting in my refusal to act as witness. The eloquence of these gentlemen was, however, lost on me. I quietly but firmly declared my resolution not to take the oath, and remained unshaken.

My sister's examination only lasted a few minutes this time. She also resolutely refused to take the oath.

Before the Procureur Général left us, we asked for permission to write a few lines to our mother, fearing the news of our arrest might get into the papers and alarm our parents. We offered to write the letter in French, under the very eyes of M. Delpech. It was only to consist of a few sentences, such as we are well, etc. The Procureur refused our request, on the pretext that we might

have a language of our own; that the words—we are well—might convey some hidden meaning.

These magistrates outdid Dogberry and Verges. The following is another instance of their utter imbecility. Having found, as our maid told us, a quantity of commercial letters belonging to M. Lafargue in which reference was made to the exportation of sheep and oxen, they exclaimed: "Oxen, sheep, intrigues, intrigues; sheep—Communists; oxen—Internationals."

For the remainder of that day and night we were again committed to the care of several gendarmes, one of whom ever sat opposite us while we were dining.

On the following day, the 8th, we had a visit from the Prefect and a person whom we supposed to be his Secretary. Of this interview a most inaccurate and fantastical account appeared in the *France*,^a and was from thence transferred into a great number of other papers. But to return to the Prefect.

M. de Kératry, after making a very lengthy preface, informed us most blandly that the authorities had been mistaken; that it had been found that there was no foundation for the charge made against M. Lafargue, who was innocent, and therefore at liberty to return to France. "As for your sister and yourself," said M. de Kératry, thinking, I suppose, that a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush, "there is much more against you than against M. Lafargue" (thus we were being suddenly transformed from witnesses into the accused), "and in all likelihood you will be expelled from France. However, an order from government for your liberation will come in the course of the day." Then, assuming a paternal tone, he said, "Anyhow, let me advise you to moderate your zeal in the future, '*pas trop de zèle!*'" Upon which the supposed secretary said abruptly, "And the International is the association powerful in England?" "Yes," I answered, "most powerful, and so it is in all other countries." "Ah," exclaimed M. de Kératry, "the International is a religion!" Before he made his exit, M. de Kératry once more assured us, on his word of honor, that Paul Lafargue was free, and asked us at once to write to Bosost to tell him so, and to invite him to return to France. Now, I fancied I could see the red ribbon of the Légion d'Honneur adorning the buttonhole of De Kératry, and as I have a notion that the honor of the Knights of the Légion d'Honneur must be something very different to the honor of common mortals, I thought it best to be prudent, and so instead of advising

^a "Luchon, 8 août 1871", *La France*, No. 213, August 12, 1871.—*Ed.*

M. Lafargue to return to Luchon, I intended to do the contrary, and begged of a friend to send him the means wherewith to travel further into Spain.

Followed about by our shadows, the gendarmes, we waited in vain for the promised order for our release. At 11 o'clock at night, the Procureur de la République walked into our room; but instead of bringing us the order for our liberation, M. Desagarre asked us to get ready a trunk and to follow him into "*une maison particulière*":^a I knew this proceeding was illegal—but what could we do? There were only a few women in the house with us, whereas the Procureur was accompanied by several gendarmes. Therefore, not wishing to afford the cowardly bully, M. Desagarre, the satisfaction of using brute force, we gave orders to our weeping maid to get ready our dresses, etc., and having attempted to console the daughter of our landlady by telling her we should soon return, we got into a carriage occupied by two gendarmes, in the dead of night, in a strange country, to be taken whither we knew not.

The *gendarmerie* barracks proved to be our destination; a bedroom having been shown us, our door having been duly barricaded outside, we were left alone. In this place we remained the following day until past five o'clock, when, determined to know what all this meant, I desired to have an interview with the Prefect. M. de Kératry came. I asked him how it was we had been taken to the *gendarmerie* after he had promised us our liberty.

"Thanks to my intercession," answered he, "you have been allowed to spend the night at the *gendarmerie*. The government (M. Thiers) would have sent you to the prison of St. Godins, near Toulouse." Then M. de Kératry handed me a letter containing 2,000 francs, which had been sent to M. Lafargue by his banker at Bordeaux, and which he, M. de Kératry, had hitherto detained; declared we were free, were not to be expelled from France, but, like Mr. Lafargue, at liberty to remain in the country.

This time we were imprudent enough to inform Mad. Lafargue of what M. de Kératry had said with regard to her husband.

On the 10th we received a *laissez-passer* to go over to Spain, but our English passport was not returned us. During ten days we applied for it in vain. M. de Kératry wrote he had sent it to Paris, and could not get it back, though he had repeatedly written for it.

We now saw we had only been turned out of the small *gendarmerie* of Luchon to be locked up in that great *gendarmerie*.

^a To a special place.—*Ed.*

the Republic-Thiers. We were still prisoners. Without a passport there was no getting out of France, in which country we were evidently to be kept, until some event or other should afford a pretext for again arresting us.

The police organs of Toulouse were daily accusing us of acting as emissaries of the International on the French and Spanish frontiers. "But," added they, "the Prefect is taking energetic measures in order to reassure (*pour rassurer*) the inhabitants of the Haute Garonne." Now, it is true, a *laissez-passer* to go over into Spain had been given us, but the experience of Mad. Lafargue in that country was not of a nature to encourage us to seek a refuge in the land of El Cid.

The facts we learned from Madame Lafargue carry us back to the 6th of August.

I mentioned above that our coachman had been compelled to leave us at Fos. Whereupon M. Desagarre, the Procureur de la République, and several "gentlemen" of the police, attempted to persuade him, in the most plausible manner, to return to Bosost, and on false pretenses to get M. Lafargue to go to Fos. Fortunately an honest man is more than a match for half a dozen police agents. The shrewd young fellow guessed there was some trick at the bottom of all this glib talk, and flatly refused to fetch M. Lafargue; consequently gendarmes and douaniers, with the Procureur at their head, set out on an expedition to Bosost. M. le Baron Desagarre, whose discretion is the better part of his valor,^a had previously declared he would not go to Fos to capture M. Lafargue without a sufficient escort; that he could do nothing with one or two gendarmes against a man like M. Lafargue, most likely given to the use of firearms. M. Desagarre was mistaken—not a bullet, but kicks and cuffs were reserved for him. On his return from Bosost he attempted to interfere with peasants celebrating their village feast. The brave mountaineers, who love their freedom as much as their own mountain air, gave the noble Baron a sound thrashing, and sent him about his business, a sadder if not a wiser man! But I am anticipating.

I was saying that M. Desagarre and his followers started for Bosost. They soon reached that town, and soon found out the hotel at which the Lafargues were staying, for the inhabitants of Bosost only possess two hotels, or rather inns. They are not yet sufficiently civilized to have the orthodox number of public houses. Now, while M. Desagarre is standing before the front

^a W. Shakespeare, *King Henry IV*, Part 1, Act 5, Scene 4.—*Ed.*

door of the Hotel Masse, M. Lafargue, aided by his good friends, the peasants, gets out of the house by the back gate, climbs the mountains and escapes along paths known only to guides, goats and English tourists—all the regular roads being guarded by Spanish carabinieri. The Spanish police had enthusiastically taken up the cause of their French brethren. Madame Lafargue is made to feel all the blessings arising from the International Association of the police. At 3 o'clock in the morning her bedroom is suddenly broken into, and in rush four Spanish officers, with their carbines pointed to the bed in which she and her child are sleeping. The poor sick baby, suddenly awakened, frightened, begins to scream; but that doesn't prevent the Spanish officers from looking in every hole and cranny of the room for M. Lafargue. Finally, convinced that their prey has escaped them, they declare they will carry off Madame Lafargue. At this the master of the hotel—a most worthy man—interferes, saying he is sure the Spanish government will not accord the extradition of a lady. He was right. Madame Lafargue was allowed to remain at Bosost, but was ever after subjected to the annoyance of being followed about by police agents. At the hotel a troop of spies established their headquarters. One Sunday even the Prefect and the Procureur de la République took the trouble to travel all the way from Luchon to Bosost for the purpose of seeing Madame Lafargue. As, however, they did not succeed in satisfying their curiosity, they consoled themselves by playing at *rouge et noir*, which, together with baccarat, forms the only serious occupation of the *petits gras*^a from Versailles, now staying at the Pyrenees.

But I must not forget to explain how it was that M. de Kératry had not succeeded in seeing Madame Lafargue. The fact is, that a French peasant from Luchon had informed some Spanish friends of his at Bosost of M. de Kératry's intended visit, and they, of course, at once warned Madame Lafargue.

The French and Spanish population of the Pyrenees form a league, offensive and defensive, against their respective governments. In our case they acted as spies upon the official spies of the Prefect—though repeatedly stopped at the French frontiers, they were untiring in their attempts to bring us news. At length M. de Kératry gave orders to the effect that no one, *not even guides*, should be allowed to cross over to Bosost, unless provided with a proper pass. This measure, of course, did not prevent our having messages brought us as heretofore; it only served to embitter still

^a Young loafers and spendthrifts.—Ed.

more the peasants of the Pyrenees, already so hostile to the rurals of Versailles.¹⁷⁸

In other parts of France I have since heard that the peasants are quite as much opposed to their *so-called* representatives, the governing rurals. M. Thiers fulfills a great revolutionary omission! By means of his prefects, priests, *gardes champêtres*^a and gendarmes he will before long provoke a general rising of the peasantry!

Of M. Lafargue's escape Madame Lafargue had informed us a few days after our release from the *gendarmerie*. Later on, we heard from a native of Bosost that M. Lafargue had been arrested at Huesca, and that the Spaniards had made the offer of his extradition to the French government. On the very day we received this news our English passport was returned us by the Juge de Paix. So, in order to put an end to the state of anxiety in which we knew Madame Lafargue must be placed, tied down as she was to Bosost by her sick child, not knowing what had become of her husband, we at once made up our minds to travel to Huesca, in order to beg the Governor of that district to let us know the real intentions of the Spanish government with respect to M. Lafargue. On reaching St. Sebastian we heard to our joy that M. Lafargue had been set at liberty. So we immediately returned to England.

I cannot conclude this letter without giving a short sketch of the treatment to which Madame C—, our landlady, and the servant were subjected on the 6th of August, during our absence; for, compared with them, we had always been treated with great courtesy. At 11 o'clock in the morning, the Prefect, Procureur Général, Procureur de la République, etc., made a raid upon our house. Enraged at not being able to lay hands on M. Lafargue, they vented their wrath on Madame C—, an invalid, suffering from heart disease in an advanced stage, and upon our maid. That poor girl was treated most roughly, because she would not tell where her master had gone.

This, the Prefect, however, succeeded in learning from a boy, employed by Madame C— as gardener, and whom he straightway sent up to Fos, there to lay in wait for us behind a hedge, in order to give warning of our arrival to the Procureur de la République & Co.

If, during his campaign against the Prussians, M. de Kératry had employed the same art of protecting his flanks and rear from surprise, of surprising detachments of the enemy by establishing

^a Rural police.—*Ed.*

videttes and sending out scouts, things would have gone better in Brittany—that is to say, if one may judge from the success of De Kératry's tactics at Fos!

Our landlady was not allowed to light a fire in her own kitchen; was ordered, instead of sleeping in her bed, to lie down on the floor. With the latter order she, however, refused to comply. Catching hold of her son, a child not three years of age, the Prefect said he must be the son of M. Lafargue. Madame C— repeatedly declared he was mistaken—but in vain; at length, really anxious to prove her child's identity (she feared he might be carried off), she exclaimed: "Why, the boy only speaks the patois of the district." For a moment or two the Prefect looked as if even that argument had failed to convince him. Perhaps M. de Kératry, believing as he does, that the "International is a religion," was pondering on the miracle of the cloven tongues descending on the apostles.^a

One of the reasons why Madame C— was so much ill-used, was because she had never in her life heard of the International, and therefore could not give an account of the doings of that mysterious society at Luchon, which, by the by, would have been an impossible task for the best initiated member—at least previous to the period at which M. de Kératry commenced at Luchon his active propaganda for the International Association. Then Madame C— had been guilty of speaking of her tenant, M. Lafargue, in very high terms. But the head and front of her offending was in her inability to point out hidden bombs and pétroleum.

Yes, it is a fact, bombs and pétroleum were searched for in our house.

Taking up a small night lamp, used for warming the baby's milk, the assembled magistrates examined it; handling it with great caution, as if it were some diabolical machine, by means of which pétroleum might have been discharged into the streets of Paris. From Luchon to Paris. Even Münchhausen never indulged in such a stretch of imagination. The French government are *capable de tout*.^b They really believe in the truth of the wild pétroleum fables—the coinage of their own distempered brains. They do think the women of Paris are "neither brute nor human, neither man nor woman"^c but "pétroleuses"⁴¹⁹—a species of the Salamander, delighting in their native element—fire.

^a The Acts of the Apostles, 2:3.—*Ed.*

^b Capable of everything.—*Ed.*

^c E. A. Poe, *The Bells*, IV.—*Ed.*

They almost come up to Henri de Pène of the *Paris-Journal*, their prophet and teacher, who, as I am told, now actually fancies that the famous letters, manufactured by himself in my father's name, have not been written by Henri de Pène but by Karl Marx.^a

One could afford to treat with silent contempt a government run mad, and to laugh at the farces in which the pottering pantaloons employed by that government play their muddling and meddling parts, did not these farces turn out to be tragedies for thousands of men, women and children. Think only of the "pétroleuses" before the court-martial of Versailles, and of the women who, for the last three months, are being slowly done to death on the pontoons.

Jenny Marx

London, Sept., 1871

First published in the weekly *Woodhull & Claflin's Weekly*, No. 23/75, October 21, 1871

Reproduced from the weekly

^a See this volume, pp. 364-66.—*Ed.*

[RECORD OF MARX'S SPEECH ON THE
SEVENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL]⁴²⁰

[FROM THE NEWSPAPER REPORT ON THE ANNIVERSARY
MEETING IN LONDON ON SEPTEMBER 24, 1871]

Concerning the International, he said that the great success which had hitherto crowned its efforts was due to circumstances over which the members themselves had no control. The foundation of the International itself was the result of these circumstances, and by no means due to the efforts of the men engaged in it. It was not the work of any set of clever politicians: all the politicians in the world could not have created the situation and circumstances requisite for the success of the International. The International had not put forth any particular creed. Its task was to organize the forces of labor and link the various working-men's movements and combine them. The circumstances which had given such a great development to the association were the conditions under which the work-people were more and more oppressed throughout the world, and this was the secret of the success. The events of the last few weeks had unmistakably shown that the working class must fight for its emancipation. The persecutions of the governments against the International were like the persecutions of ancient Rome against the primitive Christians. They, too, had been few in numbers at first, but the patricians of Rome had instinctively felt that if the Christians succeeded the Roman empire would be lost. The persecutions of Rome had not saved the empire, and the persecutions of the present day against the International would not save the existing state of things.

What was new in the International was that it was established by the working men themselves and for themselves. Before the foundation of the International all the different organizations had

been societies founded by some radicals among the ruling classes for the working classes, but the International was established by the working men for themselves. The Chartist movement⁴⁰⁹ in this country had been started with the consent and assistance of middle-class radicals, though if it had been successful it could only have been for the advantage of the working class. England was the only country where the working class was sufficiently developed and organized to turn universal suffrage to its own proper account. He then alluded to the revolution of February⁴²¹ as a movement that had been favored by a portion of the bourgeoisie against the ruling party. The revolution of February had only given promises to the working classes and had replaced one set of men of the ruling class by another. The insurrection of June had been a revolt against the whole ruling class, including the most radical portion. The working men who had lifted the new men into power in 1848 had instinctively felt that they had only exchanged one set of oppressors for another and that they were betrayed.

The last movement was the Commune, the greatest that had yet been made, and there could not be two opinions about it—the Commune was the conquest of the political power of the working classes. There was much misunderstanding about the Commune. The Commune could not found a new form of class government. In destroying the existing conditions of oppression by transferring all the means of labor to the productive laborer, and thereby compelling every able-bodied individual to work for a living, the only base for class rule and oppression would be removed. But before such a change could be effected a proletarian dictatorship would become necessary, and the first condition of that was a proletarian army. The working classes would have to conquer the right to emancipate themselves on the battlefield. The task of the International was to organize and combine the forces of labor for the coming struggle.

NOTES
AND
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NOTES

- ¹ The first Address (The General Council of the International Workingmen's Association on the War) was written by Marx between July 19 and 23, 1870. On July 19, 1870, when the Franco-Prussian war broke out, the General Council instructed Marx to draft an address on the war, of which Marx informed Engels in his letter of July 20 (see present edition, Vol. 44). The Address was adopted by the Standing Committee of the General Council on July 23, and then unanimously approved at the Council meeting on July 26, 1870. It was first published in English, in the London *Pall Mall Gazette*, No. 1702, July 28, 1870, and a few days later it appeared as a leaflet in 1,000 copies. The Address was reprinted, in full or in part, by a number of British provincial newspapers.

As the first edition of the Address was quickly sold out, on August 2, 1870, the General Council resolved to have additional 1,000 copies printed. In September that year, the first Address was published in English again, together with the General Council's second Address on the Franco-Prussian war. In this edition, Marx corrected the misprints that had occurred in the first edition of the first Address.

On August 9, the General Council appointed a commission to have the first Address translated into German and French and then distributed. The commission included Marx, Jung, Serrailier and Eccarius. The first German translation of the Address, made by Wilhelm Liebknecht, appeared in *Der Volksstaat* (Leipzig), No. 63, August 7, 1870. Marx edited it heavily and made a new translation of more than half the text. The new German translation of the Address was published in *Der Vorbote* (Geneva), No. 8, August 1870, and as a leaflet. Then it appeared in the *Arbeiter Union* (New York), August 12; *Die Tagwacht* (Zurich), No. 26, August 13; the *Volkswille* (Vienna), No. 26, August 13, and the *Proletarier* (Augsburg), No. 56, August 21. By the twentieth anniversary of the Paris Commune in 1891, Engels had the General Council's first and second addresses published in the book K. Marx, *Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich*, 3rd German edition, Berlin, 1891, Vorwärts Publishing House. The translation of the two addresses for this edition was made by Louise Kautsky and edited by Engels.

The French translation of the Address appeared in *L'Égalité* (Geneva), No. 28, August 6, 1870; *L'Internationale* (Brussels), No. 82, August 7, 1870.

and *Le Mirabeau* (Verviers), No. 55, August 7, 1870. The Address was also published as a leaflet in the French translation made by the General Council's commission.

The first Russian translation of the first Address was published in *Narodnoye Dyelo* (People's Cause) (Geneva), No. 6-7, August-September 1870.

In this volume, the first Address is reproduced from the first edition of the English leaflet, checked against its second edition and the text of the German 1870 authorised edition and that of 1891. The most important textual differences are marked by footnotes.

p. 3

- ² In May 1870, Napoleon III's government held a plebiscite in an attempt to strengthen the tottering regime of the Second Empire. The issues put to the vote were formulated in such a way that disapproval of the policy pursued by the Second Empire could not be expressed without opposing democratic reforms at the same time. Despite this demagogic manoeuvre, the plebiscite showed the growing opposition: 1.5 million voted against the government, 1.9 million abstained. During the preparations for the plebiscite, the government organised a broad campaign of repressions against the working class movement, scaring the middle-class sections with the threat of a revolution.

On April 24, 1870, the Paris Federation of the International and the Federal Chamber of Workers' Trades Associations in Paris issued a manifesto exposing the Bonapartist plebiscite manoeuvre and called on the workers to abstain from voting. On the eve of the plebiscite many members of the Paris Federation were arrested on a charge faked by the police of plotting to assassinate Napoleon III (see present edition, Vol. 43, Engels' letter to Marx of May 8, 1870). The government used this charge for organising a broad campaign of persecution and harassment of the International's members in various French towns. In this connection, the General Council, at its meeting on May 3, 1870, adopted the Address "Concerning the Persecution of the Members of the French Sections", written by Marx (see present edition, Vol. 21), which exposed the Bonapartist police's libellous charges. At the third trial of the Paris Federation members, held from June 22 to July 5, 1870, the false character of these charges was fully disclosed. Nevertheless, a number of members of the International in France were sentenced to imprisonment merely for affiliation to the International Working Men's Association.

Persecution of the International in France caused mass protests by the working class.

pp. 3, 273

- ³ A reference to the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, which gave birth to the Second Empire.

p. 4

- ⁴ A reference to the *Society of December 10* (called so after Louis Bonaparte, the Society's patron, who, on December 10, 1848, was elected President of the French Republic)—a secret Bonapartist Society, founded in 1848, mainly of declassed elements, political adventurers, militarists, etc. Though the Society was formally dissolved in November 1850, its members continued to conduct their Bonapartist propaganda and were instrumental in effecting the coup d'état of December 2, 1851 (see Note 3). A detailed description of this Society can be found in Marx's work *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 148-51).

A chauvinist demonstration in support of Louis Bonaparte's predatory plans took place on July 14, 1870.

p. 5

- ⁵ A reference to Bismarck's policy during the preparations for and the unleashing of the Austro-Prussian war of 1866. Bismarck used the contradictions between Austria and France to secure Napoleon III's neutrality in this war. The war ended in a victory for Prussia and led to the formation of the North German Confederation (see Note 9), under the supremacy of militarist Prussia. This was a major step towards the unification of Germany under the auspices of the Prussian monarchy.

The decisive battle of the Austro-Prussian war was fought on July 3, 1866, not far from the village of Sadowa, at the town of Königgrätz (Hradec Králové). The Austrian troops suffered a major defeat.

On the course of the Austro-Prussian war, see Engels' series of articles "Notes on the War in Germany" (present edition, Vol. 20). p. 5

- ⁶ This refers to the war waged by the German people against Napoleon I's rule in 1813-14. p. 6

- ⁷ The workers' meetings in Brunswick and Chemnitz on July 16 and 17, 1870 respectively, were organised by the leaders of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party in protest against the predatory policy of the ruling classes. p. 6

- ⁸ *Notes on the War* is one of Engels' major works on the military question in which he analysed the events of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 from the position of historical materialism. These constitute a series of 59 closely connected articles, written in the form of military surveys. Forty of them are entitled *Notes on the War* and are numbered correspondingly; the rest have different titles.

The immediate incentive to write these articles was provided by the proposal to send military reviews to *The Pall Mall Gazette*, made to Marx by Thieblin (Taran), a contributor to the newspaper. In a letter of July 20, 1870 Marx passed on the proposal to Engels (see present edition, Vol. 44). Engels sent the first three articles to Marx, who read them and forwarded them to the editors. To speed up publication, Engels sent the subsequent articles directly to the newspaper's editorial board.

Engels wrote the articles immediately after the events took place. As *The Pall Mall Gazette* appeared in the evening, his articles, written in the morning and posted from Manchester to London, were often published the same day. Engels made a thorough study of all the material available on the military operations: reports by English, German and French newspapers, the latest telegrams from France and Germany. Though these reports were incomplete and contradictory, he succeeded in presenting the real course of military operations, despite inaccuracies in certain details, which are inevitable in such circumstances. Marx's and Engels' letters from July to the end of September 1870, when Engels moved from Manchester to London and their regular correspondence stopped, contain information on Engels' work on this series of articles, his appraisals and forecasts concerning individual operations, the character of the war in general. The ideas Engels expressed in his letters were developed in his articles.

When Engels began the *Notes on the War*, he intended writing two articles a week. After the first three articles aroused the readers' keen interest and attracted the attention of the press, the *Pall Mall Gazette* editor Greenwood proposed that Engels send as many articles as he could; during periods of the most active military actions, Engels wrote three and even four articles a week.

Greenwood repeatedly made changes in Engels' text without his consent. As Engels pointed out, he arbitrarily changed various military terms in the *Notes on the War.—III*, which clearly showed Greenwood's incompetence in military terminology (see Engels' letter to Marx of August 3, 1870, present edition, Vol. 44), and, besides, he added a paragraph at the end of the *Notes on the War.—XIII* (see Note 45).

Notes on the War appeared in *The Pall Mall Gazette* from July 29, 1870 to February 18, 1871; with the exception of the first three articles, signed "Z", they were published unsigned, and Engels' authorship was known to only a few people. Marx valued the *Notes* highly. "Both your last articles [II and III] are splendid", "your articles ... are masterfully written" [XVI-XVII], he praised Engels in his letters of August 1 and September 10, 1870. The articles were a great success. Marx informed Engels on September 30, 1870 that *The Spectator* had declared his articles "the only significant ones in the English press". A number of newspapers reproduced them in their reviews. Among Engels' friends the nickname "General" stuck with him.

These articles on the Franco-Prussian war were not republished during Engels' lifetime. Victor Adler, one of the Austrian Social-Democratic leaders, kept cuttings from *The Pall Mall Gazette* with Engels' autograph. Only in 1923 were Engels' articles published in Vienna as a separate, lithographic, edition in English, under the general title *Notes on the War*.

In this volume, *Notes on the War* are reproduced from *The Pall Mall Gazette*, checked against the sources used by Engels. Minor misprints and inaccuracies of transcriptions have been silently corrected.

p. 9

⁹ The *North German Confederation* (Norddeutscher Bund)—a federative state formed in 1867 after Prussia's victory in the Austro-Prussian war (see Note 5) to replace the disintegrated German Confederation (see Note 27). The North German Confederation included 19 states and three free cities, which were formally recognised as autonomous. The Constitution of the North German Confederation secured Prussia's domination within it: the King of Prussia was declared President of the Confederation and Commander-in-Chief of the Confederate armed forces; he was also to direct its foreign policy. The legislative powers of the Reichstag, elected by so-called universal suffrage (women, soldiers and servants had no vote), were very limited: the laws it passed came into force only after being approved by the Bundesrat, which was reactionary in its composition, and confirmed by the President (Engels described the 1867 Constitution in his "The Role of Force in History", see present edition, Vol. 26). Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt, which initially remained outside the Confederation, joined it in 1870. The establishment of the North German Confederation was a major step towards the national unification of Germany. The Confederation ceased to exist in January 1871, when the German Empire was formed.

pp. 11, 302

¹⁰ Engels is here referring to the duchies of Schleswig and Lauenburg, which came under Prussian rule as a result of the war between Prussia and Denmark in 1864 (see Note 64), and also the Kingdom of Hanover, the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel, the Grand Duchy of Nassau, the free city of Frankfurt am Main, the Duchy of Holstein and certain parts of Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt, annexed by Prussia after her victory over Austria in 1866 (see Note 5).

p. 11

¹¹ *Landwehr*—a second line army reserve formed in Prussia during the struggle against Napoleonic rule. In the 1870s, it consisted of men under forty years of

- age who had seen active service and had been in the reserve of the first line. In peacetime, the Landwehr units were called up only for training for a certain period, while in wartime they served in the rear and in garrisons. During the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, the Landwehr was used in military actions on a par with the regular troops. p. 11
- ¹² *Mitrailleuse*—a multi-barrelled, high-speed gun placed on a carriage. The mitrailleuse used in the French army in 1870-71 had 25 barrels that fired in a succession with the help of a special mechanism. It could shoot in a minute up to 175 shots with carbine cartridges. However the experience of the Franco-Prussian war proved it unsuited to field conditions because of deficiencies in its construction. p. 12
- ¹³ The *Zouaves* (from the name of an Algerian tribe)—French light infantry first formed in 1830 as colonial troops. They were originally composed of Algerians and French colonists, but later of Frenchmen only, while Algerians were formed into special regiments of riflemen (see *Turcos* below). Three Zouave regiments of the MacMahon corps took part in the war of 1870-71.
Turcos—French light infantry formed in the early 1840s of native inhabitants of Algeria, except the officers and partly non-commissioned officers. p. 12
- ¹⁴ The *garde mobile* (mobile national guard)—special armed forces introduced in France in 1848. From 1868 onwards, it was made up of men who had reached a call-up age but were not enlisted for active service or in the reserve; it was assigned the defence of the frontiers, service in the rear and garrison service. In wartime, the *garde mobile* was made up of 20- to 40-year-olds. In 1870, it was called up for active service for the first time and formed the core of the French armed forces after the fall of the Empire. The *garde mobile* was abolished in 1872. p. 13
- ¹⁵ The French command intended to form a corps for landing on Germany's Baltic coast. The course of the military operations frustrated this plan, however, and the landing troops were used for other operations (see this volume, pp. 35, 37, 67). p. 13
- ¹⁶ A reference to the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 (see Note 5). p. 14
- ¹⁷ This and many other forecasts made by Engels concerning the possible course of military operations proved completely true. At the beginning of August, the area here mentioned became the scene of the first major battles of the Franco-Prussian war (see this volume, pp. 27-31). p. 16
- ¹⁸ At the *Battle of Solferino* (Northern Italy), fought on June 24, 1859, during the war between the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont) and France, on the one hand, and Austria, on the other, the French and Piedmontese forces defeated the Austrian troops and this decided the outcome of the war in their favour. Engels analysed the course of the battle in his articles "The Battle at Solferino", "Historical Justice" and "The Battle of Solferino" (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 392-403). pp. 16, 300
- ¹⁹ Engels obtained this information through his friend Eduard Gumpert, a German physician, who lived in Manchester. His cousin was a company commander of the 77th regiment in the vanguard of the German 7th Army Corps (see Engels' letter to Marx of July 31, 1870, present edition, Vol. 44). p. 20

- ²⁰ At the *Battle of Wissembourg*, on August 4, 1870, three German corps of the Third Army under Frederick William, Crown Prince of Prussia, used the dispersal of the French troops to their advantage, attacking and defeating the French division under Douay, of MacMahon's 1st Corps, which was considerably inferior in strength. This victory opened the way for Frederick William's army to advance on Alsace. p. 25
- ²¹ The *Chassepôt*—a breech-loading rifle named after its inventor, was adopted by the French army in 1866. It had high combat efficiency for the time and was much superior to Dreyse's needle-gun used in the Prussian army. pp. 26, 120
- ²² The *Battle of Woerth* (Alsace) was one of the first major engagements of the Franco-Prussian war. It was fought on August 6, 1870 by Marshal MacMahon's troops and the German Third Army, which was over three times stronger than the French. The French troops were defeated and retreated to Châlons-sur-Marne. As a result the Germans were able to outflank Bazaine's army, near Metz, from the south. pp. 28, 103
- ²³ At the *Battle of Magenta* (near Milan) on June 4, 1859, during the war between the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont) and France, on the one hand, and Austria, on the other, the French troops defeated the Austrian army, captured Magenta and then entered Milan; as a result, the Austrians were forced to evacuate the greater part of Lombardy (see also Note 18). Engels described this battle in his articles "Military Events", "The Austrian Defeat" and "A Chapter of History" (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 364-79). p. 28
- ²⁴ At the *Battle of Forbach* (Lorraine) on August 6, 1870, the German troops of the First Army under General Steinmetz defeated the French 2nd Corps under General Frossard. The capture of Forbach secured domination over the department of Moselle and opened up the way to Lorraine. MacMahon's army found itself cut off from that of Bazaine. In historical literature this battle is also called the battle of Spicheren. Later Engels uses this name too. pp. 29, 103
- ²⁵ Engels is referring to one of the episodes in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 (see Note 5). After being defeated at Sadowa on July 3, the Austrian troops retreated to Olmütz (Czech: Olomouc) in order to divert the Prussian army from its advance on Vienna. This plan was a failure, because the Prussian troops left a covering force at Olmütz and advanced on the Austrian capital. p. 34
- ²⁶ A reference to the anti-Bonapartist demonstrations by the Paris *garde mobile* battalions, consisting of workers and petty bourgeoisie, which took place in the camp of Châlons at the beginning of August 1870. p. 35
- ²⁷ The *German Confederation*—a union of German states formed by decision of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and originally consisting of 35 states and four free cities. It had neither a centralised army nor finances and retained all the main features of feudal fragmentation; its only central body—the Federal Diet—was presided over by a representative of Austria, had limited powers and served as a tool for the reactionary forces in the struggle against the revolutionary movement. The German Confederation fell apart during the 1848-49 revolution, was restored in 1850, and finally ceased to exist during the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 (see Note 5) when the North German Confederation was established (see Note 9). p. 36
- ²⁸ A reference to the battle of Forbach (Spicheren) (see Note 24). p. 38

- ²⁹ The defeats of the French army at Forbach and Woerth, which revealed the rottenness of the Second Empire regime, led to spontaneous popular anti-government demonstrations in Paris, Lyons, Marseilles and other cities on August 7 to 9, 1870. A great manifestation took place in Paris on August 9. Numerous crowds, mainly of workers, surrounded the premises of the Corps Législatif and demanded a republic and arming of the people. The government made wide use of gendarmes and regular troops to disperse the demonstrations. To ward off the danger of a revolution, the Ollivier Cabinet was replaced by the Palikao government, which dubbed itself the "Ministry of National Defence" and consisted of rabid Bonapartists. The bourgeois republicans, "Left"-wing deputies to the Corps Législatif (Ferri, Gambetta and others), frightened by the prospect of a popular revolution, refused to support the masses and, in fact, helped preserve the Bonapartist regime. p. 41
- ³⁰ Engels is referring to the reorganisation of the French army, carried out by the revolutionary government—the Committee of Public Safety (in which Carnot was responsible for the war and the army)—under the Jacobin dictatorship in 1793-94. An important part was played in this reorganisation by the Convention's commissars sent to the army. In keeping with the Convention's decree of August 23, 1793 calling for a general mobilisation, the strength of the revolutionary armies had increased greatly by the end of the year to exceed 600,000; volunteers' battalions merged with regular troops; old-time officers were replaced by men who enjoyed the soldiers' confidence. The Jacobin government organised the production of arms and ammunition on a large scale. All these measures enabled the French army to win several victories and clear French territory of the interventionists by the spring of 1794. p. 47
- ³¹ A reference to the armies of the first European counter-revolutionary coalition, which invaded France in 1793-94. The coalition included Austria, Prussia, the Kingdom of Sardinia, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Spain and the Kingdom of Naples. p. 47
- ³² Engels means the *Battle of Colombey-Neuilly* (also called the *Battle of Borny*), fought on August 14, 1870 east of Metz by the French Army of the Rhine under Marshal Bazaine and the troops of the German First Army under Steinmetz. A detailed description of this battle is to be found in *Notes on the War.—XI* (see this volume, pp. 61-62). p. 49
- ³³ The *Battle of Mars-la-Tour* (below, on p. 136, called the *Battle of Vionville*) took place on August 16, 1870 between the French Army of the Rhine under Bazaine and the troops of the German First and Second armies. The losses on both sides were nearly equal, but strategically victory was on the German side. Having occupied the shortest route to Verdun, the Germans managed to prevent the French Army of the Rhine from continuing its retreat from Metz. The details of the battle are given in the *Notes on the War.—XI* (see this volume, pp. 64-65). p. 53
- ³⁴ *Francs-tireurs*—guerrilla volunteers formed into small detachments to defend France against the invaders. Such detachments were first formed during the wars against the anti-French coalitions in the late 18th and early 19th century. In 1867, in connection with the growing threat of war with Germany, societies of francs-tireurs were again set up in the country. When the Franco-Prussian war broke out and Prussian troops invaded French territory, francs-tireurs were called to arms by special decree. After the French regular troops were defeated and blockaded in fortresses, the number of francs-tireurs' detachments increased

sharply. They mainly attacked enemy transports, weak detachments, trains, and food depots and caused considerable damage to the enemy. pp. 54, 582

- ³⁵ At the *Battle of Jena* (Thuringia) on October 14, 1806, during the Russo-Prussian-French war of 1806-07, the French troops under Napoleon I defeated a part of the Prussian army. The same day, the troops of Marshal Davout routed the main Prussian forces at Auerstadt. The French continued to pursue the enemy and the overwhelming majority of Prussians were taken prisoner, which led to Prussia's capitulation to Napoleonic France.

pp. 57, 103, 167

- ³⁶ Engels is quoting King William's telegram about the German troops' victory over the French Army of the Rhine at Gravelotte on August 18, 1870 according to the report "Bivouac near Bezanville, Aug. 18, 9 p.m." in *The Times*, No. 26834, August 20. After the Battle of Gravelotte (also known in historical literature as the battle of Saint Privat) the Army of the Rhine was blockaded at Metz. Engels gives details of this battle in his *Notes on the War.—XI* (see this volume, p. 60).

p. 58

- ³⁷ A reference to the battles of Colombey-Nouilly-Borny (see Note 32), Vionville-Mars-la-Tour (see Note 33) and Gravelotte-Saint Privat (see Note 36).

p. 61

- ³⁸ Presumably Engels has in mind letters from a relative of his friend Eduard Gumpert (see Note 19). The 7th Army Corps, in which he served, participated in the Battle of Colombey-Nouilly.

p. 61

- ³⁹ In June 1796, during Bonaparte's Italian campaign (1796-97), a part of the French troops besieged Mantua (Northern Italy), which was defended by an Austrian garrison, while the main French forces acted against the Austrian troops that were trying to relieve the blockaded fortress. In September 1796, the Austrian army under Wurmser was defeated by Bonaparte and took cover in Mantua; in February 1797, after a long siege and blockade, the troops in Mantua were compelled to surrender owing to a lack of provisions.

In October 1805, during the war of Napoleonic France against the third European coalition, the Austrian army under Mack in the Ulm fortress was encircled, as a result of Napoleon I's skilful manoeuvring, and was compelled to surrender.

p. 65

- ⁴⁰ After winning a victory at Jena and Auerstadt in October 1806 (see Note 35), the vanguard of Napoleon I's troops forestalled the retreating Prussian troops and prevented their taking Stettin (Polish name Szczecin) and forcing the Oder; the remainder of the Prussian army routed in the campaign was compelled to capitulate.

p. 69

- ⁴¹ As Engels foresaw, at Sedan, situated on the southern boundary of the area he specified, the Prussian troops on September 1 and 2, 1870 defeated the French army under MacMahon, cut off its way of retreat and forced it to capitulate. Engels thus not only forecast the possibility of the Sedan catastrophe, but also pointed quite accurately to the place where it was to happen.

p. 69

- ⁴² This is a name used in France for generals and officers who made their military career in the colonial wars against Algerian tribes fighting for independence (see Note 59). MacMahon took an active part in these wars in which the French command practised barbaric raids on Algerian tribes and brutally exterminated the local population, thereby breaking treaties and refusing to recognise the enemy as a belligerent party.

p. 69

- ⁴³ In March 1814, during the war against the sixth European coalition, after Napoleon I had lost the battles of Laon and Arcis-sur-Aube, and Blücher and Schwarzenberg had combined their armies against him, Napoleon resolved to attack the enemy from the rear and to halt their advance on Paris, cutting their communication lines with the Rhine with his main forces. The allies, however, who were far superior in strength and aware of the growing discontent in Paris with Napoleon's regime, kept advancing on the French capital and occupied it on March 31, 1814, thus accelerating the fall of the Empire. p. 72
- ⁴⁴ As Engels predicted, the German troops of the Third and Fourth (Maas) armies moved north following MacMahon's Châlons army, which retreated to Sedan and was forced to surrender after being encircled (see Note 49). p. 73
- ⁴⁵ At the end of this article, the *Pall Mall Gazette* editor, Greenwood, added a paragraph that is omitted in the present edition. It read: "There is every appearance that the siege of Strasbourg will soon be brought to an end by the reduction of the fortress. The Germans are clearly quite in earnest about it. The bombardment had yesterday morning been kept up from the side of Kehl day and night for three days. At the same time the Prussians had pushed their advanced posts to within 500 to 800 yards of the fortress. The arsenal has been fired, and some heavy guns just placed in position will be immediately brought to bear on the place." In a letter to Marx on September 4, 1870 Engels wrote that, in order to fill up space, Greenwood had added to the article "a few quite absurd lines about the siege of Strasbourg. On the first suitable occasion I'll write an article on this and express a quite opposite view" (see present edition, Vol. 44). Engels fulfilled his intention in the *Notes on the War.—XVII* (see this volume, pp. 91-94). p. 73
- ⁴⁶ At the *Battle of Dembe Wielkie*, a village near Warsaw, on March 18, 1831, during the Polish national liberation insurrection of 1830-31, the insurgent Poles won a victory over the Tsarist troops, who suffered considerable losses and were forced to retreat. p. 79
- ⁴⁷ The *Battle of Nouart* was fought on Monday, August 29, 1870, by the vanguard of the 12th North German and 5th French Corps. At the *Battle of Beaumont* on August 30, 1870, the troops of the 4th and 12th North German corps and the 1st Bavarian Corps defeated the French 5th Corps of General de Failly, which acted as part of MacMahon's Châlons Army. Both battles were stages in the Prussian military operation against MacMahon's Army of Châlons, leading to the latter's capitulation at Sedan. p. 79
- ⁴⁸ Engels is referring to the abortive attempt made on August 31-September 1, 1870 by the Army of the Rhine to break through from Metz along the right bank of the Moselle in a north-easterly direction. As a result of the battles, known as the engagements at Noisseville, both parties remained at their former positions. p. 82
- ⁴⁹ On September 1, 1870, a final battle was fought between the Third and Fourth Prussian armies and MacMahon's Châlons Army, in which the French army was encircled by the Prussians and defeated. The French incurred heavy losses: 3,000 killed and 14,000 wounded. On September 2, the French command signed an act of capitulation according to which over 80,000 soldiers, officers and generals, headed by Napoleon III, surrendered.

The Sedan catastrophe speeded up the collapse of the Second Empire and the proclamation of the republic in France on September 4, 1870.

With the defeat of the French regular armies and the proclamation of the republic, when the predatory aspirations of the Prussian military, Junkers and the bourgeoisie became quite obvious, the war completely lost its defensive character on Prussia's part. From that moment on, one of the major tasks of the international proletariat was to organise support for France in her defensive war against the Prussian invaders. The changed character of the war and the tasks facing the proletariat in view of this were considered by Marx in the General Council's Second Address on the Franco-Prussian war (see this volume, pp. 263-70). p. 82, 300

- ⁵⁰ *Glacis*—an artificial slope running down from the top of a counterscarp so as to expose attackers to firing from ramparts (see this volume, p. 104). p. 87

- ⁵¹ *Dantzic (Gdańsk)* was besieged twice during Napoleon I's wars against the anti-French coalitions of European states.

From March to May 1807, during Napoleon's war against the fourth European coalition, the city garrison, consisting of Prussian troops and a Russian allied detachment, put up a stubborn resistance to the besieging French corps. The garrison was supported by another Russian detachment which attempted to break through the blockade. Dantzic surrendered because of lack of military stocks, on the condition that its garrison could freely evacuate the fortress.

In early 1813, the troops of Russia and Prussia, members of the sixth European coalition, surrounded Dantzic, which was occupied by Napoleonic troops and was staunchly defended. Dantzic resisted for about a year and withstood three regular sieges, but finally had to surrender. p. 88

- ⁵² The *Quadrilateral*—a strongly fortified position formed by the North Italian fortresses of Verona, Legnago, Mantua and Peschiera. The Quadrilateral played an important role as a strongpoint in the nineteenth-century wars. During the 1848-49 bourgeois revolution in Italy, Verona, which occupied a favourable strategic position and covered the way to Austria, was the main operational base of Radetzky's counter-revolutionary Austrian army in its actions against the Piedmontese troops (see present edition, Vol. 16, pp. 183-89 and 227-31). p. 88

- ⁵³ The *siege of Sebastopol* (during the Crimean war, 1853-56) by the allied forces of France, Britain, Turkey and Sardinia lasted from September 25, 1854 to September 8, 1855. p. 88

- ⁵⁴ *Demi-lune*—works to defend the entrance to a fort and inside the line of the main ditch.

Curtain—a wall or rampart extending between two neighbouring bastions (see also this volume, p. 101). p. 88

- ⁵⁵ *Horn-work* and *Crown-work*—auxiliary outworks before the main rampart of a fortress. p. 88

- ⁵⁶ At the *Battle of Waterloo* (Belgium) on June 18, 1815 Napoleon I's army was routed by the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian armies under Wellington and Blücher, and this decided the final victory of the seventh anti-French coalition (Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, Spain and other states). pp. 92, 103

⁵⁷ *National Guard*—an armed civilian militia, first formed in Paris at the beginning of the French Revolution, which existed, with intervals, till August 1871. In time of Napoleon I it was used as an auxiliary military force in his campaigns of 1809 and 1814-15; from 1868, to distinguish it from *garde mobile* (see Note 14), it was sometimes called the *Sedentary National Guard*. It consisted of men relieved from active service and older reservists. The National Guard defended Paris when it was besieged during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71. After the revolution of March 18, 1871 a Central Committee of the Guard was elected to direct the major part of it; later this function was performed by the Commune Military Delegation. The National Guard was disbanded soon after the fall of the Paris Commune. p. 92

⁵⁸ Engels has in mind the following events: Austria's victory over Piedmontese forces in the Austro-Italian war of 1848-49, during the Italian bourgeois revolution, and a number of defeats sustained by Austrian troops when suppressing the Hungarian bourgeois revolution of 1848-49; operations of the army sent by the Tsarist government of Russia to support the Austrian Habsburgs in Hungary in 1849; and Prussian intervention in Southern Germany to put down the Baden-Palatinate uprising in 1849. p. 95

⁵⁹ The reference is to the war of the mountain-dwellers of the Northern Caucasus against Tsarist Russia which began at the end of the 1820s. It was caused by the Tsarist colonisation policy and the oppressive rule of local feudal lords who were supported by the Tsarist government. The war was very arduous and continued for decades. The last stronghold of the mountain-dwellers fell in 1859.

The Algerian people put up a stubborn resistance to the French colonialists; it took more than two decades before the country was conquered. pp. 95, 193

⁶⁰ The *system of substitutes* was, for a long time, widely employed in the French army; it was a privilege of the propertied classes, allowing them to buy themselves substitutes for military service. The system was prohibited during the French Revolution (1789-93), but was restored by Napoleon I. Certain changes were introduced into it in April 1855. According to the new legislation, the substitutes, if they were not close relatives of the men called up for military service, were appointed officially and the money for them donated to a special army fund. The 1868 legislation legitimatised the system of substitutes, used by approximately 20 thousand people every year. The system was abolished in 1872. p. 96

⁶¹ Engels refers to the Austro-Italo-French war between the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont) and France, on the one hand, and Austria, on the other (April 29 to July 8, 1859). It was launched by Napoleon III, who, under the banner of the "liberation of Italy", strove for aggrandizement and sought to strengthen the Bonapartist regime in France with the help of a successful military campaign. The Piedmontese ruling circles hoped that French support would enable them to unite Italy, without the participation of the masses, under the aegis of the Savoy dynasty ruling in Piedmont. The Austrian army was defeated at Magenta and Solferino (see Notes 18 and 23). However, Napoleon III, frightened by the scale of the national liberation movement in Italy and not willing to promote its unification, abruptly ceased hostilities. On July 11, the French and the Austrian emperor concluded a separate preliminary peace in

Villafranca. As a result of the war, France gained Savoy and Nice, Lombardy joined the Kingdom of Sardinia, and Austria was allowed to retain Venice (up to 1866). p. 96

- ⁶² The 1850 mobilisation of the Prussian army was a result of the intensification of the struggle between Austria and Prussia for domination in Germany. Prussia, however, was compelled to abandon the idea of military operations and capitulate (the Agreement of Olmütz or Olomouc of November 2, 1850) owing to the serious shortcomings in its military system, exposed during the mobilisation, and also its obsolete armaments, as well as vigorous opposition by Russia, which supported Austria in the conflict.

Engels ironically compares the failure of Prussian diplomacy with the defeat of the Roman legions at the Caudine Forks, near the ancient Roman town of Caudium, in 321 B.C., during the second Samnite war. The Samnites compelled the Romans to go under the yoke, which was the greatest disgrace for a defeated army. Hence the expression "to pass through the Caudine yoke", meaning to undergo extreme humiliation. p. 97

- ⁶³ In February 1860 the majority of the Second Chamber (the chamber of representatives) in the Prussian Landtag refused to approve the army reorganisation project submitted by War Minister von Roon. The government, however, soon succeeded in obtaining the Chamber's approval for large allocations to "maintain the army ready for action" and used them for the planned reorganisation of the army. When, in March 1862, the Chamber's liberal majority did not sanction military expenditures, the government dissolved the Landtag and called new elections. At the end of September 1862, Bismarck was appointed Prime Minister; the new government dissolved the Landtag in October and initiated a military reform without parliamentary approval of the necessary outlays. p. 98

- ⁶⁴ The *Danish war* waged by Prussia and Austria against Denmark in 1864 brought Germany's unification under the Prussian auspices nearer. Bismarck's Junker government aimed to annex Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg, which belonged to Denmark but were inhabited mostly by Germans; to strengthen Prussian influence in Germany and to suppress the opposition of the liberal bourgeoisie. Austria, which likewise intended to seize the duchies, also took part in the war. The war ended with a defeat for Denmark. The duchies were proclaimed a condominium and were to be administrated jointly by Prussia (Schleswig and Lauenburg) and Austria (Holstein). After the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 (see Note 5) the three duchies were annexed to Prussia. p. 98

- ⁶⁵ Large-scale re-planning and reconstruction of Paris, headed by Haussmann, prefect of the Seine department, took place in the 1850s-1860s. Apart from improving housing for the wealthy, the purpose of the works was to widen old streets and build new straight ones to make it easier for the troops to manoeuvre and the artillery to fire in the event of popular uprisings. Large sums from the allocations were misappropriated by Haussmann and his subordinates. p. 98

- ⁶⁶ This saying, which Napoleon I was fond of, was also used before him by Marshal Turenne, Voltaire and Frederick of Prussia. p. 104

- ⁶⁷ This and the following articles of the *Notes on the War* were written by Engels in London, having moved from Manchester on September 20, 1870. p. 108

- ⁶⁸ Engels refers to the following events in the wars of the sixth and seventh coalitions of the European states against Napoleonic France: the capitulation of Paris on March 31, 1814 after the defeat of the French troops defending it against the Russian and Prussian armies, and also its surrender, without struggle, to English and Prussian forces on July 3, 1815. p. 108
- ⁶⁹ On September 19, 1870, the 14th Corps of the French Army, under the command of General Ducrot, made a sally to prevent the German troops from seizing strategically important heights to the south of Paris. The battle of Châtillon resulted in a defeat for the French, who retreated in confusion. Paris was surrounded by Prussians. For details see *Notes on the War.—XXI*, p. 121 of this volume. p. 108
- ⁷⁰ The negotiations between Bismarck and Jules Favre, spokesman of the Government of National Defence, took place in Ferrières on September 19-20, 1870. Bismarck laid down the following armistice terms: the surrender of Bitché, Toul and Strasbourg, while Paris was to remain surrounded or one of its forts was to surrender, and a continuation of the hostilities at Metz. Bismarck also demanded that Alsace and part of Lorraine be ceded to Germany. The negotiations came to a halt since Favre refused to accept the above terms. p. 112
- ⁷¹ During the Second Empire, in peacetime all the troops of a district were brought under the command of a single person (the commander of the army corps), who could use them to support the regime and to suppress revolutionary actions of the people. His powers on questions of the deployment, organisation and training of the troops were strictly limited. Permanent army corps and armies were to be formed only in case of war, the result being a poorly organised army and poor battle training. p. 116
- ⁷² The *Minié rifle*—a rifle firing the “Minié” bullet; it played an important role in the development of rifled fire-arms. The 1857 model was muzzle-loaded but, in 1867, it became breech-loaded. p. 120
- ⁷³ *Army of Lyons* was the name given by the French press to the 24th Corps of the French army being formed in that town. Later the corps was incorporated in Bourbaki’s Eastern Army (First Army of the Loire). p. 121
- ⁷⁴ “*A nation in arms*” was the name widely used in Prussian military literature and official documents of the time for the Prussian armed forces. The Prussian army was by no means an armed nation, as Engels repeatedly noted; on the contrary, it opposed the popular masses and was an instrument for the Prussian bourgeois-Junker state’s aggressive military policy. The Prussian military system was thoroughly investigated by Engels in his work *The Prussian Military Question and the German Workers’ Party* (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 37-79). p. 123
- ⁷⁵ The *Ersatz Reserve* in the Prussian army was a part of the reserve composed of men of call-up age who, for various reasons, were exempted from active service in peacetime; they were placed in the Ersatz Reserve for 12 years and called up in time of war. p. 123
- ⁷⁶ The reference is to the insurrection of 1808 in Spain against Napoleonic rule, which marked the beginning of the national liberation war by the Spanish people against French occupation (1808-14). The Spanish made extensive use of guerrilla warfare methods. p. 129

- ⁷⁷ The reference is to the line of old city fortifications; in the 18th century they were demolished and boulevards set up in their place. p. 131
- ⁷⁸ The *Palais de Justice* is the court building in Paris, occupying most of the western end of the Île de la Cité. p. 131
- ⁷⁹ *Sonderburg*—a town in Schleswig which was a point of the so-called Lines of Düppel, a chain of Danish fortifications protecting the crossing to the island of Als during the war of Prussia and Austria against Denmark in 1864 (see Note 64). After a long siege, on April 18 Prussian troops seized the Lines of Düppel and forced the Danish army to retreat to Als. These battles demonstrated the increased role of artillery in siege operations. pp. 132, 218
- ⁸⁰ The reference is to the Civil War in the United States of America (1861-65). p. 142
- ⁸¹ This refers to the military operations of the army of the North to capture two strategically important points in the South: Vicksburg (Mississippi) and Richmond, the capital of the South (Virginia). During 1862-63, the Northern Army several times tried to seize Vicksburg but succeeded in doing so only when it had organised close co-operation of the land forces and the river fleet: Vicksburg capitulated on July 4, 1863 after a 6-week siege. Numerous attempts to capture Richmond from 1861 to 1864 failed; only on April 3, 1865, was it occupied by General Grant's troops after a stubborn blockade of nearly nine and a half months. p. 142
- ⁸² In the *Battle of Tudela* (Northern Spain) on November 23, 1808, during the Spanish national liberation war against Napoleonic rule, the French corps of Marshal Lann defeated the Spanish troops, taking advantage of their scattered positions. The remnants of the Spanish troops retreated to Saragossa. p. 143
- ⁸³ This refers to the Austro-French war of 1809, which compelled Napoleon I to withdraw his guard and cavalry from Spain. Austria lost the war after being defeated at Wagram on July 5-6, 1809. Under the peace treaty of Schönbrunn, concluded in October 1809 between France and Austria, the latter lost a considerable part of its territory and was virtually deprived of political independence. p. 144
- ⁸⁴ A "Commission of Barricades", headed by H. Rochefort, was set up in mid-September 1870. It organised the construction of a third, interior line of defence—barricades and ditches—in Paris in case the enemy broke through the forts and rampart; during the siege of Paris they were not, however, used. pp. 145, 232
- ⁸⁵ The reference is to the negotiations in September and October between Bazaine and Bismarck on an armistice, which were interrupted on October 24, 1870. At approximately the same time, preparations were made for talks between the Government of National Defence and Bismarck, with Britain participating as a negotiator. These talks between Thiers and Bismarck took place at Versailles between October 1 and 6, 1870 and were unsuccessful. p. 146
- ⁸⁶ This refers to provinces that were incorporated into Prussia prior to the annexation of new territories in 1864-66: East and West Prussia, Brandenburg, Pomerania, Silesia, Posen, Saxony, Westphalia, and the Rhine Province. p. 146
- ⁸⁷ This refers to the Delegation of the Government of National Defence, consisting of Glais-Bizoin, Cremieux and Fourichon, sent to Tours in mid-

September 1870 to organise resistance to German invasion in the provinces and to establish foreign relations. From the beginning of October till the end of the war, the delegation was headed by Gambetta, War Minister and Minister of Home Affairs. The delegation formed and equipped new bodies of troops. At the beginning of December 1870, it moved to Bordeaux. pp. 147, 249

- ⁸⁸ *Water-polacks* (Wasserpölacken) was a name (used from the 17th cent.) for Poles, native to Upper Silesia, who floated timber down the Oder. Subsequently, all the Poles of Upper Silesia, who had lived under Prussian rule for centuries, were called by this nickname.

Masures were Poles inhabiting North-eastern Poland and the Southern part of former East Prussia. p. 149

- ⁸⁹ *Baden Freischaaeren* were volunteer units which, as part of the revolutionary Baden-Palatinate army, fought against the Prussian invaders during the 1849 uprising in defence of the German Imperial Constitution in Southern and Western Germany. These units were poorly organised, disciplined and battle-trained. Engels fought in Willich's detachment, which was composed of workers and was conspicuous for its discipline and military efficiency. A detailed description of the Baden-Palatinate revolutionary army is given by Engels in his work *The Campaign for the German Imperial Constitution* (present edition, Vol. 10).

The *Bull Run*, a river near Manassas (southwest of Washington), was the scene of the first major battle in the U.S. Civil War. During this battle, on July 21, 1861, the Confederate forces defeated the Northern volunteers, who were numerically superior but badly trained.

British volunteers—territorial militia organised in Great Britain from 1859 to 1861. According to the 1863 Volunteer Act, they were to have no less than 30 exercises a year and could be called up only in the event of foreign invasion. In his articles on volunteers (see present edition, Vol. 18), Engels criticised their bad organisation, the poor training of commissioned officers and inadequate drilling system. p. 151

- ⁹⁰ The *guides*—special sub-units in a number of European armies used for guiding troops. In the French army, during the Napoleonic wars and the Second Empire, they guarded the headquarters and served as the Emperor's bodyguards. p. 154

- ⁹¹ In the battle of Leipzig on October 16-19, 1813, Napoleon's army was defeated by the armies of the sixth European coalition (Russia, Austria, Prussia, Britain, Sweden, Spain and other states). This led to Germany's liberation from Napoleon's rule. p. 155

- ⁹² After the fall of the Second Empire on September 4, 1870, Bazaine, having abandoned his plans to break the siege of Metz, started negotiations with Bismarck in September of the same year (see also Note 85) to put an end to the German blockade, with a view to using the French troops in Metz for the restoration of the empire. However, Bismarck no longer believed these plans would come true. The negotiations were interrupted on October 24, and on October 27 Bazaine signed a capitulation. p. 156

- ⁹³ The *Mexican expedition* was an armed intervention by France (initially with Spain and Britain) in Mexico from 1862 to 1867, the aim being to suppress the revolution and turn the country into a colony of the European powers. In 1862, Bazaine was in command of the first division of the French army in Mexico; from October 1863, he was commander-in-chief. Although the

French troops captured the Mexican capital and an "empire" was proclaimed, with Napoleon III's henchman Archduke Maximilian of Austria as emperor, the French interventionists were defeated as a result of the liberation struggle of the Mexican people and, in 1867, were forced to withdraw. The Mexican expedition proved a heavy financial loss to France and was greatly detrimental to the Second Empire. p. 156

- ⁹⁴ The *Arcadians*—an ironical nickname for naive, happy-go-lucky people; it originates from the name of a region in the ancient Peloponnese, Arcadia, whose people, according to Greek mythology, were simple and innocent in their manners. p. 160
- ⁹⁵ Engels has in mind the position of the English during the American War of Independence (1775-83). In their struggle, the Americans successfully combined conventional warfare with a broad guerrilla movement. p. 165
- ⁹⁶ On November 3, 1867, at *Mentana*, French troops and the Papal guards defeated Garibaldi, who had marched on Rome intending to liberate it from the Pope's rule and reunite it with the rest of Italy. p. 166
- ⁹⁷ The *Sepoy mutiny*—the Indian national liberation uprising of 1857-59 against British rule. It started in the spring of 1857 among the Sepoy units (mercenary troops recruited from the Indian population) of the Bengal army and spread to vast regions of Northern and Central India. Peasants and poor artisans from the towns took an active part in the uprising, but the leaders were, as a rule, local feudal lords. The uprising was crushed because of India's lack of unity and its religious and caste differences, and the military and technical superiority of the British. p. 166
- ⁹⁸ The *Battle of Coulmiers* took place on November 9, 1870 near Orleans. The newly formed 15th and 16th corps of the Army of the Loire, under the command of General D'Aurelle de Paladines, defeated the much weaker 1st Bavarian Corps of General von der Tann. p. 168
- ⁹⁹ A reference to the Paris peace treaties of 1814 and 1815 signed by France and the main participants of the sixth and seventh anti-French coalitions (Russia, Britain, Austria and Prussia) that defeated Napoleon. Under the first treaty (*Traité de paix signé entre la France et l'Autriche et ses alliés à Paris le 30 mai 1814*), France lost all the territories won by her in the 1792-1814 wars, with the exception of several border fortresses and Western Savoy. Under the second Paris Treaty (*Traité de paix de Paris du 20 nov. 1815, avec les conventions spéciales*), the territory of France was limited by the 1790 borders and she was deprived of strategically important points on her Eastern frontier, including the fortress Landau. p. 17, 458
- ¹⁰⁰ On July 15, 1840, Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other, signed a convention to support the Sultan of Turkey against the Egyptian ruler Mehemet Ali, who was supported by France. This implied a threat of war between France and an anti-French coalition, but Louis Philippe decided against war and denied his support to Mehemet Ali. pp. 172, 316
- ¹⁰¹ During the Spanish national liberation war against Napoleonic rule from 1808 to 1814 (see Note 76) the British expeditionary corps under Sir John Moore, which landed on the Peninsula in 1808, operated in the country alongside guerrilla detachments, which were the main resistance force; the corps was forced to leave Spain in January 1809. Another corps under General

Arthur Wellesley (Duke of Wellington from 1814) landed on the Peninsula in April 1809 and fought the French until they were driven out of the country.
p. 173

- ¹⁰² *Dismounting batteries*—siege batteries used for destroying embrasures and guns of a besieged fortress.
p. 175

- ¹⁰³ Engels is referring to the diplomatic crisis that arose in November 1870 because Russia denounced the articles of the Peace Treaty of Paris (signed on March 30, 1856 by the participants in the Crimean war: France, Britain, Sardinia, Turkey, and also by Austria and Prussia, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other), by which she had lost the right to keep her fleet in the Black Sea. The Russian policy was supported by Bismarck, who counted on the Tsar to back Prussia's terms for a peace treaty with France. Britain and Austria-Hungary, although protesting against the revision of the Paris Treaty, failed to resist Russia's demands. A convention annulling Arts. XI, XIII and XIV of the Paris Peace Treaty was signed on March 13 at the "Pontus" Conference, which was held in London from January to March 1871 with the participation of Russia, Britain, Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Italy and Turkey. Thus, Russia and Turkey regained their right to have fleets and fortresses on the Black Sea.
p. 175

- ¹⁰⁴ Giuseppe Garibaldi with his sons Ricciotti and Menotti commanded detachments of the National Guard and foreign volunteers who, from the autumn of 1870, took part in the Franco-Prussian war on the side of the French Republic. Garibaldi's troops were organised into the Vosges army and fought in Eastern France.

A detachment under Ricciotti Garibaldi defeated a Landwehr detachment in one of the battles at Châtillon, which were fought for two weeks from November 19, 1870.
p. 180

- ¹⁰⁵ In spite of official protests by Prussia, the USA and Britain exported a large quantity of rifles to France. However, the arms were often of poor quality since the suppliers wanted to get rid of obsolete models.
p. 185

- ¹⁰⁶ The engagements near Loigny and Patay took place from November 29 to December 1; they were of local importance and of variable success. On December 2, however, in battle at Loigny-Poupry some 40 km north-west of Orléans, the German troops under the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg defeated both the 16th and 17th corps of the Army of the Loire under generals Chanzy and Sônis, and the units of the 15th Corps under General Aurelle de Paladines which came to their help.
p. 192

- ¹⁰⁷ This refers to the persecution of the participants in the opposition movement of intellectuals in Germany following the wars with Napoleonic France. Many members of student gymnastic clubs, which developed during, and were active in, the liberation struggle against Napoleonic rule, came out against the reactionary system of German states and organised political demonstrations in support of the unification of Germany. The Karlsbad Conference of Ministers of the principal German states in August 1819 sanctioned measures against the participants in this movement who were called "demagogues".
p. 201

- ¹⁰⁸ "*Papal Zouaves*"—a regiment of the Papal Guard organised and trained like the Zouaves (see Note 13) and consisting of young French aristocratic volunteers. When Rome was occupied by Italian troops and the Pope's secular power abolished in September 1870, the Papal Zouaves were sent to France,

where they were reorganised into a "volunteer legion of the West". As part of the First and Second Loire armies, they participated in operations against the Germans. After the war, the legion helped suppress the Paris Commune and was later disbanded.
pp. 204, 343, 452, 513, 539

- 109 In the *Battle of Villers-Bretonneux* on November 27, 1870 in Normandy (also called the Battle of Amiens; under this name it was already mentioned by Engels in his *Notes on the War*.—XXIX, see this volume, p. 185) the French Army of the North was defeated by the First German Army under General Manteuffel.
p. 223
- 110 Engels was proved completely right in this supposition. A decisive battle between General Bourbaki's Army of the East and German troops under General Werder took place on the river Lisaine in the vicinity of Belfort from January 15 to 17, 1871. The French, although numerically superior, could not gain victory. After the battle they were compelled to retreat and were finally routed. Engels gives a description of the battle (also called the Battle at Héricourt) and the subsequent retreat in his articles *Notes on the War*.—XXXVII and "Bourbaki's Disaster" (see this volume, pp. 236-39, 241-44, 255-58, 259-62).
p. 226
- 111 In the *Battle at Le Mans* (Western France) on January 10-12, 1871, the German troops under Prince Frederick Charles defeated the re-formed Second Army of the Loire, commanded by General Chanzy, which was compelled to retreat after suffering heavy losses.
p. 229
- 112 Engels has in mind the transfer of the English and French troops during the Crimean war from their initial position in Gallipoli (Turkey) to Varna, to help the Turkish army on the Danube fight the Russians who had started operations against Silistria in May 1854. The plan was not carried out because Russia, fearful of Austria, which was prepared to join the allies and had initiated military preparations, was compelled to lift the siege of Silistria and withdraw from the Danubian principalities. The allied troops, which by that time had been transferred to Varna, were subsequently used against Sebastopol.
p. 235
- 113 In the *Battle of St. Quentin* (North-Eastern France) on January 19, 1871, the 1st German Army under General Goeben crushed the French Army of the North under General Faidherbe. The defeat had a demoralising effect on the French army and marked the end of its active operations in the region.
p. 236
- 114 This refers to the Royalist insurrection during the French Revolution, which began in March 1793 in Vendée and spread to Brittany and Normandy. The bulk of the insurgents were local peasants, incited and organised by counter-revolutionary clergy and gentry. The insurrection in Vendée and Brittany was put down in 1795-96, although new attempts were made in 1799 and subsequent years.
p. 238
- 115 The *Battle of Mont Valérien* (also known as the Battle of Montretout or Buzenval) was fought on January 19, 1871, four months after the beginning of the siege of Paris. It was the final sortie from besieged Paris, but it was not adequately prepared. There was no coordination between the actions of the attack troops, and the necessary reserves were lacking. Despite the courage displayed by the French soldiers, the sortie was beaten back at every point.
pp. 240, 437
- 116 The Army of the East, as Engels had foreseen, found itself pushed to the Swiss

frontier having retreated after an unsuccessful battle at Héricourt on January 15-17, 1871 (see also Note 110). On February 1, it was compelled to cross the frontier and surrender (see also Note 121). p. 242

- ¹¹⁷ At the end of September 1870, Bourbaki was sent by Bazaine to Chislehurst in England, where the ex-Empress-Regent Eugénie lived in emigration. Bazaine, the Commander-in-Chief of the French army in Metz, had by that time begun negotiations with Bismarck with a view to restoring the Empire with the help of the troops besieged in Metz (see also notes 85 and 92). Bourbaki's trip was prompted by Regnier, a French adventurer who posed as Eugénie's representative and told Bismarck and Bazaine that she intended to hold talks. Bourbaki's mission ended in failure because Eugénie disavowed Regnier.

p. 246

- ¹¹⁸ This refers to the *Convention on the Armistice and Capitulation of Paris* signed by Bismarck and Favre on January 28, 1871. The Government of National Defence refused to continue the struggle against the Prussian invaders and agreed to an ignominious capitulation. By this act it betrayed the national interests of France, which were sacrificed to the ruling classes' desire to suppress the revolutionary movement in the country by all possible means. By signing the Convention, Favre accepted humiliating demands put forward by the Prussians: payment of an indemnity of 200 million francs within a fortnight, the immediate surrender of most of the Paris forts, the handing over of the field guns and ammunition of the Paris army, and the disbanding of the *francs-tireurs* (armed civilians). Yet Bismarck and Favre did not dare to include a clause about the disarmament of the Paris National Guard, which mostly consisted of workers. The Convention provided for urgent elections to the National Assembly, which was to decide the question of a peace treaty.

pp. 248, 438, 519, 546, 595

- ¹¹⁹ Engels refers to the intention of the Prussian Junkers, bourgeoisie and military circles to annex French Alsace and Lorraine and their demand for a huge war indemnity.

p. 251

- ¹²⁰ The armistice concluded by Bismarck and Favre on January 28, 1871 (see also Note 118) expired on February 19. Though France's means of resistance had not been exhausted, operations against the Prussians were not resumed. After the National Assembly appointed Thiers Chief Executive, he immediately started peace talks, which concluded in a preliminary peace treaty signed at Versailles on February 26, France being compelled to accept all Bismarck's terms. On May 10, 1871 the final Peace Treaty was signed in Frankfurt am Main (see this volume, pp. 346-47 and also notes 179 and 324).

p. 251

- ¹²¹ The *Convention of Les Verrières* (Switzerland) was concluded on February 1, 1871, between General Clinchant, who replaced Bourbaki as Commander-in-Chief of the Army of the East, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Swiss Army General Herzog. The Convention specified the terms for crossing the Swiss border (see also Note 116): the French Army was to lay down its arms, equipment and ammunition.

p. 257

- ¹²² Engels is referring to the August 1870 campaign of the French Army of Châlons, which, owing to a lack of initiative on the part of its commander, Marshal MacMahon, was encircled at Sedan and had to capitulate (see notes 47 and 49).

p. 258

- ¹²³ The letter to the Committee of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party

was written by Marx in the capacity of Corresponding Secretary for Germany. On August 2, 1870, the General Council decided to defer the regular congress, due on September 5, 1870 in Mainz (on the programme of the congress see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 143-44), owing to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war. The General Council decided to ask the sections of the International for approval of its decision. In its resolution, the Committee of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party declared its support.

Marx's letter to the Committee is extant, as it was published, with abbreviations, in C. Koch, *Der Prozeß gegen den Ausschuß der social-demokratischen Arbeiterpartei...*, Braunschweig, 1871, S. 51 and in W. Bracke, *Der Braunschweiger Ausschuß der socialdemokratischen Arbeiter-Partei in Lötzen und vor dem Gericht*, Braunschweig, 1872, S. 154; and also in *Leipziger Hochverrathsprözeß. Ausführlicher Bericht über die Verhandlungen des Schwurgerichts zu Leipzig in dem Prozeß gegen Liebknecht, Bebel und Hepner wegen Vorbereitung zum Hochverrath vom 11-26 März 1872*, Leipzig, 1872, 1874, 1894. p. 259

- ¹²⁴ Here Marx means the request of the leaders of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party, which was expressed in Bonhorst's letter to Marx on October 25, 1869, to explain the Social-Democratic policy towards the German peasantry and give, in particular, instructions concerning the applicability of the Basle Congress (September 6-11, 1869) resolution on social landownership to Germany. Eager to help the leaders of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party to come to the right decision, Marx planned to write a detailed answer, but the International's current affairs prevented him from doing so. Engels provided an explanation of this question in February 1870 in his Preface to the second German edition of *The Peasant War in Germany* (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 397-482) and in the Addition to this Preface, which he wrote for the third German edition of the book in 1874 (see present edition, Vol. 23). p. 259

- ¹²⁵ The letter to the Committee of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party was written in reply to a request from the members of the Brunswick Committee that Marx elucidate the attitude of the German working class to the Franco-Prussian war. Marx considered it necessary to express his opinion because the editorial board of the *Volksstaat* (Liebknecht and others), while, on the whole, taking an internationalist position, had, at the beginning, when the war, as far as Prussia was concerned, had a defensive character, shown a one-sided attitude to it and somewhat ignored the task of national unification. Some members of the Brunswick Committee, on the contrary, underestimated the expansionist tendencies of the Prussian ruling circles, which became obvious even in the initial stages of the war.

The correspondence between Marx and Engels deals with this matter in detail. Thus, in a letter of August 15, 1870, Engels drafted the tactics for German Social-Democracy; he stressed the need to come out against the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, while participating in the movement for the unification of Germany; to distinguish between the German national and Prussian dynastic interests; always to put forward the common interests of the German and French workers (see present edition, Vol. 44). Marx considered the answer to the leaders of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party to be of exceptional importance, as the question concerned the "*directives guiding the policy of the German workers*" (see Marx's letter to Engels of August 17, 1870, present edition, Vol. 44). The final variant of the reply was prepared by Marx

and Engels during Marx's stay in Manchester from August 22 to 30, 1870. The letter was signed by Marx and sent to Germany. He reported on it at the General Council meeting on September 6.

Part of the letter to the Committee was included in the text of the Manifesto on the war issued by the Committee as a leaflet on September 5, 1870 (*Manifest des Ausschusses der social-demokratischen Arbeiterpartei*, Braunschweig, 5. September 1870). The *Manifesto* proclaimed the German working class's loyalty to the cause of the international solidarity of the proletariat and called on German workers to organise mass meetings against the Prussian government's annexationist plans. The *Manifesto* noted that the text included in it had been written by "one of our oldest and most worthy comrades in London".

Only the part of the letter reproduced in the *Manifesto* has been preserved. The copy of the leaflet obtaining at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow bears notes and corrections in Engels' hand, which testify that Marx and Engels worked together on it. The *Manifesto* was published by many newspapers in German, and also in English, French and Russian. It was also published in C. Koch, *Der Prozeß gegen den Ausschuß der social-demokratischen Arbeiterpartei...*, Braunschweig, 1871; W. Bracke, *Der Braunschweiger Ausschuß der socialdemokratischen Arbeiter-Partei...*, Braunschweig, 1872 as well as in *Leipziger Hochverrathsprozeß...*, Leipzig, 1872, 1874, and other publications.

It was first published in English in *The Echo*, October 15, 1870. p. 260

- ¹²⁶ The *treaties of Tilsit*—peace treaties signed on July 7 and 9, 1807 by Napoleonic France, and Russia and Prussia, members of the fourth anti-French coalition. In an attempt to split the defeated powers, Napoleon made no territorial claims on Russia and even succeeded in transferring some of the Prussian monarchy's eastern lands to Russia. The treaty imposed harsh terms on Prussia, which lost nearly half its territory to the German states dependent on France, was made to pay indemnities and had its army reduced. However, Russia, like Prussia, had to break its alliance with Britain and, to its disadvantage, join Napoleon's Continental System. Napoleon formed the vassal Duchy of Warsaw on Polish territory seized by Prussia during the partitions of Poland at the end of the 18th century, and planned to use it as a springboard in the event of war with Russia.

Dictated by Napoleon, the Treaty of Tilsit caused dissatisfaction among the German population and paved the way for the liberation movement that broke out against Napoleonic rule in 1813. pp. 26, 266

- ¹²⁷ *National Liberals* (Die Nationalliberale Partei) was the party of the German, mostly Prussian, bourgeoisie, which emerged in the autumn of 1866 as a result of the split in the Party of Progress. The policy of the National Liberals reflected the rejection by a considerable section of the liberal bourgeoisie of claims to broader political rights and its capitulation before Bismarck's Junker government after Prussia's victory in the Austro-Prussian war (see Note 5) and the establishment of her hegemony in Germany.

The German People's Party (Die Deutsche Volkspartei) was established in the second half of the 1860s, its members being democratically-minded bourgeois, mostly from South German states. In contrast to the National Liberals, it opposed Prussia's hegemony in Germany and supported the plan for a so-called "Great Germany", including both Prussia and Austria. While pursuing an anti-Prussian policy and advancing general democratic slogans, the German People's Party voiced the particularist aspirations of some German states. It

propagated the idea of a federal German state, but opposed Germany's unification in the form of a centralised bourgeois-democratic republic.

p. 261

- ¹²⁸ *Second Address of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the Franco-Prussian War* was written by Marx between September 6 and 9, 1870.

On September 6, 1870, having examined the new situation that had taken shape after the collapse of the Second Empire and the start of a new stage of the war, the General Council of the International decided to issue a second address on the Franco-Prussian war and, for that purpose, appointed a commission including Marx, Jung, Milner and Serraillier.

In his work on the Address, Marx used the material he received from Engels, which exposed the efforts to justify, on military-strategic grounds, the urge on the part of the Prussian military clique, the Junkers and the bourgeoisie to annex French territory (see Engels' letter to Marx and Marx's reply of September 4 and 10, 1870 respectively, present edition, Vol. 44). The Address was unanimously adopted by a special meeting of the General Council on September 9, 1870, and was circulated to all the bourgeois London newspapers, which ignored it, with the exception of *The Pall Mall Gazette* which published an excerpt from the Address in its issue No. 1745 of September 16, 1870. On September 11-13, it was issued as a leaflet in English (1,000 copies); a new edition containing the First and Second addresses appeared in late September. The misprints of the first edition were corrected and some editorial changes made in it. The Address was published by the US labour press: *The Working Man's Advocate*, Chicago, No. 7, October 8, 1870; *The National Standard*, No. 1573, November 12, 1870.

The Second Address was translated into German by Marx, who added several sentences intended for the German workers and deleted some passages. This translation was published in the newspaper *Der Volksstaat*, No. 76, September 21, 1870; in the journal *Der Vorbote*, No. 10-11, October-November 1870; *Volkswille*, Wien, No. 37, October 8, 1870; *Die Tagewacht*, Zurich, No. 33, October 1, 1870; and also as a leaflet in Geneva. In 1891, Engels published the Second Address in a German edition of *The Civil War in France*; the translation for that edition was made by Louise Kautsky under Engels' supervision.

The French translation of the Second Address was published in the newspapers *L'Internationale*, Nos. 93 and 99, October 23 and December 4, 1870; in *La Tribune de Bordeaux*, September 21, 1870; and, in an abridged form, in *L'Egalité*, No. 35, October 4, 1870. It was also published in Antwerp in Flemish by *De Werker*, Nos. 51 and 52, October 16 and 24, 1870.

In the present edition, the Second Address is published according to the second edition of the English leaflet checked against the 1870 leaflet, which was translated into German by Marx. The major differences in reading are given in footnotes.

p. 263

- ¹²⁹ In 1618, the Electorate of Brandenburg was united with the Duchy of Prussia (East Prussia), which had been formed from the possessions of the Teutonic Order in the early 16th century and was a fief of Poland. In his capacity as the Duke of Prussia, the Elector of Brandenburg continued to be a vassal of Poland until 1657, when, making use of Poland's embroilment in a war with Sweden, he secured recognition of his sovereign rights to Prussian possessions.

p. 264

- ¹³⁰ The reference is to the *Treaty of Basle* concluded on April 5, 1795 separately by the French Republic and Prussia, the latter being a member of the first anti-French coalition. Its conclusion marked the beginning of the coalition's disintegration. p. 265
- ¹³¹ During their meeting in Biarritz in October 1865, Bismarck won Napoleon III's consent to an alliance between Prussia and Italy and to a war by Prussia against Austria; in agreeing to this, Napoleon III expected to be able to intervene in the conflict with benefit for himself, in the event of Prussia's defeat.
At the start of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, the Tsarist Foreign Minister Gorchakov declared, during his negotiations with Bismarck in Berlin, that in the war Russia would maintain a benevolent neutrality towards Prussia and would exert diplomatic pressure on Austria; for its part, the Prussian government undertook not to impede Tsarist Russia in her policy in the East. p. 267
- ¹³² The reference is to the strengthening of feudal reaction in Germany after the collapse of Napoleonic rule. The governments of the European feudal absolutist states, supported by the reactionary nobility, made use of the results of the liberation war against the domination of Napoleon I. The German Confederation (see Note 27) did not eliminate feudal division; the feudal-absolutist system was consolidated; all the nobility's privileges were preserved and semi-feudal exploitation of the peasants intensified. p. 268
- ¹³³ The reference is to the *June insurrection*, the heroic insurrection of Paris workers on June 23-26, 1848. It was the first civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in history. Marx called it the first great battle between the two classes. He assessed its historical importance in the *Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 67-70). pp. 269, 316, 445, 521
- ¹³⁴ Marx is referring here to the movement of British workers for recognition of the French Republic, which was established on September 4, 1870, and giving it diplomatic support. From September 5, in London, Birmingham, Newcastle and other big cities meetings and demonstrations by large numbers of workers took place, with some trade unions taking an active part. Their participants expressed sympathy for the French people and demanded in their resolutions and petitions that the British government immediately recognise the French Republic.
The General Council of the International and Marx himself took an active part in organising the movement for recognition of the French Republic (see Marx's letters to Engels of September 10 and 14, 1870, present edition, Vol. 44). p. 269
- ¹³⁵ The allusion is to Britain's active participation in forming the coalition of feudal-absolutist states, which unleashed a war against revolutionary France in 1792 (Britain entered the war in 1793); and also to the fact that the British ruling oligarchy was the first in Europe to recognise the Bonapartist regime in France, established as a result of Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état of December 2, 1851. p. 269
- ¹³⁶ During the Civil War in the USA (1861-65), the British press, which expressed the views of the British ruling quarters, actively supported the Southern slave-owning states in an attempt to split and weaken the USA. p. 270

¹³⁷ On September 9, 1870, Bracke, Bonhorst, Spier, Kühn and Gralle, members of the Brunswick Committee of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party, as well as Ehlers, a member of the Party, and Sievers, a printer, were arrested for publishing the Manifesto on war (see Note 125). By this measure, the ruling circles tried to undermine the workers' movement and to prevent any actions against the Prussian government's militarist plans. Having received news of the arrest of the Brunswick Committee from Wilhelm Liebknecht, Marx took immediate steps to give publicity to this act of tyranny on the part of the German authorities, the first in a series of open police persecutions of Social-Democrats there. The information was sent to *The Pall Mall Gazette* and *The Echo*, where it was published on September 15, and to a number of other newspapers. On September 20, 1870, at a meeting of the General Council, Marx made a report on the arrest of the members of the Brunswick Committee, stressing that there were absolutely no legal grounds for it. In October 1871, after many months of imprisonment, the members of the Brunswick Committee were brought to trial on the trumped-up charge of disturbing peace. One of the main charges was their membership of the international workers' organisation—the International, which was banned by Prussian laws. The court sentenced the members of the Brunswick Committee to various terms of imprisonment. Despite repressive police measures, the Social-Democratic Workers' Party, led by August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht, started propaganda work against Prussia's predatory plans and for an honourable peace with France. p. 271

¹³⁸ Engels wrote this letter on the instructions of the General Council after a discussion of the question of the Belgian Sections at the Council's meeting on December 20, 1870. When the letter was published for the first time (*L'Internationale*, No. 103, January 1, 1871), the three last paragraphs in Engels' rough manuscript were omitted as being confidential in nature.

The 6th regular half-yearly Congress of the Belgian Federation of the International Working Men's Association took place on December 25 and 26, 1870 in Brussels. The delegates heard the financial report and reports on the Federation's press organ, *L'Internationale*, and on the position of the International Working Men's Association in Belgium. p. 272

¹³⁹ The *London Treaty on Neutrality of Luxembourg* was signed on May 11, 1867 by Austria, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Prussia and Russia. It ended the so-called Luxembourg crisis that had been caused by Napoleon III's attempt to make Prussia agree to France's annexation of Luxembourg in payment for the latter's neutrality in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866. This treaty declared Luxembourg a permanently neutral state, its neutrality being guaranteed by the signatory states.

On December 9, 1870, Bismarck announced his intention not to abide by this treaty, considering that Luxembourg had taken too friendly a position towards France, but already on December 19 under pressure from Britain he abandoned his threat. pp. 275, 575

¹⁴⁰ Engels wrote this letter in his capacity as the General Council's Corresponding Secretary pro tem for Spain in answer to a letter from the Spanish Federal Council of December 14, 1870. Having established links with the Spanish sections of the International, Engels helped them in their struggle against Bakuninism, which developed in Spain, too. There, within the limits of the International Bakuninists had set up an organisation of the Alliance of Socialist

Democracy and tried to take over leadership of the Spanish Federal Council. Despite the Bakuninists' splitting activities, the International's ideas penetrated among the workers and new sections of the International Working Men's Association were established in Spain. This letter was published in English for the first time in Marx and Engels, *Selected Correspondence*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1955. p. 277

¹⁴¹ The *National Labour Union* was founded in the USA in August 1866 at a congress in Baltimore, with the active participation of William Sylvius, a prominent figure in the American labour movement. Marx thought highly of the Baltimore congress. In October 1866, the National Labour Union established contacts with the International Working Men's Association. However, Trevellick, elected delegate to the regular congress of the International at the Chicago congress of the Union in August 1867, could not come to Lausanne. At the last sessions of the Basle Congress of the International (September 1869) the National Labour Union was represented by A. Cameron. In August 1870, at a congress in Cincinnati, Cameron made a report on his participation in the congress of the International. The Union adopted a resolution on adherence to the principles of the IWMA and a desire to join it. This decision was not implemented, however, as the Union leaders were soon carried away by the utopian projects of currency reform. In 1870-71, many trades unions withdrew from the Labour Union and in 1872 it virtually ceased to exist. pp. 280, 575

¹⁴² This article was occasioned by the floating on the London Stock Exchange in March 1871 of Russia's loan of £12 million. This article, first published in *The Pall Mall Gazette* on March 16, 1871, was included in a lithographic edition of Engels' series of articles *Notes on the War*, which came out in Vienna in 1923, and was subsequently reprinted with the *Notes on the War*. p. 281

¹⁴³ This refers to the London Conference of several states, which took place in January-March 1871 and discussed the question of Russia's denunciation of the articles of the Paris Treaty of 1856 forbidding her to have warships in the Black Sea and fortresses on its coasts (see Note 103). p. 282

¹⁴⁴ This letter was drafted by Engels on Marx's request in connection with a letter that was published in the French police newspaper *Paris-Journal* on March 19, 1871, which the editors declared to be Marx's letter to Serrailier. According to them it testified to the contradictions between the French and German members of the International. The forged letter was reprinted in the bourgeois newspapers of various countries, which joined in the campaign of slander against the International. At the meeting of the General Council of March 21, 1871, Marx exposed the communication in the *Paris-Journal* as a provocative forgery and said that he had already sent a refutation to the editor of *The Times*, which had reprinted the communication from the *Paris-Journal*.

The item on Marx's refutation was published in *The Times* on March 22, 1871, but the newspaper, joining the campaign of slander against the International, published an item by a correspondent of the Bonapartist newspaper *La Liberté* distorting Marx's letter of March 21. At the meeting of the General Council on March 28, 1871, Marx again exposed the slanderers. He inserted the text of this piece into his letter to Paul Lafargue of March 23, 1871 (see present edition, Vol. 44) in order to make it known to the Paris members of the International. p. 285

- ¹⁴⁵ This statement was made necessary by the false allegations about the expulsion of Germans from the International's sections in Paris, which were disseminated by the reactionary newspaper *Paris-Journal*. These allegations were refuted in a special letter from the Paris Federal Council in response to the General Council's request. The statement of the General Council to the editor of *The Times* and other papers was written by Marx and unanimously approved by the General Council at its meeting on March 21. The Statement was published in *The Times*, No. 27018, March 23; in *The Eastern Post*, No. 130, March 25; *The Standard*, No. 14555, March 27, 1871. The statement was included in Marx's letter to the editor of *Der Volksstaat* of March 23, 1871 (see this volume, p. 289), and in Marx's letter to Lafargue of the same date. p. 286
- ¹⁴⁶ In the first half of March, the French bourgeois papers, particularly the *Paris-Journal* and the *Gaulois*, were actively supporting the idea of founding the so-called *Anti-German League*. The League was supposed to foster in the young people a spirit of revenge for the defeat in the war, to help the French depart from Alsace and Lorraine, which were occupied by the German army, and to sow discord between French and German workers. p. 286
- ¹⁴⁷ The *Jockey Club*—an aristocratic club founded in Paris in 1833. p. 286
- ¹⁴⁸ A meeting of Germans belonging to the propertied classes was held in Zurich in March 1871 to celebrate Germany's victory in the Franco-Prussian war. At the meeting, there was a clash between a group of French officers interned in Switzerland and the Germans. The reactionary press blew up a provocative campaign in order to undermine the international ties between the workers of different countries and accused the International of staging these events. The Swiss section of the International exposed the slander of the bourgeois press in a special statement. Several trades unions in Zurich likewise issued statements saying that members of the International had nothing to do with the clash. p. 286
- ¹⁴⁹ Marx's letter to the editor of *Der Volksstaat* contained (with minor changes in the German translation) the statement by the General Council to the editor of *The Times* and other papers, written by him on March 21 (see this volume, pp. 286-87). The letter to the editor of *Der Volksstaat* was published in German in that paper, No. 26, March 29, 1871, in *Die Tagwacht*, No. 14, April 1, 1871 and in *Der Vorbote*, No. 4, April 23, 1871. It was published in French in *L'Egalité*, No. 6, March 31, 1871, with the first two paragraphs in abridged form. Besides the press organs of the International, the letter was published in *Die Zukunft*, No. 73, March 26, 1871. p. 288
- ¹⁵⁰ "Haupt-Chef" ("The principal leader")—the name given by Stieber, a Prussian police officer, at the Cologne Communist trial in 1852 to Cherval, an agent-provocateur, trying to ascribe to him, for provocative purposes, the leading role in the Communist League and make it appear that Cherval was closely connected with Marx and the defendants (see K. Marx's *Revelations Concerning the Communist Trial in Cologne*, present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 407-19). p. 288
- ¹⁵¹ This letter to *De Werker* was written by Marx at the request of the editorial secretary Ph. Coenen to expose the forgeries published in the *Paris-Journal* and reprinted in the reactionary press of various countries in order to defame the International. The editor prefaced the letter, translated from the French into

Flemish with the following paragraph: "It has been known for a long time that our opponents stop at nothing to achieve their aims. Despite this we did not believe they were so impudent as to write forged letters on behalf of the members of the International. But this is what happened. Some time ago a letter by 'Karl Marx' on the conduct of French workers could be read in all big newspapers. In connection with this, the Antwerp section asked Karl Marx for an explanation. Here is what the member of the General Council of the International replied." p. 291

- ¹⁵² A similar letter was sent by Marx to *The Daily News*, which published it on April 6, 1871. p. 292

- ¹⁵³ Marx and Engels learned about the strike of the cigar-workers in Antwerp from the letter written by Ph. Coenen, an organiser of the International's sections in Belgium and the Netherlands, on March 29, 1871. They immediately took steps to organise international aid to the strikers. At the General Council meeting of April 4, 1871 Engels made a report on the strike, and the Council resolved, on Engels' proposal, to send letters and delegations to the British trades unions. On April 5, 1871 the General Council issued an address to the British trades unions to give assistance to the Antwerp cigar-workers; it was printed as a separate leaflet signed by Eccarius. That very day, Engels informed Ph. Coenen of this and sent a letter to Liebknecht asking him to provide assistance to the Antwerp cigar-workers, with the given item for *Der Volksstaat* enclosed (see Engels' letter to Coenen and Engels' letter to Liebknecht of April 5, 1871, present edition, Vol. 44).

In response to the General Council's appeal, material assistance to the Antwerp cigar-workers was provided by a number of British trades unions and the workers of Brussels, where the cigar-workers also went on strike. The aid provided by the General Council to the Antwerp cigar-workers, who came out in defence of their trades union, enabled them to hold out till September 1871, when the manufacturers had to accept their terms. p. 294

- ¹⁵⁴ This Outline of an Appeal was prepared by Engels on the request of the Madrid Federal Council to provide assistance to the weavers and spinners of Barcelona who were on strike. Engels made a report on the subject at the meeting of the General Council on April 18, 1871. On April 19 he sent the Outline to Eccarius, who was to appeal to the weavers' and spinners' trades unions of Manchester for donations for the strikers. The outline was preceded by an address to Eccarius: "Dear Eccarius, the following on the strike of the Barcelonese. To save effort, I am giving it to you direct in English."

The Outline ended with the words: "The form of contribution—donation or loan—should be left to the men's discretion. The Council could take care of the remittances, or they can send in the money direct, the address is available. Best regards, yours F. E." At the General Council meeting on April 25, 1871, Engels again touched upon the situation in the Spanish textile industry. p. 295

- ¹⁵⁵ The resolution of the Federal Council of the Paris sections of the International expelling Tolain from the IWMA as a deserter of the working-class cause was published in the newspaper of one of the Paris sections, *La Révolution politique et sociale*, No. 3, April 16, 1871. The next day, this news appeared in *The Times* (No. 27039), *The Standard* (No. 14573) and other newspapers. Tolain, who was elected deputy to the National Assembly on February 8, 1871 from the Paris workers, after the proclamation of the Paris Commune remained in the

Versailles Assembly the activity of which was aimed at suppressing the revolution in Paris, and refused to fulfil the Commune's demand that the workers' deputies break with that reactionary body. Even before this, the General Council, acting on the strength of reports in the London press, had a preliminary discussion on Tolain's treacherous behaviour at its meeting on April 18 and decided that it should be publicly condemned. After receiving the resolution on April 25, the General Council resumed its examination of Tolain's case and resolved to expel him from the International.

In the manuscript of the General Council's resolution on Tolain's expulsion, written by Engels, some corrections are made by Marx. The resolution was published in English in *The Eastern Post*, No. 135, April 29; in French (translated by Engels)—in *L'Internationale*, No. 122, May 14; in German—in *Der Volksstaat*, No. 42, May 24 and *Der Vorbote*, No. 7, July 1871. The last paragraph of the manuscript is published only in *L'Internationale*, which printed the resolution over Engels' signature, as a corresponding secretary pro tem for Belgium. p. 297

- ¹⁵⁶ Engels' article "Once Again 'Herr Vogt'" is connected with Marx's *Herr Vogt*, published in 1860 (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 21-329), in which Marx exposed the petty-bourgeois democrat Karl Vogt as a paid Bonapartist agent and a disseminator of slanderous inventions about proletarian revolutionaries.

The direct reason for writing the article was the appearance, in the autumn of 1870, after the collapse of the Second Empire, of Vogt's new pamphlet *Karl Vogt's Politische Briefe an Friedrich Kolb*, in which the author tried to camouflage his past ties with the Bonapartists. In his article, Engels also used newly-published data, confirming Marx's conclusion, made in 1860, that Vogt was a paid agent of Bonaparte. Marx wrote about this in his letter to Wilhelm Liebknecht on April 10, 1871 (see present edition, Vol. 44), that is, before Engels' article appeared. *Der Volksstaat* (No. 31, April 15) published the following short message, which, in the main, reproduced the text of Marx's letter to Liebknecht: "In the official *Papiers et correspondance de la famille impériale*, published in the report of the French government, we find, on the alphabetic list of recipients of Bonapartist money, under the letter V, literally the following: 'Vogt; il lui est remis en août 1859, 40,000 Fr. (Vogt received 40,000 francs in August of 1859).'"

The editor of *Der Volksstaat* provided this information, published on Marx's behalf, with the following comment: "The Party comrades who reproached us for ignoring Vogt's writings against the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine and were not content with our referring them to the well-known pamphlet by Marx, will surely be satisfied now. But we request our Paris friends to send us the complete register. We are certain to find many an old acquaintance on it who once dealt in Bonapartism as 'fellow-rogues' of Vogt's and now, for the same motives and with equal enthusiasm, peddle Bismarck's patriotism."

Engels' article was included in his collection *Internationales aus dem "Volksstaat" (1871-75)*, Berlin, 1894 and reprinted in *Der New Yorker Volkszeitung*, Sonntagsbl., No. 19, May 12, 1895. p. 298

- ¹⁵⁷ The *Augsburg Campaign* is the ironical name Marx uses in his pamphlet *Herr Vogt* for Vogt's action brought against the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung* in 1859 for reprinting the leaflet "Zur Warnung", which exposed Vogt as a Bonapartist agent (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 111-32). When his complaint was dismissed, he published a booklet *Mein Prozess gegen die*

- Allgemeine Zeitung*, in which he libelled proletarian revolutionaries. Marx's pamphlet *Herr Vogt* was written in response. p. 298
- ¹⁵⁸ The *Brimstone Gang* (Schwefelbände)—the name of a students' association at Jena University in the 1770s, whose members were notorious for their brawls; later the expression became widespread. In his pamphlet *Mein Prozess gegen die Allgemeine Zeitung*, Vogt applied it to Marx's supporters (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 28-47). p. 298
- ¹⁵⁹ *Napoléon le Petit* (Napoleon the Little)—the nickname given to Louis Bonaparte by Victor Hugo in a speech he made in the French Legislative Assembly in 1851. It gained wide currency after the publication in 1852 of Hugo's *Napoléon le Petit*. p. 299
- ¹⁶⁰ Engels ironically calls the *Schweizer Handels-Courier*, which was the mouthpiece of the Bonapartists in the 1850s-1860s, Vogt's *Moniteur*, by analogy with the French official organ of the same name. Vogt had close ties with this newspaper. p. 299
- ¹⁶¹ Marx described this book in his pamphlet *Herr Vogt*, Ch. VIII (see present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 133-83). p. 299
- ¹⁶² Marx is apparently referring here to Jean Baptiste Troppmann, a murderer sentenced to death in Paris in December 1869. p. 301
- ¹⁶³ *The Civil War in France*, one of Marx's most important works, was written as an address by the General Council of the International to all Association members in Europe and the United States.

From the earliest days of the Paris Commune Marx made a point of collecting and studying all available information about its activities. He made clippings from all available French, English and German newspapers of the time. Newspapers from Paris reached London with great difficulty. Marx had at his disposal only individual issues of Paris newspapers that supported the Commune. He had to use English and French bourgeois newspapers published in London, including ones of Bonapartist leanings, but succeeded in giving an objective picture of the developments in Paris. The notebook with newspaper excerpts from March 18 to May 1, 1871 is extant (it was published for the first time in the original languages in: *Marx/Engels, Archives*, Vol. III (VIII), Moscow, 1934).

Marx also drew valuable information from the letters of active participants and prominent figures of the Paris Commune, such as Leo Frankel, Eugène Varlin, Auguste Serraillier, Yelisaveta Tomanovskaya, as well as from the letters of Paul Lafargue, Pyotr Lavrov and others.

Originally he intended to write an address to the workers of Paris, as he declared at the meeting of the General Council on March 28, 1871. His motion was unanimously approved. The further developments in Paris led him, however, to the conclusion that an appeal should be addressed to proletarians of the world. At the General Council meeting on April 18, Marx suggested to issue "an address to the International generally about the general tendency of the struggle".

Marx was entrusted with drafting the address. He started his work after April 18 and continued throughout May. Originally he wrote the First and Second drafts of *The Civil War in France* as preparatory variants for the work (see this volume, pp. 433-51 and Note 285), and then set about making up the final text of the address.

He did most of the work on the First and Second drafts and the final version roughly between May 6 and 30. On May 30, 1871, two days after the last barricade had fallen in Paris, the General Council unanimously approved the text of *The Civil War in France*, which Marx had read out.

The Civil War in France was first published in London on about June 13, 1871 in English, as a pamphlet of 35 pages in 1,000 copies. Since the first edition quickly sold out, the second English edition of 2,000 copies was published at a lower price, for sale to workers. In this edition, Marx corrected some of the misprints occurring in the first edition, and the section "Notes" was supplemented with another document. Changes were made in the list of General Council members who signed the Address: the names of Lucraft and Odger were deleted, as they had expressed disagreement with the Address in the bourgeois press and had withdrawn from the General Council, and the names of the new members of the General Council were added. In August 1871, the third English edition of *The Civil War in France* came out, in which Marx eliminated the inaccuracies of the previous editions.

In 1871-72, *The Civil War in France* was translated into French, German, Russian, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, Flemish, Serbo-Croat, Danish and Polish, and published in the periodical press and as separate pamphlets in various European countries and the USA. It was repeatedly published in subsequent years.

The German translation was made by Engels and published in *Der Volksstaat* in June-July 1871 (Nos. 52-61, June 28 and July 1, 5, 8, 12, 16, 19, 22, 26 and 29), and, in abridged form, in *Der Vorbote* (Nos. 8-10) in August-October 1871, and it also came out as a separate pamphlet in Leipzig. Engels made several insignificant alterations in the text. By the fifth anniversary of the Paris Commune, in 1876, a new German edition was put out, with minor corrections introduced in the text.

In 1891, when preparing a jubilee German edition of *The Civil War in France* to mark the 20th anniversary of the Paris Commune, Engels once again edited the text of his translation. He also wrote an introduction to this edition, emphasising the historical significance of the experience of the Paris Commune, and its theoretical generalisation by Marx in *The Civil War in France*, and also giving additional information on the activities of the Communards from among the Blanquists and Proudhonists. Engels included in this edition the First and Second addresses of the General Council of the International Working Men's Association on the Franco-Prussian war, which were published in subsequent editions in different languages also together with *The Civil War in France*.

The Civil War in France was published in French for the first time in *L'Internationale* in Brussels in July-September 1871. A separate French edition appeared in Brussels in 1872; it was edited by Marx, who made numerous changes in the proofs and retranslated many passages.

The first Russian edition of *The Civil War in France*, which served as the basis for a number of subsequent printed and hectographed publications, appeared in Zurich in 1871. In 1905, *The Civil War in France* came out in Russian in a translation from the German edition of 1891 (Burevestnik Publishers, Odessa). The second edition was brought out under the editorship of Lenin by the same publishing house, also in 1905 during the first Russian revolution. When editing the translation of *The Civil War in France*, at the request of the publishers, Lenin introduced precise economic and political terminology into the text, eliminated numerous mistakes and inaccuracies of

the previous edition of 1905 and restored those parts of the text deleted by Tsarist censorship.

In this volume, *The Civil War in France* is published according to the 3rd English edition of 1871, collated with the German translations of 1871 and 1891. The most essential textual differences are given in the footnotes. To establish Marx's sources, his notebook with excerpts from various newspapers was used. References to the sources quoted or mentioned in the text are given according to these excerpts. In a number of cases concerning decrees and other documents of the Paris Commune, a reference is also given to the publications of the official organs of the Commune. p. 307

- ¹⁶⁴ On January 28, 1871 Bismarck and Jules Favre, a representative of the Government of National Defence, signed a Convention on the Armistice and the Capitulation of Paris (see Note 120). p. 313

- ¹⁶⁵ *Capitulards*—a scornful nickname for those who advocated the capitulation of Paris during the siege of 1870-71. It subsequently came to denote capitulators in general. pp. 313, 438, 482, 517, 523, 538, 546

- ¹⁶⁶ Jean Jules Pic and Jean Taillefer stole large sums of money from the insurance society by forgery and used them to finance the Bonapartist newspaper *L'Étendard*. In 1869 they were sentenced to hard labour. pp. 313, 475, 518

- ¹⁶⁷ The *Société générale du Crédit Mobilier*—a large French joint-stock bank founded by the Péreire brothers in 1852. It was closely associated with Napoleon III's government and under the latter's protection engaged in large-scale speculation. It went bankrupt in 1867 and was liquidated in 1871. Marx gave an all-out characteristic of the Crédit Mobilier in a number of articles published in the *New-York Daily Tribune* in 1856-58 (see present edition, Vol. 15). pp. 314, 439, 496, 518

- ¹⁶⁸ A reference to the anti-Legitimist and anti-clerical riots in Paris on February 14 and 15, 1831, which were echoed in the provinces. In protest against the Legitimist demonstration during the requiem mass for the Duke de Berry, the mob plundered the church of Saint Germain l'Auxerrois and the palace of Archbishop Quélen, who was known for his Legitimist sympathies. The Orleanist government, which was striving to weaken the hostile Legitimist party, did nothing to stop the crowd. Thiers, who was present when the church and palace were attacked, urged the National Guards not to interfere.

In 1832, by order of Thiers, then Minister of the Interior, the Duchess de Berry, mother of the Comte de Chambord, the Legitimist pretender to the French throne, was arrested and subjected to a humiliating medical examination to expose her secret marriage with a Neapolitan nobleman and pregnancy, and in this way politically compromise her and her son.

pp. 315, 454, 503, 520

- ¹⁶⁹ An allusion to the unseemly role played by Thiers in suppressing the popular insurrection in Paris on April 13-14, 1834, directed by the secret Republican Society of the Rights of Man (*Société des Droits de l'Homme*). Thiers, then Minister of the Interior, organised the brutal persecution of the participants in the insurrection and was, in particular, responsible for the death of the inhabitants of a house in Rue Transnonain.

September Laws (1835) were issued by the French government, which took advantage of an attempt on the life of Louis Philippe on July 28 to restrict trial by jury and introduce harsh measures against the press, including higher

securities for periodicals, and prison terms and large fines for statements against property and the existing political system.

pp. 315, 446, 454, 520, 596

- 170 In January 1841, Thiers came forward in the Chamber of Deputies with a project, prepared by Minister of War Soult, for building fortifications around Paris—a wall and several forts. Revolutionary and democratic circles took it as a preparatory step towards suppressing any popular movement, though the project was presented as a measure to strengthen the city's defences. It was noted that Thiers' project provided for the construction of especially strong and numerous forts near the working-class quarters to the east and north-east of Paris.
pp. 315, 454, 520
- 171 In January 1848, the Neapolitan troops of King Ferdinand II, subsequently nicknamed King Bomba for his savage bombardment of Messina in the autumn of that year, shelled Palermo in an effort to suppress a popular uprising, which sparked off the bourgeois revolution in the Italian states in 1848-49.
pp. 315, 455, 520
- 172 In April 1849, the French bourgeois government, in alliance with Austria and Naples, intervened against the Roman Republic for the purpose of suppressing it and restoring the Pope's secular power. As a result of the armed intervention and the siege of Rome, which was subjected to fierce bombardment by French troops, the Roman Republic, despite heroic resistance, was overthrown and Rome was occupied by French troops.
pp. 315, 455, 510, 521, 572
- 173 The *Party of Order*—a party of the big reactionary bourgeoisie, which was formed in 1848 as a coalition of monarchist groups: the Legitimists (supporters of the Bourbon dynasty), the Orleanists (supporters of the Orleans dynasty) and the Bonapartists. From 1849 until the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, it held sway in the Legislative Assembly of the Second Republic.
pp. 316, 497, 503, 521
- 174 On January 11, 1864, Thiers spoke in the Corps législatif about the government's duty to return the "necessary liberties" to the country, including freedom of the individual, the press, association, and elections to parliament (*Le Moniteur universel*, No. 12, January 12, 1864).
pp. 316, 443, 453
- 175 Thiers asked Bismarck for permission to increase the number of troops, which was not to exceed 40,000 according to Art. 3 of the preliminary treaty signed by Thiers and Jules Favre, on the one hand, and Bismarck and representatives of the South German states, on the other, in Versailles on February 26, 1871. Thiers' government assured Bismarck that the troops would be used exclusively for suppressing the insurrection in Paris, and on March 28, 1871, according to the Rouen Convention, Thiers received permission to increase the size of the Versailles army to 80,000 and, somewhat later, to 100,000 men. Accordingly, the German Command repatriated French prisoners of war, most of whom had been serving in the armies that surrendered in Sedan and Metz. The Versailles government quartered these units in secret camps, where they were trained for action against the Paris Commune.
pp. 317, 452, 458, 483, 541
- 176 *Legitimists*—the party of supporters of the Bourbon dynasty, which was overthrown in France in 1792, representing the interests of the big landed aristocracy and top clergy; it took shape as a party and assumed this name in

1830, after the dynasty was overthrown for the second time. During the Second Republic, the Legitimists, together with the other monarchist parties, formed the Party of Order (see Note 173). Under the Second Empire, failing to win any support from the people, they confined themselves to marking time and issuing critical pamphlets, and were galvanised into action only in 1871, when they joined the general counter-revolutionary onslaught against the Paris Commune. pp. 318, 465

- ¹⁷⁷ *Chambre introuvable*—the name given by King Louis XVIII to the Chamber of Deputies in France which in 1815-16 consisted of extreme reactionaries. pp. 319, 340, 465, 476, 503, 524

- ¹⁷⁸ The Assembly of "Rurals"—a scornful nickname for the National Assembly, which met on February 12, 1871 in Bordeaux and consisted mostly of reactionary monarchists, such as provincial landowners, civil servants, rentiers and merchants elected from rural constituencies. pp. 319, 446, 492, 497, 520, 530, 538, 543, 629

- ¹⁷⁹ According to the terms of the preliminary peace treaty, signed on February 26, 1871 at Versailles, France ceded Alsace and East Lorraine to Germany and paid it 5 billion francs indemnity; until the indemnity was paid, a part of the French territory continued to be occupied by the German troops. The final peace treaty was signed in Frankfurt am Main on May 10, 1871 (see this volume, pp. 346-47). p. 319

- ¹⁸⁰ On March 10, 1871, the National Assembly adopted a law on overdue bills. Accordingly, a seven-month moratorium was set for payments on security made from August 13 to November 12, 1870; no moratorium was allowed for payments on securities contracted after November 12. This meant that the law gave virtually no deferment to those in debt, the working class and the impecunious sections of the population. It also caused the bankruptcy of many small industrialists and merchants.

During the siege of Paris, the time for rent payment was transferred from one quarter of a year to another. At the end of March 1871 another payment came due. The project advanced by Thiers and Dufaure gave house-owners the right, if the rent had not been paid for two years, to evict the tenants and appropriate their furniture and personal belongings. The National Assembly refused to consider the project. pp. 319, 441, 444, 474

- ¹⁸¹ *Decembriseur*—participant in the Society of December 10 (see Note 4). Vinoy was directly involved in the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, having used troops to put down attempts to start a republican uprising in one of the departments of France. pp. 320, 441, 525, 543

- ¹⁸² According to newspaper reports, out of the internal loan that the government of the Third Republic had decided to float, its head Thiers and other ministers were to receive more than 300 million francs by way of "commission". Thiers subsequently admitted that the men representing the financial circles with whom the loan was being negotiated were demanding swift suppression of the revolution in Paris. The loan bill was passed on June 20, 1870, after the Paris Commune had been crushed. pp. 320, 442, 524

- ¹⁸³ *Cayenne*—town in French Guiana (South America), a penal colony and place of exile for political prisoners and criminals. pp. 321, 451, 522

- ¹⁸⁴ On October 31, 1870, following the reports of the capitulation at Metz, the defeat at Le-Bourget, and the negotiations with the Prussians started by Thiers

on behalf of the Government of National Defence, Paris workers and the revolutionary section of the National Guard started an uprising and took the Town Hall, setting up an organ of revolutionary power—the Committee of Public Safety, headed by Auguste Blanqui. Under pressure from the workers, the Government of National Defence was forced to promise to resign and set elections to the Commune for November 1. But, taking advantage of the loose organisation of the revolutionary forces in Paris and the differences between the Blanquists and the petty-bourgeois Jacobin Democrats, who led the uprising, the government went back on its promise to resign, threw the loyal battalions of the National Guard against the Town Hall and restored its power.

pp. 323, 447, 527

- ¹⁸⁵ *Bretons*—the Breton Mobile Guard, which Trochu used as a gendarmerie to suppress the revolutionary movement in Paris. The Bretons replaced the *Corsicans* who, under the Second Empire, constituted a large section of the gendarmerie corps.

pp. 323, 446, 481, 513, 527, 532, 539

- ¹⁸⁶ On January 22, 1871, the Blanquists initiated a new revolutionary action by the Paris proletariat and the National Guard, who demanded the overthrow of the government and the establishment of a commune. On orders of the Government of National Defence, the Breton Mobile Guard, who were guarding the Town Hall, fired on them. Many of the participants in the demonstration were arrested, all the clubs in Paris were closed down, public gatherings were prohibited and a number of newspapers banned. Once the revolutionary movement was suppressed by means of terrorism, the government proceeded to prepare for the surrender of Paris.

p. 324

- ¹⁸⁷ *Somation* (a demand to disperse)—a form of warning given while breaking up demonstrations, meetings, etc. According to the 1831 law, the demand was repeated three times, accompanied by drumming or trumpets (*faire les trois sommations*), following which the authorities were entitled to resort to force.

The *Riot Act* (an act for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies, and for the more speedy and effectual punishing of rioters) was introduced in the British Parliament in 1714 and passed in 1715. The Act obliged the authorities to read part of it to those unlawfully assembled and to open fire if the latter refused to disperse within an hour.

pp. 325, 511, 529

- ¹⁸⁸ This refers to the repressive laws initiated or actively supported by J. Dufaure and passed in 1839 and 1849. On May 14, 1839, after the armed action, the secret Republican Society of the Seasons was banned. After the demonstration of June 13, 1849 had been dispersed, a number of repressive laws were adopted: on June 19, the law on associations, on June 27—the law on the press (*loi sur la presse*), on August 9—the law on the state of siege (*loi sur l'état de siège*). After Dufaure became Minister of Justice in February 1871, he adopted a whole series of repressive laws. The law on the state of siege of April 28, 1871 restored certain laws meant to suppress freedom of the press, including the law of 1849.

pp. 325, 444, 512

- ¹⁸⁹ During the October 31 events (see Note 184), when the members of the Government of National Defence were detained at the Town Hall, Flourens prevented their being shot, as one of the insurgents was demanding.

p. 326

- ¹⁹⁰ By the terms of the European Convention signed at Geneva in 1864, subject to certain regulations, the wounded and the official staff of ambulances and their equipment were declared neutral.

pp. 327, 478, 530

- ¹⁹¹ The decree of the Commune of April 5, 1871 on reprisals and hostages (Marx gives the date according to the report in *The Daily News*, No. 7781, April 7, 1871) was published in the *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 96, April 6, 1871. Under this decree, all persons charged with and proved to be maintaining contacts with Versailles were declared to be hostages. By this measure, the Paris Commune tried to prevent the Versailles men from shooting Communards.
p. 327
- ¹⁹² *Girondins*—during the French Revolution the party of the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and the landowning bourgeoisie which emerged in the years of the revolution; named after the department of Gironde, which was represented in the Legislative Assembly and the Convention by many leaders of this party. The Girondins stood for turning France into a federation of republics and opposed the Jacobin dictatorship.
p. 333
- ¹⁹³ On December 21, 1870, Professor Thomas Huxley suggested to the School Board for London that the Board Secretary's salary should be £1,000. The School Board decided on a salary of £800.
pp. 336, 488
- ¹⁹⁴ On April 12, 1871, the Commune suspended all kinds of prosecution for delay of payments (*Décret sur la suspension des poursuites pour échéances*) until the law on payment terms was published. The Paris Commune law of April 16, 1871 (*Loi sur les échéances*) provided for payment of all debts in instalments over three years and the abolition of interest on them. The law greatly alleviated the financial position of the petty bourgeoisie and was disadvantageous to the big capitalist creditors.
pp. 336, 474
- ¹⁹⁵ Marx is referring to the Constituent Assembly's rejection, on August 22, 1848, of the bill on "amicable agreements" ("*concordats à l'amiable*"), providing for a moratorium for debtors able to prove that they had gone bankrupt as a result of the depression caused by the revolution. This had ruined a considerable section of the petty bourgeoisie and left it in the clutches of big bourgeois creditors.
pp. 336, 496
- ¹⁹⁶ *Frères ignorantins* or *ignorantines*—the name of the religious order *Frères des écoles chrétiennes* (Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools), which was founded in Rheims in 1680 and whose members pledged themselves to educate the children of the poor. Marx uses the term to hint at the low level and clerical nature of primary education in France.
p. 336
- ¹⁹⁷ This refers to the *Alliance républicaine des départements*, a political association of petty-bourgeois residents in Paris who came from various regions of France. It was founded in April 1871 and soon sided with the Paris Commune. The Alliance came out against the Versailles Government, organised solidarity meetings in the provinces, and worked out a project for democratic reforms to strengthen the Republican system.
pp. 337, 495
- ¹⁹⁸ This apparently refers to the Paris Commune appeal "To the Working People of the Villages" ("*Aux travailleurs des campagnes*"), published in April-early May 1871 in the Commune newspapers and issued as a separate leaflet.
p. 337
- ¹⁹⁹ Marx is referring to the law passed by the government of Charles X on April 27, 1825, authorising the payment of compensation to former émigrés for the landed estates confiscated from them during the French Revolution. Most of

- this compensation, which came to 1 billion francs and was paid as a three per cent state rent, went to top courtiers and big landowners. pp. 337, 492
- ²⁰⁰ An *additional tax of forty-five centimes* on the franc of the direct tax was established by the Provisional Government of the Second Republic on March 16, 1848. The tax, the whole brunt of which fell on the shoulders of the peasants, aroused intense resentment among them, and this mood was utilised by the big landowners and Catholic priests for agitation against the democrats and workers of Paris in order to turn the peasantry into a reserve of the counter-revolution. pp. 337, 492
- ²⁰¹ A reference to the ordinance dividing France into military districts and granting almost unlimited powers to their commanders; the bill giving the President of the Republic the right to remove or appoint mayors; the law on village teachers, who were put under the supervision of the prefects, and the education law which increased the influence of the clergy on education. Marx gives a description of these laws in his work *The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850* (see present edition, Vol. 10, p. 123). pp. 338, 493
- ²⁰² The *Vendôme Column*—a war memorial erected in Paris between 1806 and 1810 as a tribute to the military victories of Napoleon I. It was made of bronze from captured enemy guns. On May 16, 1871, by order of the Paris Commune the Vendôme Column was destroyed as a symbol of militarism. pp. 339, 475, 501
- ²⁰³ In the 1850s and 1860s, G.E. Haussmann, prefect of the Seine Department, carried out considerable work on rebuilding Paris. The old streets were widened and new straight ones were laid to facilitate the use of artillery by troops in suppressing popular uprisings. Big sums of money allocated by the state for these works were misappropriated by Haussmann and his subordinates. pp. 339, 351
- ²⁰⁴ In May 1871, facts exposing crimes committed in monasteries became known. In the Picpus nunnery, in the St. Antoine suburb of Paris, cases were established of nuns being incarcerated in cells for many years and instruments of torture found; in the Church of Saint Laurent, a secret cemetery was discovered attesting to the murders that had been committed there. See "Les squelettes découverts..." in *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 71, May 5, 1871; H. Rochefort, "Les mystères du Couvent Picpus", *Le Mot d'Ordre*, No. 72, May 6, 1871, and also the pamphlet *Les crimes des congrégations religieuses. Mystères de l'Eglise Saint Laurent*, Paris, [1871]. p. 340
- ²⁰⁵ *Wilhelmshöhe* (near Kassel)—the castle of the Prussian kings, where the ex-Emperor Napoleon III, captured by the Prussians, was retained from September 5, 1870 to March 19, 1871. p. 340
- ²⁰⁶ This refers to Stanislas Pourille, elected to the Commune under the false name of Blanchet. On May 5, 1871 he was expelled from the Commune and then arrested. p. 340
- ²⁰⁷ *Absentees*—landlords who owned estates in Ireland but lived permanently in England. Their estates were managed by agents who robbed the Irish peasants, or were leased to speculator-middlemen, who subleased small plots to the peasants. p. 341

- ²⁰⁸ *Francs-fileurs* (literally: "free absconders")—the name given to the Paris bourgeois who fled from the city during the siege. It sounded all the more ironical being a pun on francs-tireurs (see Note 34). pp. 342, 350, 457, 543
- ²⁰⁹ This refers to the Théâtre de la Porte-Saint-Martin in Paris. p. 343
- ²¹⁰ *Coblenz*—a city in Western Germany, the centre of counter-revolutionary emigration during the French Revolution. It was the seat of the émigré government headed by de Calonne, former minister of Louis XVI. pp. 343, 457, 543
- ²¹¹ *Chouans*—participants in the counter-revolutionary insurrection in North-West France during the French Revolution. During the Paris Commune, this name was given by the Communards to the detachment of monarchist-minded Versailles soldiers recruited in Brittany and used against the Commune. pp. 343, 452
- ²¹² Under the impact of the proletarian revolution of March 18, 1871, which led to the establishment of the Paris Commune, revolutionary mass actions were mounted in Lyons, Marseilles and a number of other cities of France. On March 22, the Town Hall in Lyons was seized by the National Guard and the city's working people, and a Commune was proclaimed. However, the provisional commission set up to prepare elections to the Commune abdicated its powers because it commanded only a small military force and had no strong links with the people and the National Guard. Fresh actions by the working people of Lyons on April 30 were fiercely suppressed by the army and the police.
In Marseilles, the insurgent population took the Town Hall and arrested the prefect. A commission of the Department was set up in the city and elections to the Commune were scheduled for April 5. However, the revolutionary movement in Marseilles was put down on April 4 by government troops, who shelled the city. p. 345
- ²¹³ This refers to Dufaure's activities, aimed at strengthening the regime of the July monarchy, during the armed action of the secret conspiratorial Republican Society of the Seasons (*Société des Saisons*) in May 1839, and to Dufaure's role in the struggle against the oppositional petty-bourgeois Party of the Mountain during the Second Republic in June 1849.
The revolutionary action of the Society of the Seasons on May 12, 1839, headed by Blanqui and Barbès, was suppressed by government troops and the National Guard. To fight the revolutionary danger a new ministry was formed, of which Dufaure became a member.
In June 1849, in a situation of mounting political crisis that resulted from the oppositional moves of the Party of the Mountain against Louis Bonaparte, President of the Republic, Dufaure, who became Minister of the Interior, initiated a number of repressive laws aimed against the revolutionary section of the National Guard, democrats and socialists. p. 345
- ²¹⁴ This refers to the law on the press, adopted by the National Assembly on June 6, 1871, which reintroduced provisions from the previous reactionary laws on the press of 1819 and 1849: it provided for harsh penalties, including the closure of periodicals, for statements against the authorities. Besides, a law was adopted on the reinstatement of officials of the Second Empire who had been dismissed and a special law on the procedures for the return of property

- confiscated by the Commune and on the introduction of penalties for its confiscation, as a criminal offence. pp. 345, 467, 479
- 215 The bill on shortening the trial by courts-martial (Projet de loi relatif à l'abréviation des procédures devant les Conseils de guerre), motioned by Dufaure and adopted by the National Assembly on April 6, 1871, extended the powers of the army commander and the Minister of War. In particular, they were empowered to institute criminal proceedings without preliminary investigation and pass sentences within 48 hours. p. 345
- 216 A reference to the commercial treaty between Britain and France, signed on January 23, 1860, under which France was conceded the right to export most of its goods to England duty-free. France abandoned her prohibitive tariff policy and replaced it with duties of no more than 30 per cent of the value of the goods. The result was a sharp intensification of competition on the French domestic market, which was flooded with goods from Britain, and this caused discontent among French industrialists. Marx describes this treaty in his articles published in volume 17 of the present edition. pp. 346, 442
- 217 A reference to the reign of terror and bloody reprisals in Ancient Rome in the period of intensified social and political struggle in the 1st century B.C.
 The *dictatorship of Sulla* (82-79 B.C.), who was made dictator by the slave-owning nobility, was characterised by mass scale annihilation of members of the oppositional slave-owners' faction.
The First and Second Triumvirates—periods of dictatorship by the most influential Roman generals, who divided power between themselves.
 The First Triumvirate (60-53 B.C.)—the period of the dictatorship of Pompey, Caesar and Crassus; the Second Triumvirate (43-36, formally until 31 B.C.)—of Octavianus, Antonius and Lepidus. p. 349
- 218 In August 1814, during the war between Britain and the United States (1812-14), the British troops took Washington and burned the Capitol (the Congressional building), the White House and other public buildings.
 In October 1860, during the colonial war (1856-60) waged by Britain and France against China, the Anglo-French troops plundered and burned down the Summer Palace, a treasure-house of Chinese architecture and art near Peking. p. 350
- 219 In 1812, *Moscow* became the centre of the all-Russian resistance to the aggression of Napoleon's France. On September 7, a battle took place at the village of Borodino near Moscow, and this largely predetermined the collapse of Napoleon's aggressive plans. At the beginning of the occupation of Moscow by the French army, a great fire began in the city and lasted about a week. p. 351
- 220 *Praetorians*—privileged troops in the Roman Empire; originally—the body-guard of the military commanders. Their name has come to symbolise mercenary troops supporting a tyranny. pp. 352, 514
- 221 Marx gives the name "Chambre introuvable" (see Note 177) to the Prussian Assembly elected in January-February 1849, on the basis of the Constitution granted by the Prussian King on December 5, 1848, the day of the counter-revolutionary coup d'état in Prussia. In accordance with the Constitution, the Assembly consisted of two chambers: the privileged, aristocratic "chamber of the gentry", and the second chamber, dominated by

the Junkers and the bourgeoisie. Bismarck, elected to the second chamber, was the leader of its extreme Right-wing Junker group. p. 353

- ²²² The statement issued by the General Council of the International over Jules Favre's circular of June 6, 1871, written by Marx and Engels, was included in the second and third English editions of *The Civil War in France* and its German editions of 1871, 1876 and 1891. It was also published separately in a number of newspapers (see this volume pp. 361-63). p. 357

- ²²³ In 1841, *Le National*, the newspaper of moderate bourgeois Republicans, approved Thiers' plan for building fortifications round Paris, aimed against the workers' and democratic movement (on the plan see Note 170). E. Cabet strongly condemned the position of *Le National*. On April 10, 1841, the newspaper published an article containing attacks of a personal nature against Cabet and presenting a distorted picture of his position during the July 1830 revolution. *Le National* refused to publish Cabet's refutation. Cabet prosecuted the newspaper for libel, and in May 1841 the court compelled it to publish the letter. After new attacks by *Le National* in August 1841, Cabet obtained a court order obliging the newspaper to publish his new letter. During the summer of 1841, he published a number of pamphlets in which he exposed the slanderous character of the newspaper's publications. p. 357

- ²²⁴ This statement, written by Marx and Engels, was approved by the General Council of the International Working Men's Association at its meeting on June 13, 1871. In his report on the issue, Engels noted that, of all the bourgeois dailies, only *The Times* in its issue No. 27088 on June 13, 1871 published the full text of the statement and *The Pall Mall Gazette* in its No. 1975, June 13, 1871 printed it in part. The statement subsequently appeared in several press organs of the International in 1871: *The Eastern Post*, No. 142, June 17, *La Liberté*, No. 57, June 17, *L'Internationale*, No. 127, June 18, *Les Cahiers du Travail*, No. 12, June, *Der Volksstaat*, No. 50, June 21, *Der Vorbote*, No. 6, June, *La Emancipation*, No. 2, June 26, *L'Egalité*, No. 11, June 27, etc.

The statement was included in some editions of *The Civil War in France* (see this volume, p. 357 and note 222). p. 361

- ²²⁵ This statement, written by Marx and edited by Engels, was occasioned by the leading article of *The Times* on June 19, which labelled the Paris Commune and the International; it extolled Louis Bonaparte's "merits" in suppressing the revolutionary working-class movement. The editor of *The Times* refused to publish the statement. Engels made some changes in the draft statement written by Marx.

The statement was published in English for the first time in *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 419-20. p. 364

- ²²⁶ On September 24, 1867, the General Council resolved, on Marx's initiative, to abolish the permanent office of Chairman and elect a Chairman for each meeting. p. 365

- ²²⁷ The last paragraph of Marx's draft statement was edited by Engels. *The Standard* never published the letter.

The statement was first published in English in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *On the Paris Commune*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, pp. 242-43. p. 366

- ²²⁸ This statement by the General Council was drawn up by Engels in connection

with the letter by George Holyoake, a leading figure in the co-operative movement, published in *The Daily News* on June 20, 1871, which contained attacks on the General Council's Address *The Civil War in France*. George Holyoake asserted that the Address aided the reactionary forces; that its authors were not thoroughly acquainted with the English working-class movement; that the English members of the General Council Odger and Lucraft neither saw nor signed the statement. He thus encouraged them to oppose it.

At the General Council meeting of June 20, 1871, which was to approve this statement, Odger and Lucraft expressed their disapproval of it and demanded that their names should not be appended. In compliance with Marx's wishes, the General Council announced in this statement that the Address *The Civil War in France* had been drawn up by Marx. p. 367

- ²²⁹ Engels wrote this letter at Marx's suggestion because *The Spectator* and *The Examiner* reprinted the reports of the reactionary French press on the so-called manifestoes of the International, which were actually forged by the French police (see this volume, pp. 364-66). Marx's proposal to send a refutation to these papers was approved by the General Council at its meeting on June 20, 1871. The editors of the newspapers did not, however, publish the letter.

This letter was first published in English in *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871, Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, p. 423. p. 369

- ²³⁰ Marx's letter to the editor of *The Daily News* was occasioned by this newspaper's publication on June 26, 1871 of letters by British clergyman John Llewellyn Davies, Benjamin Lucraft, and George Holyoake. George Holyoake again slanderously attacked the Address even after the General Council had made its statement on June 21 (see this volume, pp. 367-68). Lucraft expressed his disagreement with the propositions of the Address and declared his resignation from the General Council. Davies called upon the French Government to start legal proceedings against the General Council for the accusations contained in the Address against Thiers, Favre and others. Marx sent the letter to the editors of *The Daily News* and *The Pall Mall Gazette*. The latter published an excerpt from the letter on June 27, 1871. As the editors of *The Daily News* refused to publish the second part of Marx's letter, in which he exposed the British bourgeois press, the letter was also sent to *The Eastern Post*, which published it in full on July 1, 1871. p. 370

- ²³¹ This refers to articles and documents exposing Palmerston's foreign policy. They were published in the 1830s and 1840s by the British conservative journalist and politician David Urquhart in *The Portfolio*, a collection of diplomatic documents put out by him, and in various periodicals. Marx, who persistently exposed the diplomacy of the ruling classes, in addition to other sources, made use of the documents published by Urquhart in his series of articles "Lord Palmerston" written in 1853 (see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 341-406). At the same time, Marx criticised Urquhart's reactionary views. p. 371

- ²³² This statement, drawn up by Engels in connection with the letters of Holyoake and Lucraft published in *The Daily News* on June 26, 1871, was approved at the meeting of the General Council on June 27, 1871. The meeting unanimously censured Lucraft and Odger, who refused to support the Address of the General Council *The Civil War in France* and accepted their resignation from the Council. p. 372

- ²³³ This refers to articles and documents forged by the Paris reactionary press to slander the Paris Commune and the International; they resembled the forgeries used in the struggle against the revolutionary movement by the Prussian police under Stieber, one of the chief organisers of the provocative Communist trial in Cologne (1852). p. 375
- ²³⁴ This letter was written by Marx in reply to the declaration of *The Pall Mall Gazette* that the accusations levelled by Marx against the Versailles Government in the General Council's Address *The Civil War in France* were libellous (see this volume, pp. 307-59). On July 3, *The Pall Mall Gazette* printed Marx's letter in an editorial entitled "The Regenerator Rampant", but at the same time made new attacks on him, arbitrarily quoting from Section One of the Address. On July 4, Marx informed the General Council about his letter and its publication in *The Pall Mall Gazette*. p. 378
- ²³⁵ This Address of the General Council, drawn up by Marx, exposes the demagogical and provocative part played by bourgeois diplomacy in relation to the Paris Commune, citing as an example the activities of Mr. Washburne, American Ambassador in Paris. Marx showed that, from the start, the American diplomats joined international reaction in its struggle against the Commune. Washburne, while expressing his sympathy for the Communards, in actual fact used his position in Paris to act against the Commune. Though he stayed in Paris, he maintained constant contacts with the Versailles Government and often went to Versailles to convey information about the situation in the city. During the days of the Commune, he corresponded with Bismarck and the latter's representatives in Versailles, inciting them to armed actions. At the same time, in order to disrupt the defence of Paris, American diplomats tried to make the Communards entertain hopes that Prussia would remain neutral and act as mediator. That was the primary aim pursued by Washburne in suggesting that contacts be established with the Prussian command.
- When writing this Address, Marx used the letter by Mr. Reid, the Paris correspondent of *The Daily Telegraph* (Section I) and the communication of Serrailier, a Communeard and member of the General Council (Section II). On returning to England Reid delivered lectures in support of the Paris Commune, contacted Marx and met him on July 1, 1871 (see this volume pp. 552-53). On July 4, the General Council unanimously passed a resolution to cooperate with Reid in disseminating truthful information about the Paris Commune and the General Council's Address *The Civil War in France*. On July 7, the Sub-Committee of the General Council, having discussed Washburne's subversive activities against the Commune, adopted a draft Address written by Marx. On July 11, the Address was unanimously approved by the General Council and published in London as a pamphlet. On August 1, the New York Central Committee for the United States' Sections of the International had it published in the bourgeois New York newspaper *The Sun*. Sorge and other members of the New York Committee supplied the Address with a preface explaining the significance of the Commune. Concerning Washburne, it stated that "he belongs to that large family of State parasites, feeding upon the public crib..."; the New York Committee called on the workers to give no credence to the information about the Commune received "through the channel of its deadly adversaries—a subsidised press" and to remember that the Commune "was a workingmen's government, and as such was hated, dreaded and calumniated by all the privileged classes and their ubiquitous mouthpieces and subordinates...".
- The Address "Mr. Washburne, the American Ambassador in Paris" was

published in 1871 in English in the American newspapers *The Workingman's Advocate*, August 5, 1871, *The National Standard*, No. 7, September 9, and in the *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly*, No. 20/12, September 30; in German in *Der Volksstaat*, No. 60, July 26, 1871; in French in *La Liberté*, No. 88, July 19, 1871; in Spanish in *La Emancipación*, No. 14, September 18, 1871.

Thiers' government banned the publication of the Address in France.

p. 379

²³⁶ The Archbishop of Paris, Georges Darboy, was arrested and, among others, kept hostage by the Commune in an attempt to stop the Versailles shooting Communards. The Commune repeatedly offered the Versailles Government to exchange all the hostages for Blanqui alone, who was arrested on March 17, 1871 (see this volume, pp. 352, 400-02, 446-49). Washburne recommended Thiers to consent, hoping that, if Blanqui were released, the position of the Blanquists in the Commune would become stronger and the contradictions that intensified in late April and early May within the Commune would be aggravated further. Thiers did not agree. After the Archbishop had been executed, Washburne in his articles and at lectures slandered the Commune on the strength of this measure, which it had been forced to take. p. 381

²³⁷ This article by Engels was occasioned by the slander campaign against the International and the Paris Commune being joined by Mazzini before the 12th Congress of the Italian workers' societies, which took place on November 1-6, 1871. Mazzini planned to prevent the spread of the International's influence on the Italian workers' movement and the strengthening of their class organisation in Italy.

Carlo Cafiero, a leader of the Neapolitan Section of the International, sent Mazzini's Address "To the Italian Workers" to Engels. The Address, published in *La Roma del Popolo*, No. 20, July 13, 1871, distorted the history of the foundation of the International, its programme and principles. Engels made a speech concerning Mazzini's attitude towards the International at the meeting of the General Council on July 25 (see this volume, pp. 607-08). He developed the principal theses of his speech in this article, which he enclosed in a letter to Cafiero of July 28, 1871. In his letter Engels stressed that the facts about Mazzini's activities should be made known to the workers and the true meaning of his propaganda exposed. Cafiero sent Engels' article to several newspapers and used it and an extract Engels sent him from the minutes of the General Council's meeting in writing his own article against Mazzini, but he was arrested before he could finish it; the rough draft of the article was confiscated by the police. p. 385

²³⁸ At a meeting of the Sub-Committee of the General Council on October 8, 1864, Luigi Wolff proposed that the Rules of the Italian Working Men's Association, written by Mazzini and translated into English by Wolff, should be adopted as the Rules of the International. Mazzini's Rules gave the organisation a sectarian and conspiratorial character.

The Sub-Committee, or the Standing Committee, of the General Council of the International developed from a committee set up in the early period of the International Working Men's Association in 1864 to draw up its programme and Rules. The Sub-Committee consisted of corresponding secretaries for various countries, the General Secretary of the General Council, and a treasurer. The Sub-Committee, which was not envisaged by the Rules of the International, was an executive body; under Marx's direction, it fulfilled a wide range of duties in the day-to-day guidance of the International and drafting its

documents, which were subsequently submitted to the General Council for approval. pp. 385, 556, 593, 608

- ²³⁹ This refers to the withdrawal of the Italian Mazzinists from the General Council in April 1865 following the discussion of the conflict in the Paris section of the International between journalist Henri Lefort, on the one hand, and the Proudhonists Fribourg and Tolain, on the other; the bourgeois elements tried to use this conflict to their own ends. The discussion ended with the adoption of resolutions written by Marx (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 82-83). p. 386

- ²⁴⁰ This refers to Jung's letter to the editor of the bourgeois-democratic newspaper *L'Écho de Verviers*, in reply to the libellous attacks made on the International's leaders by the petty-bourgeois republican Vésinier in the columns of the paper (H. Jung, "L'Association Internationale des Travailleurs", *L'Écho de Verviers*, No. 43, February 20, 1866). Jung's letter was edited by Marx and dated February 15, 1866 (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 392-400). p. 386

- ²⁴¹ This covering letter to the editor of *The Times* of August 7, 1871 attached to Engels' letter printed below, was written by Marx in connection with an article published in the newspaper on July 29, 1871. Along with the appeals to prosecute the leaders of the Paris Commune, the newspaper admitted that a great many citizens suspected of participating in it were being kept under terrible conditions in the Versailles prisons without trial for two months and brutally treated. *The Times* article and an attempt by Thiers' *Journal officiel* to refute it aroused protests in the press of various countries against the brutal treatment of the arrested Communards. However, Marx's and Engels' attempt to make use of the polemic between the two papers in order to defend the victims of the Versailles terror in the columns of the widely read British newspaper failed. The editor of *The Times* did not publish Engels' letter.

This letter was first published in English in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *On the Paris Commune*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, pp. 260-61. p. 388

- ²⁴² See Note 241.

First published in English in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *On the Paris Commune*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, pp. 260-61. p. 389

- ²⁴³ This and other refutations (see this volume, pp. 393, 405) were written by Marx in reply to the libellous article about the International Working Men's Association published in the Berlin *National-Zeitung* on July 30, 1871. Excerpts from it were reprinted in several bourgeois London newspapers, including *L'International*, which also made new attacks on Marx.

The refutation was published in full in *Der Volksstaat* in an item about the *National-Zeitung* libel on the International. The rough draft in French contains some additions in Engels' hand. p. 391

- ²⁴⁴ This private letter and an open letter to the editor of *Public Opinion* (this volume, pp. 393-94) were dispatched by Marx to Engels with his letter of August 19, 1871 (see present edition, Vol. 44), in which he asked Engels to make copies of the letters and send them to the newspaper, because his own handwriting might cause misprints.

This letter was first published in English in Marx/Engels, *Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA). Erste Abteilung, Bd. 22, Berlin, 1978. S. 1090. p. 392

- ²⁴⁵ This open letter was sent to the editor of *Public Opinion* together with a private letter (this volume, p. 392). The editor supplied Marx's letter with the following statement: "In our last number we published, under the title 'A German View of the International', an article from the Berlin *National-Zeitung*, criticising the proceedings of the International Society. M. Karl Marx complains of a paragraph in that article as conveying an imputation of personal corruption or impropriety against himself and his colleagues in the Society. We gladly publish his letter. We at once disclaim the intention of making any such imputations as that which he has understood to be conveyed by the paragraph in question; and we are sorry that anything has appeared in our columns capable of such a meaning."

A copy was sent by Marx to *The Evening Standard*, but it was not published there (see this volume, p. 405). p. 393

- ²⁴⁶ This letter was written by Marx in connection with the reprint by *Le Gaulois* of extracts from the report of a conversation Marx had with a *New York Herald* correspondent on July 20, 1871, since the report, published in *The New York Herald* on August 3, deliberately falsified the conversation (see also Marx's letter to Friedrich Bolte of August 25, 1871, present edition, Vol. 44). *The New York Herald* did not publish Marx's statement. p. 395

- ²⁴⁷ This is Marx's reply to a letter from Charles Dana, a former editor of the *New-York Daily Tribune* whom Marx had known since the time he had contributed to the paper in 1851-62. In his capacity as editor of *The Sun*, Dana asked Marx on July 6, 1871, to write several articles on the International. Marx decided to use this opportunity primarily to expose the Thiers government and the regime of police terror in France. He wanted, in particular, to make public the facts revealing the persecution of his daughters and Paul Lafargue in France and Spain. Later, to the same end, Marx also dispatched to the American press a letter written by his daughter Jenny (see this volume, pp. 622-32). In replying to Dana, Marx expected Dana to publish, in one form or another, the material contained in the letter on the persecution of the members of his family by the French authorities. Marx's letter reached New York at the same time as rumours of his death, circulated by a Bonapartist newspaper. This prompted Dana to publish in *The Sun* the whole letter, with a short obituary, on September 9, 1871. Subsequently Marx refuted the rumours spread in the American press about his death and pointed to their source (see this volume, p. 432). p. 396

- ²⁴⁸ At a meeting of the General Council of the International on August 22, 1871 Engels proposed that an appeal be made by the General Council to the workmen of America on behalf of the refugees. The General Council instructed Marx to write an appeal and dispatch it to the American section of the International. Marx forwarded it to Friedrich Sorge on September 5, 1871. The text of the appeal has not survived. p. 396

- ²⁴⁹ The letter was one of the numerous contributions by Marx in defence of the Paris Commune (see this volume, pp. 360, 364-74, 378, 388-99, 403-05). Marx presumably addressed it to the editor of *The Examiner* because, as Engels put it, it was "the only paper to behave really decently" (see this volume, p. 376) in the slander campaign initiated by the British bourgeois press after *The Civil War in France* had been published.

The title "The Commune and Archbishop Darboy" was probably supplied by the editors of the newspaper. p. 400

²⁵⁰ Though not published in *La Vérité*, this statement was widely circulated. It was published in 1871 in *Le Soir*, No. 862, September 3, *Paris-Journal*, No. 236, September 4, *Journal des Débats*, September 4, *La Favilla*, No. 210, September 8 and also in the press organs of the International; *L'Internationale*, No. 139, September 10, *Der Volksstaat*, No. 74, September 13, *Il Proletario Italiano*, No. 19, September 14, *Die Tagwacht*, No. 38, September 16 and *L'Eguaglianza*, No. 10, September 17. p. 403

²⁵¹ Marx spoke at the meeting of the General Council on July 11, 1871 about the fabrications presented as documents of the International. The report on the meeting and the account of Marx's speech were published in *The Eastern Post*, No. 146, July 15, 1871. p. 403

²⁵² These propositions were submitted by Marx to the General Council at its meeting on September 5, 1871 and approved by it. The available manuscript, written by Engels, has a correction in Marx's hand. The words "Financial account" at the beginning of the manuscript related to the proposal that the General Council should prepare the accounts for the Conference.

They were published in English for the first time in *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967. p. 406

²⁵³ Preliminary draft resolutions were submitted by Marx to the Sub-Committee of the General Council (see Note 238) and approved by it on September 9, 1871. Later, the drafts were supplemented; in particular, clauses were added on the formation of working women's sections and on the general statistics of the working class. On September 12, after Engels' report, the resolutions were discussed and approved by the General Council. At the London Conference, Marx moved these resolutions on behalf of the General Council. Some of them were edited and subsequently included in the official publication of the Conference resolutions (see resolutions of the London Conference II, III, IV and X, in this volume, pp. 423, 424, 427).

Engels' manuscript contains additions made by Marx.

They were published in English for the first time in: *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967. pp. 407, 565

²⁵⁴ The reference to the resolutions of the Congress of Basle is inaccurate. The Congress of Basle (1869) adopted a number of resolutions enhancing the leading role of the General Council, but it did not adopt a resolution on the designation of local branches of the International. Such a resolution was adopted at the London Conference (1871) and, after its approval by the General Council, included in the Administrative Regulations of the International Working Men's Association (see present edition, Vol. 23) without any reference to the Congress of Basle. pp. 408, 565

²⁵⁵ The *London Conference* (September 17-23, 1871) marked an important stage in the struggle waged by Marx and Engels for establishing a proletarian party.

In conformity with a resolution of the Congress of Basle (1869), the next congress of the International Working Men's Association was to be held in Paris. However, the persecution of the International's sections by the police in France by orders of the Bonapartist government compelled the General Council to shift the next congress to Mayence (Germany) (see present edition, Vol. 21, p. 132). The outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war made the congress impossible; nor was it possible to hold it in the atmosphere of severe reprisals against the members of the International during the civil war in France, especially after the suppression of the Paris Commune. Under these conditions,

the majority of national federations suggested that the congress be postponed and the General Council be empowered to convene it at its own discretion. At the same time, the need to take account of the experience of the Paris Commune and adopt collective decisions so as to strengthen the ideological unity and organisation of the International, the urgent tasks of the struggle against the Bakuninists and other sectarian elements, who had stepped up their splitting activities, as well as other tasks, demanded the convocation of a conference of representatives of the International from all countries. At its meeting on July 25, 1871, the General Council, at Engels' suggestion, resolved to convene a closed conference of the International Working Men's Association in London on September 17. The majority of the federations agreed with this proposal. Marx and Engels carried out tremendous preparatory work. At the meetings of the General Council on August 15 and September 5, 12 and 16, the questions concerning the organisation and the agenda were discussed and the draft resolutions were adopted.

Twenty-two delegates with votes and ten delegates with voice but no votes took part in the work of the Conference. The countries unable to send delegates were represented by the corresponding secretaries. Marx represented Germany, Engels, Italy. In all, there were nine closed sessions.

The minutes of the Conference and the other related material were first published, in Russian, in the book *The London Conference of the First International, 17-23 September, 1871*, Moscow, 1936.

In this volume, the Conference resolutions, along with the accounts of the statements by Marx and Engels, which have reached us as written down by Engels, are published in the main text. Marx's speeches, recorded by Rochat and Martin, are published in Appendices (see pp. 613-21). p. 409

- ²⁵⁶ This speech was made by Marx on September 18, 1871 at the sitting of the commission elected by the London Conference to consider the question of the Bakuninists' splitting activities in the International's sections of Romance Switzerland. Bakunin's followers used several Swiss newspapers to attack the General Council and propagate Bakunin's ideas. At the Congress in La Chaux-de-Fonds, held in April 1870, the Bakuninists won an insignificant majority. The representatives of the Geneva sections refused to comply with the decisions of the Congress. The General Council repudiated the attempts by the Bakunist Council to take over the powers of a central, leading body of the International in Switzerland. As a result of the sharp criticism of the Bakuninists' activities by Marx and Engels, who were supported by a majority of the International's sections, the leaders of the Alliance did not venture to come out against the General Council openly and, some weeks before the London Conference, they declared the Alliance dissolved, but wanted to keep it secretly.

Marx and Engels considered the unmasking of the Bakuninists' activities and ideas, which introduced disorganisation into the working-class movement, to be an important task of the London Conference. The Conference commission expressed its agreement with Marx's conclusions and exposed the attempts on the part of the Bakunist Robin to justify the Alliance's activities in Switzerland. The question of the Alliance was subsequently discussed at the Conference which, on September 21, approved the report made by Marx on behalf of the commission and unanimously passed the resolutions moved by him (see this volume, pp. 419-22, 429-31). pp. 411, 556

- ²⁵⁷ There is a slip of the pen in the manuscript: the reference is actually to the

Congress of the Romance Federation of the International in La Chaux-de-Fonds on April 4-6, 1870 (see Note 256). Locle, mentioned in the manuscript, was a centre of Bakuninists' activity. p. 412

- ²⁵⁸ This document contains the preliminary text of the resolutions on organisational and tactical questions moved by Marx on behalf of the General Council and adopted at its meeting on September 12, 1871. The Conference unanimously adopted these resolutions on September 18 and 19, 1871. The text was discussed at the General Council's meeting on October 16, 1871 and finally edited by Marx. The text that is published in this volume was written by Engels in French, and does not fully coincide with the official edition of the *Resolutions of the Conference of Delegates of the International Working Men's Association Assembled at London from 17th to 23rd September 1871* (see this volume, pp. 423-31). p. 413

- ²⁵⁹ The question of the political action of the working class, which was the main issue on the agenda of the London Conference and was comprehensively analysed in the speeches by Marx and Engels, was discussed at the sixth and seventh sessions of the Conference on September 20 and 21. The Bakuninists Bastelica and Robin, as well as Lorenzo, the representative of the Spanish sections, tried to have this question taken off the agenda declaring that the Conference was incompetent to discuss it. By a majority vote, the Conference instructed the General Council to prepare the final text of the resolution taking all motions into account (see this volume, pp. 426-27). In addition to this plan of Engels' speech on the political action of the working class, written in German, there is his record of this speech in French, which was appended to the minutes of the Conference on September 21 (pp. 417-18). This speech has also survived as a brief record in the minutes. p. 415

- ²⁶⁰ See Note 259.

Published in English for the first time in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1968, p. 314. p. 417

- ²⁶¹ This full text of the resolution in French was moved by Marx at the Conference session on September 21, 1871 and finally edited not later than September 26. In the official edition of the Resolutions of the London Conference, Clause 1 is abridged. The text of the resolution published in *L'Egalité* was signed: "Pour copie conforme: Le secrétaire-correspondant pour la Suisse H. Jung."

Marx also spoke on the conflicts in the Romance Federation and the splitting activities of the Bakuninists in the Conference commission on September 18, 1871 (see this volume, pp. 411-12). p. 419

- ²⁶² This refers to the *General Council Resolution on the Federal Committee of Romance Switzerland*, written by Marx, which, despite the Bakuninists' claims, helped to preserve the committee's name and status as the guiding body of the International's sections in Romance Switzerland (see present edition, Vol. 21) pp. 420, 430

- ²⁶³ The resolutions of the London Conference were mainly drafted and moved at its sessions by Marx and Engels. Several resolutions were based on preliminary drafts prepared by them (see this volume, pp. 407-08), Marx's speeches at the Sub-Committee meeting on September 9, 1871 (*ibid.*, pp. 565-66) and also the speeches by Marx and Engels at the Conference. Marx's and Engels' positions were also reflected in resolutions moved by other delegates at the Conference. In

his capacity as Conference Secretary for editing and translating resolutions, Engels took a major part in drafting and editing them.

Marx and Engels deemed it necessary to inform the members of the International and the international working-class movement in general about the major decisions of the Conference as quickly as possible. On their initiative, the Conference commissioned the delegates to make reports in the sections of the International about the adopted resolutions. The General Council charged a special commission headed by Marx with the official publication of the resolutions of the London Conference in English, French and German. Marx and Engels carried out the final editing of the Conference resolutions, which they received in rough form. The translation of the resolutions into French and German was done under their direct supervision.

In view of the fact that the decisions of the 1871 London Conference, which was of a consultative nature, were not, according to the Rules, obligatory, in contrast to the decisions of regular congresses, its resolutions approved by the General Council and published as a circular letter of the General Council, were addressed to all the federations and sections of the International.

The resolutions were published in pamphlet form in English and French at the beginning of November 1871.

The resolutions were published in German in *Der Volksstaat*, No. 92, November 15, 1871 and as a separate edition early in February 1872. In November-December 1871, on the basis of these three editions approved by the General Council, many newspapers reprinted these resolutions in full or in an abridged form. They were translated into Italian, Spanish, Polish, Serbo-Croatian and Flemish and widely circulated.

The resolutions were published in the principal organs of the International in 1871: *L'Égalité*, No. 22, November 19, *L'Internationale*, No. 150, November 26, *Die Tagwacht*, Nos. 48, 49 and 50, November 25, December 2 and 9, *Der Vorbote*, No. 12, December, *La Emancipation*, No. 24, November 27, *La Federación*, No. 119, November 26, *L'Eguaglianza*, No. 21, December 3, and others.

The decisions were supported by most of the sections and federations of the International.

p. 423

²⁶⁴ Resolution I—"Composition of General Council"—was moved by Laurent Verrycken and César De Paepe, and was adopted at the eighth session of the London Conference on September 22, after a discussion in which Marx and Engels took part; of the four resolutions on the composition of the General Council passed by the Conference, only the first (Resolution I) and the fourth (see Point 1 of the section XIII "Special Votes of the Conference") were published. The second and third resolutions envisaged an extension of the probation period for candidate members of the Council to three weeks, and the right of sections of different countries to nominate candidates for the respective corresponding secretaryships. These resolutions have survived in the minutes of the London Conference and in the Minute Book of the General Council (meeting of October 16, 1871, at which Marx read the four resolutions).

p. 423

²⁶⁵ Resolution II—"Designations of National Councils, etc."—was moved by Marx on behalf of the General Council, and passed at the second session of the London Conference on September 18, 1871. Point 1 of this resolution had already been formulated by Marx and Engels in the preliminary draft resolutions, which were submitted to and approved by the Sub-Committee of

the General Council on September 9, 1871 (see this volume, pp. 407-08). This point, with some amendments, was included in the Administrative Regulations as Point 1 of Section II, points 2-4 became points 2-4 of Section V (see present edition, Vol. 23). The resolution was directed against the attempts of the petty-bourgeois elements (Right-wing Proudhonists, Bakuninists, Positivists, etc.) to impose their sectarian views on the local organisations of the International in opposition to the principles of the General Rules, which was reflected in the designations of local sections. p. 423

266 Resolution III—"Delegates of the General Council" was moved by Marx on behalf of the General Council and passed at the fourth session of the London Conference on September 19, 1871; its first version is found in the preliminary draft resolutions written by Marx and Engels (see this volume, p. 408); it was included in the Administrative Regulations as point 8 of Section II (see present edition, Vol. 23). p. 424

267 Resolution IV—"Contribution of 1d. per Member to the General Council"—was moved by Frankel, who made a report on behalf of the commission that was to work out measures for a more regular inflow of individual contributions, and passed by the London Conference at its sixth session on September 20. During the preparations for the Conference, Marx raised the question of the contributions at the meeting of the Sub-Committee of the General Council on September 9, 1871 (see this volume, p. 565). The resolution, with slight amendments, was included in the Administrative Regulations as Section III (see present edition, Vol. 23). p. 424

268 Resolution V—"Formation of Working Women's Branches"—was moved by Marx on behalf of the General Council and passed by the London Conference at its third session on September 19, 1871. During the preparations for the Conference, the question was raised at the meeting of the Sub-Committee of the General Council on September 11, 1871 (see this volume, p. 567). Moving his motion, Marx stressed the need to establish women's branches in countries with a high rate of female employment in industry. The resolution was included in the Administrative Regulations as point 6 of Section V (see present edition, Vol. 23). p. 424

269 Resolution VI—"General Statistics of the Working Class"—was moved by Marx on behalf of the General Council at the third session of the London Conference on September 19, 1871 and adopted with addenda proposed by Utin and Frankel.

Moving the resolution, Marx stressed that general statistics were especially important in organising aid for strikers from the workers of other countries and for other joint actions as an expression of international proletarian solidarity. The resolution was included in the Administrative Regulations as points 1-4 of Section VI (see present edition, Vol. 23). p. 425

270 This refers to the Rules of the International Working Men's Association published by the General Council in London in 1867. This edition reflected the changes introduced in the Rules at the Geneva (1866) and Lausanne (1867) congresses. In the Provisional Rules, published in 1864, this article, except the last sentence added later, was numbered 6 (see present edition, Vol. 20).

The resolution passed by the Geneva Congress (its text is included in section VI of the Administrative Regulations, see present edition, Vol. 23), was based on Section 2 (c) of Marx's "Instructions for the Delegates of the Provisional Central Council" (see present edition, Vol. 20). p. 425

- 271 Resolution VII—"International Relations of Trades' Unions"—was moved by Frankel, Bastelica, Utin, Serraillier, Lorenzo and De Paepe at the fifth session of the London Conference on September 20, 1871 in connection with the discussion of Delahaye's proposal to organise international federations of trade unions according to trades, to direct the working-class movement and to achieve "administrative decentralisation" and "to create a real commune of the future". Delahaye's proposal contained anarcho-syndicalist ideas that specifically denied the significance of the proletarian party. It was criticised by Marx and other delegates (see Note 406). The resolution was adopted as edited by Marx and Engels. p. 425
- 272 Resolution VIII—"Agricultural Producers"—was moved by Marx and adopted at the eighth session of the London Conference on September 22, 1871. In his speeches, Marx stressed the need to carry on propaganda in the countryside and proposed that the question of securing the alliance of the working class and the peasants be discussed. p. 426
- 273 At the sixth session of the London Conference on September 20, 1871, Vaillant moved a draft resolution stressing that political and social questions were inseparable, and that the political activities of the working class were of prime importance. During the discussion of Vaillant's resolution and Serraillier's and Frankel's additions to it, Marx and Engels made speeches on the political action of the working class (see this volume, pp. 409-10, 413-14 and Note 259). Their speeches formed the basis of Resolution (IX) "Political Action of the Working Class" which the General Council was charged with drafting by the Conference. On October 7, 1871 a commission was set up; Engels was elected to the commission and Marx also took part in its work. Marx and Engels drafted an essentially new resolution formulating a clear proposition on the political party of the working class as indispensable for the victory of a socialist revolution and the achievement of its final goal—the building of a classless society.
- The 9th resolution of the London Conference was approved by the Hague Congress in September 1872 and its main part was included in Article 7^a of the General Rules. p. 426
- 274 At the end of 1864—beginning of 1865, the Paris section of the International, headed by Proudhonists, published the French translation of the Provisional Rules (*Association Internationale des Travailleurs. Congrès ouvrier. Règlement provisoire*. [Paris, s.a.]) and, at the end of 1865, issued a new edition almost without changes. There were, however, a number of inaccuracies and distortions of principle (see K. Marx, "The General Council to the Federal Council of Romance Switzerland", present edition, Vol. 21). p. 427
- 275 "General Resolution as to the Countries where the Regular Organisation of the International is Interfered with by the Governments" (X) was moved by Marx on behalf of the General Council at the ninth session of the London Conference on September 22, 1871. Its contents were set forth in preliminary draft resolutions worked out by Marx and Engels (see this volume, p. 407) and also in Marx's speech at the meeting of the Sub-Committee of the General Council on September 9, 1871 (see this volume, p. 565). p. 427
- 276 "Resolutions Relating to France" (XI) were introduced by Utin at the eighth session of the London Conference on September 22, 1871 during the discussion of the state of the International's organisation in France. The resolutions were based on propositions expounded at this session by Marx. Of

the resolutions on this issue adopted by the Conference only the first two were published, which are given in this volume. The third resolution made the Belgian and Spanish federal councils and the Federal Council of Romance Switzerland ensure contacts between the French sections and the General Council and admit sections formed by French refugees to the respective federations. The fourth resolution proposed that the General Council publish an appeal to the French workers, calling on them to wage an open struggle against the counter-revolutionary government and, despite persecutions, to set up organisations of the International. At its meeting on October 24, however, the General Council resolved to abstain from publishing this appeal since it might do harm to the imprisoned Communards.

p. 428

- ²⁷⁷ "Resolution Relating to England" (XII)—was moved by Marx at the eighth session of the London Conference on September 22, 1871. Moving his motion, Marx noted that the General Council had previously opposed the formation of the Federal Committee or Council for England, because the English workers were represented on the General Council, which promoted their education in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and socialism and prevented the bourgeoisie from taking over the leadership of the English working-class movement. The tremendous amount of work carried out by the General Council after the establishment of the Paris Commune made, however, the formation of a Federal Council in England imperative. On October 21, 1871, a provisional London Federal Council, which included representatives of the London Section of the International and some trades unions, was set up.

p. 428

- ²⁷⁸ "Special Votes of the Conference" (XIII). The first resolution was moved by De Paepe and adopted at the eighth session of the London Conference on September 22. The second, adopted at the ninth session on September 22, was based on Marx's speech on the position of the International in Germany and England, in which he noted the solidarity of the German workers with the Paris Commune, and also on a proposal introduced by Utin. The third one was adopted at the fifth session on September 20, in connection with the memorandum of the Spanish Federation on the organisation of the International in Spain. The fourth was moved by De Paepe at the ninth session, on September 22, in connection with Utin's report on Nechayev's case. Marx, who spoke on the issue, noted that the bourgeois press used the Nechayev conspiracy to slander the International (see Note 279).

p. 428

- ²⁷⁹ The reference is to the activities of Nechayev, who had established contacts with Bakunin and started setting up a secret organisation called Narodnaya Rasprava (People's Justice) in various cities in Russia. Having received from Bakunin the credentials of the non-existent European Revolutionary Union, Nechayev passed himself off as a representative of the International and thus misled the members of the organisation he had created.

When members of Nechayev's organisation were arrested and put on trial in St. Petersburg in the summer of 1871, his adventurist methods to achieve his own ends were made public: blackmail, intimidation, deception, etc. The bourgeois press used Nechayev's case to discredit the International. See "Declaration on Nechayev's Misuse of the Name of the International" (present edition, Vol. 23).

p. 429

- ²⁸⁰ Resolution XIV—"Instruction to Citizen Outine"—was moved by Edouard Vaillant and adopted at the ninth session of the London Conference on

September 22, 1871, in connection with Utin's communication about the Nechayev trial. Marx moved that the report on the Nechayev trial should be submitted to the General Council. Using the material of the St. Petersburg trial, Utin wrote a detailed report in French; its main points he used in his speech at the Hague Congress in 1872. Marx and Engels used Utin's report while working on the assignment of the Hague Congress on *The Alliance of Socialist Democracy and the International Working Men's Association*, in Chapter VIII "The Alliance in Russia" (see present edition, Vol. 23). p. 429

- 281 Resolution XV—"Convocation of Next Congress"—was moved, in a slightly different wording, by De Paepe and Eugène Steens at the ninth session of the London Conference on September 22, 1871. p. 429

- 282 Resolution XVI—"Alliance de la Démocratie socialiste"—was moved by Marx at the seventh session of the London Conference on September 21, 1871. After the question had been discussed in the commission (see this volume, pp. 411-12 and Note 256), this session heard Marx's report on the Alliance and Bakuninists' splitting activities in Switzerland and then passed Resolutions XVI and XVII. p. 429

- 283 Resolution XVII—"Split in the French-Speaking Part of Switzerland"—was moved by Marx at the seventh session of the London Conference on September 21, 1871. An abridged text of this resolution was published in a separate edition of the London Conference resolutions. The resolution was published in full in *L'Égalité*, No. 20, October 21, 1871 (see this volume, pp. 419-22). p. 430

- 284 This is Marx's covering letter to that of his daughter Jenny (see this volume, pp. 622-32). It was presumably written in reply to a request by the editors of *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly* for an explanation of the rumours about Marx's death circulated by the bourgeois press. p. 432

- 285 Marx wrote the drafts of *The Civil War in France*, which are preparatory versions of this work, between mid-April and May 23, 1871; after this, he started work on the final version of *The Civil War in France* as an Address of the International Working Men's Association. Newspaper clippings and excerpts in Marx's notebook relating to the last week of the Paris Commune were used not in the second draft, but in the final text of the Address itself.

The manuscript of the first, more sizable draft, which seems to have survived in full, fills eleven sheets, 22 pages altogether. Judging by Marx's pagination (it is not on all sheets), the Second Draft consisted of 13 sheets, of which only 11 have survived. The missing sheets apparently contained item 4, which preceded extant item 5: "Opening of the civil war. 18 March Revolution. Clement Thomas. Lecomte. The Affaire Vendôme". The last three unnumbered pages (see this volume, pp. 545-51) contain, in the main, a new version of separate passages of the Second Draft. Marx marked a large part of the text of the First and Second Drafts with vertical and oblique lines, by which he usually indicated the passages included in the final version of a text. Words and sentences crossed out by Marx by horizontal lines are not reproduced in this edition (in some cases, the crossed out passages that are of importance are reproduced in the footnotes). Both manuscripts have numerous marks in the margins, parentheses, square brackets, etc., that Marx made for himself. They are not reproduced in the present edition.

When Marx quotes or mentions the decrees and proclamations of the

Commune, he often gives the dates according to their publication or reports of them in London newspapers.

The drafts were not published in Marx's and Engels' lifetime and for a long time after their death. Some excerpts from the First Draft were published first, in Russian, in the USSR in *Pravda*, Nos. 72 and 76, March 14 and 18, 1933; both drafts were first published in full in the USSR in 1934 in the language of the original (English), and in a Russian translation in *Marx/Engels Archives*, Vol. III (VIII), by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC CPSU.

p. 435

- ²⁸⁶ On October 5, 1870, a demonstration of the workers' battalions of the National Guard took place in front of the Town Hall in Paris. The workers, led by Gustave Flourens, demanded that the Government of National Defence hold elections to the Commune, and take measures to strengthen the Republic and to fight resolutely against the invaders. The government rejected these demands and banned National Guard assemblies and armed demonstrations.

On the October 31, 1870 uprising see Note 184.

p. 438

- ²⁸⁷ This refers to the new electoral qualifications introduced under the law of May 31, 1850, which was passed by the Legislative Assembly of the French Republic on the initiative of Thiers' Party of Order, frightened by the successes of the Democrats and Socialists at the by-elections to the Assembly in March and April 1850. The new electoral law, directed against the workers, agricultural labourers and poor peasants, introduced personal tax and three-year residential qualification. As a result, the number of voters fell by almost three million.

Shortly after the adoption of the 1850 electoral law, the salary of the President of the Republic, Louis Bonaparte, paid from the treasury, was raised by the Assembly from 600,000 to three million francs.

p. 442

- ²⁸⁸ The attempts by the Normand millowners to reduce the wages of textile workers in order to compete more effectively with British manufacturers caused a big strike at Sotteville-lès-Rouen in late 1868 and early 1869. Meeting the strikers' request for support, the General Council of the International organised collection of funds for the strikers through the London and French trades unions. As Marx noted in the Report of the General Council to the Fourth Annual Congress of the International Working Men's Association (see present edition, Vol. 21), the strike, despite its defeat, promoted the organisation and unity of the workers in the Normand textile industry and led to the establishment of trades unions in Rouen, Elbeuf, Darnétal and other towns. It also consolidated an alliance between the English and French workers.

p. 442

- ²⁸⁹ The reference is to the actions of the Blanquist Société des Saisons on May 12, 1839 (see Note 213).

p. 444

- ²⁹⁰ This refers to the *Comité de la reunion de la rue de Poitiers*, the guiding body of the Party of Order (see Note 173). The Comité was dominated by the Orleanists, headed by Thiers.

pp. 444, 456

- ²⁹¹ When speaking of the *Union libérale* of 1847, Marx has in mind a group of so-called progressive conservatives that took shape in the French Chamber of Deputies after the elections of 1846. Its leaders were the Orleanists Girardin, Tocqueville, Dufaure and others.

The *Union libérale* was a coalition of bourgeois Republicans, Orleanists and a section of the Legitimists, formed during the elections to the Corps Législatif in

- 1863, on the common platform of opposition to the Empire. An attempt to revive the *Union libérale* during the election campaign of 1869 failed owing to differences between the parties that formed the 1863 coalition. p. 445
- ²⁹² This refers to the Bonapartist coup d'état of December 2, 1851. p. 447
- ²⁹³ The *Commission of Fifteen* (Commission des Quinze) was appointed by the National Assembly on March 20, 1871 to help Thiers' government fight revolutionary Paris. It consisted mainly of monarchists and bourgeois republicans supporting Thiers; after the defeat of the Commune the Commission ceased to exist. pp. 447, 541
- ²⁹⁴ Marx presumably intended to give examples of monarchist intrigues in the Versailles National Assembly. The excerpts made by Marx from the newspapers of the time contain information about the intrigues of the Duc d'Aumale and his brother Prince Joinville, rumours about a merger of the Bourbons and the Orleans and plans to put the Duc d'Aumale on the French throne. p. 450
- ²⁹⁵ The *municipals* or the *Municipal Guard* (from 1871—the Republican Guard)—militarised foot and mounted police in Paris, formed by the government of the July monarchy in 1830 to fight the revolutionary movement. In 1871, it became the shock force of the counter-revolutionary Versailles army. p. 452
- ²⁹⁶ The London Convention, signed by Russia, Britain, Austria, Prussia and Turkey in 1840, provided for aid to the Turkish Sultan against the Egyptian ruler Mehemet Ali (see Note 100). As France supported Mehemet Ali, it faced political isolation and the threat of a new anti-French coalition of the European powers. By denying support to Mehemet Ali, which signified a major defeat of French foreign policy in the Middle East, the French government secured its participation in the signing of the London Convention on July 13, 1841. Russia, Britain, France, Austria and Prussia, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other, agreed to close the Black Sea Straits for foreign men of war in peacetime.
- In the third English edition of *The Civil War in France*, Marx cites the London Convention of 1840 as an example of the defeat of French diplomacy. pp. 453, 519
- ²⁹⁷ The *Vienna Treaties* were concluded at the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) in May and June 1815 by the states that had participated in the Napoleonic wars. Under these treaties, the map of Europe was redrawn with a view to restoring legitimate monarchies, contrary to the interests of the unity and independence of nations.
- The *Paris Treaty*—a preliminary peace treaty signed by France and Germany on February 26, 1871 (see Note 179). p. 458
- ²⁹⁸ Marx has in mind the half-hearted bourgeois reforms carried out in feudal Prussia from 1807 to 1811, after its defeat in the war against Napoleonic France in 1806. The personal bondage of serfs was abolished, but they still had to perform all the feudal services; their redemption was allowed only with the consent of the landowner; limited local self-government was introduced and the army and central government institutions reorganised. p. 459
- ²⁹⁹ At the Paris Congress (February-March 1856) the Russian diplomats took advantage of the contradictions between Britain, Austria and France to secure much milder peace terms for Russia which had lost the Crimean war: the territorial concessions to Turkey were considerably reduced, Russia retained

her possessions in the Caucasus and the right to have her fleet and fortresses on the Azov Sea. The Congress adopted a decision to put an end to the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia by Austria, which made Austria's expansion in the Balkans much more difficult.

Speaking about the reforms in Russia after the Crimean war, Marx has in mind the 1861 Reform which abolished serfdom, the local government reforms (the introduction of Zemstvos in 1864) and the 1870 reform of municipal administration, the introduction of new judicial regulations in 1864 and the financial reform. These reforms were a step towards the transformation of Russia into a bourgeois monarchy. p. 459

- ³⁰⁰ Marx gave a detailed description of the bourgeois republican faction rallied round *Le National* and represented primarily by A. Marrast, A. T. Maire, J. Bastide and L. E. Cavaignac, in his *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 112-13, 119-20). p. 461

- ³⁰¹ The *(Great) Unpaid*—an ironic name for magistrates in Britain, who were not paid for their services. p. 464

- ³⁰² The *Ligue d'Union Républicaine pour les droits de Paris*—a bourgeois organisation set up in Paris in early April 1871. It tried to stop the Civil War, expecting that an agreement between Versailles and Paris based on recognition of the Republic and municipal liberties of Paris would lead to a peaceful elimination of the Commune.

The *manifestation of the freemasons* was held on April 29, 1871: the freemasons marched to the city fortifications to make the Versailles troops stop military operations. On April 26 and 29, the Commune organised meetings with the freemasons in the Town Hall striving to win over the republican petty and middle bourgeoisie, whose views the freemasons expressed. At these meetings, the freemasons, whose armistice proposals were rejected by Thiers, declared their support for the Commune. The meeting on April 29 was followed by the manifestation already mentioned, the delegates of the Commune taking part in it. p. 466, 543

- ³⁰³ Marx has in mind the "law of suspects" (*Loi des suspects*) passed by the Corps Législatif on February 19, 1858; it gave the government and the emperor unlimited powers to deport to various parts of France and Algeria or to exile from France all persons suspected of a hostile attitude to the Second Empire. p. 467

- ³⁰⁴ An Address from the Lyons municipal council, submitted to the National Assembly by deputy Greppo, contained a demand to put an end to the Civil War and for a reconciliation between Versailles and Paris. It also proposed that functions be clearly divided between the National Assembly and the Paris Commune, and that the Commune's activities be limited to municipal matters. p. 468

- ³⁰⁵ This refers to the municipal councils elected in 1865, with the Imperial authorities exerting strong pressure. p. 468

- ³⁰⁶ *Ligue des villes* (League of the Cities) (full name: *Ligue patriotique des villes républicaines*)—an organisation which bourgeois republicans, fearing the restoration of the monarchy after the suppression of the Paris Commune, tried to set up in April-May 1871. The provisional committee of the League, with the active support of the *Ligue d'Union Républicaine pour les droits de Paris* (see Note

302), intended to convene a congress of municipal council representatives in Bordeaux on May 9, 1871, with the aim of bringing closer an end of the Civil War, consolidating the Republic and formalising the League. The Versailles Government banned the Congress and the provisional committee soon ceased to exist.

Le Rappel in its issue No. 692, May 6, 1871 carried the programme of the proposed congress of the *Ligue des villes*. pp. 469, 593

- 307 The news of the Sedan disaster and the revolution in Paris, which brought about the fall of the Empire on September 4, 1870, caused revolutionary actions of the workers in many towns of France. In Lyons, Marseilles and Toulouse organs of popular power—communes—were set up. Though they were short-lived, provincial communes, especially in Lyons, implemented a number of important revolutionary measures. The Government of National Defence brutally crushed the provincial communes. pp. 480, 532
- 308 On November 3, 1870, the Government of National Defence held a plebiscite in Paris on the question of support for the government, trying in this way to consolidate its unstable position, which had been demonstrated during the revolutionary events of October 31, 1870 (see Note 184). Although a considerable section of Parisians voted against the government's policy, it succeeded, at the time of the actual state of siege, in winning a majority vote by exerting pressure on the population, carrying on demagogical propaganda, etc. p. 480
- 309 *Ryots*—hereditary tenants of state-owned lands in India. Here—Indian peasants. p. 494
- 310 On June 20, 1789, in response to Louis XVI's attempt to frustrate a regular sitting of the States-General, which had proclaimed itself the National Assembly, the deputies of third estate who gathered in the Salle des Paumes (Tennis Court) at Versailles took an oath to stay there till the Constitution was adopted. The Tennis Court oath was one of the events that marked the prologue to the French Revolution. pp. 497, 538
- 311 A reference to the Paris *Société des prolétaires positivistes*, whose programme was based on Auguste Comte's ideas. At the beginning of 1870, the General Council, taking into account the working-class composition of the society, admitted it to the International as a section; at the same time, the society's programme was sharply criticised (see Marx's letter to Engels of March 19, 1870, present edition, Vol. 43). pp. 498, 556
- 312 *Billingsgate* was one of the early gates into London; the fish-market situated nearby is named after it. Used figuratively, it can mean the abusive language of the market. p. 499
- 313 *Phalanstère*—palaces in which, according to the French utopian socialist, Charles Fourier, members of producer and consumer associations were to live and work in an ideal socialist society.
- Icarie*—an utopian communist country in Étienne Cabet's *Voyage en Icarie* (1840), subsequently the name of communist colonies in America. p. 499
- 314 *National estates* (*Biens nationaux*)—real estate and movable property of the clergy, émigrés and enemies of the revolution confiscated by the government during the French Revolution. A considerable part of national property passed

- to the bourgeoisie and rich peasants. During the Restoration period, the unsold lands from the national estates were returned to their former owners; owners whose lands had been sold received monetary compensation. p. 501
- ³¹⁵ *L'Association générale des Défenseurs de la République* (the General Association of the Defenders of the Republic)—a bourgeois-democratic organisation founded in Paris in February 1871; its aim was to struggle for the Republic. It supported the Commune and condemned the policy of the Versailles Government. The quoted decision was published in the *Journal officiel* (Paris), No. 129, May 9, 1871. p. 507
- ³¹⁶ The *Constitution of 1793* was the Constitution of the First French Republic adopted by the Convention during the Jacobins' revolutionary dictatorship. p. 510
- ³¹⁷ This refers to the participants in the Bonapartist coup d'état of December 2, 1851. p. 516
- ³¹⁸ This refers to the convention on capitulation (see Note 118), which came into force for Paris on January 28 and for departments on January 31, 1871. pp. 523, 525
- ³¹⁹ *Oeil de Boeuf* (Bull's eye)—named from its oval window, was the anteroom in the Palace of Versailles, where the courtiers waited for Louis XIV to wake up and appear. p. 524
- ³²⁰ The reference is to the invasion of France in 1814 and 1815 by the troops of the sixth and seventh anti-French coalitions headed by Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia, to overthrow Napoleon I's rule and restore the legitimate Bourbon monarchy. p. 524
- ³²¹ A reference to the influence on the international trade of the discovery of gold in California and Australia in the mid-19th century. p. 536
- ³²² Marx ironically hints at the dictum "L'état c'est moi" ("I am the state") ascribed to the French King Louis XIV, which became the motto of absolutism. p. 538
- ³²³ This refers to the *secession* of the Southern slave states from the North American Union in late 1860 and early 1861. The armed rebellion of the secessionist states in April 1861 marked the beginning of the US Civil War (1861-65). p. 542
- ³²⁴ The *Frankfort Peace Treaty*, concluded on May 10, 1871, defined the final terms of the peace between France and Germany, confirming the concession of Alsace and Eastern Lorraine to Germany as was envisaged by the preliminary peace treaty of February 26, 1871 (see Note 179). Under the Frankfort treaty, France was to pay indemnities on more onerous terms and the occupation of French territory by the German troops was prolonged in exchange for help rendered by Bismarck to the Versailles Government in suppressing the Commune. The Frankfort Peace Treaty made a future military clash between France and Germany inevitable. p. 544
- ³²⁵ This presumably refers to the law on municipal organisation of 1831, which drastically curtailed the rights of municipal councils, and also the law on municipal organisation of 1855, which banned interrelations between councils. On the plan for convening a congress of municipal delegates at Bordeaux see Note 306. pp. 545, 593

- ³²⁶ Engels recorded in English and German the talk he and Marx had had with the British democratic journalist Robert Reid. On June 30, Reid offered Marx, for the defence of the Communards, the use of the material he had collected while in Paris during the Commune as correspondent for the London liberal newspaper *The Daily Telegraph*. Marx and Engels reported their talk to the General Council on July 4, 1871. Engels noted that Reid "had made some interesting statements which proved the villainous part acted by the press of this country towards the Commune".

It was first published in the languages of the original (English and German) in Marx/Engels, *Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA), Vol. 1/22, pp. 244-45. p. 552

- ³²⁷ On April 12, 1871, the Federal Council of the Paris sections of the International passed a resolution expelling Tolain from the International as a deserter of the working class cause (see Note 155). On April 25, the General Council endorsed this by a special resolution which was published only by the working-class press (see this volume, p. 590). p. 553

- ³²⁸ As the English newspapers declared, the lecture was due on July 1, 1871 (see *The Daily Telegraph*, No. 5006, June 30, 1871; *The Morning Advertiser*, No. 24987, July 1, 1871). p. 553

- ³²⁹ The excerpts made by Marx and partly by Engels from the Minute Books of the General Council for 1869-71, which have survived, end on September 5, 1871. They were made during the preparations for the London Conference of the International and were to serve as material for the General Council's report to the Conference on the work of the International from 1869 to 1871. Related to them are excerpts from the minutes for June 1870-April 1872, made by Marx a year later, at the end of August 1872, on the eve of the Hague Congress of the International (see present edition, Vol. 23). Markings in the manuscripts testify that Marx and Engels used them in the course of their work on the International's documents. The square brackets are Marx's. The abbreviated words are written in full, without mentioning it.

Published in English for the first time in *The Hague Congress of the First International, September 2-7, 1872. Minutes and Documents*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, pp. 643-54.

The minutes are published in full in *The General Council of the First International. 1868-1870*, Moscow, 1966 and *The General Council of the First International. 1871-1872*, Moscow, 1968. p. 554

- ³³⁰ In his letter of September 3, 1869 Gustave Cluseret expressed his regret that he could not attend the Basle Congress and asked the delegates to work out a specific programme of action for the workers of all countries and to adopt an address to the American workers calling for solidarity with the International. p. 554

- ³³¹ This refers to Eugène Varlin's letter to Jung of September 29, 1869. As he intended to publish the Rules and Administrative Regulations of the International Working Men's Association, Varlin asked Jung to send him all the resolutions of the Basle Congress concerning the relations of the General Council with federal councils, the procedure for expelling sections, etc. The French translation of the Rules, with some Proudhonist distortions, was published on September 19, 1869 in *La Commerce*,—a small newspaper of the commercial employees' trade union. p. 554

- ³³² On December 11, 1869, a specimen issue of *Die Tagwacht*, the organ of the German sections of the International in Switzerland, was published in Zurich. It

carried a programmatic article containing the following demands: separation of the church from the State and of the school from the church, free tuition in institutions of higher education, free medical aid, nationalisation of railways, prohibition of child labour in factories, a reduction of working hours, and government supervision over factories. A Bakunist criticism of the programme appeared in *Le Progrès*, No. 28, December 25, 1869 and *L'Égalité*, No. 1, January 1, 1870. p. 555

- ³³³ This refers to the letter sent by the Federal Council of Romance Switzerland to Jung on January 4, 1870. The Council declared its disagreement with *L'Égalité's* attacks on the General Council and stated that the Alliance of Socialist Democracy had not been admitted to the Romance Federation, nor had its aims anything to do with those of the International. The private letter written on the same date by the secretary of the Federal Council, Henri Perret, informed Jung about the Bakunists' withdrawal from the editorial board of the paper. The letters were posted from Geneva prior to the receipt of the circular letter "The General Council to the Federal Council of Romance Switzerland" (see present edition, Vol. 21). p. 555

- ³³⁴ This refers to the conflict between the old Lyons section (Schettel and others), which sided with the French Left Republicans, and the group under the Bakunist Richard. See Marx's letter to Engels of February 19, 1870 (present edition, Vol. 43). p. 556

- ³³⁵ The reference is to Guillaume's letter to Jung of April 21, 1870 in connection with the split at the Congress in La Chaux-de-Fonds (see Note 256). p. 557

- ³³⁶ At the meeting of the General Council on June 28, 1870, Weston said that, if the Alliance of Socialist Democracy "advised abstention from politics and acted upon that", the General Council "would disqualify them from acting as administrators. The Alliance was only tolerated on condition of conforming to the Rules". p. 558

- ³³⁷ This refers to the third trial (June 22-July 5, 1870) of the International members arrested in France for alleged participation in the conspiracy against Napoleon III. The charge fell through and the accused were tried for being members of the International (see Note 2). p. 558

- ³³⁸ This refers to the so-called *French Section in London*, founded in the autumn of 1865 by a group of French petty-bourgeois refugees in London, followers of Félix Pyat. Having lost contact with the International, they continued to call themselves the French section in London and to issue documents in the name of the International Working Men's Association. When a third trial against members of the International was being prepared in France, the incriminating material included documents of the so-called French section in London. The meeting of the General Council on May 10, 1870 adopted a resolution that the French section had nothing in common with the International (see present edition, Vol. 21).

At the General Council meeting on July 12, 1870 Lemaître "regretted very much that there should exist a difference between the Council and the French branch... He considered the differences only personal". p. 558

- ³³⁹ On September 9, 1870 five members of the Committee of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party, a member of the Party and a printer, were arrested in Germany for publishing the manifesto on war (see this volume, p. 271). *Manifest des Ausschusses der sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei. An alle*

deutschen Arbeiter! appeared as a leaflet on September 5, 1870 and was also published in *Der Volksstaat*, No. 73, September 11, 1870.

Four Social-Democrats who took part in the demonstration prohibited by the police were expelled from Mayence as not being natives or citizens of the town. p. 559

- ³⁴⁰ The deputation of English workers and democratic organisations was received by the Prime Minister Gladstone on September 27, 1870. It included several trade union leaders (Applegarth, Coulson, Dodson and others) and prominent bourgeois-democratic leaders (Beesly, Congreve). They asked for Britain to recognise the French Republic and to promote peace. Gladstone got away with indefinite promises to facilitate the termination of the war. p. 560

- ³⁴¹ The news of the defeat at Sedan caused an uprising in Lyons on September 4, 1870. On his arrival in Lyons on September 15, Bakunin tried to head the movement and implement his anarchist programme. On September 28, the anarchists attempted a coup d'état, which was a complete failure. The Minute Book of the General Council mistakenly has "September 27". p. 560

- ³⁴² Marx is referring to the meetings of October 11 and 18, 1870, organised by *Freundschaft* (Friendship), a German nationalistic society in London. These meetings put forward, allegedly in the name of the German workers in London, the demand that Alsace and Lorraine be annexed. In reply, the German Workers' Educational Society in London and the Teutonia Society issued a joint address to the German workers in London, exposing the groundless arguments of those who advocated the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine. The address was published in *Der Vorbote*, Nos. 11 and 12, 1870 and as a leaflet in Geneva *Erklärung des Londoner Arbeiter-Bildungs-Vereins und der Teutonia* (1870). p. 560

- ³⁴³ The joint meeting of the German and French sections of New York was held on October 16, 1870. The address to the workers of Europe, adopted by these sections, was the first joint document of the New York sections of the International. It was published in a number of newspapers, and also issued in leaflet form in French and in English. p. 560

- ³⁴⁴ The *Anglo-French Intervention Committee* was founded in October 1870 by the petty-bourgeois leaders of the International Democratic Association (see Note 354) and trade union members of the Land and Labour League (see Note 350), with the leaders of the British Positivists playing a prominent role. Its programme demanded immediate recognition of the French Republic by Britain, condemnation of Prussia's aggressive policy and the conclusion of a defensive treaty with France.

Taking advantage of the discontent with the British government's pro-Prussian policy among part of the workers, the Committee's leaders tried to head the movement in support of the French Republic and organised several meetings in London in October-November 1870. p. 560

- ³⁴⁵ From Sorge's letter, dated October 30, 1870, Marx learned about the preparations for the mass anti-war meeting that was held in New York on November 19, 1870. It was organised by the International's sections, trades unions, the Free Thinkers' Society and other associations. Attended by nearly 2,000 people, the meeting adopted an address condemning the continued war against the French Republic and the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, and

- called on the US Government to exert its influence to render assistance to the French Republic. p. 560
- ³⁴⁶ The *Central Committee of the International Working Men's Association for the United States* was formed on December 1, 1870 by delegates from several sections of the International: German Section No. 1, French Section No. 2 and Czech Section No. 3. p. 561
- ³⁴⁷ The German workers' educational societies in Switzerland, whose press organ was the Swiss *Felleisen*, joined the International at their congress in Neuchâtel in August 1868. The growing nationalist tendencies in these societies after Germany's victory in the Franco-Prussian war led to their withdrawal from the International (see Marx's letter to Jung of January 18, 1871, present edition, Vol. 44). p. 561
- ³⁴⁸ On January 6 and 10, 1871, meetings for the recognition of the French Republic by Britain were held in St. James's Hall. At these meetings Odger moved a resolution extolling the Government of National Defence and its Foreign Minister Jules Favre. p. 561
- ³⁴⁹ The *Land Tenure Reform Association* was founded in July 1869 under the auspices of John Stuart Mill. Its aim was to revive the class of small farmers by leasing small plots of waste land to the unemployed. p. 561
- ³⁵⁰ The *Land and Labour League* was set up in London in October 1869 with the participation of the General Council. The League's programme was drawn up by Eccarius with Marx's help (see *Address of the Land and Labour League to the Working Men and Women of Great Britain and Ireland*, present edition, Vol. 21).
Marx held that the League could play a certain role in revolutionising the working class and regarded it as a means for establishing an independent proletarian party in England. pp. 561, 603, 610
- ³⁵¹ This refers to the *Déclaration reglant divers points de droit maritime*, a codicil to the Paris Treaty of 1856 which concluded the Crimean war of 1853-56. The Declaration set up rules for warfare at sea, envisaged the abolition of privateering, immunity of neutral goods in enemy vessels and of enemy goods in neutral vessels (with the exception of war contraband), and the recognition of a blockade only if actually effective.
In their speeches at the General Council meetings of January 31 and March 7, 1871, Marx and Engels put forward the demand that, because of the international situation, Britain should renounce the Paris Declaration, and argued that this step would serve as a means of preventing Tsarist Russia entering the Franco-Prussian war as Prussia's ally. pp. 561, 574, 576, 581
- ³⁵² In the autumn of 1870, the English republican movement gained strength as a result of the campaign for the recognition of the French Republic by Britain. In the spring of 1871, under the influence of the Paris Commune, a Left wing began to take shape which put social content into the republican slogans and actively supported the Commune. The General Council of the International took advantage of the numerous republican meetings to organise a campaign in support of the Commune.
One of the meetings was held at Wellington Music Hall on March 22, 1871. This meeting, chaired by Odger, resolved to form a Central Republican

Association and elected an Executive Committee, which included Odger, Eccarius and others. p. 562

- ³⁵³ Marx is referring to the letter from John Wallis, Secretary of the Canterbury Working Men's Mutual Protection Society, dated February 16, 1871. John Wallis asked that the English workers who wanted to emigrate to New Zealand be warned that there was unemployment there and that the authorities and police compelled immigrants to work for scanty wages. The letter was included in the report on the General Council meeting published in *The Eastern Post*, No. 137, May 13, 1871. p. 562
- ³⁵⁴ The *International Democratic Association* consisted of petty-bourgeois French and German immigrants in London and also included English Republicans. In April 1871, members of the Association founded the Universal Republican League. Its leaders attempted to involve the General Council of the International in it, but their proposition was rejected unanimously at the General Council meeting on April 25, 1871 (see Engels' letter to Wilhelm Liebknecht of April 20, 1871, present edition, Vol. 44.) pp. 562, 597
- ³⁵⁵ In his letter of June 12, 1871, Cafiero wrote about his contacts with workers' societies in Italy. p. 563
- ³⁵⁶ The *Refugees' Society*, formed in London in July 1871, tried to take over the right to distribute money collected by the General Council for the refugees and to establish direct ties with the International's sections in other countries in order, bypassing the General Council, to obtain money collected by them for the refugees or information about the sums being sent to the General Council. Early in 1872, this society was reorganised into a mutual aid society. p. 564
- ³⁵⁷ First published in English in *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 317-19. p. 565
- ³⁵⁸ First published in English in *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, p. 320. p. 567
- ³⁵⁹ In a letter to Marx of August 9, 1871, Truelove informed him that 200 copies of the first edition of *The Civil War in France* had not been sold out, of the second—600 copies, and all the copies of the third edition remained with him. In a letter of September 4, Truelove again requested payment of the bill. p. 567
- ³⁶⁰ Marx's speech on the Government of National Defence at the General Council meeting on January 17, 1871 was directed against Odger's praising of the government and its Foreign Minister Jules Favre, who was expected in London, at the meeting in St. James's Hall in London on January 10. Odger moved a resolution that extolled the Government of National Defence and contradicted the class approach taken towards it by the General Council in its Second Address on the Franco-Prussian war (see this volume, pp. 267-75). In connection with Marx's criticism of Odger's speech, the General Council discussed the question of the need for the members of the International to adhere to its principles at meetings. This speech, like other speeches by Marx and Engels at the General Council meetings, has survived as a record in the Minute Book. The records for the period covered by this volume were made by Eccarius (up to May 1871) and later by Hales, they are brief and fragmentary, and often contain serious inaccuracies. The same applies to the newspaper reports of the General Council

meetings made by Eccarius on their basis and published in *The Eastern Post*. In some cases, when the newspaper reports are fuller than the minutes, Marx's and Engels' speeches are given according to the newspaper reports. The minutes, as was the rule in the General Council, were approved at each subsequent meeting; on Marx's and Engels' demand, notes were often made concerning mistakes in the records.

This record was first published in *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 106-07. p. 571

- ³⁶¹ The Paris demonstration on May 15, 1848 was organised by revolutionary clubs; nearly 150,000 people, mainly workers, took part in it. The participants marched to the Constituent Assembly, which was to discuss the Polish question that day, entered the conference hall and demanded military assistance to Poland in her struggle for independence, as well as decisive measures to combat unemployment and poverty. Since their demands were rejected, they declared the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the formation of a revolutionary government. The demonstration was dispersed by troops and bourgeois detachments of the National Guard. p. 571

- ³⁶² The reference is to the *Executive Committee* (Commission exécutive)—the Government of the French Republic, set up by the Constituent Assembly on May 10, 1848, in place of the Provisional Government, which had resigned. It existed until June 24, 1848, when Cavaignac's dictatorship was established. p. 572

- ³⁶³ The reference is to the reactionary press laws passed by the Constituent Assembly on August 9 and 11, 1848. According to these laws, the periodicals had to make large deposits of money, which meant that progressive and workers' newspapers and journals had to close down; the laws also envisaged serious punishment (fines and imprisonment) for the printing of articles against the government, the existing order and private property. They were based on similar laws enacted during the Restoration and the July monarchy. p. 572

- ³⁶⁴ The minutes of the General Council meetings, extracts from which are given below, were first published in English in *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 108-57. The reports of the meetings were published in *The Eastern Post*, in January-March 1871. p. 573

- ³⁶⁵ This mass meeting was held in Trafalgar Square on January 23, 1871. It put forward a demand, in the name of the workers, that the British Government bring pressure to bear on Prussia in order to make the latter end the war against the French Republic. p. 573

- ³⁶⁶ This refers to excesses committed by trade unionists against strike-breakers in Sheffield in the autumn of 1866. The matter was investigated by a special government commission over several months in 1867 and was widely used by the bourgeois papers to discredit the trade unions and the working-class movement in general.

Speaking at a meeting in London on July 4, 1867, Beesly exposed the hypocrisy of the bourgeoisie who condemned the trade unionist excesses, but applauded General Eyre, who had savagely put down the Jamaica revolt of 1865. Beesly was ruthlessly persecuted by the bourgeois press for his speech. The London trade unions expressed their gratitude to Beesly in public. In July 1867, Marx wrote a letter of sympathy to Beesly in view of the campaign against him. p. 574

- ³⁶⁷ A reference to the remonstrance to Gladstone, published in *The Times* on December 30, 1870; it was signed by Beesly and other Positivists and also by some members of the General Council—Eccarius, Odger and Applegarth. Its last point called on the British Government to declare war on Prussia. p. 574
- ³⁶⁸ Analysing the military position of the French Republic, Engels compares the situation in October-November 1870—when the defence of Paris engaged considerable Prussian forces, and the Army of the Loire under the command of General Aurelle de Paladines carried out a successful operation against the Prussian army—with that in January 1871, after the battle at Le Mans in Western France, where the German troops defeated the newly formed Army of the Loire under the command of General Chanzy, which suffered serious losses and had to retreat (see this volume, pp. 236-39). p. 575
- ³⁶⁹ The *Peninsular War* was the name given to the joint military operations by the British, Spanish and Portuguese armies against Napoleon's troops on the Peninsula from 1808 to 1814 (see also notes 76 and 101).
The *Crimean war* (1853-56) was waged by Russia against a coalition of Britain, France and Turkey for supremacy in the Middle East. The course of military operations and the results of the war were analysed by Marx and Engels in the articles included in Vols. 13, 14 and 15 of the present edition. p. 575
- ³⁷⁰ The meeting on January 5, 1871 in the hotel in Cannon Street, chaired by the lawyer J. Merriman, called on the British Government to make efforts to end the Franco-Prussian war and to recognise the French Republic. p. 577
- ³⁷¹ This refers to the mass demonstrations in London in June and July 1855 as a consequence of Parliament's decision to limit the working hours of taverns and places of entertainment and to prohibit retail trade on Sundays. Marx participated in one of the demonstrations (see present edition, Vol. 14, pp. 302-07, 323-27). p. 578
- ³⁷² A reference is evidently to the following speeches: by Lowe, Chancellor of the Exchequer, on September 16, 1870 in Elgin; by Bruce, Home Secretary, on September 26 in Glasgow; and by Cardwell, M.P., on October 14, in Oxford. All the speakers demanded that Britain observe strict neutrality. p. 579
- ³⁷³ What is meant here is the exchange of Notes between Bernstorff, Prussian Ambassador to London, and Lord Granville, British Foreign Secretary, that took place in August to October 1870 in connection with British supplies of arms and other equipment to France. p. 579
- ³⁷⁴ This refers to the British ship *International*, detained by customs officials in the mouth of the Thames on December 21, 1870; it carried submarine cable for the line to be laid between Dunkirk and Bordeaux. On January 17, 1871, a British court found the actions of the customs officials illegal. p. 579
- ³⁷⁵ The *Holy Alliance*—an association of European monarchs, founded in 1815, to suppress revolutionary movements and preserve feudal monarchies in European countries. Later, the phrase was often used to denote a coalition of counter-revolutionary powers. p. 582
- ³⁷⁶ This refers to the international conference of representatives from Russia, Britain, Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Italy and Turkey, held in London

from January to March 1871, to discuss the revision of the Paris Treaty of 1856. p. 582

- ³⁷⁷ This speech of Engels begins a series of reports by Marx and Engels on the proletarian revolution in Paris on March 18, 1871, which they made regularly at the General Council meetings. Basing his report on letters received from Paris, Engels refutes the bourgeois press stories that gave a distorted picture of the events of March 18. The minutes of this meeting, with the record of Engels' speech, were mistakenly dated March 14; Marx, when looking through them, corrected the date to March 21.

First published in English in *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 160-61. p. 585

- ³⁷⁸ Engels has in mind the National Assembly, extremely reactionary in its composition, elected on February 8 and opened on February 12, 1871 in Bordeaux (see Note 178). p. 585

- ³⁷⁹ In their speeches on the republican movement in England, Marx and Engels summed up the discussion of this issue at the General Council meeting on March 28, 1871 in connection with the report of the General Council deputation to the republican meetings. The deputation included Hales, Weston, Jung and Serrailier; its report said that Serrailier's speech at the meeting in the Wellington Music Hall on March 22 (see Note 352) was well received and that a resolution expressing support for the Paris workers was passed unanimously. It was also noted that the meeting adopted a very moderate, bourgeois republican resolution moved by Odger.

During the discussion, the General Council members criticised the position taken by Odger and other trade union leaders, confining the programme of the republican movement to the slogan of a bourgeois republic in France.

First published in English in *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 165-66. p. 587

- ³⁸⁰ Published in English for the first time in *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 170-71. p. 588

- ³⁸¹ The elections to the Commune took place on March 26, 1871. After the victorious uprising of the Paris people, on March 18-28, 1871, power was held by the Central Committee of the National Guard, which then handed it over to the Commune. p. 588

- ³⁸² This laconic remark by Engels refers to Favre's speech in the National Assembly on April 10, 1871. Favre tried to justify the Versailles Government, which had actually concluded an alliance with Bismarck in order to suppress the Paris Commune, and hypocritically stated that the government had rejected the help offered by Bismarck. In a number of articles and speeches, particularly in Marx's *The Civil War in France* (see this volume, pp. 346-55), Marx and Engels exposed the treacherous agreement between the French counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and the country's enemies for the purpose of suppressing the working-class movement. p. 588

- ³⁸³ For a long time, Marx's speech at the General Council meeting of April 25, 1871 was not published in full because page 216 was missing from the Minute Book. The text of this page found later was first published in English in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* (Berlin), 1978, No. 3, p. 402. p. 589

- ³⁸⁴ The reference is to the report of the Central Committee of the North-American Sections, dated April 2, 1871 and signed by Sorge. p. 589
- ³⁸⁵ Serraillier was elected to the Commune at the additional elections on April 16, 1871, from the Paris 2nd arrondissement. Eugène Dupont, a member of the General Council, was also nominated, but he did not stand, because he was unable to leave England for Paris. J. M. A. Dupont was elected from the 17th arrondissement. p. 590
- ³⁸⁶ In his letter to Leo Frankel of April 26, 1871, written on the instructions of the General Council, Marx refuted the slanderous attacks on Serraillier made by petty-bourgeois democrat Félix Pyat (see present edition, Vol. 44). p. 591
- ³⁸⁷ Paul Lafargue stayed in Paris from April 6 to 12, 1871. p. 591
- ³⁸⁸ Published in English for the first time in *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 189-90, 192. p. 593
- ³⁸⁹ Engels seconded Jung's proposal to send a delegation from the General Council to the celebrations of the centenary of Robert Owen's birth, which were to take place on May 16, 1871, in Freemason's Hall, London. p. 593
- ³⁹⁰ Mottershead objected to participation in the celebrations on the grounds that Owen "had not been quite so original as Engels seemed to think. His socialism he had had from older French writers, his religious ideas from Locke". Besides, Mottershead ascribed to Engels the allegation that Owenite socialists were Chartists (see *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 191-92). p. 594
- ³⁹¹ Marx's speech at the General Council meeting on May 23, 1871, started the debate on the need to expose the Versailles Government and voice a protest against the brutal reprisals against the Communards being prepared by Thiers. In his speech on this issue (only a short record of it was made in the Minute Book) Engels stressed the treacherous behaviour of Thiers, who had promised to be lenient to the Communards. The General Council also decided to form a commission to find out what measures could be taken in England to put a stop to the brutalities of the Versailles Government. p. 595
- ³⁹² *Fenian Brotherhood*, or Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood—a secret organisation founded in the late 1850s among Irish immigrants in America and later in Ireland. Its members fought for the establishment of an independent Irish Republic through an armed uprising. Objectively, the Fenians voiced the interests of the Irish peasants, although they mainly belonged to the urban petty bourgeoisie and democratic intellectuals. Marx and Engels more than once pointed to the shortcomings of the Fenian movement and criticised the Fenians for their conspiratorial tactics and their sectarian and bourgeois-nationalistic views. At the same time they highly appreciated its revolutionary character.
- Carbonari* were members of a secret society active in Italy in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, and in France in the 1820s.
- Marianne* was the name of a secret republican society founded in France in 1850; during the Second Empire it opposed Napoleon III. p. 597
- ³⁹³ Marx's speech is recorded in the Minutes of the General Council meeting on June 20, 1871 as follows: "Citizen Marx then proposed that a letter should be sent to the *Examiner* and *Spectator* denouncing the pretended manifestoes of the Paris section of the International; they were all forgeries of the Versailles

police" (*The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, p. 220). The letter written by Engels on behalf of the General Council did not appear in the aforementioned newspapers and only a rough draft of it has survived (see this volume, p. 379). p. 599

³⁹⁴ *Hans Breitmann's Ballads* by the American humorous author Ch. G. Leland were written in a peculiar Anglo-German dialect. p. 600

³⁹⁵ The correspondent's record is inaccurate. It was the textile workers who went on strike in Barcelona in the spring of 1871, while the cigar-makers' strike occurred at the same time in Antwerp (see this volume, pp. 294-96). p. 602

³⁹⁶ In an attempt to strengthen its weakened positions, the government of Napoleon III scheduled a plebiscite for the spring of 1871. The questions were formulated in such a way that it was impossible to express disapproval of the Second Empire's policy without simultaneously opposing all democratic reforms. Along with this demagogic address to the popular (mostly peasant) masses, repressions were taken against the proletarian and left-wing republican movements (see present edition, Vol. 21, pp. 127-28). p. 603

³⁹⁷ The public meeting to celebrate the anniversary of the June 1848 insurrection of the Paris workers was held on June 29, 1868 at Cleveland Hall in London. The French petty-bourgeois democrat Félix Pyat delivered a speech and moved a provocative resolution urging terroristic acts against Napoleon III (the resolution was published in *The Bee-Hive*, No. 351, July 4, 1868). The Brussels *L'Epiègle*, No. 25 on July 5, 1868 published a report on the meeting describing it as a meeting of International members, with Pyat as one of its leaders. This statement was repeated in other newspapers. The General Council held that this might discredit the International in the eyes of the workers and serve the Bonapartist government as a pretext for persecuting its members in France and Belgium. Consequently, at its meeting on July 7 the Council resolved, on Marx's proposal, to disavow Pyat's behaviour in a resolution to this effect (see present edition, Vol. 21).

Pyat's group lost its ties with the International, but continued to act in its name and repeatedly supported antiproletarian groups opposing Marx's line in the General Council. On May 10, 1870, the General Council officially dissociated itself from this group (see present edition, Vol. 21). p. 605

³⁹⁸ The interview ended as follows: "I have here given you as well as I can remember them the heads of my conversation with this remarkable man. I shall leave you to form your own conclusions. Whatever may be said for or against the probability of its complicity with the movement of the Commune we may be assured that in the International Association the civilized world has a new power in its midst with which it must come to a reckoning for good or ill." p. 606

³⁹⁹ Before Engels took the floor at the General Council meeting, Marx made a report on Pope Pius IX's speech against the International. p. 607

⁴⁰⁰ Engels has in mind the so-called "principle of nationalities" advanced by the ruling circles of the Second Empire and used extensively by them as an ideological screen for their aggressive plans and adventurist foreign policy. Posing as a "defender of nations", Napoleon III made use of national interests

of the oppressed peoples to strengthen France's hegemony and extend her frontiers. The "principle of nationalities" was designed to stir up national hatred and to turn the national movement, especially that of small nations, into a weapon of counter-revolutionary policy of the rival powers. This principle was exposed by Marx in his pamphlet *Herr Vogt* (present edition, Vol. 17, pp. 133-83) and by Engels in his work "What Have the Working Classes to Do with Poland?" (present edition, Vol. 20). p. 608

- ⁴⁰¹ Having adopted Engels' proposal on the convocation of the London conference, the General Council at its meeting on July 25, 1871, instructed the Sub-Committee (see Note 238) to work out its programme. It also resolved that the conference should discuss the splitting activities of the Bakuninist Alliance of Socialist Democracy in Romance Switzerland (see Note 256).

Published in English for the first time in *The General Council of the First International. 1870-1871. Minutes*, Moscow, 1967, pp. 244-45. p. 609

- ⁴⁰² Marx spoke against Odger, in connection with his shift to the position of bourgeois republicanism, open renunciation of the International's principles and slanderous attacks on the General Council and the Paris Commune. p. 610

- ⁴⁰³ The resolution abolishing the office of President of the General Council, adopted at the General Council meeting of September 24, 1867, was confirmed by the Basle Congress of the International (September 1869). p. 611

- ⁴⁰⁴ Marx's speech at the opening of the London Conference has reached us in two versions.

Like the speeches of other delegates, it was recorded in French in the minutes of the Conference sessions by the two secretaries, Martin and Rochat. The English minutes are not extant.

Another version of Marx's speech was given by Eccarius in his article on the London Conference, published anonymously in *The Scotsman*, No. 87, October 2, 1871.

Marx said that the conference was "a meeting of delegates from different countries, rendered necessary by extraordinary circumstances, to consult with the General Council about urgent matters arising out of these extraordinary circumstances; but that this conference could not appoint a new General Council, or transfer the seat of the General Council, or alter the fundamental Rules of the Association. Its province was to decide upon tactics, policy, and organisation within the limits of the existing Rules, and to devise measures for carrying out these rules more effectually". p. 613

- ⁴⁰⁵ Marx has in mind the trial of the members of Nechayev's organisation (see Note 279), which took place in St. Petersburg from July 1, 1871.

On September 22, 1871, the London Conference instructed the General Council to inform the public that the International Working Men's Association had nothing in common with Nechayev's activities. On October 16, the General Council adopted a relevant resolution drafted by Marx (see present edition, Vol. 23). p. 613

- ⁴⁰⁶ Marx spoke about the trades unions during the discussion on the draft resolution submitted by Delahaye at the fifth session of the London Conference on September 20, 1871 (see Note 271). p. 614

- ⁴⁰⁷ The reference is to the Basle Congress resolution on the trades unions, one of whose clauses instructed the General Council to promote international

federation of trade unions. (see "Report of the Fourth Annual Congress of the International Working Men's Association, held at Basle, in Switzerland. From the 6th to the 11th September 1869", London [1869] p. 30). p. 614

- ⁴⁰⁸ During the discussion on the international contacts of trade unions, Steens, a delegate from Belgium, expressed an apprehension that in case of international federation of trade unions the national trades unions might be absorbed by the English ones. p. 614

- ⁴⁰⁹ The reference is to Chartism, the workers' political movement in Great Britain from the 1830s to the early 1850s under the slogan of the People's Charter, which included the demand for universal suffrage and certain conditions to ensure this right to the workers. pp. 615, 634

- ⁴¹⁰ This refers to the Executive Committee of the Reform League, set up on the initiative and with the participation of the Central (General) Council of the International in London in the spring of 1865 as the political centre of the mass movement for the electoral reform. The League's leading bodies—the Council and the Executive Committee—included the General Council members, mainly trade union leaders and representatives of bourgeois radicals. Unlike the bourgeois parties, which confined their demands to suffrage for householders and tenants, the League demanded suffrage for the entire adult male population. This revived Chartist slogan secured it the support of the trades unions, hitherto indifferent to politics. The vacillations of the radicals in its leadership and the conciliatory behaviour of the trade union leaders prevented the League, however, from following the line charted by the General Council of the International. The British bourgeoisie succeeded in splitting the movement and a moderate reform was carried out in 1867, granting franchise only to the petty bourgeoisie and the upper strata of the working class. p. 616

- ⁴¹¹ On the discussion at the London Conference of the political action by the working class, see notes 253 and 273. p. 616

- ⁴¹² The original text of the Rules of the International Working Men's Association was written by Marx in English in October 1864 and approved by the Central Council on November 1 of that year as the Provisional Rules (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 14-16). At the Geneva Congress in 1866, the Rules were confirmed, with some additions and amendments, together with the Administrative Regulations appended to them. In the autumn of 1866, the Rules and Administrative Regulations were translated by Marx and Lafargue into French and, late in November, published in London as a pamphlet that included the basic changes introduced at the Geneva Congress (see present edition, Vol. 20, pp. 441-46). In 1867, the English text of the Rules and Administrative Regulations was printed in London; it took account of the changes introduced by the Geneva and Lausanne congresses since the adoption of the Provisional Rules in 1864. At the next congresses—in Brussels (1868) and Basle (1869)—a number of resolutions were adopted that constituted addenda to the Rules. However, the texts of the Rules without these addenda and amendments were current at the time. The English editions published after the Geneva and Lausanne congresses also contained some substantial inaccuracies. Besides, there was no official edition of the Rules in different languages, which led to poor translations of them circulating in a number of countries. The French translation of 1866, prepared by Tolain, a Right-wing Proudhonist, distorted

the most important proposition of the role of political struggle for the emancipation of the working class. Considering all these circumstances, the London Conference adopted a resolution, drafted by Marx, on the publication of a new, authentic edition of the Rules and Administrative Regulations in English, German and French. It also resolved that all translations into other languages should be approved by the General Council.

At the end of September-October 1871, Marx and Engels prepared a new edition of the Rules and Administrative Regulations, taking into account the resolutions of all the congresses of the International and of the London Conference. They rewrote the Appendix that substantiated all the amendments and addenda in detail. Marx and Engels directly supervised the translation of the Rules and Regulations into German and French. The official English edition—*General Rules and Administrative Regulations of the International Working Men's Association*—appeared as a pamphlet in London early in November, in French—in December 1871; in German the Rules and Regulations were published in pamphlet form in Leipzig and also in the newspaper *Der Volksstaat*, No. 12, February 10, 1872. For lack of money, the General Council failed to publish the official edition of the Rules and Regulations, prepared with Engels' participation, in Italian. They were issued in Italian in abridged form by *La Plebe* and *L'Eguaglianza* publishers. p. 616

⁴¹³ Marx has in mind certain dubious elements and traitors who made their way into the Central Committee of the National Guard in Paris, which was of a mixed character (Blanquists, neo-Jacobins, Proudhonists, etc). Such people on the Central Committee functioning as the revolutionary government from March 18 to 28, 1871 (when the Commune was proclaimed), as well as absence of political unity among them, were the main reasons for the serious mistakes it committed (see this volume, pp. 509-10). p. 616

⁴¹⁴ This refers to the congress of the American National Labour Union, which took place from August 7 to 10, 1871 (see Note 141). p. 616

⁴¹⁵ The reference is to Utin's motion to instruct the General Council to draw up the final text of the resolution "Political Action of the Working Class", taking into account Vaillant's proposal and Serrailier's and Frankel's amendments made during the discussion of this question at the Conference. The London Conference adopted Utin's motion. p. 618

⁴¹⁶ This is Marx's brief report as Corresponding Secretary of the General Council for Germany; other corresponding secretaries and delegates also made reports. The part of his speech dealing with England is an addition to his speeches on trades unions (this volume, pp. 614-15). p. 619

⁴¹⁷ The congress of the Union of German Workers' Associations (Verband Deutscher Arbeitervereine) in Nuremberg on September 5-7, 1868, resolved to join the International. In 1869 in Eisenach, the Union was reorganised into the Social-Democratic Workers' Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei). Its Dresden Congress (August 12-15, 1871) decided to campaign for a shorter working day, a genuine universal suffrage, etc., and reaffirmed the decision to join the International by stating in its resolution on the party organ, *Der Volksstaat*, that it maintained the ideological ties between German Social-Democracy and the International Working Men's Association. p. 619

⁴¹⁸ Marx sent his daughter Jenny's letter to the editors of *Woodhull and Claflin's Weekly*; it was published in the journal together with Marx's covering letter (see this volume, p. 432). p. 622

- ⁴¹⁹ *Pétroleuses* was the nickname given by the reactionary press to the Paris women workers falsely accused by the Versailles courts of setting fire to houses during street fighting in Paris in May 1871 p. 631
- ⁴²⁰ Marx made this speech at the ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the 7th anniversary of the International, held in London on September 24, 1871. The meeting was chaired by Marx and attended by the delegates to the London Conference, members of the General Council and refugee Communards. The report on this meeting, mistakenly dated September 25, was published in *The World*; it gave a brief rendering of Marx's speech, which is reproduced in this volume. p. 633
- ⁴²¹ This refers to the February 1848 revolution in France. p. 634

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- Brass, August** (1818-1876)—German journalist; took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Germany; emigrated to Switzerland after its defeat; follower of Bismarck from the 1860s; editor-in-chief of the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*.—300
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- Brunel, Paul Antoine Magloire** (b. 1830)—French officer, Blanquist; took part in the uprising of October 31, 1870; member of the Central Committee of the National Guard and of the Paris Commune; was gravely wounded by the Versaillists in May 1871; emigrated to England after the suppression of the Commune; in his absence was sentenced to death in Paris in 1871, which was commuted to five years' imprisonment in 1872.—357
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- Cabet, Étienne** (1788-1856)—French lawyer and writer, utopian communist, author of *Voyage en Icarie* (1840);
- Cardwell, Edward Cardwell, Viscount** (1813-1886)—British statesman, a Peelite leader, later Liberal; President of the Board of Trade (1852-55), Secretary for Ireland (1859-61), Sec-

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- Cavaignac, Louis Eugène* (1802-1857)—French general and politician, moderate republican; took part in the conquest of Algeria; after the February 1848 revolution, Governor of Algeria; from May 1848 War Minister of France; directed the suppression of the June uprising; head of the executive (June-December 1848).—352, 444, 446, 461, 510, 521-22, 528
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- Changarnier, Nicolas Anne Théodule* (1793-1877)—French general and politician, monarchist; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-51); commander of the Paris garrison and the National Guard after June 1848; commanded the troops that dispersed the demonstration of June 13, 1849 in Paris; was expelled from France after the coup d'état of December 2, 1851 and returned to France in 1859; a staff officer of the Army of the Rhine during the Franco-Prussian war; was taken prisoner at Metz; deputy to the National Assembly (1871).—325, 455, 512, 529
- Chanzy, Antoine Alfred Eugène* (1823-1883)—French general; commanded the 16th Corps and then the Second Army of the Loire during the Franco-Prussian war; deputy to the National Assembly (1871).—203, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 221, 222, 226, 228-30, 236-38, 249, 251, 253, 450, 478
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- Clarendon, George William Frederick Villiers, 4th Earl of, 4th Baron Hyde* (1800-1870) — British statesman, Whig, later Liberal; Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (1847-52), Foreign Secretary (1853-58, 1865-66, 1868-70).—576, 582
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- Chuseret, Gustave Paul* (1823-1900)—French officer; member of the First International; was close to the Bakuninists; took part in the revolutionary uprisings in Lyons and Marseilles (1870); member of the Paris Commune and its military delegate (April 1871); a refugee after the suppression of the Paris Commune.—399, 470, 554, 557
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- Corbon, Claude Anthime* (1808-1891)—French politician, republican; Vice-President of the Constituent Assembly (1848-49); after the fall of the Second Empire, Mayor of the 15th arrondissement of Paris; deputy to the National Assembly of 1871; belonged to its Left minority.—312, 516
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- Cousin-Montauban, Charles Guillaume Marie Apollinaire Antoine, comte de Palikao* (1796-1878)—French general, Bonapartist; War Minister and Prime Minister (August-September 1870).—13, 44, 50, 120, 161, 320, 441
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- Crouzat, Joseph Constant* (1811-1879)—French general; commanded the 20th Corps during the Franco-Prussian war.—203
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- Dallas*—Paris correspondent of *The Times* (1871).—552, 553
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- Fourier, abolitionist; an editor (1848) and then managing editor (1849-62) of the *New-York Tribune*; an editor of the *New American Cyclopaedia* (1857-63); editor-in-chief of the *New-York Sun* (1868-97).—396
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- Delescluze, Louis Charles* (1809-1871)—French revolutionary, journalist; participant in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848; founder, editor and publisher of *Le Réveil* (1868-71); member of the Paris Commune, and its military delegate; was killed on the barricades during the street fighting in Paris on May 25, 1871.—381, 398
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- Delpèch*—French lawyer, reactionary; general prosecutor in Toulouse (1871).—397, 398, 624-25, 630
- De Paepe, César Aimé Désiré* (1841-1890)—prominent in the Belgian working-class and socialist movement; compositor, subsequently physician; a founder of the Belgian section of the International; member of the Belgian Federal Council; delegate to the London Conference (1865), the Lausanne (1867), Brussels (1868) and Basle (1869) congresses and to the London Conference (1871) of the International; following the Hague Congress of 1872 supported the Bakuninists for some time; one of the founders of the Belgian Workers' Party.—557
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- Desmarests*—French captain of the gendarme troops at Versailles; killed Gustave Flourens.—326, 447, 464, 530
- Disraeli, Benjamin, Earl of Beaconsfield* (1804-1881)—British statesman and author, a Tory leader; one of the

- founders and ideologists of the Conservative Party; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852, 1858-59, 1866-68), Prime Minister (1868, 1874-80).—576
- Dombrowski, Jaroslaw* (1836-1871)—Polish revolutionary democrat; took part in the national liberation movement in Poland (1860s); general of the Paris Commune; commander-in-chief of all its armed forces from early May 1871; killed on the barricades.—339
- Douay, Charles Abel* (1809-1870)—French general; commanded a division of the Second Corps during the Franco-Prussian war; killed in the battle of Wissembourg.—37
- Douay, Félix Charles* (1816-1879)—French general; commanded the Seventh Corps of the Army of the Rhine during the Franco-Prussian war; was taken prisoner at Sedan; one of the organisers of reprisals against the Paris Commune; commanded the Fourth Corps of the Versailles Army.—34, 35, 38, 40, 41, 51, 54, 58, 66, 67, 78, 109, 159, 348
- Ducrot, Auguste Alexandre* (1817-1882)—French general, Orleanist; commanded a division of the First Corps, then the First Corps and the Second Paris Army during the Franco-Prussian war; took part in the building up of the Versailles Army for the suppression of the Paris Commune; deputy to the National Assembly (1871).—108, 121, 169, 177, 189-91, 193, 232, 506
- Dufaure, Jules Armand Stanislas* (1798-1881)—French lawyer and politician, Orleanist; deputy to the Constituent Assembly (1848); Minister of the Interior (October-December 1848, June-October 1849); Minister of Justice (February 1871-May 1873); inspired the suppression of the Paris Commune.—319, 325, 344, 345, 441, 443-45, 467-69, 497, 519, 544
- Dumas, Alexandre (son)* (1824-1895)—French dramatist and novelist.—464, 478
- Dupanloup, Félix Antoine Philibert* (1802-1878)—French theologian and politician; one of the leaders of the Catholic Party; Bishop of Orléans from 1849; deputy to the National Assembly (1871).—198, 200, 585
- Dupont, Eugène* (c. 1831-1881)—participant in the French and international working-class movement; musical-instrument maker; took part in the June 1848 uprising in Paris; from 1862 lived in London, then in Manchester; member of the General Council of the International (November 1864-72), Corresponding Secretary for France (1865-71); participant in all the conferences and congresses of the International (except the Basle Congress); contributed to *Le Courrier français*; formed the French branch of the International in Manchester (1870); in 1872 became a member of the British Federal Council of the International; in 1874 moved to the USA; associate of Marx and Engels.—8, 270, 355, 382, 431, 556, 558, 560, 590-91
- Duval, Émile Victoire* (1840-1871)—French ironfounder, Blanquist; member of the International; member of the Central Committee of the National Guard and of the Paris Commune; general of the Commune's National Guard; member of the Executive and Military commissions; was shot by the Versailles troops on April 4, 1871.—326, 401, 447, 471, 530, 557, 591

E

- Eccarius, Johann Georg* (1818-1889)—prominent figure in the international and German working-class movement; tailor; member of the League of the Just and later of the Communist League; member of the General

Council of the First International (1864-72) and then its General Secretary (1867-71); Corresponding Secretary for America (1870-72), delegate to all the International's congresses and conferences; until 1872 follower of Marx; after the Hague Congress joined the reformist wing of the British Federal Council.—8, 270, 286, 287, 355, 382, 431, 562, 565-67, 577, 590

Elliott, Thomas—British trade-unionist; from 1871 member of the British Federal Council of the International.—563

Elpidin, Mikhail Konstantinovich (c. 1835-1908)—was active in the Russian revolutionary movement in the early 1860s; in 1865 emigrated to Switzerland; member of the First International and of the Alliance of Socialist Democracy; later was exposed as an agent-provocateur of the tsarist secret police.—377

Engels, Frederick (1820-1895)—138, 156, 158, 161, 170, 185, 186, 192, 208, 247, 249, 250, 256, 273, 277-80, 284, 355, 370, 382, 389, 561, 564, 566, 567, 573, 577, 582, 587, 588, 593, 594, 607, 609

Espartero, Joaquín Baldomero Fernández, duque de la Vittoria y de Morello, conde de Luchana (1793-1879)—Spanish general and politician; leader of the Progresista Party; Regent of Spain (1841-43), head of government (1854-56).—315, 455, 521

Eugénie—see *Montijo, Eugénie*

F

Faidherbe, Louis Leon César (1818-1889)—French general; commanded the Army of the North during the Franco-Prussian war.—203, 222-24, 230, 236, 251, 253, 389

Faillé, Pierre Louis Charles Achille de (1810-1892)—French general, Senator; commander of a division in

the Crimea (1855); commanded the Fifth Corps during the Franco-Prussian war; was taken prisoner at Sedan.—33, 37, 38, 40, 51, 57, 66, 67, 78, 109, 154, 158, 161

Falloux, Frédéric Alfred Pierre, comte de (1811-1886)—French politician and writer; Legitimist and clerical; in 1848 initiated the closure of the national workshops and inspired the suppression of the June uprising of the Paris workers; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; Minister of Education (1848-49).—524

Favre, Claude Gabriel Jules (1809-1880)—French lawyer and politician; from the late 1850s, a leader of the bourgeois-republican opposition; Foreign Minister in the Government of National Defence and in Thiers' government (1870-71); negotiated the capitulation of Paris and peace treaty with Germany; together with Thiers directed the struggle against the First International.—4, 112, 114, 241, 248, 249, 304, 312, 313, 317, 320, 323, 340, 346, 357-62, 370, 376, 416, 417, 437-40, 442, 450, 454, 456, 466, 469, 475, 481, 482, 506, 509, 511, 513-18, 527, 528, 571, 572, 588, 595, 608, 610, 611, 616

Ferdinand II (1810-1859)—King of the Two Sicilies (1830-59), nicknamed King Bomba for the bombardment of Messina (1848).—315, 455, 520

Ferry, Jules François Camille (1832-1893)—French lawyer and politician; one of the leaders of moderate bourgeois republicans; member of the Government of National Defence; Mayor of Paris (1870-71); deputy to the National Assembly (1871); Prime Minister (1880-81, 1883-85).—314, 438, 439, 440, 443, 480, 509, 515, 517-18

Flocon, Ferdinand (1800-1866)—French politician and journalist; democrat; an editor of *La Réforme*; member of

- the Provisional Government in 1848.—571
- Flourens, Gustave Paul* (1838-1871)—French naturalist and revolutionary, follower of Blanqui; contributed to *La Marseillaise*; emigrated to London in March 1870 and returned in September 1870; one of the leaders of the Paris uprisings on October 31, 1870 and January 22, 1871; member of the Paris Commune and its Military Commission; on April 3, 1871 was killed by the Versaillists.—320, 323, 326, 447, 471, 480, 527, 530, 591
- Fonderville, Eugène (Fondewille)*—member of the French section of the First International in Bordeaux; member of the Paris Commune; a refugee in London after its defeat; took part in the London Conference of the International in 1871; in 1875 emigrated to the USA.—400-02
- Forcade de la Roquette, Jean Louis Victor Adolphe de* (1820-1874)—French statesman, liberal; Minister of the Interior in the Ollivier cabinet (1869).—45
- François*—French National Guardsman, Communard; killed during the counter-revolutionary demonstration in Paris on March 22, 1871.—511, 529
- Frankel, Léo* (1844-1896)—active in the Hungarian and international working-class movement; jeweller; in the 1860s emigrated to France; in 1870 was one of the founders of the German section in Paris; Secretary and member of the Paris Federal Council; was prosecuted at the third trial of the International in Paris; member of the National Guard and of the Paris Commune; in 1872 was sentenced to death in his absence; in 1871-72 member of the General Council of the International, Corresponding Secretary for Austria-Hungary; delegate to the London Conference (1871) and the Hague Congress (1872); in 1876 returned to Hungary; associate of Marx and Engels.—339, 431, 476, 501, 617
- Fransecky, Eduard Friedrich von* (1807-1890)—German general; commanded the Second Corps during the Franco-Prussian war.—241
- Frederick II (the Great)* (1712-1786)—King of Prussia (1740-86).—165, 359
- Frederick Charles* (1828-1885)—Prussian prince, German general, from October 1870 field marshal-general; during the Franco-Prussian war commanded the Second Army.—20, 23, 29, 33, 34, 39, 41, 62, 69, 86, 104, 147, 152, 170, 171, 175-77, 179, 183, 185, 186, 188, 195, 196, 204-06, 209-12, 221, 222, 226, 228-30, 238, 245, 248-49, 252
- Frederick Francis II* (1823-1883)—Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin (1842-83); German general; during the Franco-Prussian war first commanded the troops on the coast of Germany and then a formation fighting south of Paris.—147, 169, 176, 177, 179, 180, 182, 183, 186, 195, 196, 204-06, 208, 209, 221, 222, 243
- Frederick William* (1831-1888)—Crown Prince of Prussia and the German Empire; general; son of William I; King of Prussia and Emperor of Germany under the name of Frederick III (1888); commanded the Third Army during the Franco-Prussian war.—20, 23, 25, 28-29, 33, 37, 57, 67-69, 71, 72, 75, 78, 81, 147, 177, 195, 281
- Frederick William III* (1770-1840)—King of Prussia (1797-1840).—98, 195-97
- Friedländer, Max* (1829-1872)—German democratic journalist, editor of the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* and *Die Presse*, to which Karl Marx contributed in the 1850s-1860s; founder and editor of the *Neue Freie Presse* (1864-72).—374
- Frossard, Charles Auguste* (1807-1875)—French general; commanded the Sec-

ond Corps during the Franco-Prussian war; was taken prisoner at Metz.—22, 29, 30, 32-34, 37, 38, 42, 57, 61, 62, 67, 154

G

Gallien, Louis Auguste (b. 1831)—officer of the National Guard of the Commune.—470, 477

Galliffet, Florence Georgina—wife of marquis de Galliffet.—326, 356, 447, 530

Galliffet, Gaston Alexandre Auguste, marquis de (1830-1909)—French general; commanded a cavalry regiment during the Franco-Prussian war; was taken prisoner at Sedan but was released to fight the Commune; commanded a cavalry brigade in the Versailles army.—326-27, 356, 447, 477, 513, 530, 532

Gambetta, Léon (1838-1882)—French statesman, bourgeois republican; member of the Government of National Defence (1870-71); head of the delegation sent by this government to Tours; Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1881-82).—129, 168, 186, 191, 221, 229, 238, 242, 253, 275, 312, 437, 480, 516, 532, 618

GanESCO, Grégory (c. 1830-1877)—French journalist, Romanian by birth; Bonapartist during the Second Empire, and then supported the Thiers government.—338

Garau—governor of the prison in Mazas.—401

Garibaldi, Giuseppe (1807-1882)—Italian revolutionary, democrat, leader of the Italian national liberation movement and the struggle for the unification of Italy in the 1850s-1860s; participant in the Franco-Prussian war on the side of the French Republic; commanded the Vosges Army, consisting of units of the National Guard, French and

foreign volunteers.—199, 224, 242, 244, 245, 248, 252

Garibaldi, Ricciotti (1847-1924)—son of Giuseppe Garibaldi; took part in the national liberation movement in Italy; participant in the Franco-Prussian war on the side of France as the commander of a brigade of the Vosges Army.—180

Garnier-Pagès, Louis Antoine (1803-1878)—French politician, moderate republican; member of the Provisional Government and Mayor of Paris in 1848; member of the Government of National Defence (1870-71).—469

Giovacchini, P.—member of the General Council of the International, Corresponding Secretary for Italy (1871).—355, 382

Gladstone, William Ewart (1809-1898)—British statesman, Tory and then Peelite; in the latter half of the nineteenth century, leader of the Liberal Party; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852-55 and 1859-66) and Prime Minister (1868-74, 1880-85, 1886, and 1892-94).—281, 560, 578-80

Gneisenau, August Wilhelm Anton, Count Neithardt von (1760-1831)—Prussian field marshal; one of the organisers of the liberation struggle against Napoleon's rule; took part in drawing up and carrying out Prussian army reforms.—166, 200-02

Goeben, August Karl Friedrich Christian von (1816-1880)—German general; commanded the Eighth Corps and from January 1871 the First Army during the Franco-Prussian war.—223, 228, 230, 248, 252

Goltz, Eduard Kuno, Baron von der (1817-1897)—German general; commanded a Prussian detachment of the 14th Corps during the Franco-Prussian war.—228

Gorchakov, Alexander Mikhailovich, Prince (1798-1883)—Russian statesman and diplomat, envoy in Vienna (1854-56),

- Foreign Minister (1856-82).—267, 575
- Gramont, Antoine Alfred Agénor, duc de Gramont et de Guiche, prince de Bidache* (1819-1880)—French diplomat; Minister of Foreign Affairs (1870); pursued the policy of unleashing a war between France and Prussia.—12
- Grand Duke of Mecklenburg*—see *Frederick Francis II*
- Grant, Ulysses Simpson* (1822-1885)—American general and statesman; fought in the Civil War on the side of the Union, Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Army from March 1864; War Secretary (1867-68), US President (1869-77).—142
- Granville, George Leveson Gower, 2nd Earl* (1815-1891)—British statesman, Whig and later Liberal; Foreign Secretary (1851-52, 1870-74, 1880-85); President of the Council (1852-54, 1855-58 and 1859-65), Secretary of State for the Colonies (1868-70, 1886).—579
- Greenwood, Frederick* (1830-1909)—British journalist, first editor of *The Pall Mall Gazette* (1865-80); held bourgeois-liberal and then conservative views.—281, 359, 378
- Greppo, Jean Louis* (1810-1888)—French socialist, took part in the Lyons uprisings of 1831 and 1834; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; Mayor of an arrondissement in Paris (1870-71); deputy to the National Assembly (1871).—468
- Grimal*—French officer; commissary of one of the military courts set up at Versailles for trying the Communards.—389
- Grousset, Paschal Jean François* (1844-1909)—French journalist and politician, Blanquist; member of the Central Committee of the National Guard and of the Paris Commune; Chairman of the Commission for Foreign Relations; after the suppression of the Commune deported to New Caledonia, from which he escaped in 1874; up to 1881 lived in England and then returned to France.—476
- Guillaume, James* (1844-1916)—Swiss teacher, anarchist, Bakunist; member of the International; participant of the Geneva (1866), Lausanne (1867), Basle (1869) and the Hague (1872) congresses of the First International; one of the organisers of the Alliance of Socialist Democracy; editor of the newspapers *Le Progrès*, *La Solidarité* and *Bulletin de la Fédération jurassienne*; at the Hague Congress (1872) was expelled from the International for his splitting activities.—412, 557, 559
- Guiod, Alphonse Simon* (b. 1805)—French general; Commander-in-Chief of the artillery during the siege of Paris in the Franco-Prussian war (1870-71).—313, 438, 517
- Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume* (1787-1874)—French historian and statesman; virtually directed the home and foreign policy of France from 1840 to the February 1848 revolution; expressed the interests of the big financial bourgeoisie.—315, 316, 445, 455, 521
- Gyulay, Ferenc, Count* (1798-1868)—Austrian general, Hungarian by birth; took part in suppressing the 1848-49 revolution in Italy; War Minister (1849-50); during the Italian war of 1859 commanded an Austrian army until the defeat at Magenta.—34

H

- Hales, John* (b. 1839)—British trade-union leader, weaver; member of the General Council of the International (1866-72) and its Secretary (1871-72); member of the Executive Committee of the Reform League and of the

- Land and Labour League; delegate to the London Conference (1871) and the Hague Congress (1872) of the International; in 1872 headed the reformist wing of the British Federal Council.—7, 270, 355, 358, 362, 367, 368, 370, 373, 382, 403, 431, 554, 555, 558, 562, 564, 567
- Hales, William*.—member of the International; member of the General Council of the International (1867, 1869-72).—7, 270, 355, 382, 431, 562
- Harris, George*.—active in the British working-class movement; Chartist, supported the social views of James O'Brien; member of the National Reform League; member of the General Council of the International (1869-72); Financial Secretary of the Council (1870-71).—7, 270, 355, 431
- Hausmann, Georges Eugène, Baron* (1809-1891) — French politician, Bonapartist; took part in the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; prefect of the Seine Department (1853-70); directed work on the reconstruction of Paris.—98, 339, 351
- Heeckeren, Georges Charles d'Anthès, Baron* (1812-1895)—French politician, Royalist; Russian army officer (1834-37); killed the Russian poet Alexander Pushkin in a duel; Bonapartist from 1848; Senator of the Second Empire; one of the organisers of the counter-revolutionary demonstration in Paris on March 22, 1871.—325, 505, 529
- Heinemann*.—Prussian agent provocateur in England; editor-in-chief of the German-language weekly *Hermann*, published in London.—560
- Henderson, Edmund Newmans Wolcott* (1821-1896)—British officer, chief of the London police (1869-86).—597
- Henry II* (1519-1559)—King of France (1547-59).—117
- Henry V*.—see *Chambord, Henri Charles Ferdinand Marie Dieudonné d'Artois, duc de Bordeaux, comte de*
- Hepner, Adolf* (1846-1923)—German journalist; one of the founders of the Social-Democratic Workers' Party (1869); editor of *Der Volksstaat* (1869-73); delegate to the Hague Congress of the International (1872); emigrated to the USA (1882); in 1908 returned to Germany.—275
- Herbert, Auberon Edward William Molyneux* (1838-1906) — English philosopher and publicist, Liberal; member of the House of Commons (1870-74).—580
- Herman, Alfred*.—active in the Belgian working-class movement, sculptor; founder and member of the International section in Liege (1868-71); member of the General Council and Corresponding Secretary for Belgium (1871-72); delegate to the Brussels Congress (1868), the London Conference (1871) and the Hague Congress (1872) of the International; at the Hague Congress joined the anarchist minority.—355, 431, 563
- Hervé, Aimé Marie Édouard* (1835-1899)—French journalist; one of the founders and editor-in-chief of *Le Journal de Paris*; bourgeois liberal; Orleanist after the fall of the Second Empire.—349
- Herzen, Alexander Ivanovich* (1812-1870)—Russian revolutionary democrat, materialist philosopher, journalist and writer; emigrated to France in 1847; from 1852 lived in London, where he established the Free Russian Press and published the periodical *Polyarnaya Zvezda* (Polar Star) and the newspaper *Kolokol* (The Bell).—374
- Hill, F.H.*.—editor-in-chief of *The Daily News* (1868-86).—274-76
- Hohenzollerns*.—dynasty of Brandenburg electors (1415-1701), Prussian kings (1701-1918) and German emperors (1871-1918).—5, 125, 275, 301, 339

Holyoake, George Jacob (1817-1906)—British journalist; reformist; Owenite and Chartist in the 1830s and 1840s; prominent figure in the co-operative movement.—367, 368, 370, 372, 563

Hossart.—378, 380, 382

Hugo, Victor Marie (1802-1885)—French writer; deputy to the Constituent and the Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; opposed Louis Bonaparte.—133

Hume, Robert William—American journalist; one of the leaders of the National Labour Union; member of the International and Correspondent of its General Council.—555, 558

Hurliman (Hurlimann)—Swiss by birth; member of the General Council of the International (1871-72).—431

Huxley, Thomas Henry (1825-1895)—British naturalist, the closest associate of Charles Darwin; inconsistent materialist in philosophy.—336, 488

J

Jaclard, Charles Victor (1840-1903)—French mathematician, physician and publicist, Blanquist; member of the International; member of the Central Committee of the National Guard; during the Paris Commune commander of a legion of the National Guard; following the suppression of the Paris Commune emigrated to Switzerland and then to Russia; after the 1880 amnesty returned to France.—510

Jacquemet, Alexandre—French clergyman; in 1848, Vicar General of the Archbishops of Paris.—352, 446, 528

Jaubert, Hippolyte François, comte (1798-1874)—French politician, monarchist; Minister of Public Works in the Thiers government (1840); deputy to the National Assembly (1871).—354, 538, 596

Jaurès, Constant Louis Jean Benjamin (1823-1889)—French naval officer,

admiral from 1871; as a general commanded the 21st Corps during the Franco-Prussian war; deputy to the National Assembly (1871).—203

Jeannerod, Georges (1832-1890) — French officer and journalist; war correspondent of *Le Temps* at the beginning of the Franco-Prussian war.—23, 38, 39, 43, 62, 66

Johannard, Jules Paul (1843-1892)—active in the French working-class movement; flowerist; Blanquist; member of the General Council of the International (1868-69, 1871-72) and Corresponding Secretary for Italy (1868-69); member of the Paris Commune; following the defeat of the Commune emigrated to London; delegate to the Hague Congress (1872).—431

Joukovsky (Zhukovsky), Nikolai Ivanovich (1833-1895)—Russian anarchist; a refugee in Switzerland from 1862; Secretary of the Geneva section of the Alliance of Socialist Democracy; in 1872 withdrew from the International in protest against Bakunin's expulsion.—429

Jourde, François (1843-1893)—French banking employee; member of the Central Committee of the National Guard and of the Paris Commune; representative of the Finance Commission; adhered to the Proudhonist minority; sentenced to exile to New Caledonia after the suppression of the Commune; escaped in 1874.—553

Jung, Hermann (1830-1901)—prominent in the Swiss and international working-class movement; watchmaker; an émigré in London; member of the General Council of the International and Corresponding Secretary for Switzerland (November 1864-72); Treasurer of the General Council (1871-72); Vice-Chairman of the London Conference (1865), Chairman of the Geneva (1866), Brussels (1868) and Basle (1869) congresses

and of the London Conference (1871) of the International; member of the British Federal Council; supported Marx before the Hague Congress of 1872 but later sided with the reformist wing of the British trade unions.—8, 270, 355, 382, 420, 431, 554-59, 562, 564-67

K

Kameke, Georg Arnold Karl von (1817-1893)—German general; during the Franco-Prussian war commanded the 14th Division, then conducted the siege operations near Paris; War Minister (1873-83).—32, 224

Keller—German general; commanded a brigade during the Franco-Prussian war.—257

Kératry, Émile, comte de (1832-1905)—French politician, Orleanist, Prefect of the Paris police (September-October 1870); later supervised the formation of territorial armed forces in Brittany; Prefect of the Haute-Garonne Department (1871); in April 1871 suppressed the Commune in Toulouse.—176, 186, 203, 397, 398, 624-27, 629-30

Kinglake, Alexander William (1809-1891)—English historian and politician, Liberal M.P. (1857-68).—235

Kolb, Georg Friedrich (1808-1884)—German politician, publicist and statistician; bourgeois democrat.—299

Kolb, Karl—member of the General Council of the International (1870-71).—355, 382

Küchenmeister, Gottlieb Friedrich Heinrich (1821-1890)—German physician, parasitologist; author of scientific works.—298

Kummer, Ferdinand von (1816-1900)—Prussian general; commanded the Third Reserve Division and then the 15th Division during the Franco-Prussian war.—127, 147

L

Lacretelle, Charles Nicolas (1822-1891)—French general; during the Franco-Prussian war commanded a division of the 12th Corps; was taken prisoner at Sedan; later commanded a division of the Second Corps of the Versailles Army.—470

Ladmirault, Louis René Paul de (1808-1898)—French general; took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; commanded the Fourth Corps during the Franco-Prussian war; was taken prisoner at Metz; later commanded the Second Corps of the Versailles Army; Governor of Paris (1871-78).—32, 34, 37, 38, 62, 154

Lafargue (February 1871-July 1871)—second son of Laura and Paul Lafargue.—622, 623

Lafargue, Charles Étienne (1869-1872)—first son of Laura and Paul Lafargue.—622, 623, 625, 630, 631

Lafargue, François (died 1870 or 1871)—father of Paul Lafargue.—396

Lafargue, Laura (1845-1911)—second daughter of Karl Marx; was active in the French working-class movement; wife of Paul Lafargue from 1868.—396-98, 432, 622, 623, 625, 627-30

Lafargue Paul (1842-1911)—prominent figure in the French and international working-class movement; member of the General Council of the International, Corresponding Secretary for Spain (1866-69); helped to organise the International's sections in France (1869-70), Spain and Portugal (1871-72); delegate to the Hague Congress (1872); one of the founders of the Workers' Party of France (1879); disciple and associate of Marx and Engels; from 1868 husband of Marx's daughter Laura.—396-98, 612, 622, 623, 625-31

- Laffitte, Jacques* (1767-1844)—French banker and liberal politician; headed the government in the early period of the July monarchy (1830-31).—314, 454
- Lafont*—French official; inspector-general of prisons (1871).—478
- Lagarde*—French abbot.—401
- Lambord*—member of the International.—554
- Lamennais, Félicité Robert de* (1782-1854)—French abbot, writer, one of the ideologists of Christian socialism.—507
- Landeck, Bernard* (b. 1832)—French jeweller, Polish by birth; participant in the Paris uprisings on October 31, 1870 and January 22, 1871; member of the Central Committee of the National Guard and of the Paris Commune; emigrated to England; one of the founders of the French section of the International in London in 1871; in his absence was sentenced to death in Marseilles (1872) and Versailles (1873).—565
- Landor, R.*—American journalist; London correspondent of the New York newspaper *The World* (1871).—600-06
- La Rochejaquelein (Larochejaquelein), Henri Auguste Georges du Vergier, marquis de* (1805-1867)—French politician, one of the leaders of the Legitimists; deputy to the Constituent Assembly during the Second Republic; Senator during the Second Empire.—524
- La Roncière Le Noury, Camille Adalbert Marie, baron Clement de* (1813-1881)—French admiral; during the siege of Paris (1870-71) commanded a division of the Third Paris Army and then a corps.—189
- Latham, Robert Masden*—British trade-unionist; President of the Labour Representation League; member of the International.—554
- Lavallée, Théophile Sébastien* (1804-1866)—French historian and military geographer.—117
- Lebrun, Barthélemy Louis Joseph* (1809-1889)—French general; during the Franco-Prussian war commanded the 12th Corps; was taken prisoner at Sedan.—78
- Lecomte, Claude Martin* (1817-1871)—French general; commanded a brigade during the Franco-Prussian war; on March 18, 1871 was shot by the insurgent soldiers after the failure of the Thiers government to seize the artillery of the National Guard.—323, 324, 328, 345, 347, 443, 445, 508, 524, 526, 528, 532
- Ledru-Rollin, Alexandre Auguste* (1807-1874)—French journalist and politician, a leader of the petty-bourgeois democrats; editor of *La Réforme*; Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government (1848); deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (leader of the Montagnards); after the demonstration of June 13, 1849 emigrated to England, where he lived up to early 1870; deputy to the National Assembly in 1871, resigned in protest against the conclusion of peace with Germany.—571
- Le Flô, Adolphe Emmanuel Charles* (1804-1887)—French general, politician and diplomat; representative of the Party of Order; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic, Minister of War in the Government of National Defence and the Thiers government (1870-71); deputy to the National Assembly (1871), Ambassador to St. Petersburg (1848-49 and 1871-79).—324, 327, 449, 527
- Legreulier*—member of the General Council of the International in 1870.—8
- Leland, Charles Godfrey* (1824-1903)—

- American lawyer, writer and journalist.—600
- Lemaître, Antoine Louis Prosper* (pseudonym *Frédéric Lemaître*) (1800-1876)—French actor and playwright, representative of romanticism and founder of critical realism in the French theatre.—442
- Lemaître, Frédéric*—French refugee, owner of a small printshop in London; member of the Paris section of the International; participant in the Paris Commune; after its suppression again emigrated to England; member of the French branch of the International in London.—558
- Le Moussu, Benjamin Constant* (b. 1846)—active in the French working-class movement, engraver; member of the Paris Commune; after its suppression emigrated to London; in 1872 was sentenced to death in his absence; member of the General Council of the International and Corresponding Secretary for the French sections in America (1871-72); delegate to the Hague Congress (1872); supported Marx and Engels in their struggle against the Bakuninists.—431
- Leroux, Pierre* (1797-1871)—French writer, utopian socialist; representative of Christian socialism; émigré in England in 1851-52.—598
- Lessner, Friedrich (Frederick)* (1825-1910)—active in the German and international working-class movement, tailor; member of the Communist League; participant in the revolution of 1848-49; at the Cologne Communist trial was sentenced to three years' imprisonment; from 1856, an émigré in London, member of the London German Workers' Educational Society and of the General Council of the International (November 1864 to 1872); delegate to the London Conferences (1865 and 1871), the Lausanne (1867), Brussels (1868), Basle (1869) and the Hague (1872) congresses of the International; member of the British Federal Council; a founder of the British Independent Labour Party in 1893; friend and associate of Marx and Engels.—8, 270, 355, 382, 431
- Leuckart, Friedrich Rudolf* (1823-1898)—German parasitologist and zoologist.—298
- Lewis, Sir George Cornwall* (1806-1863)—British statesman, Whig; Secretary to the Treasury (1850-52), Chancellor of the Exchequer (1855-58); Home Secretary (1859-61), and Secretary of State for War (1861-63).—582
- Liebknecht, Wilhelm Philipp Martin Christian Ludwig* (1826-1900)—prominent figure in the German and international working-class movement; took part in the 1848-49 revolution; member of the Communist League and the First International, delegate to the Basle Congress (1869); editor of *Der Volksstaat* (1869-76); a founder and leader of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party; in 1867-70 member of North German Reichstag; friend and associate of Marx and Engels.—272, 274, 278, 617, 619, 620
- Lincoln, Abraham* (1809-1865) — American statesman, a leader of the Republican Party, President of the USA (1861-65); under the influence of the masses, carried out important bourgeois-democratic reforms during the Civil War, thus making possible the adoption of revolutionary methods of warfare; was assassinated by an agent of slave-owners in April 1865.—458, 464, 542
- Lintern, W.* — British trade-unionist, member of the General Council of the International (1870).—8
- Litré, Maximilien Paul Émile* (1801-

- 1881)—French philosopher, philologist and politician.—510
- Lochner, Georg* (born c. 1824)—active in the German and international working-class movement, carpenter; member of the Communist League and of the German Workers' Educational Society in London, member of the General Council of the International (November 1864-1867 and 1871-72); delegate to the London Conference (1865); friend and associate of Marx and Engels.—355, 386, 431
- Locke, John* (1632-1704)—English dualist philosopher and economist.—594
- Longuet, Charles Félix César* (1839-1903)—prominent in the French working-class movement, journalist, Proudhonist; member of the General Council of the International (1866-67, 1871-72); Corresponding Secretary for Belgium (1866); delegate to the Lausanne (1867), Brussels (1868), the Hague (1872) congresses and the London Conference (1871); took part in the defence of Paris (1870-71); member of the Paris Commune; editor-in-chief of the Paris Commune's organ *Journal officiel de la République française*; after the suppression of the Commune emigrated to England; later joined the Possibilists; husband of Marx's daughter Jenny.—431
- Lopatin, German Alexandrovich* (1845-1918)—Russian revolutionary, follower of Chernyshevsky, Narodnik; member of the General Council of the International (1870); translated into Russian a sizable part of Volume I of *Capital*; Marx's friend.—270
- Lorenz (Lorentz), Josef* (1814-1879)—Austrian army officer and military inventor.—96
- Lorenzo, Anselmo* (1841-1915)—Spanish printer, member of the International (from 1869); a founder of the International's sections in Spain (1869); delegate to the London Conference (1871); Secretary of the Spanish Federal Council (1872).—415, 616
- Louis XIV* (1638-1715) — King of France (1643-1715).—165, 440, 538
- Louis XVI* (1754-1793)—King of France (1774-92); guillotined during the French Revolution.—476
- Louis XVIII* (1755-1824)—King of France (1814-15 and 1815-24).—503
- Louis Napoleon*—see *Napoleon III*
- Louis Philippe* (1773-1850)—Duke of Orléans, King of France (1830-48).—95, 122, 304, 314, 316, 317, 323, 333, 345, 442, 444, 451, 453-55, 460, 470, 520, 521, 527, 538, 539
- Louis Philippe Albert, duc d'Orléans, count of Paris* (1838-1894)—grandson of Louis Philippe; pretender to the French throne.—540
- Lowe, Robert, 1st Viscount Sherbrooke* (1811-1892)—British statesman and journalist, contributor to *The Times*, Whig and later Liberal; M.P., Chancellor of the Exchequer (1868-73); Home Secretary (1873-74).—579
- Löwenfeld*—German general, inspector of reserve units during the Franco-Prussian war.—148
- Lucraft, Benjamin* (1809-1897)—a leader of the British trade unions, cabinet-maker; member of the General Council of the International (1864-71), delegate to the Brussels (1868) and Basle (1869) congresses of the International; member of the Executive Committee of the Reform League, later member of London School Board; in 1871 refused to sign the General Council's Address *The Civil War in France* and withdrew from the International.—8, 270, 372, 376, 386
- Lumley*.—563

Lyons, Richard Bickerton Pemell, 2nd Baron and 1st Earl Lyons (1817-1887)—British diplomat, envoy in Washington (1858-65), ambassador to Constantinople (1865-67) and Paris (1867-87); in September 1870 mediator in the negotiations between Favre and Bismarck.—379, 380

M

Maccabees—the name of a Jewish family of priests dominant in Jerusalem; in the mid-2nd century B.C. headed the revolt against foreign dominion; ruling dynasty in Judaea from 142 to 40 B.C.—200

McDonnell (Mac Donnell), Joseph Patrick (1847-1906)—active in the Irish working-class movement; member of the General Council of the International and Corresponding Secretary for Ireland (1871-72); delegate to the London Conference (1871) and the Hague Congress (1872) of the International; in 1872 emigrated to the USA where he participated in the American working-class movement.—355, 382, 386, 431

Mack, Charles (1752-1828)—Austrian general; in 1805 commanded troops in the war against Napoleonic France; was defeated by Napoleon I and capitulated at Ulm.—34, 65

McKean, J. A.—secretary of the American ambassador Washburne in Paris in 1871.—381

Mac-Mahon (MacMachon), Marie Edme Patrice Maurice, comte de, duc de Magenta (1808-1893)—French general and politician, marshal, Bonapartist; during the Franco-Prussian war commanded the First Corps and later the Army of Châlons; was taken prisoner at Sedan; Commander-in-Chief of the Versailles Army; President of the Third Republic (1873-79).—26-30, 32, 33, 37, 38, 40, 42,

44, 51, 54, 57, 58, 65-85, 86, 91, 109, 120, 155, 158-59, 161, 174, 348, 352-53, 465, 542

Magne, Alfred—French official, collector-general of taxes in the Loire Department; Pierre Magne's son.—443

Magne, Pierre (1806-1879)—French statesman, Bonapartist; Minister of Finance (1855-60, 1867-69, 1870, 1873-74).—443

Malet, Sir Edward Baldwin, Baronet (1837-1908)—British diplomat, secretary of the embassy in Paris (1867-71).—380

Maljournal, Louis Charles (1841-1894)—French bookbinder; member and secretary of the National Guard's Central Committee; member of the First International; participant in the Paris Commune; was wounded and taken prisoner; in 1872 was sentenced to deportation and amnestied in 1879.—325, 511

Malon, Benoît (1841-1893)—French socialist; member of the International; was accused at the second and third trials in Paris against the International; delegate to the Geneva Congress (1866); deputy to the National Assembly (1871); member of the National Guard's Central Committee and of the Paris Commune; after the suppression of the Commune emigrated to Italy and then to Switzerland; later one of the leaders and ideologists of the Possibilists.—421

Manteuffel, Edwin Hans Karl, Baron von (1809-1885)—German general, from 1873 field marshal-general; in 1865-66 governor and commander of Prussian troops in Schleswig; during the Franco-Prussian war commanded the First Corps, then the First (from October 1870) and South (from January 1871) armies; Commander-in-Chief of the German occupational troops in France (1871-73).—185,

- 186, 196, 211, 222-24, 228, 237, 244-46, 248, 252
- Manuel, Jacques, Antoine* (1775-1827)—French lawyer, democrat; in 1818-23 member of the Chamber of Deputies; was expelled from the Chamber by the reactionary majority.—617
- Markowski*—agent of the Tsarist government in France; was in the service of Thiers in 1871.—338
- Martin, Constant (Saint-Martin)* (1839-1906)—French employee, Blanquist; member of the Paris Federal Council of the First International; member of the Paris Commune; after its defeat emigrated to London; member of the General Council of the International (1871-72); Secretary of the London Conference (1871); after the amnesty in 1880 returned to France.—431
- Martin des Pallières, Charles Gabriel Félicité* (1823-1876)—French general; commanded a brigade of the Second Corps and then the 15th Corps during the Franco-Prussian war.—203
- Marx, Eleanor* (1855-1898)—Karl Marx's youngest daughter, prominent figure in the British and international working-class movement; married Eduard Aveling in 1884.—397, 398, 432, 622-31
- Marx, Jenny (née von Westphalen)* (1814-1881)—Karl Marx's wife.—397, 625
- Marx, Jenny* (1844-1883)—Karl Marx's eldest daughter, journalist; was active in the international working-class movement; married Charles Longuet in 1872.—397, 398, 432, 622-32
- Marx, Karl* (1818-1883)—8, 259, 270, 276, 288-93, 299, 355, 360, 364, 367, 370-71, 378, 382-84, 386, 388, 391-96, 398-400, 403, 405, 411, 431, 432, 555, 556, 558-67, 571, 573, 577, 578, 580-82, 587-93, 595, 599, 600-06, 607, 610, 613, 614, 616-22, 625, 631, 633-34
- Mayo, Henry*—active in the British working-class movement; member of the General Council of the International (1871-72) and from 1872 of the British Federal Council, belonged to its reformist wing.—431
- Mazzini, Giuseppe* (1805-1872)—Italian revolutionary, democrat; a leader of the Italian national liberation movement; headed the Provisional Government of the Roman Republic (1849); an organiser of the Central Committee of European Democracy in London (1850); during the foundation of the International in 1864 tried to bring it under his influence; in 1871 opposed the Paris Commune and the General Council of the International.—385-87, 598, 605, 607-08
- Michel, Alexandre Ernest*—French general; commanded a cavalry division of the Army of the Loire during the Franco-Prussian war.—203
- Mill, John Stuart* (1806-1873)—English economist and positivist philosopher.—561, 582, 605
- Miller, Joseph or Josias* (commonly called *Joe Miller*) (1684-1738)—English comic actor.—314, 440, 518
- Millière, Jean Baptiste Édouard* (1817-1871)—French lawyer, journalist, Left Proudhonist; participated in the uprising of October 31, 1870; criticised the Thiers government, blamed Jules Favre and supported the Paris Commune; was shot by Versaillists on May 26, 1871.—313, 358, 362, 365, 439, 512, 597
- Mills, Charles*—English engineer, member of the General Council of the International in 1871.—355, 386
- Milner, George*—Irish tailor; was active in the British working-class movement; supported the social views of the Chartist James O'Brien; member of the National Reform League and the Land and Labour League;

- member of the General Council of the International (1868-72); delegate to the London Conference (1871); from the autumn of 1872 member of the British Federal Council.—7, 270, 355, 382, 431, 578
- Milton, John* (1608-1674)—English poet and writer; prominent in the English revolution.—490
- Minié, Claude Etienne* (1804-1879)—French army officer, inventor of a new type of rifle.—120
- Mirabeau, Honoré Gabriel Victor Riqueti, comte de* (1749-1791)—prominent figure in the French Revolution, constitutional monarchist.—316
- Molière* (real name *Jean Baptiste Poquelin*) (1622-1673)—French dramatist.—319, 524
- Molinet, vicomte de* (d. 1871)—French aristocrat; killed during the counter-revolutionary demonstration on March 22, 1871 in Paris.—512
- Moltke, Helmuth Karl Bernhard, Count von* (1800-1891)—military writer and strategist, ideologist of Prussian militarism; field marshal-general from 1871; Chief of Prussian (1857-71) and Imperial (1871-88) General Staff; virtually commander-in-chief during the Franco-Prussian war.—21, 27, 52, 71, 133, 152-53, 170, 177, 178, 181, 186, 195, 243, 245, 248, 574, 577
- Montalembert, Marc René, marquis de* (1714-1800)—French general, military engineer; elaborated a new fortification system largely used in the nineteenth century.—87
- Montaudon, Jean Baptiste Alexandre*—French general; commanded a division of the Third Corps during the Franco-Prussian war.—42
- Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de* (1689-1755)—French philosopher, economist and writer of the Enlightenment.—333, 507, 510
- Montijo, Eugénie (Eugenia Maria de Montijo de Guzman, condesa de Teba)* (1826-1920)—French Empress, wife of Napoleon III.—30, 160, 161, 162, 300, 301
- Moore, Sir John* (1761-1809)—British general; commanded the British troops in Portugal in 1808-09.—173
- Mottershead, Thomas G.* (c. 1826-1884)—English weaver, a Chartist; member of the General Council (1869-72), Corresponding Secretary for Denmark (1871-72); delegate to the London Conference (1871) and the Hague Congress (1872); member of the British Federal Council; opposed Marx's line in the General Council and the British Federal Council; expelled from the First International by decision of the General Council in May 1872.—7, 270, 355, 382, 431, 555, 562, 565, 591, 594
- Murray, Charles*—active in the British working-class movement, shoemaker, a Chartist, follower of the social views of James O'Brien, member of the National Reform League and the Land and Labour League, member of the General Council of the International (1870-72) and of the British Federal Council (1872-73).—7, 270, 355, 382, 431

N

Napoleon I Bonaparte (1769-1821)—Emperor of the French (1804-14 and 1815).—7, 22, 33, 57, 65, 69, 72, 104, 155, 160, 165-66, 199, 202, 254, 256, 260, 266, 316, 337, 449, 462, 484, 493, 519, 522, 542

Napoleon III (Charles Louis Napoléon Bonaparte) (1808-1873)—nephew of Napoleon I, President of the Second Republic (1848-51), Emperor of the French (1852-70).—3-5, 11, 12, 14, 22, 24-26, 29-30, 33-38, 44, 48-51,

56-57, 59, 70, 95, 96, 98-99, 106, 110, 116, 157-62, 182, 191, 219, 263, 264, 267-69, 279, 283, 299-304, 313, 316, 317, 319, 321-23, 329, 330, 333, 338-42, 345, 347, 348, 358, 364, 439, 442, 445, 451-55, 459, 462, 468-69, 475, 478, 480-81, 486, 490, 493, 505, 515, 517, 518, 520, 522, 524, 527, 532, 539, 547, 572, 585, 588, 608, 611, 619

Nero (Nero Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus) (37-68)—Roman Emperor (54-68).—457

Netschajeff (Nechaev), Sergei Gennadievich (1847-1882)—Russian revolutionary, conspirator; representative of the extreme adventurist trend of anarchism; as a refugee in Switzerland in 1869-71, was connected with Bakunin; in 1872 was extradited by the Swiss authorities to the Russian government and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment; died in the St. Peter and Paul fortress.—377

O

Obernitz, Hugo Moritz Anton Heinrich von (1819-1901)—German general, commanded the Württemberg division during the Franco-Prussian war.—190, 191

Odger, George (1820-1877)—a leader of the British trade unions, shoemaker; took part in founding the London Trades Council and was its Secretary from 1862 to 1872; member of the British National League for the Independence of Poland, the Land and Labour League and the Labour Representation League; member of the Executive Committee of the Reform League; member of the General Council of the International (1864-71) and its President (1864-67); took part in the London Conference (1865) and the Geneva Congress (1866); opposed revolutionary tactics; in 1871 refused to sign the General

Council's Address *The Civil War in France* and left the Council.—7, 270, 364, 373, 376, 386, 554, 562, 563, 571, 610, 611

Ollivier, Émile (1825-1913)—French politician, moderate republican; member of the *Corps Législatif* from 1857; became Bonapartist in the late 1860s; head of the government (January-August 1870).—4, 160, 448, 532

Orléans—royal dynasty in France (1830-48).—301, 340

Oudinot, Nicolas Charles Victor (1791-1863)—French general, Orleanist; in 1849 commanded the troops sent against the Roman Republic.—521

Outline—see *Utin*

Owen, Robert (1771-1858)—British utopian socialist.—594

P

Palikao—see *Cousin-Montauban*

Pallières—see *Martin des Pallières*

Palmerston, Henry John Temple, 3rd Viscount (1784-1865)—British statesman; at the beginning of his career a Tory, from 1830 Whig; Foreign Secretary (1830-34, 1835-41, 1846-51); Home Secretary (1852-55) and Prime Minister (1855-58, 1859-65).—371, 579, 582

Parnell, James—English worker, member of the General Council of the International (1869-70).—7, 270

Pène, Henri de (1830-1888)—French journalist, monarchist; an organiser of the counter-revolutionary demonstration in Paris on March 22, 1871.—325, 511, 529, 631

Perret, Henri—Swiss engraver; one of the leaders of the International in Switzerland; member and secretary of the Romance Federal Committee

- (1868-73); member of the editorial board of *L'Égalité*, delegate to all congresses and the London Conference (1871) of the International.—557
- Pertz, Georg Heinrich* (1795-1876)—German historian, author of works on the history of Germany.—201
- Petit*—secretary of Archbishop Darboy.—401
- Pfänder (Pfander), Carl* (1818-1876)—participant in the German and international working-class movement, miniaturist; from 1845, a refugee in London; a leader of the League of the Just; member of the German Workers' Educational Society in London, of the Central Committee of the Communist League and of the General Council of the First International (1864-67 and 1870-72); friend and associate of Marx and Engels.—7, 270, 355, 382, 431
- Pic, Jules*—French journalist, Bonapartist; editor of *L'Étendard*.—313, 475, 518
- Picard, Eugène Arthur* (b. 1825)—French politician and broker; moderate republican; editor-in-chief of *L'Électeur libre*; brother of Joseph Ernest Picard.—314, 439, 440, 518
- Picard, Louis Joseph Ernest* (1821-1877)—French lawyer and politician; moderate republican; Minister of Finance in the Government of National Defence (1870-71); Minister of the Interior in the Thiers government (1871).—314, 320, 326, 354, 439, 440, 442, 443, 445, 454, 466, 467, 471, 508, 515, 517, 518, 616
- Piètri, Joseph Marie* (1820-1902)—French politician, Bonapartist; Prefect of the Paris police (1866-70).—5, 343, 440, 447, 452, 459, 477, 518, 541
- Pius IX (Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti)* (1792-1878)—Pope (1846-78).—166, 563, 601, 607
- Plon-Plon*—see *Bonaparte, Prince Napoléon Joseph Charles Paul*
- Pourille, Jean Baptiste Stanislas Xavier* (pseudonym *Blanchet*) (b. 1833)—former Capuchin; French journalist; sold second-hand things and silk, interpreter in the Lyons' prison (1864-67), secretary of the police commissariat; member of the National Guard's Central Committee and of the Paris Commune; member of the Justice Commission; expelled from the Commune as a police officer.—340
- Pouyer-Quertier, Augustin Thomas* (1820-1891)—French manufacturer and politician; Protectionist; Minister of Finance (1871-72); took part in peace negotiations with Germany in Frankfurt (1871).—319, 346, 441-43, 446, 519
- Protot, Eugène* (1839-1921)—French lawyer, physician and journalist; Blanquist; member of the First International; member of the Paris Commune; delegate of the Justice Commission, after the suppression of the Commune emigrated to Italy, Switzerland, England and the USA; after the amnesty returned to France and withdrew from politics.—475, 591
- Proudhon, Pierre Joseph* (1809-1865)—French journalist, economist and sociologist; ideologist of the petty bourgeoisie; a founder of anarchism.—607
- Pyat, Félix* (1810-1889)—French journalist, playwright and politician; democrat; took part in the 1848 revolution; emigrated in 1849 to Switzerland and later to Belgium and England; was against independent working-class movement; conducted a slander campaign against Marx and the First International; member of the Paris Commune, after its suppression, emigrated to England.—416, 417, 586, 591, 605

R

- Radetzky Joseph, Count of Radetz* (1766-1858)—Austrian field marshal; commanded the Austrian troops in Northern Italy from 1831; suppressed the national liberation movement in Italy (1848-49); Governor-General of the Kingdom of Lombardy and Venice (1850-56).—88
- Raglan, Lord Fitzroy James Henry Somerset, Baron* (1788-1855)—British field marshal; Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in the Crimea (1854-55).—235
- Reid, Robert*—British journalist, democrat; Paris correspondent of English and American newspapers before and during the Paris Commune.—379-82, 552, 553, 563
- Reitlinger*—Jules Favre's friend and private secretary.—358, 362
- Renault (Renaut), Léon Charles* (b. 1839)—French lawyer; defended Paris Communards before the Versailles court (1871).—403
- Renault, Pierre Hippolyte Publius* (1807-1870)—French general; commanded the Second Corps of the Second Paris Army during the Franco-Prussian war.—190
- Reuter, Paul Julius, Baron von* (1816-1899)—founder of the Reuter telegraph agency in London (1851); German by birth.—48
- Richard, Albert* (1846-1925)—French journalist, a leader of the Lyons section of the International; member of the secret Alliance of Socialist Democracy; took part in the Lyons uprising of 1870; after the suppression of the Paris Commune, a Bonapartist; in the 1880s adhered to the Allemanists, an opportunist trend in the French socialist movement.—556, 563
- Roach, John*—member of the General Council of the International (1871-72); delegate to the Hague Congress (1872); Corresponding Secretary for the British Federal Council, where he sided with the reformist wing (1872).—355, 382, 386
- Robin, Paul Charles Louis Jean* (1837-1912)—French teacher, Bakuninist; a founder of the Belgian section of the First International; one of the leaders of the Alliance of Socialist Democracy (from 1869); member of the General Council (1870-71); delegate to the Basle Congress (1869) and the London Conference (1871); in October 1871 expelled from the International.—419-21, 561-63, 609
- Robinet, Jean François Eugène* (1825-1899)—French physician and historian; Positivist, republican; took part in the 1848 revolution; Mayor of an arrondissement in Paris during the Franco-Prussian war (1870-71); member of Ligue de L'Union républicaine pour les Droits de Paris, came out for a reconciliation between the Versailles government and the Commune.—354, 364
- Rochat, Charles Michel* (b. 1844)—member of the Paris Federal Council and of the General Council of the International; took part in the Paris Commune; Corresponding Secretary for Holland (1871-72); delegate to the London Conference (1871); in 1872 emigrated to Belgium.—355, 431, 563
- Rochefort, Victor Henri, marquis de Rochefort Luçay* (1830-1913)—French journalist, writer and politician; Left-wing republican; publisher of *La Lanterne* (1868-69); founder and publisher of *La Marseillaise* (1869-70) and editor of *Le Mot d'Ordre* (1871); member of the Government of National Defence (September-October 1870); condemned the counter-revolutionary policy of the Versailles government but at the same time opposed the Commune's revolution-

ary activities; after the suppression of the Commune was exiled to New Caledonia; returned to France after the amnesty (1880).—145, 232

Roche-Lambert—French official; was appointed collector-general of taxes in the Loire Department (1871).—442

Roon, Albrecht Theodor Emil, Count von (1803-1879)—Prussian statesman and military leader; field marshal-general from 1873, War Minister (1859-73) and Naval Minister (1861-71); reorganised the Prussian army.—106

Rouher, Eugène (1814-1884)—French statesman, Bonapartist; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; Minister of Justice (1849-52, with intervals), Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works (1855-63), Prime Minister (1863-69), President of the Senate (1869-70); after the fall of the Empire emigrated to England; a leader of the Bonapartists in France in the 1870s.—23

Rühl, J.—German worker, member of the German Workers' Educational Society in London; member of the General Council of the International (1870-72).—7, 270, 355, 382, 431

Russell, Odo William Leopold, 1st Baron Amphilhill (1829-1884)—British diplomat, ambassador at Berlin (1871-84).—580

Rutson, E.—private secretary of Henry Austin Bruce, British Home Secretary, in 1871.—563

S

Sadler, Michael Thomas—British member of the General Council of the International (1871-72).—355, 382, 431

Sagasta, Práxedes Mateo (1827-1903)—Spanish politician, leader of the Liberal party; Home Minister (1868-70,

1871-72); Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (1874), Prime Minister (1881-1902, with intervals).—398

Sagulyajew (Zagulyaev), Mikhail Andreyevich (1834-1900)—Russian officer and journalist; editor of the political section of the newspaper *Golos* (Voice) (1862-83).—276

Saint-Arnaud, Armand Jacques Achille Leroy de (1801-1854)—Marshal of France, Bonapartist; an organiser of the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; War Minister (1851-54); Commander-in-Chief of the French army in the Crimea (1854).—235

Saisset, Jean Marie Joseph Théodore (1810-1879)—French admiral and politician, monarchist; commanded the troops defending the Eastern forts during the siege of Paris (1870-71); Commander of the Paris National Guard (March 20-25, 1871); tried to unite reactionary forces in Paris to suppress the proletarian revolution of March 18; deputy to the National Assembly (1871).—326, 450, 457, 497, 512, 529, 539, 543

Scharnhorst, Gerhard Johann David von (1755-1813)—Prussian general and politician; after the defeat of the Prussian army by Napoleon I in 1806, head of the commission for a reform of the army; War Minister (1807-10) and Chief of Staff (1810-13); took an active part in the liberation war of the German people against Napoleonic rule.—166

Scheffer—French National Guardsman; took part in the Paris Commune.—327, 465, 478, 532

Schill, Ferdinand von (1776-1809)—Prussian officer; commanded a guerrilla detachment fighting against Napoleon's forces, killed in 1809 during an attempt to raise a national liberation uprising.—199, 200

Schmeling—German general; commanded the Fourth Reserve Army

- during the Franco-Prussian war.—148, 243
- Schmutz*—Swiss worker, member of the General Council of the International (1870-71).—8, 270
- Schoelcher, Victor* (1804-1893)—French politician and journalist, Left Republican; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; commanded the artillery legion of the Paris National Guard during the Franco-Prussian war and the Paris Commune; deputy to the National Assembly (1871); tried to persuade the Communards to capitulate to the Thiers government.—497, 509
- Schwarzenberg, Karl Philipp, Prince von* (1771-1820)—Austrian field marshal; fought against Napoleon I; Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies of the European coalition (1813-14).—72
- Schweitzer, Johann Baptist von* (1833-1875)—editor of *Der Social-Demokrat* (1864-67); President of the General Association of German Workers (1867-71); supported Bismarck's policy of unification of Germany under Prussia's supremacy; hindered German workers from joining the International, fought against the Social-Democratic Workers' Party; was expelled from the Association for his contacts with the Prussian authorities (1872).—616
- Serebrennikoff, Vladimir Ivanovich* (born c. 1850)—Russian revolutionary; took part in the students movement in St. Petersburg in 1868-69; refugee in England and Switzerland; follower of Nechaev.—377
- Serrailier, Auguste* (b. 1840)—active in the French and international working-class movement, shoemaker; lived in England; member of the General Council of the International (1869-72) and of the British Federal Council (1873-74); associate of Marx and Engels; Corresponding Secretary for Belgium (1870) and France (1871-72); was sent to Paris as representative of the General Council in September 1870 and in March 1871; officer of the National Guard; member of the Paris Commune; delegate to the London Conference (1871) and the Hague Congress (1872) of the International.—8, 270, 273, 277, 288, 289, 355, 381, 431, 556, 557, 559, 561, 562, 566, 567, 585, 590-91
- Shakespeare, William* (1564-1616)—English poet and dramatist.—319, 356, 470, 496, 540, 626, 628
- Shepherd, Joseph*—member of the General Council of the International (1869-70).—8, 270
- Sheridan, Philip Henry* (1831-1888)—American general; took part in the US Civil War (1861-65) on the side of the Northerners; observer in the German headquarters during the Franco-Prussian war.—512.
- Shipton, George* (1839-1911)—trade-union leader, Reformist; founder and secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Housepainters and Decorators, member of the Land and Labour League; secretary of the London Trades Council (1872-96).—600
- Simon, Jules François Simon Suisse* (1814-1896)—French statesman; moderate republican; deputy to the Constituent Assembly (1848-49); Minister of Public Instruction in the government of National Defence and the Thiers government (1870-73); deputy to the National Assembly (1871); President of the Council of Ministers (1876-77).—320, 442, 469
- Smith (Smith-Headingley), Adolphe (Adolphus)* (1846-1924)—British journalist; was born in Paris; member of the Social Democratic Federation in the 1880s; adhered to the French Possibilists.—553

- Sonis, Louis Gaston de* (1825-1887)—French general; commanded the 17th Corps during the Franco-Prussian war.—203
- Sorge, Friedrich Adolph* (1828-1906)—prominent figure in the international and American working-class and socialist movement, German teacher; took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Germany; in 1852 emigrated to the USA; founder of the American sections of the First International; Secretary of the Federal Council; delegate to the Hague Congress (1872); member of the General Council in New York and its General Secretary (1872-74); friend and associate of Marx and Engels.—589
- Steens, Eugène* (1825-1898)—Belgian journalist, member of the International; editor of *La Tribune du Peuple* and *L'Internationale*; delegate to the Brussels Congress (1868) and the London Conference (1871) of the International.—614
- Steinmetz, Karl Friedrich, von* (1796-1877)—German general, field marshal from 1871; commanded the First Army during the Franco-Prussian war (up to September 1870).—20, 23, 33, 34, 42, 69, 86
- Stepney, Cowell William Frederick* (1820-1872)—British, member of the Reform League; member of the General Council of the International (1866-72) and its Treasurer (1868-70); delegate to the Brussels (1868) and Basle (1869) congresses; member of the British Federal Council (1872).—8, 270, 355, 382, 431
- St. Hilaire*—see *Barthélemy Saint Hilaire, Jules*
- Stieber, Wilhelm* (1818-1882)—Prussian police officer; Chief of the Prussian political police (1852-60); one of the organisers of and chief witness for the prosecution at the Cologne Communist trial (1852); during the Franco-Prussian war chief of military police and of the German intelligence and counter-intelligence in France.—274, 288
- Stoll*—member of the General Council of the International in 1870.—8, 270
- Stosch, Albrecht, von* (1818-1896)—German general; Chief of the Commissariat of the German armies and later Chief of Staff under Duke of Mecklenburg and Chief of Staff of German occupational troops in France (1871).—209
- Stüllpnagel, Ferdinand Wolf Louis Anton, von* (1813-1885)—German general; commanded the Fifth division during the Franco-Prussian war.—32
- Suchet, Louis Gabriel, duc d'Albufera da Valencia* (1770-1826)—Marshal of France; fought in the Peninsular war (1808-14).—143, 144
- Sulla (Lucius Cornelius Sulla)* (138-78 B.C.)—Roman general and statesman, consul (88 B.C.); dictator (82-79 B.C.).—318, 349
- Susane, (Suzanne) Louis* (1810-1876)—French general; for several years was Chief of the Artillery Department of the War Ministry; author of works on the history of the French army.—313, 438, 517

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- Tacitus, Publius Cornelius* (c. 55-c. 120)—Roman historian and orator.—349
- Taillefer*—French employee of an insurance company; was arrested for forgery and embezzlement of state property; publisher of *L'Étendard*.—313, 475, 518
- Tamisier, François Laurent Alphonse* (1809-1880)—French general and politician, republican; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; Commander of the Paris National Guards (September-November 1870); deputy to the National Assembly (1871).—323, 446, 480, 527

- Tann-Rathsamhausen, Ludwig Samson Arthur Freiherr von und zu der* (1815-1881)—German general; commanded the First Bavarian Corps during the Franco-Prussian war.—138, 147, 152, 163, 168, 169, 171, 176, 181, 192, 204, 208, 211, 243
- Taylor, Alfred*—British worker; member of the General Council of the International (1871-72), and of the British Federal Council (1872-73).—355, 376, 382, 386, 431
- Taylor, Peter Alfred* (1819-1891)—British politician; bourgeois radical, M.P.—587
- Tertullian (Tertullianus, Quintus Septimus Florens)* (c. 160-c. 222)—Christian theologian and writer.—292
- Thiers, Élise* (1818-1880)—Adolphe Thiers's wife.—326, 440
- Thiers, Marie Joseph Louis Adolphe* (1797-1877)—French historian and statesman; Prime Minister (1836, 1840); head of the Orleanists after 1848; organised the suppression of the Paris Commune (1871); President of the Republic (1871-73).—4, 292, 311-12, 314-22, 324-29, 331, 337, 338-52, 354, 380, 389-90, 396, 398, 432, 438-44, 446-58, 462-70, 475-78, 492, 497, 501, 503, 506, 508-10, 512-13, 515, 519-25, 528, 530-32, 538-47, 593, 595, 597, 610, 622, 627, 628, 630
- Thomas, Clément* (1809-1871)—French general, moderate Republican; publisher of *Le National*; took part in suppressing the June 1848 uprising in Paris; commanded the Paris National Guard (November 1870-February 1871); sabotaged the city's defence; was shot by the insurgent soldiers on March 18, 1871.—323-24, 328, 346-47, 443, 445, 446, 449, 481, 508, 510, 524, 526, 528, 532
- Tibaldi, Paolo* (1825-1901)—Italian revolutionary, follower of Garibaldi; member of the International; participant in the Paris Commune; after its suppression emigrated to England.—563
- Timur (Tamerlane)* (1336-1405)—Central Asian conqueror, founder of a large state in the East with Samarkand as its capital.—326, 463, 530
- Totleben (Totleben), Eduard Ivanovich* (1818-1884)—Russian military engineer, general; an organiser of the defence of Sebastopol (1854-55).—217
- Tolain, Henri Louis* (1828-1897)—active in the French working-class movement, engraver; Right-wing Proudhonist; member of the First Paris Bureau and Paris section of the First International; delegate to all congresses and conferences of the International in 1865-69; deputy to the National Assembly (1871); during the Paris Commune went over to the Versaillists and was expelled from the International (1871); Senator during the Third Republic.—297, 327, 364, 553, 562, 590
- Townshend, William*—member of the General Council of the International (1869-72).—8, 270, 355, 382, 431
- Treschow, Udo von* (1808-1885)—German general; commanded the First Reserve Division and a siege corps at Belfort during the Franco-Prussian war.—227, 244
- Tridon, Edme Marie Gustave* (1841-1871)—French journalist, Blanquist; deputy to the National Assembly (1871); but then renounced his powers; member of the Paris Commune; after its suppression emigrated to Belgium.—510
- Trochu, Louis Jules* (1815-1896)—French general and politician, Orleanist; took part in the conquest of Algeria (1830s-1840s), in the Crimean (1853-56) and Italian (1859) wars; head of the Government of National Defence; Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of Paris (September 1870-January 1871); sabotaged the city's defence; deputy

to the National Assembly (1871).—45, 54, 89, 113, 121, 122, 139, 169, 176-78, 183, 188, 189, 192, 196, 205, 216, 219, 232-35, 240, 241, 304, 311, 312, 318, 322-24, 351, 437, 438, 446, 469, 480, 482, 506, 510, 513, 515-17, 527, 532, 547

Truelove, Edward (1809-1899)—British publisher, Chartist; member of the Reform League and the National Sunday League; helped to popularise some of Marx's works, published the General Council's two addresses on the Franco-Prussian war and *The Civil War in France*.—567

Tümpling, Wilhelm (1809-1884)—German general; commanded the Sixth Corps during the Franco-Prussian war.—189

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Ulrich, Jean Jacques Alexis (1802-1886)—French general; Commandant of the Strasbourg fortress during the Franco-Prussian war.—93, 113

Urquhart, David (1805-1877)—British diplomat, writer and politician; Tory M.P. (1847-52).—371

Utin (Outine), Nikolai Isaakovich (1845-1883)—Russian revolutionary; participant in the student movement; member of the Land and Freedom society; in 1863 emigrated to England and then to Switzerland; an organiser of the Russian section of the International; member of the *Narodnoye Dyelo* (People's Cause) editorial board (1868-70); an editor of the *Égalité* (1870-71); supported Marx and the General Council in the struggle against Bakunin and his followers; delegate to the London Conference (1871); in 1877 returned to Russia; associate of Marx and Engels.—429, 618

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Vacheron, Louis—French lawyer; general prosecutor of the Mayenne Department in 1871.—444

Vaillant, Marie Édouard (1840-1915)—French engineer, naturalist and physician; Blanquist; member of the Paris Commune, of the National Guard's Central Committee and of the General Council of the International (1871-72); delegate to the Lausanne Congress (1867) and the London Conference (1871); after the Hague Congress (1872) withdrew from the International.—431, 510, 616, 617, 618

Valentin, Louis Ernest—French general, Bonapartist; Prefect of the Paris police on the eve of the uprising on March 18, 1871.—320, 343, 441, 452, 467, 477, 510, 513, 541, 546

Varlin, Louis Eugène (1839-1871)—took part in the French working-class movement, bookbinder; Left-wing Proudhonist; member of the International from 1865; a founder of the International's sections in France; delegate to the London Conference (1865), the Geneva (1866) and Basle (1869) congresses of the International; member of the National Guard's Central Committee and the Paris Commune; was shot by the Versailles troops on May 28, 1871.—510, 554

Vauban, Sébastien Le Prestre de (1633-1707)—Marshal of France, military engineer; author of several books on fortification and siege-works.—92, 101, 102, 222

Vendéz—French general; commanded the 19th Corps during the Franco-Prussian war.—45.

Vermorel, Auguste Jean Marie (1841-1871)—French journalist and writer, Left republican; Proudhonist; contributed to various newspapers; editor-in-chief of *Le Courrier français*;

- member of the Paris Commune; was heavily wounded in street fighting in Paris in May 1871 and died in captivity.—381
- Vernier*—husband of Jeanne Char-
mont, Jules Favre's mistress.—313.
- Vésinier, Pierre* (1824-1902)—French
journalist, participant in the London
Conference of the International
(1865); was expelled from the Inter-
national in 1868 for conducting a
slandering campaign against the
General Council; member of the
Paris Commune; editor-in-chief of
the *Journal officiel de la République
française*, the main organ of the Com-
mune; after the suppression of the
Commune emigrated to England;
published the newspaper *Fédération*
and was a member of the Universal
Federalist Council which opposed
Marx and the General Council.—
386, 591
- Victor, Claude Victor Perrin, duc de
Bellune* (1764-1841)—Marshal of
France; participant in the wars of
Napoleonic France, War Minister
(1821-23).—199
- Victoria* (1819-1901)—Queen of Great
Britain and Ireland (1837-1901).—
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- Vinoy, Joseph* (1800-1880)—French
general, Bonapartist; took part in the
coup d'état of December 2, 1851;
during the Franco-Prussian war com-
manded the 13th Corps, then the
First Corps of the Second Paris Army
and the Third Paris Army; Governor
of Paris from January 22, 1871;
commanded the Versailles reserve
army.—89, 189, 191, 320, 322, 324,
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- Vivien, Alexandre François Auguste*
(1799-1854)—French lawyer and
politician; Orleanist; Minister of Jus-
tice (1840); Minister of Public Works
(1848) in Cavaignac's government.—
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- Vogel von Falckenstein, Eduard* (1797-
1885)—German general; Governor-
General of the coastal regions in
Germany during the Franco-Prussian
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- Voget, H.*—Bavarian officer.—165
- Vogt, Karl* (1817-1895)—German
natural scientist, vulgar materialist,
petty-bourgeois democrat; deputy to
the Frankfurt National Assembly
(Left wing) in 1848-49, one of the
five imperial regents (June 1849);
emigrated in 1849; subsequently re-
ceived subsidies from Napoleon III;
slandered Marx and Engels.—298-
305, 314
- Voigts-Rhetz, Konstantin Bernhard von*
(1809-1877)—German general; com-
manded the 10th Corps during the
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- Voltaire, François Marie Arouet* (1694-
1778)—French philosopher, writer
and historian of the Enlighten-
ment.—327, 460

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- Wade, Charles*—British bourgeois re-
publican.—562
- Wahlin*—served in the National Guard;
Communist; shot in the counter-
revolutionary demonstration in Paris
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- Ward, Osborne*—American mechanic,
member of the International's section
in the USA; at the Hague Congress
(1872) of the International was
elected member of the General
Council; was influenced by bourgeois
reformists.—357, 559
- Washburne, Elihu Benjamin* (1816-
1887)—American politician and dip-
lomat, Republican; ambassador in
Paris (1869-77); opposed the Paris
Commune.—379-82, 563
- Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of*
(1769-1852)—British general and
statesman, Tory; commanded the

- British forces in the wars against Napoleon I (1808-14, 1815); Commander-in-Chief (1827-28, 1842-52), Prime Minister (1828-30).—175
- Werder, August Karl, Count von* (1808-1887)—German general; commanded the 14th Corps during the Franco-Prussian war.—138, 148, 153, 171, 180, 196, 211, 222, 224, 226-29, 236-37, 243-47, 258
- Weston, John*—active in the British working-class movement, carpenter; follower of Owen; member of the General Council of the International (1864-72); delegate to the London Conference (1865); member of the Executive Committee of the Reform League; a leader of the Land and Labour League; member of the British Federal Council.—8, 270, 278, 355, 382, 431, 554, 558, 582, 583
- Wickede, Julius von* (1819-1896)—German army officer and military writer; correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung* at the German headquarters during the Franco-Prussian war.—243, 244
- Widdern, von*—see *Cardinal von Widdern, Georg*
- William I, the Conqueror* (c. 1027-1087)—Duke of Normandy, King of England (from 1066).—515
- William I (Wilhelm I)* (1797-1888)—Prince of Prussia, King of Prussia (1861-88), German Emperor (1871-88).—12, 71, 73, 85, 94, 160, 191, 195, 263, 264, 275, 276, 281, 347, 515, 579, 619, 620
- Wimpffen, Emmanuel Félix de* (1811-1884)—French general; during the Franco-Prussian war commanded the 5th Corps (from August 31, 1870); commanded the Army of Châlons after Mac-Mahon was wounded in the battle of Sedan, and after the defeat signed the capitulation of the Sedan Army.—78-80, 86
- Wittich, Friedrich Wilhelm Ludwig, von* (1818-1884)—German general; commanded the 22nd division during the Franco-Prussian war.—147, 169
- Wolff, Luigi*—Italian major, follower of Mazzini; member of the Associazione di Mutuo Progresso in London; member of the General Council of the International (1864-65); took part in the London Conference (1865); agent provocateur of the Bonapartist police.—385, 563, 608
- Wróblewski, Walery* (1836-1908)—Polish revolutionary democrat; a leader of the Polish liberation uprising of 1863; general of the Paris Commune; member of the General Council of the International and Corresponding Secretary for Poland (1871-72); delegate to the Hague Congress (1872).—339, 431
- Wurmser, Dagobert Siegmund, Count* (1724-1797)—Austrian field marshal; commander of the Austrian troops in Italy (1796); was defeated by Bonaparte several times and capitulated in the fortress of Mantua.—65

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- Żabicki, Antoni* (c. 1810-1889)—a leader of the Polish national liberation movement; compositor; emigrated from Poland after 1831; participant in the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49; from 1851 a refugee in England; a leader of the Democratic Association in London; from 1863 published *Głos Wolny*, newspaper of the Polish democratic refugees; Secretary of the Polish National Committee; member of the General Council of the International and Corresponding Secretary for Poland (1866-71).—8, 270, 355, 382
- Zastrow, Heinrich Adolf von* (1801-1875)—German general and military writer; commanded the Seventh

- Corps during the Franco-Prussian war.—224, 227, 228, 237, 241
- Zévy, Maurice—member of the General Council of the International (1866-72); Corresponding Secretary for Hungary (1870-71).—8, 270, 355, 382, 431

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- Anthony—see *Marcus Antonius*
- Breitmann, Hans—character of Charles Godfrey Leland's (1824-1903) book of humorous ballads of the same name.—600
- Carlos, Don (1545-1568)—idealised character in a number of literary works; Spanish infant, son of the Spanish King Philip II; was persecuted for his opposition to his father and died in confinement.—316, 445
- Christ, Jesus (*Bib.*)—343, 467, 544
- Cid (*Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar*) also called *El Campeador* (*El Sid*) (1026 or c. 1041-1099)—a Spanish hero who fought against and conquered the Moors; the hero of the Spanish epic poem *Cantar de mio Cid* and many romances and chronicles, e.g. Corneille's *Le Cid*.—628
- Dogberry—a character of Shakespeare's comedy *Much Ado About Nothing*.—626
- Falstaff—a character in Shakespeare's tragedy *King Henry IV* and his comedy *The Merry Wives of Windsor*.—314, 628
- Hecate (Greek myth.)—the goddess of moonlight, mistress of monsters and shades in the underworld.—350
- Heracles (*Hercules*) (Greek and Roman myth.)—son of Zeus, famous for his strength and courage.—269, 452, 505
- Job (*Bib.*)—317
- Joshua (*Bib.*)—leader of the Israelites.—73, 325
- Marcus Antonius (*Anthony*) (c. 83-30 B.C.)—Roman general and politician; hero in Shakespeare's tragedy *Julius Caesar*.—470
- Megaera—one of the three goddesses of vengeance personifying wrath and enviousness.—350
- Münchhausen, Baron—character from German humorous adventure stories collected into a book by the German writer Rudolf Erich Raspe (second half of the 18th century) and published in English as the character's recollection; main character of Karl Immerman's novel *Münchhausen, eine Geschichte in Arabesken* (1838).—292, 631
- Pistol—a character in Shakespeare's *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, *King Henry IV* (Part Two) and *King Henry V*: an idler, braggart and liar.—356
- Pourceaugnac—a character from Molière's comedy *Monsieur de Pourceaugnac*.—319, 524
- Shylock—a character in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*.—319, 540
- Tom Thumb (*Tom Pouce*)—a very small boy in fairy tale.—326, 463
- Triboulet—joker, a hero in Hugo's *Le Roi s'amuse*.—463
- Verges—a character in Shakespeare's comedy *Much Ado About Nothing*.—626

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- The Eastern Post*—an English workers' weekly published in London under this name from 1868 to 1873, and under various titles up to 1938; organ of the General Council of the International from February 1871 to June 1872.—580, 591, 592, 597
- L'Echo de Verviers et de l'arrondissement*—a Belgian bourgeois-democratic daily published in Verviers from 1864 to 1866.—386
- L'Égalité. Journal de l'Association internationale des Travailleurs de la Suisse romande*—a French-language daily published in Geneva from December 1868 to December 1872; organ of the Romance Federation of the International; from 1869 it was virtually controlled by Bakunin.—411, 429, 430, 555, 556
- L'Électeur libre*—a weekly (a daily since the Franco-Prussian war) of the Right-wing republicans published in Paris from 1868 to 1871; in 1870-71 it was connected with the Ministry of Finance of the Government of National Defence.—314, 440, 518
- L'Étendard*—a French Bonapartist weekly published in Paris from 1866 to 1869; was closed down after the exposure of fraudulent machinations which were a source of financing the paper.—315, 475
- The Evening Standard*—a conservative newspaper published in London from 1827 to 1905.—357, 405, 502
- The Examiner*—a liberal weekly published in London from 1808 to 1881.—369, 376
- La Federacion*—a Spanish workers' weekly published in Barcelona from 1869 to 1873; organ of the Barcelona Federation of the International, and, later, of the Federal Council of the International in Barcelona; was under the influence of the Bakuninists.—277
- Felleisen*—a Swiss magazine, organ of the Educational Societies of German Workers in Switzerland, published in Zurich and Geneva from 1862 to 1874; in August 1868 joined the International, published some materials on its activity.—561

- Le Figaro*—a French conservative daily published in Paris since 1854; from 1826 to 1833 it appeared under the title *Figaro, journal nonpolitiqué*; in the 1850s it took a Bonapartist stand.—292, 312, 318, 437, 516
- La France*—a bourgeois-republican daily published in Paris from 1861 to 1939.—390, 626
- Le Gaulois*—a conservative monarchist daily, organ of the big bourgeoisie and aristocracy, published in Paris from 1868 to 1929.—292, 395, 398
- La Gazette de France*—a royalist newspaper published under this title in Paris from 1762 to 1792 and from 1797 to 1848.—383, 384
- Golos (Voice)*—a Russian political and literary daily, mouthpiece of the liberal bourgeoisie, published in St. Petersburg from 1863 to 1884.—276
- L'International*—a French-language daily published in London from 1863 to 1871; semi-official organ of the French Government.—391
- L'Internationale. Organe des sections belges de l'Association Internationale des Travailleurs*—a Belgian weekly published in Brussels with active participation of De Paep from January 17, 1869 to December 28, 1873; it published documents of the International; in 1873 it took the anarchist stand.—6, 554, 560
- Journal de Bruxelles. Politique, Littérature et Commerce*—a conservative newspaper, mouthpiece of Catholic circles, published from 1820.—187
- Journal de Paris, national, politique et littéraire. Journal du Soir*—a weekly published in Paris from 1867; it voiced the views of the Orleanists.—349
- Journal de Saint-Petersbourg*—a daily newspaper, organ of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in French from 1825 to 1914.—281
- Journal officiel*—an abbreviated title of the *Journal officiel de L'Empire français*; it was published in Paris from January 1, 1869 as the official organ of the Bonapartist government instead of *Le Moniteur universel*; in September 1870, after the fall of the Empire, it appeared under the name of *Journal officiel de la République française* and from March 20 to May 24, 1871, it was the official organ of the Paris Commune (during the Commune, the Thiers government issued a newspaper of the same name in Versailles).—188, 242, 312, 327, 328, 331, 332, 337, 339, 340, 347, 348, 351, 354, 357, 361, 376, 388, 389, 438, 448, 450, 465, 466, 470, 472-79, 488, 492, 500, 502, 503, 506-09, 513, 516, 517, 530, 596
- Kamerad*—a Vienna military magazine.—187
- Karlsruher Zeitung*—a German daily, official organ of the Grand Duchy of Baden, published in Karlsruhe from 1757.—224
- Kladderadatsch. Humoristisch-satirisches Wochenblatt*—an illustrated weekly published in Berlin from 1848 to 1944.—334
- Kölnische Zeitung*—a daily published in Cologne from 1802 to 1945; in the 1850s it voiced the interests of the Prussian liberal bourgeoisie.—200, 204, 224, 235, 238, 243, 244, 261, 264, 405
- Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*—a daily of the Prussian Government published under this title in Berlin from 1851 to 1871.—232, 234, 274

La Liberté—a conservative evening daily, mouthpiece of the big bourgeoisie, published in Paris from 1865 to 1940; during the siege of Paris in 1870-71 was published in Tours, and then in Bordeaux; in 1866-70 it was owned by E. Girardin; it supported the policy of the Second Empire, advocated war against Prussia, and opposed the Government of National Defence.—286, 287, 289, 464, 478

The Manchester Guardian—Free Traders' newspaper founded as a weekly in Manchester in 1821; a daily since 1857; organ of the Liberal Party since the middle of the 19th century.—61

La Marseillaise—a French daily, organ of the Left-wing republicans, published in Paris from December 1869 to September 1870; it printed materials on the activity of the International and on the working-class movement.—4, 6

Moniteur des Communes. Bulletin hebdomadaire—a French government newspaper published during the Paris Commune, from May to June 1871, in Versailles as an evening supplement to *Journal officiel* of the Thiers government.—467, 471, 502

Moniteur officiel du Gouvernement général du Nord de France et de la Préfecture de Seine-et-Oise—the title under which a semi-official Prussian newspaper for the French population was published when this article was printed; its abbreviated title—*Moniteur*; it appeared from October 15, 1870 to March 5, 1871 in Versailles under Bismarck's supervision.—274

Le Maniteur universel—a daily published in Paris in 1789-1901; it appeared under this title from 1811 and was an official government publication (1799-1869).—119, 191, 316, 319, 348, 456, 521

The Morning Advertiser—a daily published in London from 1794; it voiced the views of the radical bourgeoisie in the 1850s.—383, 552

Le Mot d'Ordre—a Left-wing republican daily, published in Paris under the editorship of Henri Rochefort from February 3, 1871. On March 11 it was suspended by the order of the Governor of Paris, Joseph Vinoy, but was resumed during the Paris Commune on April 8, and continued to appear until May 20, 1871. The newspaper resolutely opposed the Versailles government and the monarchist majority of the National Assembly, but it never gave its full support to the Commune and opposed the Commune's measures aimed at suppressing the counter-revolutionary forces in Paris.—317, 327, 343, 344, 444, 453, 464, 468, 478, 544

Le National—a French moderate republican daily published in Paris from 1830 to 1851.—323, 357, 360, 443, 455, 527

National-Zeitung—a German daily published in Berlin from 1848 to 1915; it voiced liberal views in the 1850s.—393, 405

Neue Freie Presse—an Austrian bourgeois-liberal daily with morning and evening editions was published in Vienna from 1864 to 1939.—374

Neue Schweizer Zeitung—a radical weekly published in Geneva in 1859-60 by the German refugee August Brass.—300

New-York Daily Tribune—a newspaper founded by Horace Greeley, published from 1841 to 1924; organ of the US Left-wing Whigs till the mid-1850s, later it voiced the views of the Republican Party. Marx and Engels contributed to it from

- August 1851 to March 1862. The paper had several special issues, among them the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* and *New-York Weekly Tribune*, which also printed articles by Marx and Engels.—405
- The New-York Herald*—a US daily published in 1835-1924; it favoured compromise with the slaveowners of the South during the Civil War.—379, 395, 396
- Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*—a reactionary daily published in Berlin from 1861 to 1918; in the 1860s-1880s was the official organ of the Bismarck government.—198, 210, 300
- El Obrero*—a Spanish weekly, published in Palma (Majorca) in 1870-71; it was banned by the government in January 1871 but continued to appear under the name *La Revolution social*; after the publication of its three issues it was closed down, the editor being put on trial on a charge of "having insulted the King".—277
- The Observer*—a conservative weekly published in London since 1791.—505, 543
- Ostsee-Zeitung und Börsennachrichten der Ostsee*—a German daily published in Stettin from 1835, its first title was *Börsen-Nachrichten der Ostsee*.—283
- The Pall Mall Gazette. An Evening Newspaper and Review*—a daily published in London from 1865 to 1920; in the 1860s and 1870s pursued a conservative line; Marx and Engels maintained contacts with it from July 1870 to June 1871, at this time it published a series of Engels' articles *Notes on the War*.—157, 158, 180, 281, 360, 375, 376, 378, 563
- Paris-Journal*—a daily published in Paris from 1868 to 1874 by Henri de Pène; it supported the Second Empire, then the Government of National Defence and Thiers and slandered the International and the Paris Commune.—285, 288, 289, 291-93, 364, 369, 383, 384, 464, 631
- Le Petit Journal*—a bourgeois-republican daily published in Paris from 1863 to 1944.—328, 475, 500, 533, 548
- Die Presse*—a liberal daily published in Vienna from 1848 to 1896; it opposed Bonapartism, and printed articles and news reports by Marx in 1861 and 1862.—374
- Le Progrès*—a Bakuninist newspaper which opposed the General Council of the International; it was published in French in *Le Locle* under the editorship of Guillaume from December 1868 to April 1870.—412, 421, 430, 555
- La Province*—a monarchist daily published in Bordeaux in 1870-71.—588
- Provinzial-Correspondenz*—a Prussian government paper, founded in Berlin in 1862.—243
- Public Opinion*—a bourgeois-liberal weekly founded in London in 1861.—392, 393, 405
- Punch, or the London Charivari*—a liberal comic weekly founded in London in 1841.—334
- Le Rappel*—a Left-wing republican daily founded by Victor Hugo and Henri Rochefort; was published in Paris from 1869 to 1928; it sharply criticised the Second Empire; in the period of the Paris Commune it came out in support of it.—315, 325, 327, 339, 342, 345, 346, 354, 443, 446, 448, 450, 454-55, 457-58, 466, 468, 474-78, 488, 512, 521, 528, 529, 531, 539, 541-43

Le Réveil—a French weekly and, from May 1869 onwards, a daily of the Left republicans published in Paris under the editorship of Charles Delescluse between July 1868 and January 1871; from October 1870 it opposed the Government of National Defence.—4

La Revolucion social—see *El Obrero*

La Roma del popolo. Pubblicazione settimanale di filosofia religiosa, politica, letteratura—a petty-bourgeois democratic daily published in Rome in 1871-72; organ of the Left-wing Mazzinists; it opposed the Paris Commune and the International.—385, 605

Schweizer Handels-Courier—a Swiss daily published in Biel (canton of Berne); appeared under this title from 1853 to 1909; voiced Bonapartist views; in the 1850s-1860s, its editors were closely connected with Karl Vogt.—299

Le Siècle—a daily published in Paris from 1836 to 1939; in the 1850s it was the organ of moderate republicans.—54, 234

La Situation—a French-language Bonapartist daily, published in London from September 1870 to August 2, 1871; opposed the Government of National Defence and Thiers government.—313, 314, 320, 328, 342, 352, 438, 439, 446, 448, 452, 454, 459, 475, 476, 517, 518, 531, 541, 595, 604

La Solidaridad—a Spanish newspaper, organ of the Madrid sections of the International, published in Madrid from January 1870; was banned by the government in January 1871.—277

La Solidarité. Organe des sections de la Fédération romande de l'Association Internationale des Travailleurs—a Bakuninist weekly, published in French from April 11, to September 3, 1870 in Neuchâtel, and from March 28 to May 12, 1871 in Geneva.—277

The Spectator—an English weekly published in London since 1828, first Liberal and later Conservative.—359, 369, 375

Staats-Anzeiger—see *Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger*

The Standard—an English conservative newspaper published in London from 1857 to 1916.—66, 255, 349, 366, 375, 384, 404, 509

The Sun—a liberal daily published in London from 1798 to 1876.—396

Die Tagespresse—a daily, organ of the petty-bourgeois German People's Party, published in Vienna from 1869 to 1878.—198, 299

Die Tagwacht—a Swiss Social-Democratic newspaper, published in Zurich from 1869 to 1880; organ of the German sections of the International in Switzerland in 1869-73.—555

Telegraph—see *Daily Telegraph*

Le Temps—a conservative daily newspaper, organ of the French big bourgeoisie, published in Paris from 1861 to 1943; it opposed the Second Empire and the war against Prussia; after the fall of the Empire supported the Government of National Defence.—4, 5, 19, 23, 38-41, 43, 45, 48, 50, 51, 65, 66, 121, 133, 139, 150, 283, 356, 357

The Times—an English conservative daily founded in London in 1785.—4, 12, 14, 23, 25, 27, 28, 30-34, 53, 54, 62, 67, 70, 71, 74, 75, 79, 80, 82, 85, 100,

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La Tribune de Bordeaux. Journal Quotidien, Politique, Commercial et Littéraire—an originally bourgeois-democratic and subsequently labour newspaper published in Bordeaux from September 1870; during the Paris Commune, was under considerable influence of Paul Lafargue.—318, 341, 506, 522

Le Vengeur—a Left-wing republican newspaper published in Paris from February 3, 1871; on March 11 the publication was suspended by the order of the Governor of Paris, Joseph Vinoy, but was resumed during the Paris Commune on March 30, and was continued until May 24, 1871; it supported the Commune, published its official documents and reports on its assemblies.—313, 315, 324, 342, 358, 361, 439, 451, 455, 457, 466, 467, 473, 479, 505, 506, 517, 520, 527, 541

La Vérité. Journal politique quotidien—a republican bourgeois-radical newspaper published in Paris from October 6, 1870 to September 3, 1871; at first it supported the Commune but then opposed its social measures.—404, 505, 552

Der Volksstaat—Central organ of the German Social-Democratic Workers' Party published in Leipzig from October 2, 1869 to September 29, 1876, first twice a week, and, from 1873, three times a week.—6, 259, 268, 275, 281, 288, 559

Der Wanderer—an Austrian daily published in Vienna from 1809 to 1866.—377

De Werker. Orgaan der Vlaamsche Afdeelingen van de Internationale Werkereeniging—a newspaper published in Flemish in Antwerp from 1868 to 1914; in 1868-71, a weekly of the Flemish section of the International, published its documents; later on a daily of the Flemish and then of the Belgian Socialist Workers' parties.—291

Woodhull & Claflin's Weekly—a weekly published in New York in 1870-76 by the bourgeois feminists Victoria Woodhull and Tennessee Claflin; organ of the Section No. 12 of the International in the USA, which consisted of bourgeois reformists and was expelled from the International by the General Council in March 1872.—432, 622

The World—a newspaper published in New York from 1860 to 1931.—600

Zeitschrift des Königlich preussischen statistischen Bureaus—Prussian official statistical monthly published in Berlin from 1860 to 1905.—105, 123

Die Zukunft—a bourgeois-democratic newspaper, organ of the German People's Party, published from 1866 to 1868 in Königsberg, and from 1868 to 1871 in Berlin.—288

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